UNITED STATES оf America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eric Jackson TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-6223
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
December 6, 2016
860 F. App‘x 860
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge
Leslie M. Maye, Office of the United States Attorney, Western District of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Eric Jackson Taylor, Pro Se
Before BRISCOE, GORSUCH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge
Eric Jackson Taylor appeals the district court‘s order denying his motion under
I. BACKGROUND
On July 10, 2011, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Mr. Taylor with the following: two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
Before sentencing, the United States Probation Office prеpared a Presentence Investigation Report, which stated Mr. Taylor was subject to an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA), based on three prior convictions in Oklahoma for second-degree burglary. The district court imposed the ACCA enhanсement, sentencing Mr. Taylor to 188 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release.
On January 25, 2016, Mr. Taylor filed a motion under
II. ANALYSIS
A prisoner challenging a district court‘s denial of habeas corpus relief under
In the § 2255 proceedings before the district court, Mr. Taylor acknowledged the sentencing court applied an ACCA enhancement based on three prior convictions under Oklahoma state law: (1) a conviction for attempted burglary and two сounts of second-degree burglary; (2) a conviction for second-degree burglary; and (3) another conviction for second-degree burglary. But Mr. Taylor argued that, after the Supreme Court‘s decision in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), his prior convictions no longer qualified as violent felonies and, as a result, the “ACCA does not apply to him.” He therefore asserted he should be resentenced and “released immediately.”
The government contended Mr. Taylor was not entitled to resentencing because Johnson applies only to the residual clause of the ACCA, and Mr. Taylor was not sentenced under the residual clause. The district court agreed, explaining that the ACCA‘s definition of “violent felony” includes felony convictions for four specific offenses, including burglary. And Johnson did not affect sentencing enhancements based on the ACCA‘s enumerated offenses. Thus, the distriсt court concluded Mr. Taylor‘s prior convictions were for “violent felonies” and the ACCA sentencing enhancement applied.
We agree with the district court‘s analysis under Johnson. The Supreme Court in Johnson held only that the ACCA‘s residual clause was unconstitutionally vague and specifically explained that its “decision
But on appeal, Mr. Taylor also cites Mathis v. United States, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), a case decided after the district court denied Mr. Taylor‘s § 2255 motion. There, the Supreme Court explained that the ACCA imposes a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence if a defendant is convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and he or she has three prior convictions for a “violent felony,” including “burglary, arson, or extortion.” Id. at 2248 (citing
To make this determination, сourts apply the “categorical approach,” looking at the “generic versions” and “not to all variants of the [enumerated] offenses.” Id. In the case of burglary—the relevant crime in Mathis and this case—courts “focus solely on whether the elements of the crime of conviction sufficiently match the elements of generic burglary, while ignoring the particular facts of the case.” Id. In other words,
[a] crime counts as ‘burglary’ under the [ACCA] if its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense. But if the crime of conviction covers any more conduct than the generic offense, then it is not an ACCA ‘burglary‘—even if the defendant‘s actual conduct (i.e., the facts of the crime) fits within the generic offense‘s boundaries. Id.
Mathis, however, involved a particular type of statute: “one that enumerates various factual means of committing a single element” of the offense. Id. at 2249. Specifically, the parties agreed “Iowa‘s burglary statute ... covers more conduct than generic burglary does.” Id. The generic burglary definition contains the following elements: “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Id. at 2248 (ellipsis and citation omitted). By contrast, the Iowa statute “reaches a broader range of places: ‘any building, structure [or] land, water, or air vehicle.‘” Id. at 2250 (quoting
The district court in Mathis “imposed an ACCA enhancement on [Mr.] Mathis after inspecting the records of his prior convictions and determining thаt he had burgled structures, rather than vehicles.” Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, similarly applying what is known as the modified categorical approach by looking at record materials to determine whether Mr. Mathis‘s prior offenses would qualify as generic burglary, even though the Iowa statute covered more conduct than the generic burglary definition. Id.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court and Eighth Circuit had erred in applying the modified categorical approach. The Court explained it had “often held, and in no uncertain terms, that a state сrime cannot qualify as an ACCA predicate if its elements are broader than those of a listed generic offense.” Id. at 2251.
How a given defendant actually perpetrated the crime—what we have referred to as the “underlying brute facts or means” of commission—makes no difference; even if his conduct fits within
The Court further stated that “[f]or more than 25 years, our decisions have held that the prior crime qualifies as an ACCA predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.” Id. at 2247. And the Court declined to find an exception for situations “when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements.” Id. at 2248. Because the Iowa statute covered a broader range of conduct than generic burglary, Mr. Mathis‘s prior Iowa burglary convictions did not qualify as ACCA prediсates.
Here, Mr. Taylor‘s ACCA enhancement was based on his three prior convictions for second-degree burglary under
Every person who breaks and enters any building or any part of any building, room, booth, tent, railroad car, automobile, truck, trailer, vessel or other structure or erection, in which any property is kept, or breaks into or forcibly opens, any coin-operated or vending machine or device with intent to steal any property therein or to commit any felony, is guilty of burglary in the second degree.
Similar to the Iowa statute at issue in Mathis, the Oklahoma statute “cоvers more conduct than generic burglary does.” Mathis, 136 S.Ct. at 2250. Generic burglary covers only the “unlawful or unprivileged entry into a building or other structure,” while second-degree burglary in Oklahoma covers entry into additional places, such as tents, railroad cars, automobiles, trucks, trailers, and vessels.
Because the Oklahoma statute defines burglary more broadly than generic burglary, Mr. Taylor‘s convictions under the Oklahoma statute “cannot give rise to an ACCA sentence.” Id. at 2257. Even though the district court correctly declined to apply Johnson to grant Mr. Taylor‘s § 2255 petition, the distriсt court applied the modified categorical approach in its analysis of Mr. Taylor‘s prior convictions under the Oklahoma statute. And Mathis has now made clear that the district court‘s approach would be reversible error.
Indeed, in cases on direct appeal, other circuit courts have similarly concluded that sentencing enhancements may not be imposed based on prior convictions under state statutes similar to the statute in Mathis—i.e., those providing a more expansive list of places where burglary may ocсur than provided in the generic burglary definition. See, e.g., United States v. White, 836 F.3d 437, 444-45 (4th Cir. 2016) (concluding “the West Virginia burglary statute encompasses conduct that is excluded from the definition of generic burglary” because the state statute “covers enclosures other than ‘buildings or structures‘” (brackets and ellipsis omitted)); United States v. Edwards, 836 F.3d 831, 833, 838 (7th Cir. 2016) (vacating sentences and remanding for resentencing where the Wisconsin statute defines burglary more broadly than the Sentencing Guidelines and the district courts consulted state charging documents to decide whether the defendants had been charged with burgling a dwelling as required by the relevant Guideline).
In a plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), the Supreme Court “laid out the framework to be used in determining whether a rule announced in [a Supreme Court opinion] should be applied retroactively to judgments in criminal cases that are already final on direct review.” Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1 (2007). “Under the Teague framework, аn old rule applies both on direct and collateral review, but a new rule is generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review.” Id. This general rule is subject to two exceptions that allow for retroactive application in collаteral proceedings, see id. but we need not address the exceptions here because our analysis ends with the question of whether Mathis provides a new rule.
“[A] case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant‘s conviction becаme final.” Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. Here, the Supreme Court explicitly stated in Mathis that it was not announcing a new rule and that its decision was dictated by decades of prior precedent:
For more than 25 years, we have repeatedly made clear that application of ACCA involves, and involves only, comparing elements. Courts must ask whether the crime of conviction is the same as, or narrower than, the relevant generic offense. They may not ask whether the defendant‘s conduct—his particular means of committing the crime—falls within the generic definition. And that rule does not change when a statute hаppens to list possible alternative means of commission: Whether or not made explicit, they remain what they ever were—just the facts, which ACCA (so we have held, over and over) does not care about. 136 S.Ct. at 2257.
Thus, Mathis did not announce a new rule. And courts applying Mathis have consistently reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Dawkins v. United States, 829 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 2016) (concluding Mathis did not announce a new rule that would allow a second or successive habeas petition); Dimott v. United States, Nos. 2:06-cr-26-GZS, 2:16-cv-347-GZS, 2016 WL 6068114, at *3 (Oct. 14, 2016) (”Mathis has not been recognized as a case that announced a new substantive rule that is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. The Supreme Court made clear that it was not breaking new ground in Mathis....“); Blackwell v. United States, Case No. 4:10-cr-00012, 2016 WL 5849384, at *5 (W.D. Va. Oct. 6, 2016) (“By the Court‘s own admission, Mathis does not set a new rule.“).
Because Mathis did not announce a new rule, Mr. Taylor cannot rely on it in a § 2255 petition filed nearly fifteen years
III. CONCLUSION
Because neither Johnson nor Mathis provides a basis for the relief that Mr. Taylor seеks, and because reasonable jurists would not find the denial of Mr. Taylor‘s constitutional claims debatable or wrong, we deny his request for a COA.
* This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule Appellate Procedure 32.1 and 10th Circuit Rule 32.1.