152 F. 290 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri | 1907
The United States exhibited its bill in this court under the act of July 2, 1890, “to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies” (26 Stat. 209, c. 647 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3200]), in which it alleged the existence of this state of facts: The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, a corporation, 7 individual defendants, and about 70 other defendants, called “subsidiary corporations,” have formed and are engaged in executing a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize commerce in petroleum' and its products among the states and territories and with foreign nations. Pursuant to, and in the execution of, the plan of this conspiracy, the individual defendants have caused the control of all the subsidiary corporations and the ownership of a majority of the stock of many of them to be vested in the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, a holding corporation, while the subsidiary corporations are the producers, refiners, traders, and operators, by means of which the restraint and monopoly are intended to be and are effected, and the profits of the scheme are gathered. The individual defendants own a majority of the stock of
Section 4 of the act of July 2, 1890, confers upon the several Circuit Courts of the United States jurisdiction to restrain violations of its provisions, and section 5 reads in this way:
“Whenever it shall appear to the court before which any proceeding under section four of this act may be pending that the ends of justice require that other parties should be brought before the court, the court may cause them to be summoned, whether they reside in the district in which the court is held or not; and subpoenas to that end.may be served in any district by the marshal thereof.”
The individual defendants, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and nearly all the subsidiary corporations, except the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, were not inhabitants of, and could not be found in, this district. After the filing of the bill, and upon the presentation by the complainant of a petition which disclosed this fact, the court ordered-that the nonresident defendants should be brought in, and that subpoenas should be served upon them in the districts in which they resided. Certain of these defendants have appeared specially, and moved the court to vacate this order and to quash the service of the subpoenas upon them, upon the grounds that the court was without jurisdiction to make the order, that it was prematurely and irregularly made, and that the ends of justice did not require that the nonresident defendants should be brought into this suit.
The judicial power of the United States is vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court, “and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” .This power extends “to all cases in law and equhy arising under this Constitution and the laws of the United- States, — to controversies to which the United States shall be
The inhibition of section 1 of the judiciary acts of March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552, and Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508], that “no civil suit shall be brought before either of said courts [the Circuit and District Courts] against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant,” does not restrict the jurisdiction of this court, nor its power to bring in parties without its district, in the case under consideration, because that provision is inapplicable to instances in which exclusive jurisdiction over particular cases, or classes of cases, is created and conferred upon the courts of the United States by special acts of Congress. U. S. v. Mooney, 116 U. S. 106, 6 Sup. Ct. 304, 29 L. Ed. 550; Van Patten v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. (C. C.) 74 Fed. 981, 985-988; Atkins v. Disintegrating Co., 18 Wall. 272, 21 L. Ed. 841; In re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U. S. 488, 493, 10 Sup. Ct. 587, 33 L. Ed. 991; In re Hohorst, 150 U. S. 653, 662, 14 Sup. Ct. 221, 37 L. Ed. 1211. There can therefore be no doubt that Congress had the authority to confer jurisdiction of this case upon this court, nor that they have lawfully exercised that authority; and the only question is whether or not this court exceeded the power thus conferred upon it when it summoned the nonresident defendants.
. Counsel call attention to the fact that the complainant alleges in its bill that the seven individual defendants conceived and put into operation the plan whereby the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, with a capital of $113,000,000, became the holding company, and whereby, through it, they direct and control the acts of the subsidiary corporations, and they contend that, if a Circuit Court, within whose district one of these eight principal defendants is a resident, would have the ¡lower in a suit of this nature to bring in nonresident parties necessary to a complete adjudication of the case, nevertheless, the subsidiary corporations are mere tools of the principal defendants, and the act was not intended to grant, and does not give, to a court within whose district a subsidiary corporation only resides, the power to summon the other conspirators who are not resident's of that district. They argue that it is only where there is a resident defendant who is a participant in the whole length and breadth of the conspiracy that nonresident
Repeated readings of the act under which this bill is brought disclose no such limitation or condition of the authority granted to the Circuit Courts to bring in nonresident parties. The power is given without restriction to every Circuit Court whenever it appears to it that the ends-of justice require its exercise. The Congress has unlimited discretion here. It might have conditioned this authority by the rank, by the power, or by the degree of participation in the conspiracy of the resident defendant. The fact that it failed to do so raises a persuasive presumption that it never intended to impose any condition or limitation of this nature.
Again, the alleged conspiracy is one. Its scheme is single. It has but one object. Perhaps none of the alleged conspirators participates in every part of the conception and of the work of the combination, but every one of them takes his part in the plan or in its execution, a part promotive of its purpose, the restraint and monopolization of commerce in the products of petroleum among the states. To the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, the resident defendant, has been allotted no inconsiderable portion of the execution of this plan. Its?,part is, with the aid of the Galena Signal Oil Company, to restrain and monopolize the commerce throughout the United States in the lubricating oil used by railroad companies, and, with the aid of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana, to divide between them the territory in Missouri and the Southwest, and to restrain and monopolize the commerce in the products of petroleum in their respective districts. It has accepted its assignment and is engaged in the performance of this portion of the scheme of the conspiracy. It has been engaged in executing some part of its plan for many years. It is true that a majority of its stock is owned by the eight principal defendants, that they choose its officer^, control its operation, and share its profits; but the Waters-Pierce Oil Company is still a distinct legal entity, a corporation of the state of Missouri. The knowledge of its officers and directors is its knowledge, and those officers and directors cannot have caused this corporation to act its important part in the accomplishment of the purpose of this conspiracy without knowledge of the conspiracy, its scheme, its object, and its effect. One who learns of a conspiracy after it is formed, and then joins it, or knowingly aids in the execution of its scheme, and shares in its profits, becomes from that time as much a co-conspirator as if he were one of those who originally designed it and put it in operation. Lincoln v. Claflin, 7 Wall. 132, 138, 19 L. Ed. 106; United States v. Babcock, Fed. Cas. No. 14,487; United States v. Cassidy (D. C.) 67 Fed. 698, 702; The Anarchists’ Case, 12 N. E. 865, 976, 17 N. E. 898, 122 Ill. 1, 3 Am. St. Rep. 320; United
Was the order irregular or premature ? Immediately after the filing of the bill, and before a subpoena had been issued or served upon the resident defendant, the United States presented its petition that the nonresident defendants should be brought in, and it was granted. _ It is insisted that the order was premature, and that the court was without power to make it, until after the resident defendant had been served with process, and notice of the hearing upon the petition had been given to the defendants without the district. But the statute requires no notice of the application for the order, and there is no reason for it, because the order conclusively adjudicates nothing, and every question which conditions its validity or propriety is open to challenge, hearing, and decision as completely after, as before it was made, as in the case now under consideration. The act does not prescribe the time or the manner in which it shall be made to appear to the court that other parties should be brought before it, and, in the absence of any provision of this nature5 the requisite appearance may be made at such a time and in such a way as the court, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, may direct or permit. The method suggested by counsel for the defendants is that the United States should first file its bill against the resident conspirators, and cause service of process to be made upon them, and that thereafter it should present a petition that the nonresident conspirators should be brought in and made parties to the suit. The method pursued was to make all the alleged conspirators defendants to the bill, to set forth therein the existence and history of the conspiracy and the connection of each defendant therewith, and immediately upon its filing to present a petition, in which the places where the nonresident defendants could be served with process were disclosed, and to pray therein that they be summoned. In the prosecution of each method, the question whether the nonresident conspirators are necessary or proper parties to the suit between the government and the resident conspirators equally conditions the duty of the court to bring them before it. In the prosecution of each method, that question may be well determined. No sound reason occurs to us why the former is preferable to the latter. On the other hand, the presentation of its entire cause of action in the original bill, in which all the alleged conspirators are named as defendants, and wherein their connection with the conspiracy is set forth, accom
Finally, it is insisted that it did not appear to the court that the ends of justice required the nonresident defendants to be brought before it, because more of them and more of the original -and chief conspirators resided in the Southern district of New York and in certain other districts than in the district in which this court sits, and it is contended that the’ends of justice will be more completely served by the prosecution and adjudication of tire controversy involved .in this suit in the district of the inhabitancy of a larger number of the defendants. But that question is not open to the consideration or adjudication of this court. The Congress did not confer jurisdiction, in this class of cases, upon the Circuit Court in whose district the largest number of conspirators resided, but upon every Circuit Court in whose district a resident conspirator could be found and served with process. It did not grant to any of the Circuit Courts the power to select the court in which the United States should institute its suit. If it had done so, each court might have selected another. It left the complainant free to commence its'suit in any Circuit Court in which it could find and serve a resident conspirator. It instituted its suit in this court and invoked its exercise of its power to acquire jurisdiction of the defendants by the issue and service of its process. The question presented by the petition for that purpose was, not in which court the ends of justice required the complainant to choose to institute its suit, but whether or not in this suit the ends of justice required that the nonresident defendants should be brought in.
The exercise of the power conferred upon the courts by the Constitution and the acts of Congress, to acquire jurisdiction of controversies and parties by the issue and service of their process, is not discretionary with the courts, when a complainant demands it. It is an imperative duty, which may not be renounced, and whose discharge .may not be evaded. It is the duty of a court of equity to finally determine the entire controversy before it, and to do complete justice by adjusting all the rights involved therein. Hence, in every suit in which the power to acquire jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties is conferred upon the court, the duty is imposed upon it, if its discharge is invoked by the complainant, to summon and hear, before decision, not only every indispensable party, but every necessary party within reach of its process, every party who has an interest in the controversy, and who ought to be made a party to the suit in order that the court may finally adjudicate the whole matter, although if he were not amenable to process, final justice might be administered between the other parties, without his presence. Story’s Eq. Pl.; Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. 130, 15 L. Ed. 158; Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184 U. S. 199, 235, 22 Sup. Ct. 308, 46 L. Ed. 499.
The scope of the bill in this case is broad and comprehensive. It portrays an alleged conspiracy which extends throughout the nation.
Our conclusions are these: Congress had the power, under the Constitution, to confer jurisdiction of suits of this nature upon this court, and to authorize it to bring into a suit against a resident conspirator nonresident co-conspirators by service of its process upon them anywhere within the dominion of the United States. It exercised this power by the act of July 2, 1890. The Waters-Pierce Oil Company was a resident of this district and a co-conspirator with the nonresident de-fendánts. The fifth section of the act granted authority to bring in the nonresident co-conspirators by service of its subpoenas upon them without this district. The ends of justice required the court to bring them in. The proceedings for that purpose were regular, and the order was timely, and the motions to vacate it and to quash the service of the subpoenas issued under it must be denied.
Let an order be entered accordingly.
