*1 294 denial, the defendant en- Austin, Following this Assis- Amy Leigh
ARGUED: which Richmond, plea agreement under Defender, tered into Public Federal tant im- eighteen months he was James sentenced Appellant. Michael for Virginia, prisonment. Attorney, States Elston, United Assistant Alexandria, Appellee. ON Virginia, for asked us defendant has appeal, the On Jr., Dunham, Federal BRIEF: Frank W. Johnson in in opinion our to reconsider Richmond, Defender, Virginia, for Public Supreme Court deci- of the recent light McNulty, United Paul J. Appellant. Morrison, v. 529 United States sions Flannery, Assis- E. Attorney, Sara States 1740, 598, 658 146 L.Ed.2d 120 S.Ct. U.S. Alexandria, Attorney, tant United States, v. United (2000), 529 Jones and Appellee. Virginia, 1904, 848, L.Ed.2d 902 U.S. S.Ct. Mor- (2000). Because we do construe WILKINS, Judge, Chief Before in the or Jones to establish change rison BEEZER, WIDENER, Judge, Circuit previ- to overrule requires law that us of the United States Judge Circuit Senior court, panel of another ous decision of the United States Court Court our decision we decline reconsider Circuit, sitting by Appeals for the Ninth Najjar, v. United States Johnson. See designation. Cir.2002). F.3d 486 n. 8 by published per curiam Affirmed district Accordingly, opinion. court is AFFIRMED.
OPINION PER CURIAM: was in- Ralph Howard Rich
Defendant Virginia in the Eastern District
dicted failing pay unlawfully willfully and support for more than child
court-ordered than in an amount years greater
two $10,000 Support in violation of Child America, STATES UNITED Act, § as amend- Recovery 18 U.S.C. Plaintiff-Appellant, Punishment Parents ed Deadbeat 228(a)(3) Act, (Supp.1999). § 18 U.S.C. v. the indict- moved to dismiss defendant UNIVERSITY, a ST. LOUIS § ground ment on U.S.C. corporation, Defendant- of Con- unconstitutional exercise was an Appellee. dis- power. The gress’s Commerce Clause No. 02-1351. motion, reasoning trict court denied by the Fourth Circuit that it was bound Appeals, United States Court Johnson, decision of United States Fourth Circuit. (4th Cir.1997), which this F.3d Support Recov- court held that Child Argued: Jan. 2003. Congress’s exercise of ery proper Act is a July 2003. Decided: a state power because Commerce Clause “thing in interstate support order is child parent and obligated when
commerce” states. child reside different
dependent *2 Mary Leach, McElroy
ARGUED: Sen- Trial, ior Department United States Of Justice, D.C., Washington, Appellant. for Moller, Marc Simon Kreindler & Krein- dler, York, York, New Appellee. New McCallum, Jr., ON BRIEF: Robert D. General, Attorney Assistant Thomas M. DiBiagio, Attorney, Jeffrey United States Axelrad, Director, Branch, Torts Di- Civil vision, United Department Of Jus- tice, D.C.; Washington, Troy, Daniel E. Chief, Blumberg, Eric M. Deputy Chief for Litigation, Druckman, Michael N. Associ- ate Chief for Biologies, Drug U.S. Food & Administration, Rockville, Maryland; Alex against SLU.1 judgment entered General, Department Of II, Azar, M. Services, and remand. Washington, reverse Human And Health Dunn, R. Her- Mark D.C., Appellant. L.L.P., Louis, McGhee, St. &
zog, Crebs
I. BACKGROUND
Kops,
Cynwyd,
Bala
Missouri;
P.
Stanley
*3
Korein,
Carr, Carr,
A. The Vaccine
Rex
Pennsylvania;
Glass,
St.
Kunin, Montroy &
East
Tillery,
poliomyelitis;
types of
There are three
Missouri,
Louis,
Appellee.
a
only from
contracted
“Type I can be
II
virus,
only
Type
from a
I
II
Type
Type
LUTTIG,
NIEMEYER,
and
Before
Type
a
III
only
III
from
Type
and
virus
TRAXLER,
Judges.
Circuit
Polio Vaccine
In re
Oral
virus.”
by published
and remanded
Reversed
F.Supp.
412
Litig.,
Liab.
Prods.
wrote the
Judge TRAXLER
opinion.
1950s,
(D.Md.1990).
an oral polio
In the
Judge
in which
opinion,
majority
(“OPV”)
a
developed that used
vaccine
Judge
joined.
LUTTIG
NIEMEYER
polio vi-
or weakened
live but attenuated
dissenting opinion.
a
wrote
cultivated from live
all
rus. “Like
vaccines
viruses,
immunity
induc-
OPV creates
OPINION
recipient.”
in the
mild infection
ing a
TRAXLER,
Judge:
Circuit
Co., 158
Cyanamid
v.
Stuart
American
(“SLU”) paid a
University
$16
Louis
St.
Cir.1998).
(2d
However,
622, 625
F.3d
to
Missouri state-court
million
a
a
with it
risk that
also
OPV
carries
boy
paralyzed
became
family of a
who
(or
in close contact with
recipient
someone
Orimune,
polio
an oral
vac
receiving
after
contract
the disease
recipient) will
from
sought contribution
SLU
cine.
through
vaccine.
company
parent
Cyanamid,
American
wild virus
produced by passing
OPV is
manufacturer, and United
the vaccine
to
an animal host
type through
each
ap
tested and
government, which
of attenuated virus.
develop a “strain”
district court
the vaccine. The
proved
uses the strain
The vaccine manufacturer
summary judgment
favor of
granted
virus,
type
of each
grow
a “seed”
government, concluding
and the
Cyanamid
monopools of
produce
are used
seeds
claims were
SLU’s contribution
virus,
“lots” of that virus
type of
each
estoppel.
of collateral
by principles
barred
monopools.
from the
type are derived
St.
and remanded.
reversed
are
type of virus
then
Lots from each
States, Fed.Appx.
v.
Univ. United
Louis
single
pool,
into a
“trivalent”
combined
(4th
2001);
Cyanamid
Cir.
American
pro-
can be
vaccine
from which trivalent
(4th
Univ.,
Fed.Appx. 131
St. Louis
types
all three
protect against
duced to
2001).
remand,
After
on motions and
Cir.
States, 486
v. United
polio. See Berkovitz
judgment,
summary
cross-motions
100 L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
U.S.
govern
court concluded
district
(1988).
ment,
Cyanamid, was liable in
but not
approved
ap
The United States
The
to SLU.
contribution
adopted regula-
in 1961
in 1960 and
OPV
court’s conclusion
the district
peals
manufacture
governing
tions
to the state-
required to contribute
can be
claim asserted
rejection of its contribution
Cyanamid Co. v. St. Louis Uni
In American
1.
appeal in
Cyanamid. We address that
versity,
After the collateral cases, in the Sabin the court determined parties engaged eighteen months of dis- that the government’s regulatory violations covery. then moved for caused injuries at issue. argued SLU summary judgment on ground that Danny Callahan’s vaccine came prove govern- SLU could not from one of the seeds that the district ment’s negligence Danny’s polio. caused Sabin had concluded The district court reviewed the evidence ment negligently approved in violation of submitted SLU and concluded that it its regulatory own standards. insufficient, Since the given the Callahan find- court had Sabin concluded that gov- ings, to establish a causal connection be- failings ernment’s proximately caused the government’s tween the negligence and injuries of the plaintiffs, Sabin sug- SLU Danny’s injuries. The district court there- gested that those regulatory same viola- granted summary fore to the tions must also be held to proximate- on SLU’s contribution claim. ly Danny’s injuries. caused remanded, We reversed and concluding that the district court improperly applied agreed district court with Ap- SLU. Missouri law when it held that the Calla- plying analysis the same the court had jury han verdict had collateral estoppel III, used the district court con- effect on SLU’s contribution action cluded negligence in government. explained that Mis- approving vaccine that did satisfy souri law did not limit SLU to causation neurovirulence standards Danny’s *6 predicated theories on the Callahan jury’s polio. The district court granted therefore implicit conclusion that Danny would not partial summary SLU, to con- have contracted negli- but for SLU’s cluding government that the was liable in gence suppression which resulted in the of SLU, contribution to but for la- reserving However, his system. immune the district ter the determination of the extent of the court had during limited SLU discovery to government’s liability to SLU.3 causation theories consistent with rul- its ing as to the estoppel collateral effect of III. ANALYSIS the judgment, Callahan and the district government’s liability The premised court in contribu- its order granting sum- tion, course, dependent of mary judgment on SLU’s pres- on SLU’s failure to ability to establish that government ent evidence the of causation consistent with can be its collateral held hable on the tort claim in estoppel ruling. the Because of underlying action. the district court’s error with See United v. regard to the Co., issue, 543, estoppel 546-50, collateral Yellow Cab we 340 U.S. 71 reversed the (1951) grant district court’s S.Ct. 95 L.Ed. summary judg- (concluding ment to opportunity allow SLU an to de- of sovereign immunity waiver un- velop appropriate other theories of causa- der the Federal Tort Claims Act encom- tion. passes claims for contribution the law 3. ap- bring The district court interlocutory certified the order as appeal. See 28 review, propriate immediate 1292(b) (West 1993). and this § U.S.C.A. granted government permission the to the cases as appears that the court viewed private hold state would the relevant on the binding precedent in the establishing contribution liable for
individual
circumstances);
v.
Corp.
proximate cause. See St.
question
Gramex
same
Inc.,
States,
S.W.3d
Supply,
v. United
Green
Louis Univ.
banc) (“To
(en
ac-
(Mo.2002)
(“I
maintain an
(D.Md.2002)
am
500 5
F.Supp.2d
n.
contribution,
party
seek-
both
tion for
of collateral
relying upon
not
doctrine
defendant
ing contribution
may not be invocable
estoppel, which
sought must
contribution is
whom
against
simply fol-
government.
I am
tortfeasors,
liable to the
originally
be
III that
lowing my reasoning
Sabin
(alterations and
party.”
plaintiff-injured
(citation omitted)).
appeal.”
affirmed on
omitted)). The
marks
quotation
internal
then,
III
is whether Sabin
question,
The
presented
that SLU
contends
government
serve as
and our
in Sabin IV
decision
showing that
no evidence
think
precedent in this case. We
binding
vac-
original polio
ment’s violations
is no.
question
the answer to that
caused the
proximately
regulations
cine
Ac-
by Danny Callahan.
injuries suffered
Tort Claims
the Federal
Under
the district
cording
government,
law,
Act,
serves as
not federal
state
amounts to
the case
approach
court’s
liability.”
“the
source
substantive
liability for the
imposition
of absolute
471, 478, 114
Meyer,
v.
510 U.S.
FDIC
inconsistent with
which is
government,
(1994).
guments III, F.Supp. 774 at Maryland, see Sabin controlling given ef- cases must Sabin be 953-54, law, Maryland including its choice- outset, At we litigation. in the fect this case, just as principles, governs of-law government’s claim dispense can with the Under Ma- governed it the Sabin cases. improperly gave col- that the district court the law to principles, ryland’s choice-of-law the deci- estoppel Sabin lateral effect the law of the applied in tort cases is be sions, might well have an action which suffered, not injury where the was state v. Mendo- been error. See United negligent the act occurred. 568, where za, 162, 104 S.Ct. U.S. Co., 785 F.2d Foods (1984) Johnson Oroweat (rejecting the use of L.Ed.2d 379 Cir.1986). Danny Callahan estoppel offensive nonmutual collateral Missouri, Missouri law injured so was The district government). the against the applies to SLU’s claim the expressly give Sabin did Instead, plaintiffs in the Sabin ment. But the effect. estoppel cases collateral Maryland cases were residents The district court concluded that SLU injuries Florida and suffered their in those sufficiently had established that gov- Thus, proximate states. cause deter- ernment’s regulatory violations caused by ap- mination in III was injuries. reached Callahan’s The court explained law, plying Maryland III, and Florida while that in Sabin proximate cause determination in this I held that cause was estab- by applying-Missouri case must be made by lished the mere fact that if seeds 45 law. Accordingly, notwithstanding the fac- B 85 B use, and 45 165 had not been in cases, tual overlap analyses of the giving vaccine injuries rise to the simply Sabin III and Sabin IV do not would not have been manufactured. govern this case.4 The evidence clearly establishes that but
for the United States’s negligence, the- B. seeds would not have been used. I went reject on to an ancillary contention made plaintiff Under Missouri by seeking to hold a defendant liable in tort dispelled by specif- the fact that the must duty establish the existence of a on ic lots involved in the two cases under part protect defendant to consideration had met the regulatory plaintiff, a duty, breach of that and dam criteria, neurovirulence I concluded See, ages by e.g., caused the breach. that the causal connection between the ex L.A.C. rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shop regulatory plaintiffs’ inju- violations and Co., (Mo.2002) ping Ctr. 75 S.W.3d logical, ries are sensible and direct. The (en banc). (and In this case the Sabin Fourth Circuit affirmed this holding on eases), the district court concluded that the appeal. government’s duty arose under the “Good doctrine, through
Samaritan” which My liabili reasoning Sabin III equally is ty may imposed be negligent applicable exe here. easily This can be most voluntarily cution of by undertaken duties. hypothesizing seen that SLU is cor- Dairy, See Hoover’s Inc. v. Mid-America rect in contending that the immunosup- (Mo. Dairymen, pression S.W.2d 432-33 allegedly by its mal- 1985) (en banc) (following practice Good Samaritan played absolutely no role in (Sec standards set forth in making Restatement susceptible Callahan to contract- ond) (1965)). §§ Torts 324A ing polio true, For from If that OPV. purposes litigation, of this exactly po- Callahan stands in the same agreed has to be bound findings sition as did the in other Sabin the Sabin cases duty that it breached its cases because that event the sole violating regulations. OPV See St. cause of his was the vaccine. Like- Univ., Thus, F.Supp.2d wise, Louis at 498. immunosuppression even the did *8 only issue before the district court play some role in process, the disease whether Danny SLU could establish that exposure Callahan’s to the oral vaccine injuries Callahan’s were had to contributing be a cause to his government’s duty. breach of paralysis. Type po- The isolation of III Instead, assuming 4. Even Maryland that SLU is correct in its and Florida law. we will Maryland contention that the tort laws of and go directly to the source and consult Missouri similar, Missouri are it makes little sense for cases to determine whether SLU has satisfied apply by way this court to Missouri law of requirements of Missouri law. IV, applied Sabin HI and Sabin cases that have occurred but for injuries would not stool demon- in Callahan’s lio virus no one cause is not polio, and that conduct. Proximate he contracted strates fact, immunosuppression is a limitation the causation but suggests caused the disease. upon right to recover imposes alone could law III, I held in Sabin Cal- Accordingly, as negligent of a act. consequences for the to the as a exposed virus proximate lahan was proving of requirement - government’s viola- consequence of the it those actors whom cause absolves gov- If the regulations. tion of OPV punish unfair to because of the would be wrongfully approved had not ernment relation which their conduct attenuated which the vaccine was seed from plaintiffs injury. bears to the derived, have been Callahan would never (citations Robinson, at 77 and S.W.3d of and a dose Orimune administered omitted). quotation marks internal polio have contracted even would never Danny district court’s conclusion Cal- immunosuppressed. This had he been lahan not have contracted “but would relationship meets the stan- “but for” goes action thus for” Missouri of cause under proximate dard causation-in-fact, only question to the law of just it does under the law as cause, proximate because it does not applicable in Sa- Maryland and Florida partic- of whether the question answer bin III. ular result that occurred was a reasonable Univ., F.Supp.2d at 499-500 Louis St. probable consequence and of the (footnotes, alterations, quota- and internal Callahan, ment’s conduct. See 863 S.W.2d omitted). tion marks (Missouri generally at 865 courts “have assume, course, that Sabin injury must be a said reasonable Mary properly applied III and Sabin IV act probable consequence and of the or Nonetheless, it is Florida law.5 land and defendant.”). omission approach in the Sabin clear that the taken explanation The district court’s requirements with the cases is inconsistent why required different results were as governs this case. of Missouri which the claims law, plaintiff must estab Under Missouri manufacturer, Cyanamid, sug the vaccine lish both causation-in-fact gests that the court believed the causation Callahan, 863 S.W.2d at cause. See standard is different cases where 865; Highway State Robinson v. Missouri duty arises under the Good Samaritan doc (Mo. Com’n, Transp. & S.W.3d trine. The court stated: curiam). (per Ct.App.2000) Cyanamid I find that cannot be held
A defendant’s conduct is the cause
injuries where the
hable for contribution to SLU and that
fact of a
States,
(4th Cir.1991)
points
out that when this
ed
923 F.2d
5. The
("Our
interpretation Maryland
TV affirmed the
in Sabin
law in Waf-
III,
analysis
we
in Sabin
relied on
question
we
is called into
because
were
Waf
fen
Department
v.
Health &
United
interpreting Maryland
espoused
law as
in He
fen
Services,
Cir.1986),
Human
vaccine seeds violation of the OPV olations, we conclude that SLU was re- regulations. Cyanamid no was under quired to Danny likely establish that would duty. responsibili- such Its duties and (or not have contacted would have public, partic- ties to the members of the polio) contracted less severe case of from ularly recipients to their OPV fami- a vaccine that satisfied the government’s nes, products liability [are] defined neurovirulence requirements. Any lesser In considering law. against claims standard would in result Cyanamid, the focus must therefore be being strictly held regulatory liable for its on safety product, of its not the violations, which would be inconsistent regulatory process govern- for which the with Missouri law. See Sill v. Burlington Likewise, responsibility. ment bore in R.R., No. (Mo.Ct.App. S.W.3d analyzing the element of 2002) (explaining that the violation of a cause in against Cyanamid, claims can, circumstances, statute under certain focus must on plaintiff be whether the support claim, a negligence per se but that prove can it was a defect plaintiff prove must that the statutory OPV resulted in his injury, not sim- “violation was the cause of the ply- a case —as evidence, injury.”). course, And this exposed ment —whether he had been to expert must be the form of testimony. OPV derived from a seed that had been See, Barr, e.g., Wright v. 62 S.W.3d improperly approved in violation of the (“If (Mo.Ct.App.2001) there is a so regulatory process. Under Missouri law phisticated injury, requires one that surgi this element of required causation is cal intervention or other highly scientific plaintiff whether a sues for strict liabili- techniques diagnosis, expert medical ty, negligence, or warranty. breach of causation.”). testimony required prove Univ., St. Louis F.Supp.2d at 500. law, however, Missouri There is no such quite makes it evidence this record. best, clear that At experts the Good Samaritan SLU’s assumed that in- doctrine is relevant question creased neurovirulence in- duty only; it led increased no effect general has on the polio, rules of causa- cidence vaccine-associated but tion. See Wollen v. DePaul experts opinion. Health Cen- SLU’s did not offer that ter, (Mo.1992) (en fact, 828 S.W.2d experts none of SLU’s were even
304 it entitled to contri- to show that is opinion.6 The failed such an render
qualified to there- government. from the bution this absence of recognized district of Univ., grant court’s fore reverse the district evidence, Louis St. see in favor of SLU (“Whether summary judgment partial oral or not an F.Supp.2d at 502 judgment entry for the and we remand the OPV complied with that polio vaccine Monahan government. of the in favor caused Callahan regulations would Va., F.3d Chesterfield, County cases in the other Sabin and the Cir.1996) that (explaining ultimately unknowable is contract summary judg- SLU, cross-motions where as does SLU. unprovable.”), filed, appellate court have been to ment however, required it is not insists that favor entry can direct the proximate cause. present evidence of appellant). of the SLU, es- regulations According to AND REMANDED. REVERSED standards tablishing the neurovirulence presumption” “unrebuttable created an LUTTIG, Judge, dissenting: Circuit exceeding the standards any that vaccine recipi- unacceptable judg- risk affirm the district court’s posed an I would Appel- polio. binding prece- Brief of ent would contract ment in this case under the Thus, contends that once In In re 21. SLU of the circuit. Sabin Oral lee at dent Liability Litiga- in the Sabin cases it was established Polio Vaccine Products (4th Cir.1993) (“Sabin regulations tion, violated its F.2d 124 IV”), caused proximately that under a tort and that the violations we determined respects was automati- injuries, regime, identical all relevant injuries here, injury, for the suffered an identical cally liable the one at issue here, derived proximately received a vaccine at anyone who to the one issue at seeds issue conduct identical to that from one of the vaccine tortious above, such an As noted the basis of the reason- alleged the Sabin cases. here. On case, with Mis- in that I must approach utterly ing adopted inconsistent which we (“If Sill, at a application 87 S.W.3d that our here of Mis- souri law. See conclude negli- under a yields case is made law the conclusion submissible souri state action, plaintiff a gence per appellee proffered se cause SLU sufficient evidence that a jury necessary could recover if a concluded causation legally to establish the violation was prevail. statute was violated and the injury.”); proximate cause con- majority opposite reaches the Corp., Tire Friend v. Yokohama It reasons that “our decision clusion. (“One (Mo.Ct.App.1995) 5.W.2d binding pre- serve as [does not] Sabin IV action negligence per of a se elements case,” in this ante at because cedent was the is that the violation of statute determination in Sa- “the cause injury.”). proximate cause of by applying Maryland bin III was reached while the and Florida is no evidence Because there in this case must be made proxi- determination government’s regulatory violations at by applying Missouri law.” Ante 300. Danny’s injury, SLU has mately caused Moreover, pursue appeal. the district appeal, noted that it on 6. first this court expert provided who neurovi- court concluded that there was some evidence that more testimony qualified to render an this was not Danny to have more rulent vaccine caused causation, however, SLU, opinion on and SLU does not chal- polio. did not severe case of appeal. lenge on pursue theory does not that determination after remand and *11 reasoning would if compelling This be abide it until this court en banc or the proposed apply that we Supreme SLU the state law Court holds otherwise. holdings of Sabin IV to the facts of the Having rejected mistakenly the authori- But, today. majority case before us is TV, ty of Sabin majority asserts that SLU, wrong suggest by implica- that or the district court erred here because it tion, I, that argue binding Sabin IV is as a in engaged proximate no cause determina- matter of Missouri state All law. that tion whatsoever. But Sabin quite TV asks, I appro- SLU and all that contend is clearly shows majority to be error priate, judgment by is we reach our There, point. on this we concluded that an applying binding reasoning of Sabin identical causation theory, in the unique IV. circumstance where the tortfeasor’s func- tion is that of a product-approver, suffices While our decision in Sabin IV resulted to establish cause. rea- law holdings, produced state it also rea- soned as follows: soning, by which we reached those state point The final appeal concerns the law holdings. This is reasoning uniquely district court’s determination that [the court, and, the creature of this as it is government’s] approval of the lots was us, binding upon apply we must it in other cause of plaintiffs] [the involving predicate cases the same facts injuries. The probable test of [sic] (ie., functionally underlying identical tort cause is one of “reasonable probability facts, theories). regime, and causation or certainty.” reasonable In other manner, Sabin TV binds us as a mat- words, plaintiff “the has the burden of ter of open federal delimiting the field introducing evidence which affords a that we would otherwise face formulat- reasonable basis for the conclusion that ing our reasoning. question Because the it is likely more than not that the con- simply before us is how we will reason to duct of the defendant awas substantial application our regime, Missouri’s tort in bringing factor about the result.” which regime is functionally identical in The district court concluded: regards the relevant to those from which Regardless acceptability of the of the IV, we reasoned in Sabin our conclusion as specific lots from which were derived the to how to application reason to this vaccine ... government] [the had governed by Sabin IV. properly applied C.F.R. credit, majority, to its does at- 73.114(b)(l)(iii) § ... the seed would not tempt deny point the crucial in this have been used. This is so because case, namely, Sabin IV we rea- manufacturer would have been unable to soned from two state tort regimes, law satisfy consistency requirement injuries, from and from asserted causation 73.116(c). § in 42 found C.F.R Like- theories, functionally were wise, indistin- regardless acceptability of the guishable from those before us today. the lots from which the vaccine adminis- But, denial, such absent it has no basis derived, plaintiff] tered to [the were on which to reach the conclusion it reaches lots would produced never have been today other than disagrees that it with the approval released but for the reasoning adopted Thus, we in Sabin TV.While I [the] seed.... the causal connec- am sympathetic somewhat critique to the regulatory tions between the violations the majority implicitly plaintiffs’ injuries levels at that rea- logical, are sensi- soning, I, majority, as am is bound to ble and direct. already it, that we quite for it is clear argument analysis, court’s the district concluded that was not regulation amend the
failure parties’ the two distinguishing between 'proximate *12 effects, And this proper. de- was causal the injuries misconstrues us, of wheth- regardless termination binds opinion. court’s and the district claims why it is so is prior reasoning as our er liability arose out of government’s] [The persuasive. reg- the violation of vaccine in releasing the ulations, failure to amend not in its score, on this majority’s The concern regulations. however, fully borne out. That is not even government’s con- causal effect of IV, add (emphasis F.2d at that of understood than omitted). differently ed) (citations duct the result of fact the manufacturer is clearly concluded passage, we By this role as tortfeasor government’s reasoning the district court’s —what product- as a from its actions springs here merely but-for here terms a majority manufacturer, a opposed to approver. As proper a analysis causation —constituted product, range a presumably who sells respect to a analysis cause with defect, a without with and some some as a unilateral who functions tortfeasor only role is to deter- product-approver’s binding this Under product-approver. product goes to particular a mine whether required to conclude we are precedent, role, failure, unique market at all. this reasoning court’s identical that the district care, duty a does not and breach of cause proper proximate likewise here is comparison any easy between result analysis. had the happened would have defec- what majority’s underlying dissatisfaction because, defective, “product” not been tive on the be- analysis based with this seems tortfeasor, “prod- the defective for such analysis “would result an lief that such completely the failure to withhold uct” is strictly held liable being from distribution. the distributed item violations, which would regulatory its Thus, “product” government’s had the law.” Ante with Missouri be inconsistent defect, offending of the free of none been matter, liability initial strict As an at 803. distributed at all. would have been vaccine (e.g., negli- culpability effects standards of a the case manufac- This contrasts with etc.), recklessness, causation not gence, who, product been turer had its defect every viola- regulatory That standards. free, free have defect would distributed where the tion in the circumstance injury by one’s product. causation proxi- is the product-approver is a ment quite different from “defective” action is injuries by the use mate cause of sustained other, “defect-free” since one’s action simply defectively approved product of the market keeps product all from the while liability since under does not create strict distributes defect-free the other instead proven it be Missouri law still must law, Maryland Since product. Florida negligence was result of the violation plaintiffs to require just like Missouri or recklessness. demonstrating prove defect-free, And, sympathetic that, I product while am somewhat had the been occurred, and since majority’s apparent concern— not injury to the would other product differently defect-free is treated complete withholding regards to the been the than the with would have manufacturer vaccine, great of a not too effect of its action Callahan’s of causal stretch, wholly persuasive, even our on injury may not base —we alleged us to conclude Sabin IV that the proximately alleged COMPANY,
conduct caused the in- AMERICAN CYANAMID jury- Plaintiff-Appellee, The district court’s notation that its cau- analysis sation took into account that the government acted under a Good Samari- UNIVERSITY, ST. LOUIS duty aspect
tan articulates this Defendant-Appellant. majority case. That instead thinks No. 02-1235. signals notation that the lower court *13 mistakenly “believed the causation stan- United States Appeals, Court of dard is different cases where duty Fourth Circuit. arises under the Good Samaritan doc- trine[,]” added), (emphasis ante at 302 il- Argued: Jan. 2003. panel’s lustrates the appreciate failure to how a manufacturer’s defect injury causes July Decided: 2003. way, in one product ap- while defective proval injury causes in another. That dif-
ferent relationships causal exist between categories
different of conduct in- and the
jury they bespeaks nothing as to
what legal applies standard to those causal
relationships in a tort action.
But any even there were merit to the
majority’s prior concerns that our analysis
effectively creates a liability culpabil- strict
ity standard or a but-for causation stan-
dard and treats the differently manufacturer,
from the those issues have
already fought been over and decided— by today’s opinion.
and not de- IV provides
cided the matter and so binding which,
reasoning, if we were to apply
today, would result affirmance of the Indeed,
district judgment. court’s the rule us,
we only face not binds every but also
district court within our circuit every panel court,
future of our and the dissent’s
judgment only evades that reality tempo-
rarily. Maryland, See Booth v. 327 F.3d Cir.2003) 382-83 (explaining that
it is error to follow the more recent of two
contradicting panels). reasons,
For these I respectfully dissent.