UNITED STATES ET AL. v. SOUTHWESTERN CABLE CO. ET AL.
No. 363
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 10, 1968
392 U.S. 157
Arguеd March 12-13, 1968. *Together with No. 428, Midwest Television, Inc., et al. v. Southwestern Cable Co. et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
Ernest W. Jennes argued the cause for petitioners in No. 428. With him on the briefs was Charles A. Miller.
Arthur Scheiner argued the cause for respondent Southwestern Cable Co. in both cases. With him on the brief were Morton H. Wilner and Harold F. Reis. Rob-
Michael Finkelstein filed a brief for the All-Channel Television Society, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Robert A. Marmet, Thomas W. Wilson, John D. Matthews, and Robert H. Young for the Alice Cable Television Corp. et al., and by Wayne W. Owen, Harry M. Plotkin, and George H. Shapiro for the Black Hills Video Corp. et al.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases stem from proceedings conducted by the Federal Communications Commission after requests by Midwest Television1 for relief under
On petitions for review, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Commission lacks authority under the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U. S. C. § 151, to issue such an order. 378 F. 2d 118.6 We granted certiorari to consider this important question of regulatory authority.7 389 U. S. 911. For reasons that follow, we reverse.
I.
CATV systems receive the signals of television broadcasting stations, amplify them, transmit them by cable or microwave, and ultimately distribute them by wire to the receivers of their subscribers.8 CATV systems
The CATV industry has grown rapidly since the establishment of the first commercial system in 1950.12 In the late 1950‘s, some 50 new systems were established each year; by 1959, there were 550 “nationally known and identified” systems serving a total audience of 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 persons.13 It has been more recently estimated that “new systems are being founded at the rate of more than one per day, and ... subscribers ... signed on at the rate of 15,000 per month.”14 By late 1965, it was reported that there were 1,847 operating CATV systems, that 758 others were franchised but not yet in operation, and that there were 938 applications
CATV systems perform either or both of two functions. First, they may supplement broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations in adjacent areas in which such reception would not otherwise be possible; and second, they may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant stations entirely beyond the range of local antennae. As the number and size of CATV systems have increased, their principal function has more frequently become the importation of distant signals.16 In 1959, only 50 systems employed microwave relays, and the maximum distance over which signals were transmitted was 300 miles; by 1964, 250 systems used microwave, and the transmission distances sometimes exceeded 665 miles. First Report and Order, 38 F. C. C. 683, 709. There are evidently now plans “to carry the programing of New York City independent stations by cable tо ... upstate New York, to Philadelphia, and even as far as Dayton.”17 And see Chan-nel 9 Syracuse, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 187, 385 F. 2d 969; Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. F. C. C., 128 U. S. App. D. C. 197, 385 F. 2d 979. Thus, “while the CATV industry originated in sparsely settled areas and areas of adverse terrain ... it is now spreading to metropolitan centers....” First Report and Order, supra, at 709. CATV systems, formerly no more than local auxiliaries to broadcasting, promise for the future to provide a national communications system, in which signals from selected broadcasting centers would be transmitted to metropolitan areas throughout the country.18
The Commission has on various occasions attempted to assess the relationship between community antenna television systems and its conceded regulatory functions. In 1959, it completed an extended investigation of several auxiliary broadcasting services, including CATV. CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F. C. C. 403. Although it found that CATV is “related to interstate transmission,” the Commission reasoned that CATV systems are neither common carriers nor broadcasters, and therefore are within neither of the principal regulatory categories created by the Communications Act. Id., at 427-428. The Commission declared that it had not been given plenary authority over “any and all enterprises which happen to be connected with one of the many aspects of communications.” Id., at 429. It refused to premise regulation of CATV upon assertedly adverse consequences for broadcasting, because it could not “determine where the impact takes effect, although we recognize that it may well exist.” Id., at 431.
The Commission instead declared that it would forthwith seek appropriate legislation “to clarify the situa-
Despite its inability to obtain amendatory legislation, the Commission has, since 1960, gradually asserted jurisdiction over CATV. It first placed restrictions upon the activities of common carrier microwave facilities that serve CATV systems. See Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F. C. C. 459, aff‘d, 321 F. 2d 359. Finally, the Commission in 1962 conducted a rule-making proceeding in which it re-evaluated the significance of CATV for its regulatory responsibilities. First Report and Order, supra. The proceeding was explicitly restricted to those systems that are served by microwave, but the Commission‘s conclusions plainly were more widely relevant. The Commission found that “the likelihood or probability of [CATV‘s] adverse impact upon potential and existing service has become too substantial to be dismissed.” Id., at 713-714. It reasoned that the importation of distant signals into the service areas of local stations necessarily creates “substantial competition” for local broadcasting. Id., at 707. The Commission acknowledged that it could not “measure precisely the degree of ... impact,” but found that “CATV competition can have a substantial negative effect upon station audience and revenues....” Id., at 710-711.
The Commission attempted to “accommodat[e]” the
The Commission in 1965 issued additional notices of inquiry and proposed rule-making, by which it sought to determine whether all forms of CATV, including those served only by сable, could properly be regulated under the Communications Act. 1 F. C. C. 2d 453. After further hearings, the Commission held that the Act confers adequate regulatory authority over all CATV systems. Second Report and Order, supra, at 728-734. It promulgated revised rules, applicable both to cable and to microwave CATV systems, to govern the carriage of local signals and the nonduplication of local programming. Further, the Commission forbade the importation by CATV of distant signals into the 100 largest television markets, except insofar as such service was offered on February 15, 1966, unless the Commission has previously
II.
We must first emphasize that questions as to the validity of the specific rules promulgated by the Commission for the regulation of CATV are not now before the Court. The issues in these cases are only two: whether the Commission has authority under the Communications Act to regulate CATV systems, and, if it has, whether it has, in addition, authority to issue the prohibitory order here in question.24
The Commission‘s authority to regulate broadcasting and other communications is derived from the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The Act‘s provisions are explicitly applicable to “all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio ....”
Respondents do not suggest that CATV systems are not within the term “communication by wire or radio.” Indeed, such communications are defined by the Act so as to encompass “the transmission of ... signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds,” whether by radio оr cable, “including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and services (among other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental to such transmission.”
Nor can we doubt that CATV systems are engaged in interstate communication, even where, as here, the inter-
Nonetheless, respondents urge that the Communications Act, properly understood, does not permit the regulation of CATV systems. First, they emphasize that the
Nor can we obtain significant assistance from the various expressions of congressional opinion that followed the Commission‘s requests. In the first place, the views of one Congress as to the construction of a statute adopted many years before by another Congress have “very little, if any, significance.” Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590, 593; United States v. Price, 361 U. S. 304, 313; Haynes v. United States, 390 U. S. 85, 87, n. 4. Further, it is far from clear that Congress believed, as it considered these requests for legislation, that the Commission did not already possess regulatory authority over CATV. In 1959, the proposed legislation was preceded by the Commission‘s declarations that it “did not intend to regulate CATV,” and that it preferred to rec-
Second, respondents urge that
We cannot construe the Act so restrictively. Nothing in the language of
Moreover, the Commission has reasonably concluded that regulatory authority over CATV is imperative if it is to perform with appropriate effectiveness certain of its other responsibilities. Congress has imposed upon the Commission the “obligation of providing a widely dispersed radio and television service,”38 with a “fair, efficient, and equitable distribution” of service among the
The Commission has reasonably found that the achievement of each of these purposes is “placed in jeopardy by the unregulated explosive growth of CATV.” H. R. Rep. No. 1635, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 7. Although CATV may in some circumstances make possible “the realization of some of the [Commission‘s] most important goals,” First Report and Order, supra, at 699, its importation of distant signals into the service areas of local stations may also “destroy or seriously degrade the service offered by a television broadcaster,” id., at 700, and thus ultimately deprive the public of the various benefits of a system of local broadcasting stations.43 In particular,
The Commission has been charged with broad responsibilities for the orderly development of an appropriate system of local television broadcasting. The significance of its efforts can scarcely be exaggerated, for broadcasting is dеmonstrably a principal source of information and entertainment for a great part of the Nation‘s population. The Commission has reasonably found that the successful performance of these duties demands prompt and efficacious regulation of community antenna television systems. We have elsewhere held that we may not, “in the absence of compelling evidence that such was Congress’ intention ... prohibit administrative action imperative for the achievement of an agency‘s ultimate purposes.” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747, 780. Compare National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 219-220; American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 311. There is no such evidence here, and we therefore hold that the Commission‘s authority over “all interstate ... communication by wire or radio” permits the regulation of CATV systems.
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commission‘s authority to regulate CATV. It is enough to emphasize that thе authority which we recognize today under
III.
We must next determine whether the Commission has authority under the Communications Act to issue the particular prohibitory order in question in these proceedings. In its Second Report and Order, supra, the Commission concluded that it should provide summary procedures for the disposition both of requests for special relief and of “complaints or disputes.” Id., at 764. It feared that if evidentiary hearings were in every situation mandatory they would prove “time consuming and burdensome” to the CATV systems and broadcasting stations involved. Ibid. The Commission considered that appropriate notice and opportunities for comment or objection must be given, and it declared that “additional procedures, such as oral argument, evidentiary
The Commission, after examination of various responsive pleadings but without prior hearings, ordered that respondents generally restrict their carriage of Los Angeles signals to areas served by thеm on February 15, 1966, pending hearings to determine whether the carriage of such signals into San Diego contravenes the public interest. The order does not prohibit the addition of new subscribers within areas served by respondents on February 15, 1966; it does not prevent service to other subscribers who began receiving service or who submitted an “accepted subscription request” between February 15, 1966, and the date of the Commission‘s order; and it does not preclude the carriage of San Diego and Tijuana, Mexico, signals to subscribers in new areas of service. 4 F. C. C. 2d 612, 624-625. The order is thus designed simply to preserve the situation as it existed at the moment of its issuance.
Respondents urge that the Commission may issue prohibitory orders only under the authority of
The Commission has acknowledged that, in this area of rapid and significant change, there may be situations in which its generalized regulations are inadequate, and special or additional forms of relief are imperative. It has found that the present case may prove to be such a situation, and that the public interest demands “interim relief ... limiting further expansion,” pending hearings to determine appropriate Commission action. Such orders do not exceed the Commission‘s authority. This Court has recognized that “the administrative process [must] possess sufficient flexibility to adjust itself” to the “dynamic aspects of radio transmission,” F. C. C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., supra, at 138, and that it was precisely for that reason that Congress declined to “stereo-typ[e] the powers of the Commission to specific details ....” National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, supra, at 219. And compare American Trucking Assns. v. United States, 344 U. S. 298, 311; R. A. Holman & Co. v. S. E. C., 112 U. S. App. D. C. 43, 47-48, 299 F. 2d 127,
The judgments of the Court of Appeals are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in the result.
My route to reversal of the Court of Appeals is somewhat different from thе Court‘s. Section 2 (a) of the Communications Act,
Even if
