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United States v. Stephen C. Hemmen
51 F.3d 883
9th Cir.
1995
Check Treatment

*1 аs- ineffective AFFIRMED. Stramarko’s claim is DISMISSED. of counsel

sistance America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellant, HEMMEN,

Stephen Defendant- C.

Appellee.

No. 93-35643. Appeals, Court of

United States

Ninth Circuit.

Submitted, Aug. 1994*. 7, 1995. April

Decided * panel unanimously case suitable for argument, Vgeri’s finds this prior counsel bad acts testimony. argument. Fed.R.App.P. disputed See United solicited the decision without oral (9th Cir.1991) Schaff, 34(a); States v. Rule 34-4. Ninth Circuit (errors by complaining will result in invited situation). exceptional reversal in the most *3 Allen,

Gary R. Robert L. Baker and Wil- Div., Easterbrook, Dept, Tax liam S. U.S. DC, Justice, Washington, plaintiff-appel- for lant. Hemmen, se, Tacoma, WA,

Stephen pro C. defendant-appellee. for ALARCON, BEEZER and Before: KLEINFELD, Judges. Circuit BEEZER, Judge: Circuit States, acting through the In- The United (“Service”), appeals ternal Revenue Service Hemmen, Stephen entry judgment for Meals, bankruptcy trusteе for Flavor Fresh (“Flavor Fresh”), seeking in its action Inc. $13,535.91 for Hemmen’s failure and interest the allowed respect to to honor its the debtor’s expense claims of administrative (“Al-Hadid” president, Falah Tuba Al-Hadid pursuant to 26 U.S.C. “taxpayer”), 6332(c)(1). contends that The Service law in as a matter of district court erred “not concluding Al-Hadid’s claims were pos- in Hemmen’s that was pay” at obligated to or that he was session levy was served. the notice of the time jurisdiction pursuant to 28 court had district jurisdic- §§ 1345. We have 1340 and re- 1291. We pursuant to 28 U.S.C. tion verse. May

I distribution in 1987 but object. failed to 23, 1983, the Service assessed a On June $70,132.89 penalty against civil tax Al-Hadid 24, 1992, brought On June remit the income and social for failure to сourt, contending in the district action security withheld Flavor Fresh taxes Hemmen failed to honor the December 1985 quarter ending Septem- employees for the was, thus, personally liable time, 30,1982. At that Flavor Fresh was ber 6332(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue 30, 1984, May Chapter 11 debtor. On trial, ensuing Code. At the bench allowing bankruptcy court entered order argued that he was not in Al- claim in Al-Hadid’s Hadid’s at the time he received the $18,000 aiding pres- the amount of in the He also contended that the *4 debtor-in-posses- ervation of the estate as stay provision, violated the automatic 11 5, 1984, September sion. the case was On 362(a), he, trustee, § that U.S.C. was enti- liquidation, Chapter to a 7 converted and quasi-judiciаl immunity tled to and that the appointed Hemmen was trustee. The bank- by by action was barred or laches ruptcy a second order on court entered Octo- equitable principles. May 5, 1993, On the 16, 1984, allowing an additional ber adminis- orally district court dismissed the action and $12,- expense in amount trative claim the of Hemmen, judgment entered for concluding court’s order indicated that 000. The no of, that he was not in or had no payment “except upon would be made fur- to, obligation respect taxpayer’s with court.” ther order of the property rights or property to at the time of levy. expressly rejected The court Hem- 17, 1985, agents Revenue On December men’s defense of laches but otherwise did not levy upon pursu- a notice of Hemmen served consider his alternative defenses. The 6332(a), Ser- § demanding ant to 26 timely appeals. vice property rights prop- he surrender all or to erty possession necessary in his to by liability, which time included II date, statutory additions. As of that legal question We review de ‍‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍novo the had liqui- estate had assets but not been respect whether the Service’s with to a later, Approximately dated. 18 months on taxpayer’s expense allowed administrative Hemmen, 7, 1987, May having during the claim bankruptcy must be honored estate, liquidated interim filed his final Ass’n, trustee. Bicycle See In re American $73,946.31 report, indicating that he had (9th 1277, Cir.1990). payment of administrative available ex- The Service contends that the district pense claims. Service does not admit court’s faulty premise conclusion rests on the but that it does not contest received a notice that Al-Hadid’s allowed administrative ex- to intent to distribute funds Al-Hadid pense claim “property rights was not $13,535.91 and that amount it failed to property subject levy” meaning within the objection to this file distribution. 6331(a) 6332(a). §§of Arguing and that an thereafter, bankruptcy Soon court or- allowed prop- claim is dered to disburse the funds. On Hemmen erly “property” characterized as or as a $13,535.91 3, 1987, paid June he satisfac- “right property” law, Washington tion of Al-Hadid’s claims. court dis- Hemmen, the Service contends that as bank- charged Hemmen from his duties and closed trustee, ruptcy personally liable under 25, August

the estate on 6332(c)(1) § for his failure to honor the De- 16, 1987, September agents On Revenue 17, levy. cember 1985 notice of served a Form 668-C Final Demand . referencing Hemmen December 1985 no- gives Title 26 U.S.C. levy. responded tice of one week United unpaid States a lien for taxes later, pointing out that property no funds were due “all rights property, and whether personal, Al-Hadid at the time the notice of belonging real or ... [to a delin and quent taxpayer].” served that the Service was notified of very The tax lien has a accounts, receivables, evidences See, bаnk v. Na e.g., States scope. United broad 713, debt, securities, salaries, Commerce, wages, 719- 472 U.S. tional 2919, 2923-24, commissions, compensation.... 86 L.Ed.2d 720, or other 105 S.Ct. (1985) tax lien reaches (concluding property pos- levy extends [A] taxpayer that a “every interest obligations exist at the sessed and which Kimura, have”); F.2d may In re levy. Obligations exist when time of the Cir.1992) (same). law (9th look to state We liability obligator fixed interest taxpayer’s whether a to determine although right to receive determinable law to “property” and to federal constitutes may until a payment be thereof deferred consequences. Unit resulting determine later date. Bess, 51, 55, 78 S.Ct. v. 357 U.S. ed States 301.6331-l(a)(l) (emphasis add- 26 C.F.R. (1958). liens Tax 2 L.Ed.2d 1135 ed). intangible prоp- A in effect and continue upon assessment arise of a notice of erty is made service paid or the statute until Industries, Inc., v. Donahue United States City Bank expires. Glass limitations Cir.1990). 265, 267, States, 66 S.Ct. 326 U.S. on the United of a notice of confers (1945); see 26 U.S.C. 90 L.Ed. to all levied States 6502(a) ac- an enforcement (providing relationship so that and creates a custodial *5 years of assess- begin within six tion must pos- into constructive property comes ment). Acceptance government. American session methods provides for two The Code Builders, Better p. v. Glendora Cor its lien. It can enforce by which the Service (9th Cir.1977) 1220, (citing 550 F.2d 1222-23 to 26 pursuant action bring can a foreclosure States, 330, 334, 421 U.S. 95 Phelps v. Unitеd here, can, simply § or it as it did 7403 (1975)). 1728, 1731, 44 L.Ed.2d 201 S.Ct. 6331(a).1 § property pursuant to levy on 6332(a) imposes § 26 U.S.C. Title action, levy is essen a foreclosure Unlike duty parties to honor the Service’s on third procedure. tially provisional, administrative levy levy.2 Failure to honor the Commerce, 472 U.S. at Bank National personal in under 26 U.S.C. results 722, 105 at 2925. The reaches S.Ct. 6332(c)(2) 6332(c)(1).3 pro further § Section existing obligations possessed and “property may an addi assess vides that the Service levy.” 26 U.S.C. the time “any person” who “fails 6331(b). penalty against interpreted this tional § has The Service property or surrender such requirement as follows: or refuses to obligation” “present cause.” property without reasonable rights to serving may by made a notice [l]evy be 6332(c)(2). recognize only § We of, 26 U.S.C. or any person possession in levy on with party to a served to, defenses available property or two respect obligated with (1) possess levy: party did not levy, a notice of subject includ- rights property to to 6332(c)(1) part, provides, pertinent 6331(a) in part, 3.Section provides, pertinent that: in that: neglects pay any or any person to tax if liable may] ... Service [the to the same refuses [a]ny to surrender person who fails or refuses by levy upon all [nonex- collect such empt] property ... subject rights property, to any to property or belong- rights property to Secretary, shall be levy, demand ing person there is a lien or which to such on person estate to the own liable in his chapter payment provided of such in equal the value of in the sum United States tax. surrendered, rights but property or not so 6332(a) part, provides, pertinent 2. Section exceeding for the amount of taxes not that: made, been which such has collection of (or obligated with any person such together and interest on with costs to) rights property sub- respect property or sum.... made ject levy upon has been which 6332(d), 6332(e), pro- formerly § Current (or rights property or ... surrender such shall against party an absolute defense the third vides part obligation) except discharge ... such suсh “delinquent taxpayer subsequent any claim a is, rights property at the time of or person.” any or demand, subject to an attachment exe- such any judicial process. under cution 888 rights property

any property or of the The district court reached this conclusion (2) largely reasoning property United States v. taxpayer and Mitchell, (5th Cir.1965), 349 F.2d or execution. prior attachment States, in which the Fifth Circuit considered wheth- 251 F.2d Nevada v. United denied, obligated er a tax (9th Cir.1957), an insurer to turn cert. 356 U.S. (1958). over cash surrender value of its insured’s 780, 2 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. executory life insurance contract. Determin- prior' was noticed A insured’s election to take the cash surrender correct Al-Ha- value, the Fifth Circuit concluded that in his allowed did’s interest possess any insurer did it could “property” expense claims constituted under surrender the time the notice of Washington Washington “prop law. defines Noting levy, served. Id. that a unlike a See, Eastes, broadly. e.g., erty” very Lee & lien, apply after-acquired does not proper- Comm’n, Inc. v. Public Serv. Wash.2d ty, the court reasoned that “a new would (1958) (defining P.2d the term necessary seem to reach the cash surrender “embracing everything “property” as eventually value when it is demanded.” Id. value”). exchangeable Accord has Little v. passage As the underscored and the States, Cir. indicate, court’s reliance Mitchell the dis- ‍‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍1983) (concluding redemption thаt a trict court’s conclusion was based on the “property” repre it when “possess determination that Hemmen did not “pecuni sents an “economic asset” that has obligated or was not to” Al- worth,” ary notwithstanding its characteriza Hadid’s at the time he received the law). “privilege” tion as a under California A levy. Thus, in addition to determin- claim who holds allowed *6 “property” whether an allowed claim is clearly bankruptcy something estate holds of law, Washington under we must consider “exchangeable” value. The fact that an al whether, law, as a matter of federal the only lowed claim can be satisfied after cer levy obligated Hemmen to surren- transpired, tain events have such as the de only der funds that became available after termination that the estate has sufficient as liquidated the estate bankruptcy was and the claim, satisfy negate sets to the does not the approved proposed court the distribution. holding “property” character of the essentially question This is timing impli- of Washington’s definition of broad this term. cating present obligation requirement the in Accord Leuschner v. First Bank & Western 6331(b). § Under the Service’s own inter- Co., 705, (9th Cir.1958) Trust 261 F.2d 708 pretation, we must determine whether the (cited in St. Louis Union Trust v. Co. United liability of bankruptcy the estate to Al-Hadid (8th States, Cir.1980)). was “fixed and determinable” at the time the was served Hemmen. B 301.6331-l(a)(l). § C.F.R. expense That an allowed administrative not, “property” claim constitutes as the brief, suggests opening disposi-

Service in its appears It that no Circuit court has decision, tive. In specifically ever, its oral the district court point, considered at which if expressly conceded that bankruptcy Al-Hadid’s claim a “obligator” estate becomes an may contingent property right be a respect whose with to a creditor’s concluded, levy. however, It the Service’s allowed administrative claim is that Al-Hadid’s interest was “not a “fixed meaning and determinable” within the 301.6331-l(a)(l). that was in the § Mr. Hem- of 26 pre C.F.R. As a of obligated liminary matter, men or that he was [Hemmen] agree we cannot with the levy. nothing at the time the Hе had district court that Mitchell establishes the of belonged at that taxpayer.” appropriate point time that departure.4 of In this re- appropriate point departure 4. An even less States, Mutual Ins. Co. New York v. United Life served holding in had the notice of been only Mitch- that the spect, we note depos- in which the estate checks were bank by passage of superceded has been ell they had been sent to and received ited Act of Pub.L. Tax Lien of the Federal [taxpayer] due course.” Id. at 198. 89-719, part at 80 Stat. No. codified 6332(b).5 Although not control- 26 U.S.C. Laughlin emphasizes that con- n us, Congress’ question ling on the before payable from cerned funds confirmed of Mitchell § 104 in the wake passage of Chapter plans took restrictively too us not to construe cautions position in that action that “the tax See scope the reach against the would not be effective estate Life, 874 F.2d Metropolitan States v. debtor, yet for which there was not the third Cir.1989). The Su- 1499-1500 plan.” Analo- a confirmed 912 F.2d rejected recently has also more preme Court gizing pre-plan Chapter 13 estate to an of the reach a restrictive construction estate, argues unliquidated Chapter 7 he that levy, in an unrelated context. See albeit position that thé no- Laughlin supports the Commerce, 472 U.S. National because it was tice of was defеctive (concluding that at 2929 105 S.Ct. argue premature. Although he does not obligates to surrender banks notice directly, implies levy, that a second point he joint in a bank account taxpayer’s funds held liqui- Chapter after the noticed estate joint prior holders notice or, even absent perhaps, bankruptcy court dated after the provisional it measure ground distribution, that is a approved was nec- promote prompt collection designed to “present obligation” essary to meet the re- taxes). 6331(b). quirement of Although decision can be construed to Laughlin persuaded also not

areWe (8th Cir.1990), draws IRS, give rise to the inference Hemmen it, Laughlin actually holding аuthority for the cites as which Hemmen position present in the obligated supports to hon- that he Service’s proposition persuaded are ready action. Nor we levy, provides a answer or the tax agreed Eighth would have with Hem- Laughlin, In Circuit question before us. question been before Circuit, facts, position had this determined men’s Eighth on similar respect, note that the court it. In this we must honor the Service’s the trustee to rest its decision on the expressly claims declined to a creditor’s *7 levy was holding that the Service’s Chapter for which narrower against two 13 estates against post- a only because claims at the time the valid plans had been confirmed 13 estate are vested Chapter confirmation levy 912 F.2d at 198- was served. Laughlin, 912 F.2d at argument property rights. See response In to the trustee’s 99. Finally, accepting Hemmen’s au- 198 n. 4. even action violated the that the enforcement Chapter 13 and analogy pre-plan a that between stay, court concluded the tomatic estate, unliquidated Chapter 7 we are purposes an with the “no more interfered below, explore we persuaded, for reasons stay ... than it would have the automatic such, (9th Cir.1965), that he the notice. As we at the time received 73 n. 4 in which inapposite. question expressly addressed in decision is reserved Life, that the In Mutual we concluded Mitchell. to turn over the cash surrender failure insurer’s 6332(b)(1) part, provides, pertinent 5. Section policy for reasonable cause value of the was that: "levy upon an insurer did because and demand respect to a organization with on an [a] not, give proceedings, rise to an further without contract issued insurance or endowment life company part obligation of ‍‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍the insurance shall, necessity organization by without such pay- policy and make to cancel the forthwith document, contract surrender of the for the cash to the United States of the surrender ments Secretary pay- case, by a constitute demand In the instant value.” 343 F.2d 74. right of the ... and the exercise seeking penalty under ment Sеrvice is not assessed to the 6332(c)(2) person whom the tax is failure to surrender for Hemmen's organization of such amount. Such cause. advance without reasonable Al-Hadid's days after ser- duty pay such amount 90 urge shall over was under a It does not that he levy. vice of notice of honor its liquidate estate assets in order to however, necessarily payment, defective with re- these conditions to that under- pre-plan creditor’s interest spect proposition obligation to a mines the that the Chapter 13 estate. estate Al-Hadid was “fixed” within the 1(a)(1) meaning §of after the un- 301.6331— derlying performance completed was and the point,

Finding no case law on we claim was allowed court. Accord language of directly Antonio, turn 26 C.F.R. United States v. Tax U.S. Cas. 301.6331-l(a)(l) (CCH) to determine whether P50, 482, (D.Haw. 1991 WL 253021 obligated to honor the 1991) Hemmen was Ser (concluding obligation that an on a facts us.6 vice’s on the before We note performance contract is “fixed” when has 301.6331-l(a)(l) at the outset that defines occurred); States, F.Supp. Tull v. United liability negative a “fixed and determinable” (E.D.Cal.1994) 1466, 1478-80 (concluding that ly, by distinguishing a “fixed and determin obligation is “fixed” execution of an liability obligations merely able” involv though auction pro contract even that, payment. This means deferred only ceeds of the auction will arise after the must, minimum, prevail, Hemmen at a estab execution of individual sаles contracts be liability to Al-Hadid lish that estate’s agent tween the auctioneer and third the time the was notice served was best, buyers). At the factors Hemmen cites materially distinguishable from that of an estate’s, only establish ordinary obligor on an contract with an exec fixed but that Al-Hadid’s interest was still utory duty completed perfor for a possible defeasance due to factors obligee. mance We conclude that as a having bearing no underlying perfor on the cannot do so. matter of law he mance. dispute fully no There is Al-Hadid

performed giving beneficial acts rise to sum, Although any, what if would be expense his administrative allowed "claims ultimately paid to Al-Hadid оn his allowed prior levy. to the service claims was uncertain at the time the notice of provisions Bankruptcy The in the Code for served, uncertainty does not expense of administrative allowance defeat the fact obligation the estate’s claims and for requirement was “determinable.” Unlike a priority effectively negate proposition the extent obligation of an be “deter that the services Al-Hadid’s rendered to the mined,” the term requires “determinable” volunteer, estate were beneficial acts capable precise that the sum be mea performed legitimate expectations without surement the future. Reiling Accord compеnsation. §§ See 11 U.S.C. States, (CCH) 77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. $13,535.91 payment ultimately he re- P9269, (N.D.Ind.1977) (con WL performance ceived was tied to the he under- cluding obligation that an is “determinable” prior took to the service of the tax performance when contractual has been com *8 cannot, thus, payment simply be character- pleted, despite continuing litigation over the after-acquired property. ized as Hemmen is due). amount This determination was fact that, allowed, although correct Al-Hadid’s readily made at bankruptcy the moment the expense administrative claim could be re- approved court proposed the distribution. money only duced to it after was determined thаt satisfy sufficient assets existed to his We conclude that an allowed administra- claims bankruptcy approved and the court expense against tive bankruptcy claim a es- the distribution. He is also “property” correct tate is Washington under law that the power during trustee retained the to a tax Federal and that Hem- the men, trustee, interim to court move the to disallow the obligated was administrative claims. None of to a liability “fixed and determinable” at the trustee, such, represented bankrupt- 363(b). 6. As Hemmen the estate. See 11 U.S.C. As the 323(a). cy estate. See As the es- any service of a notice of him for representative, charged tate's he was with the obligations owing by рroper. the estate was duty money to reduce to the payable to funds fourth him. vice’s on levy was served of the notice time (5th Cir.1972); Quakertown In re party) imposes an our conclusion are aware We (3d Center, Inc., Shopping See bankruptcy trustees. added burden Cir.1966) (same). agree. The automatic We are also at 199. We F.2d Laughlin, 912 debtor, the stay designed protect to the is however, aware, of the additional burden of the and the interests other the assets of estate impose on would contrary conclusion Laughlin, 912 in those assets. creditors delin- ability expeditiously collect to Service’s Any perceived effect of a F.2d at 198. urges would The rule Hemmen quent taxes. debtor, estate’s assets or the levy on the the opportunity of narrow window create a purely is chimeri- effectively interests of creditors can the Service through which the cal. The interests reached levy. see little benefit We notice serve non-debtor, belonged Al-Hadid. closely monitor requiring Service relationship, bringing every created a custodial es- of the administration progress pos- into the constructive Al-Hadid’s delinquent taxpayers hold interest against which tate See Glendora session of the United States. de- added burden and claims. This allowed Builders, 550 F.2d at 1222-23. Better very purpose lay would defeat is, thus, practical- operation actual designed to serve. Commerce, indistinguishable a creditor’s volun- ly from 472 U.S. See National Bankruptcy tary a claim. See 2929; transfer of In re American 105 S.Ct. cf. 3001(e). (conclud- Rule Ass’n, F.2d at 1280-81 Bicycle precludes a Anti-Injunction Act ing that B enjoining from bankruptcy court against an collecting penalty assessed is argues that he also Hemmen corporation). Our con- of the debtor officer personal shielded from requires the trustee to merely clusion immunity because quasi-judicial doctrine of than to the delin- rather funds to the Service pursuant made final his distribution liquidated estate is taxpayer once the quent court order. approved. proposed distribution matter, bankruptcy general aAs pоsition in a presumably The trustee immunity from suit enjoy broad trustees administration progress of the monitor the acting scope of their authori when within efficiently. the estate more v. order. Bennett ty pursuant to court (9th Cir.1989). Williams, F.2d Ill however, immune, for inten are Trustees not district can affirm the Because we imposed of duties negligent violation tional or by fairly supported any basis court on that Hem- have determined by law. Id. We record, Washington, States duty legal to honor men was under (9th Cir.1992), consider we next Although the issue confront Service’s raised be novel, Hemmen defenses respects the alternative Hemmen some ing him was in court. fore the district had levied that the Service was on notice to hоnor property and failed

Al-Hadid’s 6332(c)(1). Hemmen’s levy in violation A moreover, levy, did failure to honor Service’s contends ‍‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍duty protect the assets arise out of his stay levy violated automatic noteworthy that also find estate. We *9 ,§ 11 U.S.C. 362. provision at argue the district before Hemmen did court, he court, this before above, or in his brief argument this As noted even guidance or sought or Laughlin, instruction Eighth rejected by Circuit legal question precise brought auto reasoning entities the on the He thus bankruptcy court. attention protect were left stay designed to matic to honor 198; his failure cannot characterize levy. 912 F.2d by the unaffected cf. to a court resulting obedience 436, Levin, 462 F.2d B Ltd. v. & G cirсumstances, quasi- these order. Under (doctrine bar Ser- legis does not of custodia judicial immunity trary does not shield him from nearly to its interests when after a liability. eighteen month-long period of silence follow- its notice of it received the notice of proposed disposition

C listing Al-Hadid as payee Despite of his allowed claims. remaining equitable Hemmen’s de fact, timely object the Service failed to or to fenses revolve around a common nucleus of otherwise alert Hemmen to the fact that the fact, involving timely the Service’s failure to had not been released with respond proposed disposition to his notice of Al-Hadid’s claims. It then served its final аnd to initiate this action. He invokes lach demand proposed several weeks after the argues es. He also that the Service’s failure distribution was effected and the estate was object proposed to the notice of distribu closed. position, Unaware of the Service’s him believing tion misled into that the Ser Hemmen, perhaps reasonably light vice considered its to be defective and Eighth dicta from the Circuit’s decision in it, consequently, would not hold him Laughlin above, paid discussed the funds to personally failing liable to honor the Al-Hadid in reliance on the Service’s silence. These facts can be characterized to state a equitable estopрel. defense of Although strong, the facts do not meet the high threshold we apply- have established for matter, preliminary As a the district ing equitable estoppel against govern- properly rejected court Hemmen’s invocation public’s ment. Even if the interest would not of laches. See United States v. First Nat’l damage” “suffer undue singu- because of the Circle, (9th 882, 652 F.2d Cir. here, presented lar facts the Service’s failure 1981) (laches is not a defense to the enforce object proposed distribution, or to States). ment of tax claims the United otherwise alert consequences Hemmen to the The traditional equi action, elements of of his course of ques- raises (1) estopрel party table are that: only to be tions do; as to what the Service failed to (2) facts, estopped knows the he or in she the Service’s conduct cannot be characterized tends that his or her conduct will be acted on as going beyond “affirmative conduct mere party Watkins, must so act that the invoking estop negligence.” 875 F.2d at 707. pel (3) intended, has a to believe it is so estoppel Hemmen’s necessarily defense fails. party invoking estoppel ignorant must be facts, (4) of the true he or she must IY detrimentally rely on the former’s conduct. Service’s put December Army, Watkins v. United States 875 F.2d Hemmen on notice that he would disburse (9th Cir.1989) (en banc), cert. de taxpayer funds to peril. at his His fail- nied, U.S. S.Ct. ure to honor the notice him renders (1990).7 L.Ed.2d 395 When a seeks to 6332(c)(1). Hable under 26 U.S.C. We RE- equitable estoppel against govern invoke VERSE contrary the district court’s conclu- ment, additionally require showing we sion. agency engaged in “affirmative conduct going beyond negligence” mere and that “the KLEINFELD, Judge, dissenting: Circuit public’s will not interest suffer undue dam age” as a I application respectfully result of the of this dissent. I would affirm the doctrine. Id. at 707. district judgment court’s in favor of the trustee, Mr. Hemmen. presents strong case for the application equitable estoppel Al-Hadid, Hemmen, under its Mr. not Mr. owed the Although traditional elements. it is unclear taxes. obHgated if, Mr. Hemmen can be knew, aсtually what the Service it could infer when the IRS levied him in he that Hemmen would act a manner con- then owed Mr. Al-Hadid a fixed and deter- Although Overman, applied we have 1970); never this doctrine Cir. *10 enforcing to bar the levy, Auto., Service from a we have accord United States v. One 1973 Buick open possibility. left 1977). this See United States v. Cir. just Congress prohibited stay. automatic lev- money. the IRS of When sum minable made: which was not an as the could such act in on Hemmen ied money, (b) could any and (a) paid Al-Hadid of Except provided have in subsection as any money. The two paid the IRS section, operates not have ... petition a filed this $30,000 . in award purported entities, to court orders stay, applicable to all of— a Al-Hadid, did to expenses but administrative (3) possession proper- of any act to obtain money Al-Hadid any to payment of not allow property from the ty of estate or of order, not and subsequent did except upon property over to exercise control estate or $30,000 be the amount would establish of the estate fact, Al-Hadid never became In payable. 101(15) 362(a); § § U.S.C. U.S.C. Instead, in $30,000“allowed.” to the entitled estate, trust, (“ gov person, ‘entity1includes $13,- to Al-Hadid was the distribution Trustee”). unit, and United States ernmental 535.91. exceptions reader will notice The in 1985 issued notice' The actual (b). stay listed in automatic are subsection in “money ... now to ordered Hemmen exception for “issuance an list includes The taxpay- belonging to your possession and by governmental unit of a to the debtor (or obligat- you are for which [Al-Hadid] er deficiency.” owing ed) obligations money or other and all 362(b)(9). exception for no There is no $93,576.93. taxpayer,” up to you to this from regulations expressly levy. The tax tices of correct, majority analysis is then If the custody levy upon in the prohibit a assets Hemmen re- that when implication must be “ex bankruptcy proceeding, in a the court levy, have sent he should this notice ceived progressed to proceeding has cept where $30,000, the amount to the IRS a check interfere point that the would not such a ex- subject to Al-Hadid’s then the court of the court or where with the work plainly have been would pense award. That levy.” permission to C.F.R. grants almost three have been It would mistaken. 301.6331-l(a)(3); 1A on see also Collier money, have and could not too much times ¶ (“The per not Bankruptcy 12.06[4] IRS at that time. properly been disbursed of Intent postpetition Notices mitted to mail debtor-”). I any Levy assets of creditor, IRS, any had ei- like other in way that the IRS could no stay see of the automatic dissolution ther to seek statute, stay consistently with the automatic relief, or else special some bankruptcy and on its which money from Hemmen take entitle- all creditors’ when await distribution Al-Hadid, if even might arguably be due on 1A Collier became final. See ments have been be taken could 1993) (“The ¶ the amount to (15th ed. Bankruptcy 12.06[1] in 1985. ascertained other stay prohibits the IRS and automatic taking detri- actions which are creditors the IRS if it had been lawful for Even or which bankruptcy estate mental to the Al-Hadid due to Mr. levy on account or changing the nature in a creditor result in Mr. Hem- account existed no such bankruptcy peti- of a claim after the priority that a regulation provides hands. men’s any IRS cannot take [T]he tion is filed.... and obligation to be “fixed has third of the possession property obtain action to levy, subject and to be determinable” property оf control over or to obtain estate subsequently money levy has no effect (“The ¶ estate”); id. at 12.06[4] see also party’s possession. coming the third into scope, extremely stay broad in automatic serving may Levy be made any type of collection applies to almost of, or any person in levy on or against debtor action to, property or obligated with Thus the functions bankruptcy estate. levy, includ- rights to those of the IRS are Collection Division accounts, receivables, evidences bank severely curtailed which are most salaries, wages, securities, debt, 11.”). title filing of a case under Ex- commissions, compensation. or 301.6631-2(c) provided in cept аs properly The IRS could salary wages, a regard bankruptcy because estate *11 only property possessed bank, gous extends to the a third which from obligations, which exist at the time money time to time owes taxpayer. levy. Obligations exist when the True, foreseeably something he would owe obligor is determinable levy made, of 1985 when but the fixed of although payment to receive fixed, obligation was not and he could not may be until a later date. determine ‍‌‌‌‌​​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​​​​‌‌‌​‍how much it would be until deferred thereof For example, day if on the first of the long after the delinquent taxpayer personal month a sold get The should IRS have acted to its mon- agreement to an ey when the trustee sеnt it the notice of buyer purchase price remit the last hearing in 1987. month, day a made on the buyer day of on the tenth the month would sale, although

reach the amount due buyer satisfy levy by need not

paying over the amount to the district day the last

director until of the month.

Similarly, levy only reaches person upon levied at example, the time the is made. For CORNETT; Jensen; Susan Katherine made on a bank with to an Henry; Timothy Hiser, John on their delinquent taxpayer account of a is satis- own behalf and on behalf of all others fied if the bank surrenders the amount of similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, taxpayer’s balance the time the is made. The has no any effect deposit DONOVAN, subsequent taxpayer. Director, made Richard Idaho De partment Subsequent deposits may Welfare; be reached of Health and Ste subsequent levy phen Weeg, Administrator, on the bank. C. State Hos pital South, in their official and individ 301.6331-l(a)(l) (emphasis C.F.R. add- capacities, Defendants-Appellees. ual ed). levied, In when the IRS the bank- ruptcy obligation to trustee’s Mr. Al-Hadid No. 92-35255. yet was not “fixed” and “determinable.” It $30,000, capped Appeals, United States but not Court of fixed at that amount, any Ninth and no Circuit. one could then money determine how much Mr. Al-Hadid Argued and Submitted Nov. 1993. get. would The amount became fixed in April Decided when it was 1995. determined to be a much amount, $13,535.91. lower May As Amended ' examples provided The two regula- tion what illustrate the words “fixed and $13,-

determinable” mean. Mr. Al-Hadid’s

535.91 is not like the amount to become

payable at the end of the month from the buyer.

real estate That amount is fixed and

determined, though yet even payable. $13,535.91 closely analogous is more subsequently deposit. made bank

earlier does not make the bank liable to deposit.

the IRS for the later The bank does keep deposits

not need to track of into the

taxpayer’s they account as come in from the

taxpayer parties or third and remit them to Instead, IRS. has no effect on a

subsequent deposits. Mr. Hemmen is analo-

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Stephen C. Hemmen
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 7, 1995
Citation: 51 F.3d 883
Docket Number: 93-35643
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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