Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
A federal jury convicted appellant Theodore Edmonds of violating the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (“CCE”), 21 U.S.C. § 848, which makes it a crime to organize, supervise, or manage five or more persons in a “continuing series of violations” of the federal narcotics laws. Edmonds argues that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jurors that, in order to convict, they must agree unanimously on which violations — of the eight alleged — constituted the three related violations necessary to establish a “continuing series.”
In United States v. Echeverri,
In view of this holding, we must also decide whether the district court’s failure to give the proper unanimity instruction was harmless error. This task requires us to examine the scope of Sullivan v. Louisiana,
We conclude that Sullivan does not preclude harmless error analysis in this case. Unlike the verdict in Sullivan, in which an erroneous reasonable doubt instruction undermined all of the jury’s findings, the jury in this case delivered valid findings on essentially all of the elements of the offense by convicting Edmonds of every violation alleged to constitute the continuing series. These convictions do not themselves show unanimous agreement that the same three violations were sufficiently related to each other to constitute a continuing series. However, the evidence that the jury must have
I. Facts and Procedural History
The facts of this case are fully set out in the earlier panel opinion, see United States v. Edmonds,
A federal grand jury returned a twenty-seven count indictment against Edmonds and eleven other people. The indictment charged Edmonds with conspiracy to distribute cocaine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; distribution of heroin and aiding and abetting distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); two counts of distribution of cocaine and aiding and abetting distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); three counts of unlawful use of a communications facility in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); and four counts of money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(l)(A)(i) & (2). In addition, the indictment charged Edmonds with engaging in a CCE in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. The CCE count identified eight predicate offenses: the conspiracy count, the three distribution counts, the three communications facility counts, and one of the money laundering counts.
At trial, the district court gave the following instruction concerning the CCE charge:
So the Government has to prove that he [Edmonds] committed a felony in violation of narcotics laws; i.e.[,] that in some way he was causing or attempting to cause the distribution of cocaine and heroin as charged in Count 1 of the indictment or in other counts charged in the indictment.
The Government has to prove secondly that such violation was part of a continuing series of related violations of the federal narcotics laws. A continuing series of violations requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that three or more violations of the laws occurred and that they, those three or more, were related to each other.
The court rejected Edmonds’s request that it explain to the jurors that they must unanimously agree on which three related violations occurred. Instead, the court gave only general unanimity instructions. (“You are asked to deliberate with a view towards reaching a unanimous decision with respect to each count and each defendant charged here in this indictment”). The jury convicted Edmonds of all counts.
A panel of this Court reversed Edmonds’s CCE conviction. The panel’s decision was based on United States v. Echeverri, which held that a district court’s refusal to give a specific unanimity instruction in a CCE trial is reversible error. See Echeverri,
The panel then held that harmless error analysis was inapplicable. Although the evidence that the jury must have believed to find Edmonds guilty of the predicate offenses also established a single ongoing scheme, the panel reasoned that Sullivan v. Louisiana,
The government petitioned for rehearing, arguing that Schad v. Arizona,
II. The CCE Statute & Specific Juror Unanimity
To convict a defendant under the CCE statute, the government must prove: (1) that the defendant committed a felony violation of a provision of United States Code Title 21, Chapter 13, subchapter I or II (various drug offenses); (2) that this violation was part of a “continuing series” of violations of these sub-chapters; (3) that the defendant, in committing the continuing series of violations, acted as an organizer, supervisor, or manager of five or more other persons; and (4) that the defendant obtained “substantial income or resources” from such activities.
Only the second requirement — that the defendant committed a felony as part of a continuing series of violations — is at issue in this appeal. We have held, as have most courts of appeals, that a “series” consists of at least three predicate violations. See Echeverri,
As we have explained, the critical question is whether the jury need unanimously agree only that the defendant committed three related violations or whether, instead, the jury must unanimously agree
Following Schad, we view the CCE unanimity question principally in terms of congressional intent. We recognize that, on its face, the CCE statute gives little indication of Congress’s intent with respect to jury unanimity. Nevertheless, guided by historical tradition, constitutional considerations, and the rule of lenity, we conclude that a statute combining formerly separate crimes — crimes that may take place at different times and at different places — should generally be read to require unanimity as to each predicate offense. Here, because there is no indication of intent to the contrary, we hold that in order to convict a defendant under the CCE statute, the jury must unanimously agree that the same three related predicate offenses occurred.
A. The Analytic Framework
In Schad v. Arizona,
Edward Harold Schad was convicted under an Arizona statute that defined first degree murder as “murder which is ... wilful, deliberate or premeditated ... or which is committed ... in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, ... robbery.” Id. at 628,
A divided United States Supreme Court affirmed the Arizona Supreme Court’s judgment. In an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, Justice Souter analyzed the problem in terms of due process limits on the legislature’s power to define criminal conduct, and not as a jury unanimity issue. Id. at 630-31,
The remaining issue was whether Arizona’s definition of the crime is constitutional under the Due Process Clause. The plurality concluded' — and Justice Scalia seemed to agree — that due process limits the legislature’s “capacity to define different courses of conduct ... as merely alternative means of committing a single offense, thereby permitting a defendant’s conviction without jury agreement as to which course ... actually occurred.” Id. at 632,
The plurality described this due process concern as analogous to vagueness:
The axiomatic requirement of due process that a statute may not forbid conduct in terms so vague that people of common intelligence would be relegated to different guesses about its meaning carries the practical consequence that a defendant charged under a valid statute will be in a position to understand with some specificity the legal basis of the charge against him. Thus it is an assumption of our system of criminal justice “ ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’ ” that no person may be punished criminally save upon proof of some specific illegal conduct. Just as the requisite specificity of the charge may not be compromised by the joining of separate offenses, nothing in our history suggests that the Due Process Clause would permit a State to convict anyone under a charge of “Crime” so generic that any combination of jury findings of embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering, would suffice for conviction.
Id. at 632-33,
The plurality’s due process test looked to “history and wide practice as guides to fundamental values, as well as to narrower analytic methods of testing the moral and practical equivalence” of alternative means of satisfying an element of an offense. Id. at 637,
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia agreed that the statute at issue was constitutional under the Due Process Clause, but disagreed as to the appropriate constitutional test. He argued that due process is defined solely in terms of historical practice, at least when the procedure at issue has historical roots. See id. at 650,
Justice White dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Grounding his analysis in In re Winship,
Unlike the Supreme Court in Schad, which was bound by the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law, we must interpret the CCE statute. In relevant part, 21 U.S.C. § 848 provides:
[A] person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if—
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subehapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter—
21 U.S.C. § 848(c). In the language of Schad, the question is whether the menu of predicate violations specified by subehapters I and II are different “means” or different “offenses.”
The statute lends itself to either interpretation. On the one hand, the statute is triggered by violation of “any provision” as part of a “continuing señes of violations.” By placing no emphasis on the particular, the statute could be read to say that different routes of violation are fungible alternatives, suggesting that the provisions are mere “means.”
On the other hand, the different ways of violating the CCE statute are themselves separate offenses defined in the United States Code. The predicate violations are things which, by definition, Congress views as separate offenses. Cf. Babb v. United
Legislative history also provides little help here. Neither party cited any legislative history, and our own research failed to turn up any probative evidence. Indeed, the opaqueness of the “continuing series” requirement was a matter of concern to some members of Congress. See H.R.Rep. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4651 (stating “additional views” of some committee members that “it is not at all clear what constitutes a ‘continuing series of violations’ ”).
At least one circuit — the Seventh — has argued that the purpose of the CCE statute sheds light on Congress’s intent.
The point of the CCE statute is to impose special punishment on those who organize and direct a significant number of larger scale drug transactions; the exact specification by unanimous jury consent of any particular three ... offenses is irrelevant to any theory about why punishment should be enhanced for such uniquely antisocial activity.
United States v. Canino,
Although we are skeptical that the first prong of the Schad analysis — examining whether the legislature, in enumerating alternatives, intended to create a single or multiple offenses — has much predictive force, we must perforce attempt to work with Schad.
1. Background Interpretive Principles
a. Tradition in Criminal Jurisprudence
We look first to general historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence. Criminal trials have long ensured substantial jury agreement as to the facts establishing the offense. This is because criminal statutes and the common law have generally defined crimes in terms of conduct (and accompanying mental state) that takes place in a single place at
In the face of this tradition, we cannot read from Congress’s silence that it intended CCE predicate offenses to constitute mere means of violating a single CCE offense. To do so would allow conviction on jury agreement merely that the defendant committed some three violations of United States Code, Title 21, Chapter 13, subchapters I and II, even when it is alleged that the defendant committed many different acts occurring at different times and places. This is a wholly different situation from the one at issue in Schad. Indeed, as Justice Scalia pointed out in criticizing the plurality’s moral equivalence test of constitutionality, “We would not permit, for example, an indictment charging that the defendant assaulted either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday, despite the ‘moral equivalence’ of those two acts.” Schad,
b. Constitutional Considerations
Constitutional considerations also guide our analysis. There is a real possibility that the CCE statute would violate the Due Process Clause absent a specific unanimity requirement. See Eric S. Miller, Note, Compound-Complex Criminal Statutes and the Constitution: Demanding Unanimity as to Predicate Acts, 104 Yale L.J. 2277 (1995). “[Wjhere a statute is susceptible to two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, [our] duty is to adopt the latter.” United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
Both the Schad plurality and Justice Scalia agree that due process is defined in part by historical practice. As mentioned, interpreting predicate offenses as different means of violating a single continuing series element marks a departure from historical guarantees on the degree of factual agreement necessary to establish a conviction. And, of course, on a more specific level, there is no historical analogue to the CCE statute. The first complex criminal statutes like the CCE law appeared only in 1970. See Miller, supra, at 2280 & nn. 12-14.
Moreover, in addition to historical practice, the Schad plurality believed that due process requires that different means, for which unanimity is not required, must reflect notions of “equivalent blameworthiness or culpability.” Schad,
Judge Garth criticizes this analysis, because, in his view, Congress has “already determined” that different predicate offenses are equally blameworthy by making them alternative routes of violating the same statute. But this view fundamentally misunderstands the nature of the “equivalent blameworthiness” analysis. The Schad plurality’s test is a check on the legislature’s power: its purpose is to decide whether different routes of violating the same statute are so morally disparate that a legislature cannot constitutionally treat them as mere means. Thus, the mere fact that Congress has established alternative routes of violating the same statute shows only the need for the equivalent blameworthiness analysis; it cannot answer the question.
Judge Garth also suggests that the equivalent blameworthiness test is a pointless exercise: even if different predicate offenses are so morally disparate that a specific unanimity instruction is required, he argues, a defendant could still be convicted under the CCE statute for widely different offenses. While this argument points out another potential problem with the CCE statute — one not at issue on this appeal — it does not undermine the utility of the equivalent blameworthiness test.
c. The Rule of Lenity
Finally, requiring specific unanimity is counseled by concerns underlying the rule of lenity. That rule — requiring ambiguous criminal statutes to be construed in favor of the defendant — is applied both to the scope of conduct covered by a criminal statute and to the extent of the penalties imposed. See, e.g., Bifulco v. United States,
The rule of lenity is not directly applicable to the question whether a single statute creates multiple offenses for purposes of jury unanimity. However, the rule has been applied to a conceptually analogous situation: whether a single criminal act constitutes one or more violations of a statute. See Ladner v. United States,
Moreover, the principles motivating the rule have considerable force here. Several cases — those addressing the penalties a defendant will receive — suggest that people deserve warning not only of the boundaries of criminal conduct, but also of the repercussions of crossing those boundaries. For example, in United States v. Granderson, — U.S. -, -,
Procedural protections at trial are inherently linked to such repercussions, for these protections affect the likelihood that a penalty will be imposed. At some point, differences in procedural protections become as significant as different penalties, and the need for fair warning just as critical. The degree of jury unanimity required by a statute is important enough a protection that we hesitate to interpret an ambiguous statute to require less, rather than more, unanimity.
Just as in the rule of lenity cases, we are faced with an ambiguous statute. See Smith v. United States,
2. Reconciling United States v. Jackson
The government argues that requiring specific unanimity as to predicate offenses would conflict with United States v. Jackson,
In Jackson, we considered whether, in a CCE prosecution, unanimous agreement is required as to the identity of the five or more underlings supervised, organized, or managed by the defendant. We concluded that the primary concern of the five or more persons requirement is “that the organization in which the defendant played a leadership role was sufficiently large to warrant ... enhanced punishment,” and held that unanimity on the specific identity of the underlings is not required. Id. at 88.
Jackson’s holding is consistent with our holding here for two reasons. First, unlike the continuing series requirement, the five-person requirement has a historical analogue in the law of conspiracy, which generally has not required the jury to unanimously agree on the identity of the defendant’s co-conspirators. See United States v. Harris,
3. Conclusion
In summary, we hold that the CCE statute requires unanimous agreement as to the identity of each of the three related offenses comprising the continuing series. Our interpretation is guided by constitutional concerns, traditions in criminal jurisprudence, and the rule of lenity. These background principles lead us to conclude that when a statute combines formerly distinct offenses into a single crime — offenses that may occur at different times and in different places — we should assume that Congress intended the formerly distinct offenses to retain their “offense” status with its attendant unanimity requirements. Asking Congress to speak clearly is especially important here, where the penalty for violation of the statute is quite severe, from between twenty years to life in jail. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(a). Because there is no evidence of congressional intent to the contrary, we hold that the CCE statute requires unanimity as to its predicate offenses.
In making this decision, we do not hamper Congress’s ability to enact innovative statutes to deal with new kinds of crime. Congress may alter unanimity requirements by statute if it makes its intention clear.
III. Harmless Error
Because there is a “reasonable likelihood,” Estelle v. McGuire,
Edmonds argues, and the original panel held, that Sullivan v. Louisiana,
[Chapman’s] inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error. That must be so, because to hypothesize a guilty verdict that was never in fact rendered — no matter how inescapable the findings to support that verdict might be— would violate the jury-trial guarantee.
.... There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harm*824 less error scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a jury would surely have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt — not that the jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. That is not enough. The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury’s action, or else directed verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilty.
Edmonds and the panel are correct in a sense. Just as the Sixth Amendment precludes the court from affirming on the ground that the jury would have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt had it been properly instructed, we cannot affirm a non-unanimous verdict simply because the evidence is so overwhelming that the jury surely would have been unanimous had it been properly instructed on unanimity.
Affirmance here, however, does not require making this speculative leap. Unlike the complete undermining of the verdict that occurred in Sullivan, this ease involves error affecting only one of many findings made by the jury. The Supreme Court has held that similar errors — jury instructions that erroneously contain a mandatory presumption or misdescribe an element of the offense — may be harmless if the remaining unaffected jury findings are “functionally equivalent to finding” the lacking element. Carella v. California,
Even though such errors impermissibly deprive the jury of its fact-finding function,
Sullivan itself distinguishes this line of cases from the fundamental flaw of misdes-cribing the burden of proof. In the latter case, the error “vitiates all the jury’s findings.” Sullivan,
In this case it is unnecessary to speculate on what the jury’s verdict would have been absent the erroneous instruction: the jury made proper unanimous findings of other facts which are “functionally equivalent” to finding that three specific predicate offenses were related to each other. Adhering to the assumption that jurors follow the instructions they are given, see Richardson v. Marsh,
The only finding for which unanimity is potentially lacking is that the same three predicate offenses are related to each other. However, the evidence introduced at trial to show that Edmonds committed each of the predicate offenses established that Edmonds used the same packers and mode of distribution throughout. See Edmonds,
In these circumstances, no rational jury could unanimously find Edmonds guilty of the predicate offenses without unanimously finding that the offenses were related to each other. See Ianniello v. United States,
Judge Stapleton takes issue with our understanding of the term “functionally equivalent” findings. While he does not say so explicitly, he seems to read Rose v. Clark to allow harmless error analysis only when untainted findings, considered without reference to the evidence supporting the findings, are logically equivalent to the missing element. Otherwise, he argues, the Court engages in impermissible speculation about what a properly instructed jury would have decided.
We acknowledge that the Supreme Court has not clearly defined “functionally equiva
Judge Stapleton argues that in Rose the missing element was “necessarily inferred” from fact findings in that case, while here we impermissibly establish the missing element from “the strength of the trial evidence.” We disagree. Both the Rose Court and this Court allowed the missing element to be found by looking at the jury’s untainted findings in light of the evidence supporting those findings. In Rose, the trial court impermis-sibly instructed the jury to presume malice from certain predicate facts:
All homicides are presumed to be malicious in the absence of evidence which would rebut the implied presumption. Thus, if the State has proven beyond a reasonable ... doubt that a killing has occurred, then it is presumed that the killing was done maliciously.
Rose,
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court remanded for application of harmless error analysis. The Court stated:
When a jury is instructed to presume malice from predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury.
Id. at 580-81,
[I]t would defy common sense to conclude that an execution-style killing or a violent torture-murder was committed unintentionally. It follows that no rational jury would need to rely on an erroneous presumption instruction to find malice in such cases.
Id. at 581 n. 10,
Our reading of the functional equivalence test — which allows inquiry into evidence necessary to support the jury’s findings — is faithful both to the erroneous presumption cases and to Sullivan. Following the erroneous presumption cases, we examine the evidence in the record. However, our analysis follows Sullivan’s admonition not to speculate on what the jury would have found had it been correctly instructed. By examining the evidence necessary to support the jury’s findings, we are not weighing any evidence, as Judge Stapleton suggests, but simply using-
Furthermore, our analysis furthers the purpose of harmless error analysis:
The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.
Rose,
Accordingly, we hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Chapman,
Notes
. This may be one of this court’s last "in banc " opinions. Until recently, we have eschewed the more common "en banc " spelling in favor of the latin form. However, a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure adopts the "en banc " spelling. See Fed.R.App. P. 35 (Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendment Sept. 1995).
. The indictment's inclusion of the money laundering offense, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, as a CCE predicate offense appears to be in error. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (defining CCE predicate offenses as violations of U.S.Code Title 21, Chapter 13, subchapter I or II). However, Edmonds has not raised this issue, and we thus deem it waived.
. In Sullivan, the trial judge gave a definition of reasonable doubt virtually identical to one held unconstitutional in Cage v. Louisiana,
. In relevant part, 21 U.S.C. § 848 states:
[A] person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if—
(1) he violates any provision of this subchap-ter or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or sub-chapter II of this chapter—
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
21 U.S.C. § 848(c).
. Justice Scalia joined part of Justice Souter’s opinion, not relevant to this case, dealing with the right to have the jury instructed on a lesser included offense in capital cases.
. Although the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous verdict in federal criminal trials, it does not so require in state trials. See Johnson v. Louisiana,
. Our inquiry is not, as Judge Alito suggests, whether Congress intended to include "a special jury-unanimity requirement.” Rather, we must determine, as we do with all statutes, what level of unanimity Congress intended. In Schad's terms, the question is whether Congress intended a given fact to be an "element.” When a legislature enacts a statute, the legislature determines that certain facts are "elements,” i.e., that they are "indispensable to proof of a given offense.” Schad,
When the object of our statutory interpretation inquiry is correctly identified, Judge Alito’s criticisms fall short. That Congress has not generally adopted "special unanimity requirements” or that Congress can be explicit when it wants "special unanimity requirements” is immaterial. Congress determines “elements," and hence, what facts require unanimous jury agreement, every time it passes a criminal statute. For example, we would not allow a conviction to stand for murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 without unanimous agreement that someone was killed. Congress has made the unlawful killing of a human being an "element” for which unanimity is required. (Of course, the present inquiry is more difficult than this example, because we must inquire whether the CCE statute creates more than one offense, see infra note 8, each with its own elements).
. The Schad plurality recognized that a single statute offering alternative routes of violation may create multiple offenses for which unanimity is required. For example, in rejecting the dissent’s mode of analysis, the plurality stated:
In the dissent's view, whenever a statute lists alternative means of committing a crime, "the jury [must] indicate on which of the alternatives it has based the defendant’s guilt,” even where there is no indication that the statute seeks to create separate crimes. This approach rests on the erroneous assumption that any statutory alternatives are ipso facto independent elements defining independent crimes under state law, and therefore subject to the axiomatic principle that the prosecution must prove independently every element of the crime. In point of fact, ... legislatures frequently enumerate alternative means of committing a crime without intending to define separate elements or separate crimes. The question whether statutory alternatives constitute independent elements of the offense therefore does not, as the dissent would have it, call for a mere tautology; rather it is a substantial question of statutory construction.
Schad
.If the correct statutory analysis is used (i.e., whether Congress intended the different alternatives of violating the CCE statute to constitute separate "offenses"), Judge Alito's argument that the CCE statute is unambiguous is not tenable. The alternatives at issue here — "violations of] any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter” — are themselves defined as separate crimes. It is far from clear whether Congress intended these alternatives to lose their status as separate offenses when then they were incorporated by reference into a new statute.
Judge Alito’s dispute with our statutory analysis is really a dispute over the appropriate default rule for interpreting congressional silence. He criticizes us for failing to anchor our analysis in the text or legislative history of the CCE statute, but he cites no text or legislative history in support of his view that CCE predicate offenses are not "elements” for which unanimity is required. The reason for both our omissions is sound; the statute is simply silent on this issue.
. Arguably, rather than looking to the legislature’s intent, it would be preferable to ask, in the first instance, whether differences between statutory alternatives are so important that the lack of jury agreement as to a specific alternative casts too much doubt on the accuracy of the verdict. See Scott W. Howe, Jury Fact-Finding in Criminal Cases, 58 Mo.L.Rev. 1 (1993). Hopefully, the Supreme Court will revisit this question soon.
. We use the phrase "jury unanimity as to the CCE predicate offenses” to mean jury agreement on both the identity and relatedness of the three offenses.
. Judge Alito challenges our reading of history, arguing that it is not true (1) that the jury has always been required to "agree[] on most of the actions engaged in by the defendant”; nor (2) that the prosecution has always been required to establish the "specified time and place” where a charged offense occurred. But this response, which artificially atomizes our position, is fundamentally flawed. Although each of Judge Alito’s propositions is correct in isolation, the question is whether convictions have been allowed to stand where the jury disagrees on both (1) most of the defendant's actions; and (2) the time and place the crime occurred. If the CCE predicate offenses are not elements upon which the jury must agree, that is what the CCE statute would allow.
. Judge Garth asserts that the law of conspiracy provides a historical analogue to the continuing series requirement, because, he argues, a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy without jury agreement as to which object, of various objects alleged, forms the basis of the conspiracy. We disagree. First, we are skeptical of Judge Garth’s premise. At some point, different alleged conspiracy objects suggest such disparate fact patterns that jury agreement as to the precise object of the conspiracy is necessary to support conviction. See United States v. Castro,
. The predicate offenses involved in this case do not pose the severe disparate culpability problem identified in the hypothetical above, and thus Edmonds is not in a position to challenge the CCE statute’s constitutionality on this basis. See Schad,
. The CCE statute’s requirement that the defendant act "in concert” with five or more other people, 21 U.S.C. § 848(c), is similar to conspiracy law's requirement that a defendant enter into an agreement with some number of co-conspirators. Thus, the identity of a conspiracy defendant's co-conspirators provides a useful historical analogue to the identity of the five CCE underlings.
. As our holding is based on statutory interpretation, we do not reach the question whether the CCE statute would be unconstitutional absent a unanimity requirement. We leave that decision for another day.
. Language in the Schad plurality opinion arguably casts some doubt on whether the Sixth Amendment is implicated in jury verdict specificity problems. See Schad,
We will not engage Judge Alito’s alternative view that only the Sixth Amendment is relevant here. As the Schad plurality pointed out, "this difference in characterization ... is immaterial to the problem of how to go about deciding what level of verdict specificity is constitutionally necessary.” Schad, 501 U.S. at 634 n. 5,
However, we reject the applicability of Judge Alito’s constitutional test. Judge Alito asserts that a legislative definition is unconstitutional only if it ”contain[s] a combination of elements having no rational basis other than” an attempt to create room for factual disagreement underlying a conviction. While this framing of the issue represents an interesting way of balancing legislative deference with constitutional concerns, it is without support. Judge Alito asserts that the problematic hypotheticals discussed in Schad— (1) a crime permitting alternative findings of "embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering,” Schad,
. In addition, the Court stated that "[a]nother mode of analysis leads to the same conclusion,” and held that the unconstitutional reasonable doubt instruction was a "structural defect! ] in the constitution of the trial mechanism” not subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 280-83,
. See Carella,
. Edmonds suggests in his answer to the government's petition for rehearing that it would have been improper to dispute relatedness in the absence of his requested specific unanimity instruction. We reject this argument because the jury was properly instructed that it must find three related offenses to convict under the CCE statute. Edmonds thus had ample incentive to contest relatedness.
. Although Justice Scalia's concurrence in Car-ella criticized a broad review of the record in erroneous presumption cases, he has not suggested that it is improper to examine the jury’s findings in light of evidence in the record necessary to establish those findings. Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s view of the impact of record evidence has not carried a majority of the Court. Rather, the Court has stated that harmless error analysis in erroneous presumption cases includes a review of the record. See Yates,
. While Judge Greenberg joins in Judge Garth's opinion that the charge was correct, if he concluded that the charge was erroneous he would join in Part III of this opinion with respect to harmless error. Judge Roth joins in Part III of this opinion.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join in parts I and II of the court’s opinion. I am unable to join part III.
The court finds that the district court’s refusal to require unanimity was harmless error. This is justified, it maintains, because the evidence concerning the nine narcotics violations which the jury found to have occurred could lead a rational jury to no conclusion other than that all were related. While this view has undeniable surface appeal, it is irreconcilably at odds with the teaching of Sullivan v. Louisiana,
A judge cannot, consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, direct a verdict for the prosecution no matter how overwhelming the evidence of guilt may be. This Sixth Amendment right “includes, of course, as its most important element, the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of ‘guilty.’ ” Id. at 277,
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial includes the right to a unanimous jury agreement on each element of the offense charged, as well as an agreement on each such element beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Beros,
This appellate court has determined today only that, given the evidence at trial, a jury properly charged would surely have unanimously agreed beyond a reasonable doubt that all of Edmonds’ narcotics violations were related to one another. Under Sullivan, this is not a sufficient basis for affirming his CCE conviction.
The court distinguishes Sullivan on the ground that Edmonds’ ease is more like a line of mandatory presumption eases which the Supreme Court distinguished in Sullivan. Id. at 280-81,
This case is not like Rose and Carella, however, and is indistinguishable from Sullivan. In Rose and Carella, the court could point to an actual finding made by the jury that was the functional equivalent of the element that the jury was required to find in order to support a guilty verdict. In this case, the court has not, and cannot, point to such a jury finding.
In Rose, for example, the jury was instructed in such a manner that the court knew the jury had found either the malice required for a murder conviction or predicate acts on the part of the defendant from which malice was necessarily inferred. As the Court in Rose noted, “[w]hen a jury is instructed to presume malice from predicate facts, it must still find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt,”
In Edmonds’ case, the only unanimous jury finding to which this court can point is a finding that Edmonds committed nine narcotics felonies. That finding is not the functional equivalent of a finding that those felonies were related. It is as consistent with those felonies being unrelated as it is with their being related. My colleagues have not concluded that relatedness necessarily follows from a fact the jury found; they have, rather, concluded that relatedness necessarily follows from the evidence tendered by the government at trial.
. This critical distinction was emphasized by Justice Scalia, writing for four justices, in Carel-la:
[T]he harmless error analysis applicable in assessing a mandatory conclusive presumption is wholly unlike the typical form of such analysis. In the usual case the harmlessness determination requires consideration of "the trial record as a whole” in order to decide whether the fact supported by improperly admitted evidence was in any event overwhelmingly established by other evidence.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the court that the defendant’s conviction should be affirmed, but I cannot accept the conclusion that the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the members of the jury that they were required to agree unanimously with respect to the particular offenses that made up the “continuing series” of violations that were necessary for the defendant’s conviction under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848. Unlike the majority, I am convinced that Congress had no intention of imposing such a requirement when it enacted the CCE statute. I also conclude that such an instruction is not constitutionally required.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment, but I join only part III of the court’s opinion, which discusses harmless error. I approve this part of the court’s opinion because, assuming for the sake of argument that the trial judge erred, I agree with the court that the error was harmless. I also join Judge Garth’s opinion, but I write separately to explain in somewhat different terms why I disagree with the court’s analysis of the jury-unanimity issue.
I.
I will first address the majority’s statutory interpretation argument, i.e., its argument that Congress meant to include as part of the CCE statute a special jury-unanimity requirement that is independent of that contained in Fed.R.Cr.P. 31(a) (which simply requires a unanimous “verdict”) and of constitutional requirements (which I discuss in Part II of this opinion). I think that the majority’s interpretation of the CCE statute is wrong because it has no support in the language or legislative history of the CCE statute and because Congress has not followed the practice of including special jury-unanimity requirements as a part of criminal statutes (other than a few recent statutes setting out capital sentencing procedures.)
A. The pertinent part of the CCE statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848(c), provides as follows:
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section [which sets out penalties], a person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise if—
(1) he violates any provision of this sub-chapter or subchapter II of this chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter—
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
There is nothing in this language or any other portion of the CCE statute that even hints that Congress intended to require jury unanimity with respect to the particular offenses needed to satisfy 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(2) — and the majority does not contend otherwise. See Maj. Op. at 815. Indeed, the majority does not identify any statutory language that could serve as a reference point for its interpretation. Thus, even if there were extra-textual support for the proposition that Congress intended to impose a special jury-unanimity requirement in CCE cases, the majority’s interpretation would run into difficulty, for as the Supreme Court has noted, “ ‘courts have no authority to enforce [a] principle] gleaned solely from the legislative history that has no statutory reference point.’ ” Shannon v. United States, — U.S.-,-,
C. If this is not enough to refute the majority’s interpretation, any remaining doubt must vanish when it is noted that Congress has not customarily included special jury-unanimity requirements in federal criminal statutes (other than the few I mentioned earlier that concern capital sentencing procedures). Indeed, I have not found any federal criminal statutes outside the field of capital sentencing that contain special unanimity requirements. If I have overlooked any, I hope that my colleagues in the majority will call them to my attention. But if I am right that Congress, as a uniform or general practice, has not adopted such special unanimity requirements, that practice seems to me to be telling. With no congressional custom of adopting such special unanimity requirements and no hint in the statutory language or legislative history that Congress meant to break new ground and impose such a requirement under § 848(c), I think that the majority’s interpretation can confidently be rejected.
D. The majority claims that its interpretation of § 848(c) is supported by two canons of construction — the rule of lenity and the rule that an ambiguous statute should be interpreted where possible to avoid “ ‘grave and doubtful constitutional questions.’ ” Maj. Op. 819 (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
E. The only remaining source of authority invoked by the majority — and thus the sole pillar on which its entire statutory construction argument rests — is its understanding of “general historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence.” Maj. Op. at 818. The majority states:
Criminal trials have long ensured substantial jury agreement as to the facts establishing the offense. This is became criminal statutes and the common law have generally defined crimes in terms of conduct (and accompanying mental state) that takes place in a single place at some specific time. For example, murder statutes require that the defendant killed some other person, an act occurring in some specified time and place. Thus, when a jury delivers a general guilty verdict for such a crime, we are confident that the jury agreed on most of the actions engaged in by the defendant.
Id. (emphasis added).
The majority cites no authority for this reading of “general historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence,” and I believe that the majority has overstated the principle that can legitimately be drawn from established criminal law precedents. To be sure, our law has traditionally demanded a degree of specificity in criminal prosecutions. Many rules of law, including those governing charging instruments
In invoking “general historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence,” the majority relies on the law of murder, but I believe that this body of law exposes the weakness of the majority’s analysis. It is not correct, for example, that in a murder case the jury is required to “agree[ ] on most of the actions engaged in by the defendant.” Maj. Op. at 818. Both the holding and the controlling opinions in Schad v. Arizona,
Under the holding of Schad, which followed traditional practice (see id. at 640-42,
Moreover, even if the jurors in a murder case all agree that the defendant intentionally killed the victim, both Justice Souter’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions in Schad make clear that the jurors need not agree on how the killing was accomplished. Justice Souter discussed Andersen v. United States,
We have never suggested that in returning general verdicts in such cases the jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of commission.... In these cases, as in litigation generally, “different jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line.... ”
When a woman’s charred body has been found in a burned house, and there is ample evidence that the defendant set out to kill her, it would be absurd to set him free because six jurors believe he strangled her to death (and caused the fire accidentally in his hasty escape), while six others believe he left her unconscious and set the fire to kill her.
Nor is the prosecution in a murder case always required to nail down the “specified time” or “specified ... place” of the killing. To take another hypothetical case, suppose that a motorist is seen picking up a hitchhiker at one end of a state and that the hitchhiker is stopped many days later at the other end of the state driving the motorist’s car. Suppose also that blood stains are found in the trunk, that the motorist’s bullet-ridden body is discovered in a wooded area in another part of the state and that other evidence tying the hitchhiker to the crime is gathered. Would anybody suggest that the hitchhiker cannot be convicted unless the prosecution can prove specifically where and when the killing occurred?
In short, I do not think that it is possible to distill from “general historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence” the principle that the jury must always “agree[] on most of the actions engaged in by the defendant” or the principle that the prosecution must always prove that a charged offense occurred at a specific place or time. Instead, I think that our law has traditionally allowed some flexibility with respect to these matters, and thus I do not discern any traditional practice that provides appreciable support for the majority’s interpretation of § 848(c). Certainly I do not see anything that can begin to overcome the lack of support for that interpretation in either the statutory language or the legislative history and the absence of any congressional practice of imposing special jury-unanimity requirements as part of criminal statutes (other than the few I mentioned concerning capital sentencing). I therefore conclude that § 848(c) does not include any special jury-unanimity requirement.
II.
A. Because I reject the majority’s statutory interpretation argument, I now turn to the question whether the Constitution obligated the trial judge in this case to instruct the members of the jury that they were
B. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a “trial by jury” in “all criminal prosecutions” in federal court. In Johnson v. Louisiana,
[I]n amending the Constitution to guarantee the right to jury trial, the framers desired to preserve the jury safeguard as it was known to them at common law. At the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, unanimity had long been established as one of the attributes of a jury conviction at common law. It therefore seems to me, in accord both with history and precedent, that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict in a federal criminal trial.
Johnson v. Louisiana,
As the highlighted portion of Justice Powell’s opinion states, the common law and American practice at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights required a unanimous jury verdict —and, as far as I am aware, nothing more.
Under this approach, it is apparent that the breadth of the legislative definition of an offense substantially affects the degree of unanimity that is required. The more narrowly an offense is defined, the less room there will be for jurors to disagree on subsidiary factual matters. And the more broadly an offense is defined, the more room there will be for such disagreement. Suppose that State A defines first-degree murder as knowingly or purposely causing the death of another person. Suppose that State B defines first-degree murder as knowingly or purposely causing the death of another human being or causing the death of another human during the commission of a felony. The degree of unanimity required in State A is greater than in State B because in the latter a defendant could be convicted of first-degree murder even if some jurors think that he caused the death knowingly or purposely and others think he merely caused the death during the commission of a felony. But as Schad instructs, the scheme adopted by State B does not offend the Constitution.
C. I now come to the proviso to which I previously referred. Because of the relationship noted above between the breadth of the legislative definition of an offense and the degree of jury-unanimity needed to produce a unanimous verdict, Congress could circumvent the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a unanimous verdict by lumping together incongruous elements under the rubric of a single offense. I do not think that the Sixth Amendment would tolerate such a stratagem. If a new offense contained a combination of elements having no rational basis other than the evasion of the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement, that combination would be unconstitutional.
In Schad, both Justice Souter’s and Justice Scalia’s opinions pointed out that there could be extreme circumstances in which the Constitution would require jury-unanimity with respect to something other than the jury’s general verdict of guilty. Justice Souter’s opinion recognized that the meaning of the right to a unanimous verdict in a particular case depends on the legislative definition of the offense with which the defendant is charged, and he noted that this right could be undermined if a legislative body simply lumped together incongruous elements under the rubric of a single offense.
Justice Souter stressed, however, that considerable deference should be given to a legislative judgment concerning the definition of a criminal offense — or, in other words, to a legislative judgment that a particular combination of elements should be regarded as constituting a single rather than multiple offenses. See id. at 637-40,
Justice Scalia’s concurrence set out a similar but not identical analysis. He noted that “one can conceive of novel ‘umbrella’ crimes (a felony consisting of either robbery or failure to file a tax return) where permitting a 6-to-6 verdict would seem contrary to due process.” Id. at 650,
Under either Justice Souter’s or Justice Scalia’s analysis, Congress’s definition of a “continuing criminal enterprise” does not, in my opinion, exceed the broad limits allowed for legislative judgment in determining whether particular elements should be combined to form a single offense. I readily acknowledge that the CCE statute, unlike the Arizona murder statute at issue in Schad, is not based on a long and widely accepted model but instead, as I discuss below, represents a innovative approach developed by Congress some 25 years ago. In light of these origins, the CCE statute cannot claim the protection from constitutional challenge that a more traditional criminal statute might enjoy, but this does not mean that the CCE statute is automatically suspect. As patterns of crime change, legislative bodies must have the freedom, within constitutional limits, to devise new ways of responding to those changes, including the creation of new crimes that are not closely modelled on any common law antecedents.
Although the CCE statute does not enjoy the protection of ancient lineage, I believe that both its structure and background support its constitutionality and comfortably distinguish it from the examples of impermissible statutes that were cited in the Schad plurality and concurring opinions. Justice Souter’s example — an offense called “Crime” that would require proof that the defendant committed at least one act of “embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering” (
The hypothetical laws discussed by Justice Scalia seem to me to have similar flaws. What legitimate basis could there be for creating a crime “consisting of either robbery or failure to file a tax return” or permitting a defendant to be prosecuted for the offense of assaulting “either X on Tuesday or Y on Wednesday”? See
The CCE statute differs sharply from these monstrosities. For one thing, there are important structural differences. The CCE statute sets out several elements in addition to the commission of the predicate offenses that must be proven in every case. Specifically, it must be shown, not only that the defendant committed a “continuing series of violations,” but that (a) he undertook this activity “in concert with five or more other persons,” (b) that “with respect to [these persons] he occupie[d] a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management,” and (e) that he “obtain[ed] substantial income or resources”
The background of the CCE statute fortifies this view. The CCE statute was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub.L. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236. After study and consideration, Congress concluded that drug abuse was “approaching epidemic proportions,” that existing federal drug laws were inadequate, and that new approaches were needed. H.R.Rep. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Cong. & Admin.News 4566, 4571-72. The CCE statute represented one such innovative approach. Drafted to address what Congress considered a rapidly growing problem, this statute departed significantly from common law models and prior drug laws. Much like the RICO statute, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-64, which was passed at roughly the same time, the CCE statute created a new crime by reference to a criminal organization or “enterprise.” In enacting both of these groundbreaking statutes, it was apparently Congress’s judgment that a new organizational approach was necessary in order to mount an effective attack on criminal groups that were causing great societal damage.
To my mind, this background must be taken into account in considering whether Congress exceeded constitutional bounds by creating the offense set out in 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). This background shows, I believe, that Congress had a rational and legitimate basis for crafting the particular combination of elements required under 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2). Specifically, this background demonstrates that it was the judgment of Congress that a new type of criminal activity was growing in importance and that a new type of criminal statute, keyed to the organizational scope of that activity, was needed. This legislative judgment, in my view, is entitled to substantial respect. See Schad,
Based on the structure and background of the CCE statute, I am persuaded that the statute does not contravene the Sixth Amendment’s jury unanimity requirement but instead constitutes a permissible of exercise of Congress’s broad power to define the scope of federal criminal offenses.
III.
For these reasons, I do not think that the trial judge in this case erred in refusing to instruct the members of the jury that they were required to agree unanimously on the predicate offenses committed by the defendant. If the trial judge had erred, however, I think that the error would be harmless for the reasons explained in part III of the opinion of the court.
. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593; 21 U.S.C. § 848(k). I discuss 21 U.S.C. § 848(k) in footnote 2, infra.
. It is worth noting that another portion of the CCE statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848(k), expressly requires jury unanimity with respect to a different finding. In 1988, death penalty provisions were
. See, e.g., Fed.R.Crim.P. 3 (a complaint sets out “the essential facts constituting the offense charged”); Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1) (the indictment or the information must set out "the essential facts constituting the offense charged.”).
. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(f).
. I am aware that the majority states that "criminal statutes and the common law have generally defined crimes in terms of conduct (and accompanying mental state) that takes place in a single place at some specified time.” Maj. Op. at 818 (emphasis added). If this rule is only "generally” true, however, then there must be instances in which it is not true. And if that is so, then I think it is incumbent upon the majority to explain when the rule does not apply and why the present case is not analogous to those in which this rule has not traditionally held true. The majority provides no such explanation.
. My evaluation of the constitutional issue presented in this case would not change if I believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment were applicable here, but I do not think that it is.
The Sixth Amendment expressly guarantees the right to "trial by jury” and has been held to require a unanimous verdict in a federal criminal prosecution. See 816, infra. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, of course, provides general protection for "liberty.” "Where a particular amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’ ” Albright v. Oliver, — U.S.-,-,114 S.Ct. 807 , 813,127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994)(plurality)(quoting Graham v. Connor,490 U.S. 386 , 395,109 S.Ct. 1865 , 1871,104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). See also id. at -,114 S.Ct. at 814 (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. id. at -,114 S.Ct. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at-,114 S.Ct. at 819-22 (Souter, J., concurring). Furthermore, the proposition that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees jury unanimity to a greater degree than does the Sixth Amendment seems to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court decisions holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires less jury unanimity than does the Sixth Amendment. See Johnson v. Louisiana,406 U.S. 356 ,92 S.Ct. 1620 ,32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon,406 U.S. 404 ,92 S.Ct. 1628 ,32 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972).
In Schad v. Arizona,
Some of the hypothetical statutes mentioned in the Schad plurality opinion and in Justice Sca-lia’s concurrence could raise due process concerns unrelated to the question of jury unanimity. But insofar as jury unanimity is concerned, I see no justification for looking further than the Sixth Amendment.
. See, e.g., 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *376; Virginia Declaration of Rights, sec. 8 (protecting right "to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of [the] vicinage, without whose unanimous consent [a defendant] cannot be found guilty”); Delaware Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules, § 14 (protecting “right to a speedy Trial by an impartial Jury, without whose unanimous Consent [a defendant] ought not to be found Guilly”); Vt. Constitution of 1777 ch. 1, art. X (defendant cannot be found guilty without "the unanimous consent” of the "jury”).
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree that Edmonds’ conviction must be sustained, I cannot agree that any error was committed by the district court. Because there was no error, it is a needless exercise to address whether that error was harmless.
Congress has never required a unanimous finding for each and every component of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (“CCE”) statute, 21 U.S.C. § 848(c). Therefore, in my opinion, the jury was not required to unanimously agree on which three predicate acts constituted the “continuing series of violations” for purposes of the CCE statute, as Echeverri required, and which the majority of the Court now reaffirms.
I.
In this case, we have been asked to decide whether the identities of the predicate acts constituting the “continuing series of violations” prong of the CCE statute are so essential to proof of the CCE offense that the identity of each predicate act must be agreed upon unanimously by the jury; or whether the identities of the predicate acts are merely alternative means of committing the same CCE offense or preliminary facts required to establish the offense, such that unanimity is not required under the Supreme Court’s decision in Schad v. Arizona,
A.
In order for the government to make out the offense of conducting a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined by 21 U.S.C. § 848(e), it must show that:
(1) the defendant committed a drug-related felony, 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(1);
(2) the felony was “a part of a continuing series of violations ” of the drug laws; 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2) (emphasis added);
(3) the defendant undertook that drug-related felony “in concert with five or more other persons with respect to whom [the defendant] occupied a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management,” 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(A); and
(4) the defendant obtained substantial income or resources from these violations. 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(2)(B).
The district court had instructed the jury that “[a] continuing series of violations requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that three or more violations occurred and that they, those three or more, were related to each other.” App. 577. The district court also instructed the jury that “[y]ou are asked to deliberate with a view towards reaching a unanimous decision with respect to each count and each defendant charged here in this indictment.” App. 581. The only issue before us on appeal is whether the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury that in order to convict Edmonds of engaging in a CCE, it must unanimously agree as to which three predicate acts constituted the “continuing series of violations” under the CCE statute.
Nowhere in the language or legislative history of the CCE statute does Congress evince a concern regarding the particular nature or identity of the predicate acts constituting the “continuing series of violations.” Aside from requiring that the “violations” be drug-related offenses, Congress has not imposed limits on what predicate acts constitute a “violation.” The courts, at liberty to define this statute, have generally held that “violations” refer broadly to offenses, including unindicted offenses, whether or not they led to convictions. See United States v. Rosenthal,
Indeed, the statute itself does not require that the violations be “related,” although the courts have uniformly read such a “relatedness” requirement into the definition of “continuing series.” See e.g. United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre,
B.
The broadness with which Congress defined a “continuing series of violations” indicates that the exact identities of the predicate offenses necessary for a jury to find a “continuing series” for purposes of the CCE statute are not essential facts constituting an element of the offense. Bather, the predicate offenses are no more than alternative means of, or preliminary facts, establishing the element of-“continuing series.” In Schad v. Arizona,
In Schad, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the jury was not required to unanimously agree on whether the defendant Schad had committed premeditated murder or felony-murder in order to convict him under the Arizona first-degree murder statute. That statute provided that first-degree murder was only one crime, regardless of whether it occurred as a premeditated murder or a felony murder. The Supreme Court stated that:
Our cases reflect a long-established rule of the criminal law that an indictment need not specify which overt act, among several named, was the means by which a crime was committed.... We have never suggested that in returning general verdicts in such cases the jurors should be required to agree upon a single means of commission, any more than the indictment were required to specify one alone. In these cases, as in litigation generally, “different jurors may be persuaded by different pieces of evidence, even when they agree upon the bottom line. Plainly there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.”
Id. at 631-32,
The Schad Court recognized that there were due process limits to the state’s authority to define what facts constitute merely alternative means of committing a single offense. The Court stated that:
[Nothing in our history suggests that the Due Process Clause would permit a State to convict anyone under a charge of “Crime” so generic that any combination of jury findings of embezzlement, reckless driving, murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering, for example, would suffice for conviction.
Schad,
In the present case, the CCE statute clearly provides for conviction for engaging in a CCE regardless of the identity, level of seriousness, or differing penalties of the predicate acts constituting the “continuing series of violations.” Because any grouping of multiple related drug offenses will satisfy this element of the statute, and because different groupings of predicate acts do not define separate crimes, the identities of the specific predicate acts constituting the “continuing series” do not rise to facts so “indispensable to proof of a given offense,” Schad,
Certainly, the majority opinion has furnished us with no clue as to why just this requirement of the CCE statute (“continuing series of violations”) must be distinguished from the other three requirements of the statute.
While the first CCE prong (commission of a drug-related felony) requires only a single determination, the other three CCE prongs cannot be satisfied by a single determination and they therefore potentially raise unanimity issues. If the majority’s analysis is cor
Similarly, and just as illogically under the majority’s analysis, with respect to the CCE requirement that a defendant must have derived “substantial income or resources” from his drug violations, it would appear that the majority would also require unanimity as to the factual findings and identities of such income or resources. Would the jury have to identify the cash, property, airplanes, automobiles (Mercedes, Lexus, BMW), yachts, etc. and agree unanimously on the particular resource which the defendant received?
Such a construction — singling out and selecting one of four statutory requirements and interpreting an unartieulated congressional intent requiring unanimity only with respect to that one prong of a four-prong statute — is not supported by any precedent, any logic, or any reason. Nor can the majority’s unsupported argument, that such a construction is mandated, supply that authority. In sum, “ ‘there is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual issues which underlie the verdict.’ ” Schad,
C.
Not requiring specific unanimity on the predicate acts constituting the “continuing series of violations” is consistent with our holding in United States v. Jackson,
The majority attempts to distinguish Jackson by arguing that the five-person requirement, unlike the continuing series requirement, has a “historical analogue in the law of conspiracy, which generally has not required the jury to unanimously agree on the identity of the defendant’s co-conspirators.” (Maj. Op. at 822). The applicability of the law of conspiracy to substantive CCE offenses is open to question. Moreover, even if the law of conspiracy were applicable here, it is clear that the continuing series requirement enjoys as much of a “historical analogue” as does the five-person requirement. Notably, in the case of a multiple-object conspiracy, a jury need not unanimously agree as to which object of the various charged objects forms the basis for their conviction of a defendant for conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Linn,
The majority also argues that Jackson is distinguishable because “acting in concert with one group of five people is no more or less blameworthy than acting in concert with
D.
The district court’s general unanimity instruction sufficiently ensured that the jury would unanimously agree that a “continuing series of violations,” that is, three or more related drug offenses, occurred. Thus, I find that the district court committed no error when it did not provide a specific unanimity instruction.
II.
Today, the majority purports to “affirm” or “reaffirm” our decision in United States v. Echeverri,
A.
First, the majority argues that under the “general historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence,” “[cjriminal trials have long ensured substantial jury agreement as to the facts establishing the offense.” (Maj. Op. at 818). In so arguing, the majority glosses over and fails to answer the central dilemma in the case: how we are to determine which facts require or do not require unanimous jury agreement.
Clearly, not all of the facts underlying a verdict-require jury unanimity. See Schad, supra. In failing to define what “facts” require jury unanimity or not, the majority’s argument does not supply a satisfactory, authoritative, or logical answer as to whether the identities of the three predicate acts constituting a “continuing series of violations” for purposes of CCE require jury unanimity.
B.
Next, the majority argues that “[tjhere is a real possibility that the CCE statute would
In Schad, the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause was not violated when the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder despite the lack of assurance that the jury unanimously agreed as to whether the defendant had committed premeditated murder or felony murder. The majority argues that this result was defensible in Schad only because premeditated murder and felony murder are of “equivalent blameworthiness or culpability” (Maj. Op. at 820 (quoting Schad,
This argument lacks any basis in logic. To the extent that the CCE statute allows conviction for the same offense based on any grouping of multiple related predicate acts, despite the fact that each act may carry very different penalties, this is a decision that has already been made by Congress. In other words, Congress has already determined that regardless of the exact identity or seriousness of the predicate acts constituting the “continuing series,” a defendant is equally blameworthy so long as he has engaged in multiple related drug-related offenses. As the Supreme Court noted in Schad, “ ‘the ... legislature’s definition of the elements of the offense is usually dispositive.’ ” Schad,
A legislature’s definition of the elements of an crime does not offend constitutional strictures where such definition is supported by “history” and “shared practice.” See Schad,
Moreover, a specific unanimity instruction to the jury would do nothing to change the fact that a defendant could be convicted for CCE regardless of whether the jury found that he engaged in a series of first-time simple possession offenses or whether the jury found that he engaged in a series of more serious crimes such as distributing large quantities of drugs.
Accordingly, because Congress has already determined that any “continuing series of [drug] violations,” regardless of the identity or seriousness of those drug violations, is equally blameworthy for purposes of CCE, we defer to Congress’s determination as the Court deferred to the Arizona legislature’s intent in Schad. The majority’s argument that the predicate acts making up such a “continuing series” may vary in degrees of seriousness is irrelevant, and Edmonds’ conviction for CCE, even if based on less than unanimous jury agreement as to which three predicate acts constituted the “series,” does not violate due process.
C.
Finally, the majority also argues that requiring specific unanimity is “counseled” by the rule of lenity.
Moreover, as the majority acknowledges, there is no authority for applying the rule of lenity to the issue posed in the present case. Nevertheless, the majority argues that the rule of lenity should apply here because it has been applied to the “conceptually analogous situation: whether a single criminal act constitutes one or more violations of a statute.” (Maj. Op. at 820-21). I fail to see, however, how the issue of whether a single criminal act constitutes one or more violations of a statute is at all analogous to the present issue of whether the facts sought to be proven at trial are or are not so essential to proof of an element of the offense such that jury unanimity is or is not required.
The majority also invokes a number of cases for the proposition that the rule of lenity requires fair warning as to the harshness of criminal penalties for a given offense. From there, the majority makes the tenuous connection that because procedural protections affect the likelihood that a penalty will be imposed, that “[a]t some point, differences in procedural protections become as significant as different penalties, and the need for fair warning just as critical.” (Maj. Op. at 821-22).
III.
Because Congress has not required specific unanimity with respect to any of the predicate factual findings underlying the CCE statute, and because there is no basis for our requiring unanimity as to the identities of the predicate acts when we do not require unanimity as to the identities of the five supervised individuals, or as to the identities of the defendant’s income and resources; I would overrule Eckeverri. Instead, I would hold that, absent Congressional intent requiring jury unanimity as to the identity of predicate factual findings, a specific unanimity instruction on a statute’s predicate findings is not required.
Because there was no error committed by the district court, I would not reach the issue of harmless error. Although I concur in the ultimate result reached by the majority in sustaining Edmonds’ conviction, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that requires unanimity as to the identities of the predicate acts constituting the “continuing series” prong of the CCE statute.
. At least seven other circuits have not required unanimity with respect to the identity of the five underlings in the CCE statute. See United States v. Jelinek,
. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has held, "[w]hen a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.” Griffin v. United States,
. See also United States v. Kramer,
. I raise this point not to “suggest!] that the equivalent blameworthiness test is a pointless exercise," (Maj. Op. at 820), but to highlight the fact that the majority's criticism of the CCE statute would not be cured by the specific unanimity instruction requested on the appeal before us. Indeed, the majority’s "equal blameworthiness” argument does not provide support for a specific unanimity instruction, but instead stands as a challenge to the facial constitutionality of the CCE statute.
. The majority also notes for the first time in the harmless error section of its opinion, that the Sixth Amendment is also "implicated" by the district court’s failure to give a specific unanimity instruction in this case. (Maj. Op. at 823). However, as the majority concedes, the present inquiry turns not on Sixth Amendment concerns but Due Process concerns. (Maj. Op. at 823 n. 17).
. Presumably, the "procedural protection” that the majority has in mind is a specific unanimity instruction to the jury.
