*1 v. STANDARD OIL CO. STATES UNITED May 23, 1966. January Argued 1966. Decided No. argued for Nathan Lewin the cause the United him were States. With brief Solicitor General Marshall, Attorney General Vinson and Assistant Rosenberg. Beatrice argued
Earl B. the cause and filed brief for Hadlow appellee. Douglas delivered the opinion
Mr. Justice Court. question presented for decision whether
statutory ban on depositing “any refuse dis- water covers the description”
kind *2 gasoline. commercially aviation charge valuable provides: 13 of the and Harbors Act Section Rivers de- throw, discharge, “It shall not be lawful any descrip- kind or posit . . . refuse matter flowing whatever other than that from streets tion liquid state, a and sewers and of the United States . . . .” any navigable water into (1964 ed.). § 33 U. S. C. 407 (Ken- charged Standard Oil appellee, The indictment discharged violating by allowing § tucky), consisting into the “refuse matter” St. Johns River gasoline. Appellee 100-octane aviation to dismiss moved indictment, and, purposes of the motion, parties stipulation entered fact. It states that gasoline was commercially valuable it discharged into the only Johns because St. a shut-off valve at dockside had been “accidentally” open. left
The District Court
the indictment because
dismissed
it was of the view that
phrase
the statutory
mat-
“refuse
ter” does not
include commercially valuable oil. The
appealed
United States
directly to this Court under the
Criminal Appeals Act (18
S.
(1964 ed.)).
§
U.
C. 3731
probable
We noted
jurisdiction.
1 30 Stat. ed.). U. S. C. §407 in Harbors Rivers and § 13 construe cannot 2 Parke Baron we read Nor can a vacuum. pleading. read refuse “any are statutory words States United saidWe description.”
kind or history 491, that the S. Corp., Steel U. Republic dealing with legislation of related provision this cramped read- narrow, free-flowing rivers “forbids our if recognized The District Court ing” §of within the matter” be “refuse oil would were waste it was not within of 13 but concluded meaning “a nar- That oil.3 it was “valuable” because of its partial 13 in defeat reading” §of row, cramped *3 purpose. by or not industrial useable oil and whether
Oil is waterways. effect it has the same deleterious standards and harbors is our rivers case, presence In either pollutant. and a This navigation menace both a of construction the administrative seems advising prose- it is the basis of us that General Solicitor pollution of one-third approximately cution in Office Department of Justice reported to the cases Engineers. of of the Chief pre-existing codified statutes:
Section 13 (24 329) empty Act made it unlawful to An 1886 Stat. “any stone, slate, gravel, rubbish, ballast, earth, slack, slabs, cinders, wreck, edgings, sawdust, slag, or or filth, any other or of refuse mill-waste kind into York 2 superstitious A man whose was “fault an almost reverence for special pleading.” Dictionary the dark technicalities of XV Biography, p. (Stephen 1937-1938). National Lee and ed. 3 The District Court followed the decision of the United States Delvalle, The in United States Supp. 746, 748, District Court 45 F. valuable, usable discharge where it said: “The accidental oil . (Em . . does not constitute ... violation the statute.” phasis added.) valuable pre-discharge includes plainly
Harbor” —which material. (25 209) prevent
An “to obstructive 1888 Act Stat. injurious within the Harbor of New York deposits” and discharge “refuse, waters banned the adjacent and cinders, mud, sand, dredgings, sludge, acid, dirt, ashes, kind, any flowing any or other matter other than passing liquid in a streets, sewers, from therefrom plainly pre-discharge includes valuable state” —which also (Emphasis added.) material. 453)
The Act unlawful (26 emptying Stat. made “any waters ballast, stone, slate, gravel, earth, wreck, slabs, edgings, sawdust, rubbish, filth, slag, refuse, cinders, ashes, or other waste of . . . kind impede which shall tend to or navigation.” obstruct pre-discharge Here also valuable materials were included. 363) The prohibited deposits Stat. Act Congress harbors and for which appropriated rivers had money improvements, refuse, for of “ballast, dirt, ashes, cinders, mud, sand, other dredgings, sludge, acid, any kind than that flowing streets, other from sewers, (Em- in a liquid state.” phasis added.) pre- This also included valuable discharge material. Acts then, specifically dealt
the New York Harbor; scope the the latter was con- siderably covering broader, did the deposit “any other matter kind.” The Acts of 1890 and 1894 paralleled pertaining the earlier enactments New York, to applying their terms to waterways throughout the (cid:127) Nation.
The 1899 Act now before us was no more than an attempt to consolidate prior these Acts into one. It was by indeed stated sponsor the in the Senate to be “in accord with the in statutes now only scat- existence, . tered . . from the beginning of the statutes down reflecting 2296), Rec. Cong. (32 end” the through to ambiguities.” remove changes to slight “[v]ery merely Id., p. points statutes, several of these examination an
From the antecedent, First, 1894 Act the clear. are Harbor,4 drew York the to applicable valueless between valuable no face distinction their substances, some Second, of enumerated the substances. prior value or industrial commercial had may well have more waterways. To be covered discharge into the to they not whether or were banned acids ashes and specific, value. industrial remaining commercial had sub- the only not to enumerated Third, applied these Acts “any other matter discharge of also to the stances but substances included the enumerated any kind.” Since ejusdem the rule of pre-discharge value, with a those category latter limiting does generis require not Fourth, lacking pre-discharge value. substances coverage Acts was these not diminished the codifi- The cation of 1899. use term in the “refuse” place in codification serves lengthy list enumerated substances found earlier Acts and the provision catch-all found Act of legis- 1890. The lative history demonstrates without contradiction that Congress codify intended to change without substantive the earlier Acts. philosophy of those antecedent laws seems to us
to be clearly embodied the present law. is plain It legislative from its history that injury”' “serious our (S. watercourses Rep. No. 224, 50th Cong., Sess., 1st
4 The codification did not include the Acts of 1886 and 1888 which
pertained only to New York. These remain in effect and are found
at
33 U. S. C.
ed.).
§§441-451
The New York Harbor
statute has
apply
been held to
only
not
to waste oil which was unin
tentionally discharged (The
727)
Albania,
but also to valu
F.2d
able oil negligently discharged.
The Colombo,
p. 2) by pollu- in navigation part impeded stacles into streams” sawmill waste discharge tion —“the ballast, by “deposits of of channels injury (ibid.) and passing ves- from and rubbish ashes, oysters, steam-boat list not an obviously list is exhaustive Ibid. The sels.” Act are broad The words pollutants. any description “any matter of kind or inclusive: refuse “other than Only exception one is stated: whatever.” flowing from and sewers and there- streets navigable water of liquid state, any from in comprehensive language More United States.” to not stand difficult select. The word “refuse” does alone; is “of description “refuse” banned kind or whatever,” apart exception from the one And, noted. for the reasons already stated, meaning give we must the term “refuse” must present reflect the codification’s statutory antecedents.
The Appeals Court of Second Circuit United Co., States v. Ballard Oil (L. F. 2d 369 Hand, Augus- Hand, tus and Harrie Chase, JJ.) that causing good held to spill into a watercourse violated § 13. The word “refuse” that setting, said the court, by “is satisfied anything which has waste, become however it useful may Id., earlier have been.” p. 371. nothing There is
5The decisions in the instant case below and in United States v. Delvalle, supra, against 3, n. are authority. the stream of An unreported decision a United States District Court (United Crouch), holding States v. inapplicable polluting to but nonobstructing deposits, caused the Oil Act, 1924, Pollution seq. (1964 33 U. S. C. et ed.), passed. Rep. §431 See S. No. Cong., 68th 1st Sess.; Rep. H. R. No. Cong., 68th 1st applicable Sess. It is discharge of oil vessels into coastal deposits waters but not into inland waters; explicitly provides repeal does not modify or in manner affect existing other laws. 33 (1964 ed.). U. S. C. §437 *6 230 into spilled than oil the label “refuse” deserving of
more a river. of mat- sense the to be the common seems to us
That foreign all substances includes ter. The word “refuse” and “flowing from streets apart from those pollutants the liquid state” sewers watercourse. teaching in keeping §of 13 is with the reading
That an more that a “river is than Justice Holmes Mr. York, 283 Jersey New a treasure.” v. amenity, is charitably 13 as United States § It reads 336, U. S. supra, admonished. Republic Corp., v. Steel the pollutant, the not on only quality on the passWe nor to quantity necessary support conviction proof Act requirement to question as what scienter the the not us imposes, questions as those are before appeal.6 restricted Reversed. whom Mr. Harlan, Black Justice Justice Mr. dissenting. join, Justice Stewart Mr. to majority judging
Had the this case been content applying confine itself of law and to to relevant rules policies affecting proper leave the conservation of the Congress, Nation’s to be the I think rivers dealt today’s in this decision criminal case would have differently. eventuated The best that can be said provision case is that the reach Government’s 6 “Having placed by with the construction the court below dealt upon Act, jurisdiction appeal on this is the Sherman our exhausted. liberty objections We at are not consider other to the indictment may upon questions respect which arise the trial with to the charge. For is well merits of settled that where the District particular Court has its decision on a based construction of underlying statute, Appeals here review under Criminal question propriety is confined of that construction.” Co., United States Borden U. S. 206-207. the Rivers and Harbors Act of
§ S. which ed.), U. C. 407 under this indictment laid, is uncertain. This calls into play the traditional strictly rule that are In penal statutes construed. my opinion application requires rule dismissal of the indictment.
I. deposit Section forbids the of all kinds of “refuse *7 navigable into matter” flowing rivers “other than that from streets and sewers passing liquid therefrom in a state.” notes, As Court this Act part was of a prior codification of revamping statutes. This was not at any length discussed on the floor of either House of Congress; only provi- was informed Senate sions were merely existing codification of law, without changes 32 Cong. in substance. (1899). Rec. 2296-2297 13 was in very Section based two prior fact similar statutes. The appropriation rivers harbors act of provided the first pro- national anti-obstruction vision, 26 Stat. 453:
“Sec. 6. That it shall not be lawful to cast, throw, empty, or unlade, cause, suffer, procure or or cast, thrown, emptied, or either from unladen, or any ship, out of vessel, lighter, barge, boat, or other or craft, from the shore, pier, wharf, furnace, manu- facturing establishments, or mills of any kind what- ever, any ballast, stone, slate, gravel, earth, rubbish, wreck, filth, slabs, edgings, sawdust, slag, cinders, or refuse, ashes, any other waste of kind, any port, road, roadstead, harbor, haven, river, or navigable waters the United States which shall impede or tend obstruct navigation . . . .” A later statute, of the Rivers and Harbors 363, provided similarly: somewhat
“That it shall not be lawful to place, discharge, deposit, or or by any process in any manner, ballast, dredgings, sand, mud, cinders, ashes, dirt, refuse, kind other any matter any other acid, sludge, sewers, streets, from flowing than that har- any waters state, in the liquid ain improve- States, United or river bor appropriated been money has of which ment . .” Congress . . contend- Act, latter on the primarily relies
The Court “any other applicability ing though commer- even encompass oil, surely would kind” 228) p. (ante, *8 merely a was intended to be enactment present the Since that the construction majority concludes codification, the govern. predecessor of 1894 should the broader to inter- might properly be said about how Whatever statutes, and, especially, the 1894 it pret the 1890 more books for the last is 1899 Act that has been on thé the purposes language guide must the years, 67 its To determination of case. the extent that there were in scope some differences between the 1890 and Acts, 1894 these necessarily were resolved the 1899 codification, which, while embodying the essential of prior thrust both statutes, appears plain from language to have favored the more coverage restrictive of the 1890 Act. More- over, questionable to what extent the specu- Court’s lation as to meaning phrase of a in one of prior statutes is relevant at all language when the of pres-
233 statute, penal ent which is in nature, explicit is in itself and unambiguous.
The purpose essentially 13 was § to eliminate ob- structions to navigation and public interference with- works projects. This enactment, pre- 1899 like the two existing statutes which was intended to was a codify, minor section attached a major appropriation act to- gether with other measures dealing sunken wrecks,1 trespassing public sites,2 at works and obstructions caused by improperly constructed bridges, piers, other struc- tures.3 These statutes necessary primarily were rendered navigable because which rivers, was Congress appro- priating to improve, being funds were by obstructed de- positing of waste by materials ships.4 factories and It is of course true, as the observes, oil,” Court that “oil is ante, p. 226, and spillage the accidental of valuable oil may substantially have the same “deleterious effect waterways” depositing the wholesale of waste oil. the relevant inquiry But is not the admittedly important pollution concerns of control, Congress’ but purpose in enacting this anti-obstruction Act, appears and that
1 1899, 15, Rivers and Act of 1152, Harbors 30 Stat. 33 S.U. C. § (1964 ed.). 409§ 1899, 14, Rivers and Harbors Act of 1152, S. C. U. § (1964 ed.). §408 Rivers and Harbors Act S. Stat. U. C. (1964 ed.). §406 4 Congress presented, considering predecessors when one Act, representations the 1899 with the of the Office of the Chief Army Engineers injury had there been “serious discharge waters of sawmill In waste streams .... fair-ways harbors, injured deposits channels are from ballast, *9 ashes, oysters, steam-boat Rep. and rubbish from passing vessels.” S. Cong., (1888). No. 50th Sess., 1st Rep. See also H. R. No. Cong., Sess., 55th (1899). 3d support 3-4 There is no proposition that these “pollution” statutes were directed at inde pendently of “obstruction.” imposi- through halt a desire plainly quite obstructing depositing penalties criminal tion of harbors. in rivers refuse mean- everyday eschews construction Court’s debris, trash, waste, rubbish, ing of “refuse matter” — 3d Dictionary, International Webster’s see garbage, either reads approach an instead adopts ed.—and a gives tor- or to it altogether, out “refuse” point, that at one declares, meaning. The Court tured foreign substances all includes ‘refuse’ “The word ‘flowing from streets from those apart pollutants into the state’ liquid in a sewers and anything Ante, dropping Thus, 230. p. watercourse.” a federal appear into river would pure water but appears time, the Court also the same At misdemeanor. narrower view Second Circuit’s somewhat to endorse the however valu- material, matter” refers to that “refuse able, unsalvageable which becomes when introduced Ante, approach, On this latter pp. the water. 229-230. de- imposition penalties of criminal effect pend prospective each instance estimate phrase salvage costs. strained definitions of Such hardly as of ordinary English is clear a matter commend very and at least raise serious themselves, doubts to the intended reach of 13.§
II. Given these as to proper doubts construction of we 13,§ “refuse matter” reckon with a tradi- must tional penal canon that a narrowly statute will be con- strued. II Hale, See Historia Placitorum Coronae 335 (1736); United States Wiltberger, 5 Wheat.
The reasons
underlying
maxim are
ap-
various.
It
pears likely
the rule
originally
adopted in order
to spare people from the effects of exceedingly harsh pen-
Hall,
alties. See
Strict
Liberal Construction of Penal
*10
Even
(1935).
748, Rev.
Harv. L.
Statutes,
have force
thought
might be
rationale
though say
I cannot
person,5
a natural
the defendant
were
where
in this instance
compelling
is particularly
might
sub-
Oil
penalty to which Standard
maximum
(1964 ed.).
411§
$2,500.
33 U. S. C.
ject is
fine
of the notion
contemporary purpose
A
important
more
what the law
give
strict construction is to
notice of
everyday
is,
guide people
in their
activities.
order to
Again, however,
justify
it is difficult to
narrow read-
ing
spilling
type
§of 13 on this basis. The
of oil
something
likely
into rivers is not
one would be
to do
whether
is legally proscribed by
or not it
a federal statute.
A broad
hardly
dangers
penal-
construction would
raise
izing people
innocently
who have been
pouring valuable
waters, for such conduct in Florida is
unlawful whatever the effect of § 13. A Florida statute
penalizing as a misdemeanor
depositing
into waters
within the State of “any rubbish,
filth,
poisonous or
deleterious substance or substances,
liable to affect the
health
persons,
fish, or live stock . . . ,” Fla. Stat.
Ann.,
(1960
§387.08
ed.), quite evidently reaches the
dumping of commercial oil. And Florida’s nuisance
law would likewise seem to make this conduct actionable
in equity.
g.,
See, e.
Ferry
Pass Inspectors’
Ship-
&
pers’ Assn. v. The Whites River Inspectors’ & Shippers’
Assn., 57
Fla.
penalty for accidentally dropping foreign matter into a river. 33 U. S. C. ed.). §411 applying for reason a further however, is, There straightforward in a straightforward seemingly *11 this 25, States, U. S. 283 United McBoyle v. In way. to crime it federal making a statute that held Court commerce in interstate “motor vehicle” a stolen move a case That too airplane. to a stolen apply not did give in order required not clarity was precise in which wrong permissible line between warning due any question have been not could for there conduct, ful Nevertheless, was unlawful. aircraft stealing that but it is not “Although declared that Holmes Mr. Justice consider the text carefully will a criminal likely that reasonable steals, or is murders law before he language in given the world warning should be a fair of what understand, will the common world passed.” S., if a certain line is 283 U. to do law intends expressed primarily thus is based policy at 27. The fair in a civilized state least that play: notion of government express expected can be is that rules reasonably language expected in all can to understand. expression this Moreover, requirement clear is essential in practical sense to confine prose the discretion of cuting authorities, particularly important under a stat ute such §as 13 which imposes penalties criminal with a minimal, if any, scienter requirement.6
In an area which state or local law has traditionally regulated primary activity,7 good there is reason to re-
6 parties agreement were not in require toas what scienter ment imposes. question statute This is not before us under jurisdiction granted the restricted to this Court under 18 U. S. C. (1964 ed.), 3731 Petrillo, see United States 1; 332 U. S. United States v. Co., Borden today U. S. and the Court intimates question. no views on the pollution Besides the Florida earlier, adverted to Fla. Stat. Ann., (1960 ed.), the*city §387.08 of Jacksonville has enacted dealing ordinances generally fire prevention, with Jacksonville Ordi- penal legislation strict federal within the confines of its If language. the Federal finds that there Government or pollution sufficient obstruction waters caused the introduction of oil commercial or other easy nonrefuse it is an material, appro- matter to enact priate regulatory penal legislation.8 legislation Such specific can be directed at types pollution, and the remedies In- carefully compliance. devised to ensure such a deed, statute was enacted 1924 to deal pollution by vessels, coastal waters caused S. C. ed.). §§ U. To attempted conclude prosecution cannot stand is not to be importance oblivious to the of preserv- *12 ing the utility country’s beauties and of the rivers. It simply to take the we I find it. affirm judgment of the District Court. (1958 nance Code disposal to 19-4.24 Supp.), of waste §§19-4.1 (1958 material, Supp.), pollution city sup- §21-12 water ply, Code). §27-52 8 See, g., special message e. dealing of the President with new anti pollution legislation, Preservation Heritage Message of Our Natural — from the President of States, the United H. Doc. No. Cong., 89th Sess., Cong. 2d Rec., 23, 1966, pp. Feb. 3519-3522. notes the Court Further, cially valuable. statute a federal after modeled Harbor, 25 Stat. 209. York New dealing with of 1888 still remains Act, which York Harbor Under ed.), prosecu- seq. et 441§C. books, 33 U. S. on the £1964 commercially useful deposits for accidental tions Colombo, 2d This 42 F. sustained. have been oil of the view that thought to reinforce background purview. 1894 statute’s fall within type