11 P. 472 | Ariz. | 1886
Lead Opinion
In 1882 the congress of the United States passed an act to amend section 5352 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, in reference to polygamy, and
The defendant, Ammon M. Tenney, was indicted under this law in the Third judicial district court of Arizona, at Prescott, in said territory. On trial before a jury he was convicted of the crime of polygamy. He brings the case to this court, alleging errors in the rulings and instructions of the court below, and also defects in the indictment. We will consider the objections in the order we deem most convenient.
1. As to the pleadings. The indictment consists of three counts. The first count charges that in March, 1883, in Apache county, in the Third judicial district of Arizona, the defendant, being then and there a married man, and having a wife, Anna Tenney, with whom he was then living, unlawfully married another woman, Anna Eliza Tenney. The correctness in form of this portion of the count, and so far, is not questioned. The count then further recites that the defendant, from the time of his marriage to said Ann Eliza Tenney, continued to live and cohabit with her as his wife, up to the.time of the finding of the indictment. The second count charges the defendant with having simultaneously, and on the same day, married more than one woman. As no proof was pu5 in under this count, and no question raised upon it, no further attention need be given to it. .The third count alleged a violation of section 3 of the act referred to. By it the defendant was charged with having cohabited with more than one woman
Upon the trial the defendant insisted that such first count was bad, and so fatally defective that no conviction could legally be had under it, for the reason that it alleged two separate and distinct offenses, to wit, polygamy and unlawful cohabitation. The objection is without force. It is perfectly clear that the indictment charges the three offenses named in the act, and separate count was intended to be and is given to each. It is true that the first count, after alleging with particularity and preciseness the polygamous marriage, does proceed further, and state that cohabition followed such marriage. This, perhaps, was unnecessary to make out a complete statement of the crime of polygamy under this law, but it does not follow from that that the count is bad. The statement that cohabition followed such polygamous marriage was added as the result or effect of such marriage, and as part of a connected and complete description of that offense. Incidents and facts connected with and springing from the criminal act charged, although sometimes unnecessary, are very often put into an indictment so that there may be, on the face of the pleading, the complete history of the transaction that it is expected the proofs will disclose. In this case nothing more was undertaken. This is' clear from the fact that unlawful cohabitation, as a separate and distinct offense, is afterwards charged in a count by itself. If the reference made to that subject in the first count is, as claimed by counsel, wholly unnecessary to a complete description of the crime of polygamy, we should still treat such reference as mere surplusage, without force to destroy a count otherwise sufficient. We have no doubt the count is a perfectly good one.
2. Objection is next made to the mode of proof of the marriage of defendant to Ann Eliza Tenney. This marriage was proven by the admissions of the defendant, often and apparently deliberately made, that he was married to such person, in the county of Apache, at the time named in the
The case of Miles v. United States, 103 U. S. 304, disposes of the questions raised here adversely to the defendant. In that case, which was a prosecution for bigamy, the trial judge charged the jury that the declarations of the accused that he was married were evidence that the jury might consider as tending to prove an actual marriage; and, further, that such marriage, the same as any other fact, might be proven by the admissions of the defendant, or by circumstantial evidence, and that it was not necessary to prove it by witnesses who were present at the ceremony. In commenting on this charge the Supreme Court of the United States in its opinion says :“We are of opinion that the district court committed no error in admitting such declarations, or in its charge to the jury concerning them.” This is directly in point here, and decisive of the questions raised; nor does proof of a second or subsequent marriage, as intimated by counsel, differ from proof of a first one. The same kind of evidence is admissable in each case. 3 Greenl. Ev. § 205.
If, in addition to these authorities, reasons were necessary to be stated in support of our decisions on this branch of the case, such are not wanting, and springing, too, from the very
3. It is next assigned for error that the court admitted proof of certain facts occurring in Utah several years prior to the finding of the indictment. Acording to such testimony the defendant stated at such time, and in Utah, that he was then living with the two women named as his wives; and some proof, aside from his statement, was put in, tending to show he did cohabit with both the women in that territory. This subject, however, was first opened up and gone into by the defendant himself, presumably for the purpose of disputing the theory of the prosecution that he was married
4. We next consider the. errors alleged to have been committed by the district judge in his charge. These are the principal grounds relied upon for a reversal, and we have therefore considered them with great care. There are isolated sentences in the charge that were selected and pressed upon our attention at the hearing, and as to the correctness of which, as so presented, we then had some doubts. A more careful examination of the entire charge, however, has convinced us that it is correct in law, and that, taken as a whole, and so read and considered, there is nothing in it of which the defendant can complain as presenting the case unfairly to the jury. The real issues upon which the jury were .to pass were clearly stated, and the rules that must govern in the consideration of the case, so as to avoid a decision from mistake, passion, or prejudice, were well laid down.
Two objections, however, are made to the instruction. It is said, in the first place, that the district judge improperly followed a rule of evidence as to proof of. marriage found in the statutes of Arizona; and, next, that the charge left the jury at liberty to find the marriage of the defendant to Ann Eliza Tenney in Arizona from facts indicating his marriage to her years before in Utah. We will consider these objections separately.
The statutes of Arizona referred to, provide that, in a prosecution for bigamy, it shall not be necessary to prove either marriage by the register or certificate thereof, or other record evidence, but the same may be proved by such evidence as is admissable to prove a marriage in other cases. In his charge the district judge referred to this statute, and said that, in this
5. In the portion of the charge next claimed to be erroneous the court charged the jury, in substance, that, even though the defendant had two wives in the territory of Utah, in violation of law, the fact that he had continued the same offense for many years, it being a continuous offense, would be no defense for him to make against this prosecution. It is urged that this instruction authorized the jury to convict the defendant of the crime of polygamy upon evidence satisfying them of the fact of defendant’s marriage to a second wife in the territory of Utah, and also that the expression, “it being a continuous offense,” was a direction for the jury to find the defendant guilty upon the theory that if he married in Utah and brought his polygamous wife with him into the territory of. Arizona, he would thus renew his marriage contract in this territory, so as to make him liable to a prosecution for polygamy, the same as though the marriage had taken place
To the proof against the defendant under the third count, tending to prove him guilty of that particular crime, it would be no defense for him to say he had been guilty of the similar crime in Utah. The court did not intend to say, and did not say, that, if the defendant was actually married to his second wife in Utah, it would not be a defense to urge that fact in this prosecution, to the charge of polygamy. That this is so made clear from the balance of the charge, portions of which we quote. He says: “In this case the question of marriage is directly involved, and that, perhaps, is the most proper starting point for your consideration.” Then follows a very full and accurate definition of marriage, and the proof necessary to be adduced in support thereof. After that the court proceeds: ‘ ‘ The next proposition involved is, when must the defendant, and where must the defendant, have committed this offense, in order to make him liable under the in-, dietment that is here brought against him? He must have committed the offense within the Third judicial district, consisting of the counties of Mohave, Yavapai, and Apache,, of the territory of Arizona, since the passage of this law that has been read in your hearing.” And again: “No matter what the defendant and his wives’ relation may have been in Utah, in New Mexico, or anywhere else, if within the last two years, in the territory of Arizona, they renewed their igreement, and within the time, and within the district named, nade this contract between themselves to live together as man md wife, and he introduced and recognized them as such, I charge you that he is guilty, as charged in the first count of the indictment, of the crime of polygamy. These facts, gentlemen, must be proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not for the court to say how they will be proven, but, as I said before, it must be from the evidence in the case. ’ ’
This instruction repeats in other language the one just
The court, at further length, at the request of counsel for the defendant, instructed the jury as follows: “Even though the defendant married a second wife while his first wife was living, and without having obtained a divorce from his said first wife, yet the jury cannot find the defendant guilty of polygamy, as charged in the first count of the indictment, unless you further find that said second marriage was contracted within the said Third judicial district of the territory of Arizona.” In giving this instruction the court said: “I charge you, and I have charged you, that the offense must be committed in this judicial district, and within the time spoken of since the passage of this law.” The court gave a further request asked by defendant’s counsel, as follows: “To find the defendant guilty in the first count of'the indictment, it is necessary that you must find, from the evidence, that the defendant entered into a contract of marriage with Eliza Ten
These rather extended quotations from the charge of the district judge to the jury are made because of the able and earnest argument of counsel in behalf of the defense, that
6. Noticing the further objection made to the instruction, that too harshly criticised the offense of polygamy and bigamy, we refer to a somewhat similar instruction, and in a similar case, in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, and which was held proper by the supreme court of the United States. There the instruction, speaking of the offenses named in this law, was as follows: “I think it not improper, in the discharge of your duties in this ease, that you should consider what are to be the consequences to the innocent victims of this delusion. As this contest goes on they multiply, and there are pure-minded women, and there are innocent children, innocent in sense, even beyond the degree of the innocence of childhood itself,—these are to be the sufferers; and as jurors fail to do their duty, and as these cases come up in the territory of Utah, just so do these victims multiply, and spread themselves over the land.”
Before leaving this branch of the ease, and in connection with the objections considered, we call attention to one or two facts of importance. We are not asked to reverse this
8. It is further objected that the marriage could not have taken place here or elsewhere, between the defendant and Ann Eliza, because both these parties knew that the defendant’s first wife was still living and cohabiting with him. Upon this point we agree with counsel that under no definition of marriage, as understood by Christian people,—a union of one man with one woman, for life,—can these polygamous unions be looked upon as marriage. But counsel lose sight of the fact, which caused the enactment of the law in question, that there are such arrangements and unions, under which a man takes to himself two, three, or more women, and lives with them under a claim of marriage. These arrangements or unions are what the Edmunds law aims to punish and suppress. This was the kind of marriage meant by the district judge in his instructions touching the relation contracted and entered into in Arizona between the defendant and Ann Eliza Tenney. Such, too, is our meaning when we speak of the marriage between these parties. It is not necessary in order to make out the offense, that the second marriage should be a valid one. Every bigamous or polygamous marriage is void, and it is the entering into the void marriage while a valid one is in existence that the law punishes. Regina v. Brawn, 1 Car. & K. 144. Neither has knowledge of the fact that a prior wife was living, anything to do with the question. That knowledge usually exists, and is one of the unfortunate consequences of the practice of polygamy. But for that reason shall the law be turned aside? Clearly not. It is an additional reason, upon the contrary, why it should inexorably punish.
We have now considered all the objections urged against the conviction of the defendant in this ease, and our conclusion is that the conviction was right, and must be affirmed. It is ordered accordingly.
Barnes, J., concurs.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) I dissent from the opinion of the