240 F. 392 | 9th Cir. | 1917
These cases were heard in the court below upon writs of habeas corpus issued to determine the legality of orders of deportation made against the petitioning aliens and the returns of the inspector in charge to the writs. The charge against each was that he was found receiving, sharing in, and deriving, benefit from the earnings of a prostitute, and deportation was ordered under the provisions of section 3 of the act of Congress of March 26, 1910, entitled “An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States, approved February 20, 1907.”
“Any ali,en woman or girl who shall be found an inmate of a bouse of prostitution or practicing prostitution, at any time witbin three years after she shall have entered the United States, shall be deemed to be unlawfully witbin the United States and Shall be deported.”
The act of March 26, 1910 (36 Stat. 263), amends section 3 of the former act, and provides as follows:
“Any alien who shall be found an inmate of or connected with the management of a house of prostitution or practicing prostitution after such alien shall have entered the United States, or who shall receive, share in, or derive benefit from any part of the earnings of any prostitute; or who is employed by, in, or in connection with any house of prostitution or music or dance hall or other place of amusement or resort habitually frequented -by prostitutes, of where prostitutes gather, or who in any way assists, protects or promises to protect from arrest any prostitute shall be deemed to be unlawfully within the United States and shall be deported in the manner provided by sections 20 and 21 of this act.”
It is admitted that the appellees in all these cases were resident aliens in the territory of Hawaii before the transfer of the sovereignty thereof to the United States. We are unable to agree with the court below that the clause “after such alien shall have entered the United States” is to be read into the definition of the offense with which these three appellees are charged. The statute as we read it limits the application of that clause to alien women connected with the management of a house of prostitution or practicing prostitution. We think that Congress by the act has, in unlimited terms, provided that “any alien * * * who shall receive, share in, or derive benefit from any part of the earnings of any prostitute,” etc., shall be deemed to be unlawfully within the United States and shalj be deported. But, even if that clause were applicable to the offense with which these appellees are charged, we are of the opinion, for reasons stated in United States v. Kimi Yamamoto, 240 Fed. 390, - C. C. A. -, decided simultaneously with this case, that it does not affect the authority of the immigration officials to deport any alien who, while a resident of the United States, commits the acts with which these appellees are charged.
Nor do we think that the act should be construed otherwise from the fact that the Secretary of Tabor, under the authority which the
“The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.”
In Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 16 Sup. Ct. 977, 41 L. Ed. 140, the court denied the contention that there is no power to banish aliens who have been permitted to become residents. In Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272, 33 Sup. Ct. 31, 57 L. Ed. 218, the court said:
“It is entirely settled that the authority of Congress to prohibit aliens from coming within the United States, and to regulate their coming, includes authority to impose conditions upon the performance of which the continued liberty of the alien to reside within the bounds of this country may be made to depend.”
In Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 33 Sup. Ct. 607, 57 L. Ed. 978, it was said:
“It is thoroughly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens whose presence in the country it deems hurtful.”
In Lapina v. Williams, 232 U. S. 78, 34 Sup. Ct. 196, 58 L. Ed. 515, it was said:
“The authority of Congress over the general subject-matter is plenary; it may exclude aliens altogether, or prescribe the terms and conditions upon which they may come into or remain in this country.”
The judgment in each of the cases is reversed, and the causes are remanded to the court below, with instructions to dismiss the writs.