251 F. 689 | D. Del. | 1918
An indictment has been found against John Stobo charging him with violation of the act of Congress of February 14, 1917 (39 Stat. 919, c. 64). The act is as follows:
“Any person who knowingly and wilfully deposits or causes to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, or who knowingly and wilfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President, shall upon conviction be fined not exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned not exceeding five years, or both.”
The indictment contains three counts. The first count sets forth:
“That heretofore, that is to say, on the first day of September, A. D. 1917, at Wilmington, in the State and District of Delaware and within the jurisdiction of this court, that John Stobo, late of the District aforesaid, did then and there, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make a threat to take the life of and to inflict bodily harm upon the President' of the United States, that is to say, at Wilmington, in .the Statfe and District aforesaid, on the said date did make said threat by uttering the language following, namely, ‘The President ought to be shot and I would like to be the one to do it,’ or words substantially to that effect, meaning thereby to refer to the President of the United States, contrary to. the form,” etc.
“In this country sovereignty resides in the people, not in the President, who is merely thleir chosen representative. To threaten to kill him or to inflict upon him bodily harm stimulates opposition to national policies, however wise, even in the most critical times, incites the hostile and evil-minded to take the President’s life, adds to the expense of his safe-guarding, is an affront to all loyal and right-thinking persons, inflames their minds, provokes resentment, disorder, and violence, is akin to treason, and is rightly denounced, as. a crime against the people as the sovereign power. The statute in question was enacted not only for the protection of the President as the representative and chosen chief executive of the nation, but also to preserve the tranquillity of the people and their peace of mind. Its passage came at a time when this country was about to be driven into and to engage in an epoch-making and substantially worldwide war, participation in which it had earnestly sought to avoid. It was then known that there were some who, "on account of erratic tendencies, or mistaken views, or want of sympathy with or even loyalty to our country, were unfriendly to its aims and might, by direction or indiree*693 tion, or both, endeavor to embarrass and cripple it in the great struggle upon w hich it. was about to be forced to enter, and might by threats'assail the President, and thereby Inspire others to attempt his lifts, if they themselves should not undertake the commission of that crime. The enactment was opportune, not only on account of onr past record of three presidential a.saar;sinations and the peculiar sires» to which the country was about to he subjected, but that there might hereafter bo a deterrent to restrain the disloyal, errado, misguided, or wickedly disposed.”
The .’al, 4th, 5th, 6th, 12th and 14th causes of demurrer must be held insufficient.
“President Wilson ought to be killed. It is a wonder some onfe has not done it already. If I had an opportunity, I would do it myself.”
These words were held to constitute a threat within the meaning of the act. In point of significance I am unable to distinguish in substance the words there used from those set forth in the indictment in hand. The act denounces a threat, and does not distinguish between an absolute threat and one which is conditional. A threat is a threat whether conditional or absolute, and may have an equally sinister effect upon the minds of those hearing it. • Further, the circumstances under which the words were uttered, the manner and tone of the utterance, what else was said on the occasion, and, in short, the res gestae, may or may not be determinative of the question whether they were intended to operate or operated as a threat. In the absence of any other and sufficient ground of demurrer the words should be submitted to a jury with proper instructions from the court. I am not prepared and think it would be improper at this time to hold the uttered words did. not constitute a threat against the life or limb of the President. The 2d cause of demurrer must, therefore, be held insufficient.
“9. Because the charge and accusation against said defendant of making an alleged threat to take the life of and to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States is made and averred in said indictment and in each count thereof, without legal or legally sufficient certainty, to enable said defendant subsequently to plead, enter a previous acquittal or previous conviction iipon such charge in that no occasion upon which, and no manner or circumstances by or under which, and no definite place at which, and no means by which,' and no person to whom, such alleged threat was made, are with certainty or otherwise averred in said indictment or any count thereof.”
If under the act the bare utterance of an oral threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily.harm upon the President were a punishable offense per se, whether heard by others or not, all possible prejudice to the defendant arising from the uncertainty pointed out in the 9th cause of demurrer could feadily be obviated by means of a bill of particulars furnished by the government. On the above hypothesis each count of the indictment having set forth all of the essential elements of the offense under the act, the filing of a bill of particulars under the order of the court would not involve any usurpation of or encroachment upon the functions of the grand jury. For, while operating to obviate embarrassment in the production of evidence and to-render certain the identity of the charge upon which, an acquittal or conviction should be had, the bill of particulars would in no sense constitute part of the indictment or in any respect change or affect
The demurrer must, therefore, be sustained.