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United States v. Steele
53 M.J. 274
C.A.A.F.
2000
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 STATES, Appellee, UNITED STEELE, Corporal,

Milton D. Lance Corps, Appellant.

U.S. Marine

No. 99-0314.

Crim.App. No. 97-1236. Appeals

U.S. Court of

the Armed Forces.

Argued April 2000. Aug.

Decided

EFFRON, J., opinion delivered the Court, CRAWFORD, C.J., in which SULLI- GIERKE, JJ., COX, S.J., VAN and joined. COX, S.J., concurring opinion. filed a (ar- Appellant: George For A. Gallenthin brief). (on gued); Lieutenant Dale O. Harris Collins, Appellee: Captain For J. William Irvin, (argued); Eugene Jr. E. Commander Captain Colonel M. Kevin Sandkuhler and (on brief). Michael D. Carsten Judge opinion EFFRON delivered the the Court. composed

A court-martial mil- itary judge sitting appellant, alone convicted pursuant pleas, conspiracy to mixed wrongful distribute cocaine and distribution cocaine, in violation of Articles 81 and 112a, Military Justice, Uniform Code of 912a, §§ respectively. USC 881 and He was discharge, sentenced to a dishonorable con- forfeitures, years, finement for 8 total grade. reduction to the lowest enlisted sentence, convening authority approved the and the Court of Criminal affirmed unpublished opinion. in an appellant’s petition, granted On review following of issue: *2 those motion attach granted appellant’s DE- to WAS APPELLANT WHETHER the Because documents on March 2000. AMENDMENT NIED HIS SIXTH contested, in documents not CI- facts those TO WHERE HIS RIGHT COUNSEL of this accept purposes as true for WAS we them DEFENSE COUNSEL VILIAN appeal. LAW TO PRACTICE UNAUTHORIZED HE ALL WHERE IN JURISDICTIONS awas These reveal that Mr. C documents TO PRAC- HAD BEEN ADMITTED states, Iowa, in the bar three member of TICE LAW. Hawan, Texas, he on the had stated and specified following issue: also the

We to of Iowa admitted the bar record. He was changed to A in his status was later WHETHER CIVILIAN COUNSEL but According IN a letter IS INACTIVE OR RETIRED “retired inactive.” to WHO and BAR MEMBER- Ethics and IN HIS from the Board of Professional STATUS Court, Supreme TO “[a] REMAINS AUTHORIZED Iowa Conduct of the SHIP® A practice BEFORE GENERAL PRACTICE to person who has been admitted IN TERMS OF COURT-MARTIAL has had license law Iowa and their 38(b)(2) UCMJ, AND 27 AND ARTICLES sta- suspended or on inactive law 502. tus, authority RCM law under the cannot of Mr. C of the outside Iowa.” Iowa license below, affirm For the reasons set forth membership in Hawan was admitted to bar Ap- of of Criminal the decision the Court entered inactive status. but he later peals. Supreme Rule According Hawan Court 17(d)(7), attorney may assume an “desire to I. BACKGROUND practice of inactive status and discontinue the Appellant represented by at de- was trial attor- law in The rule notes that an Hawaü.” counsel, T, Captain by tailed and a longer ney “shall on inactive status no counsel, Mr. C. Detañed civilian defense eligible a practice law.” Mr. C became defense counsel announced he was member of the of Texas of the bar State “qualified and in accordance with certified thereafter, Shortly request, he 27(b) in accordance with Article and sworn placed result of on inactive status. The 42(a) Military Article of the Code of Uniform eivüian “not that action was that counsel was Simüarly, civilian defense counsel Justice.” practice as an and authorized to announced, “I am licensed law in the STATE of TEXAS.” counselor at Iowa, highest the courts of the States of Hawan, Texas; previously and I am and QUALIFICATIONS II. OF

qualified and and sworn in accor- COUNSEL certified 27(b) 42(a) and dance with Articles of the UCMJ, Article 10 USC entitles Müitary mili- Uniform Code of Justice.” The general special an or court- accused before tary judge appeüant then advised of his martial to detañed rights appellant stated ability regard defense without to his by Captain T be-represented he wished 27(b): pay. Under and Mr. C. (b) de- Trial counsel defense counsel Throughout post-trial proceed- trial and court-martial— tañed for Ap- ings, and before the Court of Criminal (1) advocate who is must be challenging no claim peals, made graduate of accredited law school status, qualifications, effectiveness Fed- member of bar of a or is a either his detailed or civilian counsel. of a highest or of the court eral court However, in Supplement to Petition for State; must be a member of Court, appel- in this Grant of Review filed of a Federal court or foregoing Issue moved lant asserted the State; highest court relating pro- to Mr. to attach documents C’s (2) Iowa, must be certified as fessional status as a member Judge Hawaii, duties perform such and Texas bar associations. We Advocate General the armed force mission to before a federal court is bar, which he is a member. derivative from in a state disbarment the State does not result in respect Article 27 is silent with to the automatic disbarment the federal court. represented by to be Though that state action is entitled to re- respect any qualifications imposed *3 spect, conclusively binding it is not on the upon civilian defense counsel. 544, Ruffalo, federal In courts.” re 390 U.S. 38(b), UCMJ, 838(b), § 10 USC 547, 1222, (1968), 88 S.Ct. 20 L.Ed.2d 117 penumbra sets forth the full anof accused’s States, citing 278, Theard v. United 354 U.S. options respect representation 281-82, 1274, (1957). 77 S.Ct. 1 L.Ed.2d 1342 special courts-martial: detailed Peters, (1991), In Reese v. 926 F.2d counsel, 668 individually requested mili representation Reese counsel, contended at trial tary or civilian counsel. Under Arti by lawyer a 38(b)(2), suspended who had been for cle represent “The accused pay failure to his state bar dues an by provided by ed civilian if counsel him.” automatic violation of the Sixth Amendment. any Neither provision Article 38 nor other rejected per The Seventh Circuit such a se any qualifications the Code establishes agreed rule. The court with Beto v. Bar requisites than the oath —for a civil —other (5th field, Cir.1968), 391 F.2d 275 which ian counsel to before a court-martial. lawyer held “that a whose 42, UCMJ, 842; license had been See Art. 10 USC see also suspended Hosken, (CMA pay may” for failure to dues still 1980), Soriano v. 9 221MJ meaning serve as “counsel” Kraskouskas, within the and United States v. 9 USC 607, (1958). Sixth Amendment. matters 387, “What MA 26 CMR 1958 WL 3387 purposes legal rep constitutional is that the The President quali- has established basic resentative was enrolled after the court con fications for civilian in RCM legal cluded that he was fit to render assis Courts-Martial, Manual for United States Reese, tance.” 926 F.2d at 670. (1995 ed.). representing Civilian counsel States, In Solina v. United 709 F.2d 160 accused before a court-martial “[a] must be (1983), the accused was unaware that his member of the bar of a Federal court or of attorney passed defense had not the bar highest the bar of the court of a State.” exam and had not been admitted to 502(d)(3)(A). lawyer RCM If that civilian any as a member of state bar. While the bar,” “not a member of such a then he or she Second Circuit did find this defect to be fatal lawyer must be “a who is authorized a in right terms of the Sixth Amendment recognized licensing authority distinguish the court was careful to military judge and is found to be holding its compe- from situations in which qualified upon the accused a tence was not in issue: showing to the satisfaction of the do not [W]e intimate that technical appropriate that the train- in defect the licensed status of a defen- ing familiarity general princi- with the representative dant’s would amount to a ples of apply criminal law which in a court- 502(d)(3)(B). violation of the Sixth Amendment. We martial.” RCM Neither the limit our decision this case to situations expressly disqualifies Code nor the Manual where, defendant, unbeknown to the attorney grounds on the that his or representative prac- was not authorized to her designated bar status is as “inactive.” state, tice law and the lack of such Federal courts in the civilian sector have authorization stemmed from failure to seek question attorney’s dealt with the of an going it or from its denial for a reason status vis-a-vis an accused’s Sixth Amend- legal ability, pass such failure general, they ment counsel. hold examination, or want of moral charac- attorney that once an is found ter____ licensing juris- admitted to law in a (footnote omitted). Id. at 167 diction, subsequent changes to her bar argument status do not render that coun- An that disbarment incompetent disqualified. “Though sel ad- Court of made “counsel’s continued

277 by a achieved reviewed tence has been ... under the Sixth services ineffective authority. competent licensing This determi- rejected in United States Amendment” was (9th necessarily Mouzin, Cir.), is not evis- competence nation of cert. 785 F.2d 682 States, by a nom., imposed Carvajal v. United cerated sanctions sub when denied changes in status 93 577 counsel’s 107 L.Ed.2d state bar or 479 U.S. S.Ct. (1986). subsequent ser do not The court held that matters demonstrate where those compe- negative would not counsel’s vices disbarred determination considering inadequate deemed without Ninth Circuit concluded tence. theAs quality” “intrinsic of those services. Mouzin: noted that in United States v. court Hoff nor invites suspension Neither disbarment (9th Cir.), denied,

man, F.2d cert. 733 596 per that continued se rule 83 L.Ed.2d 469 U.S. S.Ct. *4 constitutionally in an trial is inef- ongoing (1984), rejected any “per had se rule” to it to to the allows us fective. Admission bar court, repre the effect “that in the federal training, that counsel has the assume lawyer suspended prac sentation from ability a client knowledge, represent and to automatically state tice results him. licensure who chosen Continued has right Amendment to the denial the Sixth signal pub- the normally gives a reliable to It fact that an attor “[T]he counsel.” noted: to purports is what lic that the licensee he not, ney suspended is does with or disbarred attorney qualified and to advise be—an more, signifi rise the constitutional out But it an undeniable a client. is counsel under the cance ineffective Sixth lawyers unhappily experience fact of Rather, Amendment. a defendant must ordi ranging censure to incur sanctions from narily point preju specific conduct which disbarment; discipline that sometimes that him in the diced order to raise constitutional incompetence or un- flows from revealed claim” of ineffective assistance of counsel. turpitude as to trustworthiness or such Mouzin, 696-97; 785 F.2d at see also United All we deserve no client’s confidence. Maria-Martinez, 914, v. 143 States F.3d lawyer’s need here is that services hold (5th denied, 525 Cir.1998), 916-19 cert. U.S. se, case, per were on a not a ineffective 1107, 876, (1999); 142 119 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 776 basis. 664, McKinney, 53 and United States v. F.3d 698; (5th see United v. Mitch- Cir.), 785 F.2d at States nom., sub v. 675 cert. denied Wade (D.C.Cir.2000). ell, 1126,1130 States, U.S, 216 901, 261, F.3d 516 116 United S.Ct. (1995). 133 L.Ed.2d 184 III. DISCUSSION significance

Our Court has addressed the licensing authority’s decision admit a foregoing light In of the consider Hosken, person to the v. bar. Soriano ations, disquali Mr. hold that C was not supra, we that a civilian noted counsel must fied his status an “inactive” virtue of “qualified” right in order to make the Hawaii, Iowa, bars of and member of the “meaningful as intended Contrary appellant’s Texas. assertions 9 at 221. the Code.” MJ Civilian counsel brief, no evidence that Mr. C was there is recognized some must also “authorized suspended practicing in of the from licensing authority engage practice membership. states in which he held bar Kraskouskas, of law.” 9 USCMA at 26 Rather, merely inactive Mr. assumed an C at 389. There are no other restrictions CMR jurisdictions. This status in each of those right on an accused’s to counsel under Article adversely upon reflect status does not 38(b). licensed, lawyers pre- Once “such competence; any change it nor does reflect competent professional under- sumed competence of his in the determination military taking of the defense of a accused by any of these bar associ state Soriano, 9 MJ at 222. a court-martial.” fact that ations. It follows that mere appellant’s did not maintain an active The decisions of our Court other fed- licensing per states not a se that admission status in his is eral courts reflect necessary compe- disqualifying a level factor. is the indicia that 278 8-6e, deficient,

We also note Rule Com manee was otherwise ment, Department Navy heavy failed showing JAGINST to meet his burden of (Ch. 3, 1996), May 5803.1A 30 states that “an that he was denied the effective assistance of individual ‘inactive’ be considered as to Washington, counsel. Strickland 466 U.S. particular juris of law within a 104 80 L.Ed.2d 674 S.Ct. good diction and ‘in still be considered stand (1984); v. Brownfield, United 52 States MJ ” rule, ing[.]’ therefore, Under this inactive (1999); Scott, States v. United MJ status does not bar counsel from 186, 188(CMA 1987). being certified as under Article

27(b)(2) Navy Marine IV. CONCLUSION Corps adopt courts-martial. We decline to stringent more prac rule for civilian counsel Navy- decision of the United States ticing before courts-martial. Unless an ac Corps Marine Court of Criminal cused can demonstrate that civilian counsel affirmed. had never attained certified, deny could not be we shall not COX, Judge (concurring): Senior limit a accused’s under Article pick 38 to elect civilian I agree granted the resolution *5 his own civilian counsel. Once counsel is However, specified I am issues. dis- compe licensed to law a state or quieted by it acceptable the idea that is licensing authority, tent presume we shall civilian, military allow appear that civilian are they when courts-martial could not as defense counsel at courts-martial.* represent civilians civilian courts. Intui- tively, my it is belief defen- agree federal We with the cases cited dants, family as well as their licensing friends, above authority that once a state operate assumption under the that “JAGS” qualifications has reviewed the and admitted lawyers duly prac- who are authorized to attorney practice, subsequent change tice law in more of sovereign in bar one or necessarily status alone does not re- country. in a States of this sult determination that there has been a denial of the Amendment Sixth to coun- Furthermore, notwithstanding the cases appellant’s sel. We conclude that civilian upon majority opinion relied in the which disqualified was not be- have though let convictions even stand fore courts-martial virtue of the fact that lawyer disqualified practice, from was active he was “inactive” in the three states within I know of no federal or state who which he was licensed. disbarred, willingly suspended, would let a case, state, Texas, in at least one lawyer practice inactive in his or her court. prohibited practice Mr. C’s inactive status accept We should less for no our only within the state. Texas bar mem- accused. therefore, bership adequate, support rules, writing require If I I were would appearance counsel’s before a court-martial civilian) (military that counsel be in an regardless imposed by limitations Ha- “officially” status recognized which makes waii or Iowa. they may appointed repre- clear that parties they sent in a trial or that appellant presented Because criminal no client, may, go competence arising issue of from for a fee from a into a court- represent counsel’s room client. bar status and because That status perfor- recognition has not shown that civilian counsel’s simple carries with it the that the * recognized practice providing tions, The record before does not indicate for such us whether limita- generally recognized practice there is a in the appropriate it for the President to trial of criminal cases before federal district ap- consider whether similar limitations should courts that limits counsel who ply governing under the trials courts- rules are not in an in a state active status or federal UCMJ, § martial. 10 USC 836. See Art. generally bar. To the extent that there is a me to demean the permit competent” To less seems “legally profession perpetrate law and to nothing noble accept in order I would less clients. servicemembers, upon their fami- a fraud requirements of Uni- to meet the Justice, lies, large. public Military form USC Code of

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Steele
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
Date Published: Aug 16, 2000
Citation: 53 M.J. 274
Docket Number: 99-0314/MC
Court Abbreviation: C.A.A.F.
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