Anthony Alan Taylor entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiring to distribute over five grams of cocaine base and possessing a firearm during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). He appeals the district court’s
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denial of his motion to suppress cocaine base and a loaded handgun seized at the time of his arrest. He argues that he was arrested without probable cause by police officers who were also guilty of outrageous government conduct. Reviewing the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law
de novo,
we affirm.
See United States v. Brown,
I. Probable Cause to Arrest
At the suppression hearing, Minneapolis narcotics investigator Kurt Radke and police sergeant Elizabeth Dea testified for the government. Radke testified that he learned from another officer that Jerome Palmore had proposed, in exchange for leniency, that he purchase crack cocaine from a third party in a controlled buy. Radke investigated and learned from a third officer that Palmore had previously provided accurate and timely information *834 that led to the seizure of drugs and a firearm. Based on this officer’s confidence in Palmore’s reliability, Radke met with Palmore, who offered to set up a controlled buy of crack cocaine from a supplier he called “T.” Palmore described “T” and the car he drove and said that “T” was a member of the “Detroit Boys” gang. In Radke’s presence, Palmore arranged in a series of phone calls to buy an ounce of crack from “T” at an Arby’s restaurant in Hopkins, a Minneapolis suburb.
Sergeant Dea testified that she then drove Palmore to the Arby’s parking lot. With six Minneapolis and Hopkins police vehicles positioned nearby, Palmore talked with “T” by phone from Dea’s car. Pal-more rejected “T’s” request to change their rendezvous to an apartment complex across the street from the Arby’s. Shortly thereafter, Taylor came out of the apartment complex, approached the Arby’s, and appeared to place a call on his cell phone at the same time Palmore’s cell phone received a call. Palmore identified Taylor as “T,” and Dea advised Radke of Pal-more’s identification. Never losing sight of “T” as he approached, Radke held the arrest team until Taylor entered a convenience store adjacent to the Arby’s, which Radke described as a more “controlled arrest situation.” Radke then assisted in Taylor’s arrest and observed the search incident to his arrest. Palmore was called as a defense witness when the suppression hearing resumed one week later. He recanted what he told Taylor’s counsel in a phone conversation and corroborated the prior testimony by Officer Radke and Sergeant Dea.
Taylor argues that the evidence seized incident to his arrest must be suppressed because the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him without a warrant. Probable cause exists if the facts and circumstances within the arresting officers’ collective knowledge “are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing ... that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”
Brown,
Here, the district court concluded the officers had probable cause to arrest Taylor based upon information provided by Palmore, an informant known to be reliable in the past, and corroborated when Palmore arranged a controlled buy in Radke’s presence, Palmore identified Taylor as “T” when he approached the agreed location, Taylor matched Palmore’s prior physical description of “T,” and Sergeant Dea saw Taylor placing a call on his cell phone as Palmore received a call from “T.” It is clear from our prior cases that these facts and circumstances amply support the court’s probable cause ruling.
See, e.g., United States v. Taylor,
Taylor further argues that the district court clearly eired in crediting the testimony of Radke, Dea, and Pal-more because Radke “misled the court” about Palmore’s prior arrests and lied about a warrant search of Taylor’s apartment conducted after the arrest, and because Palmore recanted what he told defense counsel and admitted that he identified Taylor and cooperated in a controlled buy in exchange for leniency. These contentions are without merit. A district court’s findings regarding witness credibility are “virtually unreviewable on appeal.”
United States v. Candie,
II. Outrageous Government Conduct
The search incident to Taylor’s arrest yielded a driver’s license listing his address as an apartment in the nearby complex from which he had just emerged. Radke testified that he and other officers went to the complex, where they located a car matching Palmore’s description of Taylor’s car. A narcotics dog alerted to the vehicle. The police entered the apartment and, because people were present, “froze” the apartment and its occupants while Radke applied for a search warrant. A state court judge issued a warrant to search Taylor’s car but not the apartment. At the suppression hearing, the government advised that Radke’s warrant application, which he completed at the nearby Hopkins Police Department, could not be found. Taylor’s girlfriend testified that the police kicked in the apartment door, cuffed her and her cousin, and searched the apartment for over two hours without a waxrant. At the suppression hearing, the government represented that it would not offer any evidence from the warrant search of the car, nor was evidence from the alleged warrantless search of the apartment at issue. Taylor nonetheless argues that the lost warrant and the alleged warrantless search of his apartment amounted, cumulatively, to outrageous government conduct that violated his right to due process and require suppression of the evidence seized incident to his arrest.
We agree with the government that Taylor has waived this issue. A guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defenses.
United States v. Arrellano,
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. The HONORABLE DONOVAN W. FRANK, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.