242 F. 151 | S.D. Ohio | 1917
On February 14, 1917, Congress enacted a law which provides that:
“Any person who knowingly and willfully deposits or causes to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, or who knowingly and willfully otherwise makes-any such threat against the President, shall upon conviction he fined not exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned not exceeding five years, or both.”
The indictment charges that the defendant on April 6th—
“did unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully make a threat against the President of the UMted States, to wit, a threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the said the President of the United States, said threat being then and there uttered and spoken by the said Pemberton W. Stickrath in words and substance as follows, to wit: ‘President Wilson ought to be killed. It is a wonder some one has not done it already. If I had an opportunity, I would do it myself’ — contrary to the form of the statute,” etc.
The sufficiency of the indictment is challenged by demurrer on the-following grounds: (1) The person or persons.to whom the threat was made are not named; (2) the threat was not communicated to-the President; (3) the language employed by the defendant and set forth in the indictment does not amount to a threat; (4) the offense charged is not sufficiently described.
The situation in these respects is like that which arises from violations of section 211 of the Penal Code (Comp. St. 1916, § 10381). The person who knowingly deposits or causes to be deposited in the mail any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or other nonmailable matter is, by that section, guilty of an offense, whether in so doing he is actuated by malice or by a desire to- correct a depraving habit and to impro ve the morals of those practicing it. U. S. v. Harmon (D. C.) 45 Fed. 414. The mailing of such matter is prohibited, regardless of the relationship of the sender and the addressee, and regardless, also-, of the effect that the receipt of the article sent may have on the mind of the particular addressee. U. S. v. Musgrave (D. C.) 160 Fed. 700. The use of decoy letters by government officials in ferreting out crimes against the postal law is sanctioned by the highest authority. Grimm v. U. S., 156 U. S. 604, 610, 611, 15 Sup. Ct. 470, 39 L. Ed. 550; Goode v. U. S., 159 U. S. 663, 16 Sup. Ct. 136, 40 L. Ed. 297; Rosen v. U. S., 161 U. S. 29, 42, 16 Sup. Ct. 434, 480, 40 L. Ed. 606. That the nonmailable matter sent in response to a decoy letter does not arouse impure and libidinous thoughts in or produce any effect on the mind of the recipient constitutes no defense. U. S. v. Musgrave (D. C.) 160 Fed. 706.
If the defendant knowingly and willfully threatened to take the life of the President, the motive by which he was actuated will constitute no defense; nor is it necessary that the threat, even if communicated to the President, should have been of such a nature and extent as to disturb or unsettle his mind to any degree, or to take away from his acts in any measure that free, voluntary action which alone constitutes consent. The definitions of “threat” which are pressed upon the court’s attention, some of which are found in 38 Cyc. 290, 28 Am. & Eng. Ency. Eaw, 141, State v. Benedict, 11 Vt. 236, 34 Am. Dec. 688, and State v. Brownlee, 84 Iowa, 473, 478, 51 N. W. 25, are not pertinent or helpful in determining either the interpretation or force of the statute or the sufficiency of the indictment. It is not to be presumed that the President, or any courageous successor to1 the presidential chair, will be disturbed, or intimidated, or deterred from action, by threats of the character mentioned, even if they be communicated to him. Considering the magnitude of the country and his remoteness in point of distance from the great majority of its inhabitants, to require as a prerequisite to conviction the communication to him of such threats, would operate to defeat almost entirely the purpose of the law, although but an inconsiderable number of persons are so deficient in correct thinking, morals, or patriotism as to be ca
Naftzger v. U. S., 200 Fed. 494, 118 C. C. A. 598, on which the defendant relies, was, I think, correctly decided, but it is not pertinent. It will be! conceded that the rule would be different, were an offense charged under the first clause of the statute. In that event it would not be sufficient to charge the offense in the statutory words alone. The letter, or an adequate statement of its contents, would have to be set out. Tynes v. State, 17 Tex. App. 123.
The demurrer is overruled.
Article L442: “If any person shall threaten to take the life of any human being, or to inflict upon any human ¡being any serious bodily injury, he shall be punished by a tine of not less than one hundred nor more than two thousand dollars, and, in addition thereto, he may be imprisoned in the county jail not exceeding one year.”