UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. DAVID A. SNELL, Defendant.
Case No. 3:24-cr-103
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
July 7, 2025
Judge Thomas M. Rose
ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (DOC. NO. 28)
The Court now considers Defendant David A. Snell‘s (“Snell“) Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support (the “Motion“) (Doc. No. 28). The United States of America (the “Government“) has indicted Snell on criminal charges for the production of child pornography, in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
Law enforcement‘s investigation in this case began in March of 2024, when U.S. Homeland Security Special Agent Davis Mendelsohn (“SA Mendelsohn“) spoke to a Reddit user going by the name Resident_Phrase7 in an undercover capacity.1 (Doc. No. 33-16 at PageID 222.) SA Mendelsohn started by posting publicly to Reddit, where he identified himself as a 12-year-old girl. (Id.) Shortly after, Resident_Phrase7 allegedly mеssaged SA Mendelsohn privately using the platform‘s direct messenger system. (Id.) SA Mendelsohn then proceeded to speak with Resident_Phrase7, still posing as a 12-year-old girl. (Id.) In the course of their conversation, Resident_Phrase7 allegedly asked to see the body of the young girl they thought they were speaking to. (Id. at PageID 223.) SA Mendelsohn ultimately lost contaсt with Resident_Phrase7 when the user did not respond to SA Mendelsohn‘s last message, delivered on April 3, 2024. (Id.)
Meanwhile, after initially encountering Resident_Phrase7, SA Mendelsohn sought information from Reddit to ascertain the user‘s identity. (Doc. No. 33-2.) Specifically, on March 26, 2024, SA Mendelsohn sent an administrative summons to Reddit, Inc., requesting that the company provide Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI“) with the following subscriber information for Reddit account user Resident_Phrase7:
Username/subscriber identity, IP logs with port numbers (including registration IP), account creation date/time and the (sic.) user‘s name, email address, and phone number.
(Id. at PageID 154.) Reddit complied with this HSI summons on April 2, 2024. (Doc. No. 33-16 at PageID 223.) In particular, Reddit allegedly indicated that thе user account Resident_Phrase7 was associated with the email address, davesnell5@gmail.com, and an IP address maintained by
SA Mendelsohn followed up on the information Reddit had submitted on April 2 by conducting a Google search of the email address provided and issuing another administrative summons, this time to Altafiber. (Doc. Nos. 33-1; 33-16 at PageID 223.) Regarding his Google search, SA Mendelsohn supposedly learned that davesnell5@gmail.com had been publicly associated with a David Snell, living in Dayton, Ohio, as recently as 2018. (Doc. No. 33-16 at PageID 223.) With respect to Altafiber, SA Mendelsohn summonsed the following information from the ISP:
Subscriber Information: For the IP address(es) listed below, any and all subscriber and customer information, including but not limited to: (1) subscriber name; (2) physical, billing and email address; (3) service or subscriber agreements; (4) length of service (including start date); (5) identification of account number; (6) means and source of payment for service (including any credit card or bank account number); (7) account logs or other logs reflecting accounts usage; (8) types of service; (9) additional screen names (including instant message) and Internet Protocol(IP) logs.
(Doc. No. 33-1 at PageID 150.) In service of this request, the summons listed the IP address identified by Reddit, along with seven specific dates and times. (Id.) Altafiber allegedly complied with SA Mendelsohn‘s request on April 12, 2024, by connecting the targeted IP address with a Nicole Matus (“Ms. Matus“), living in Dayton, Ohio. (Doc. No. 33-16 at PageID 223.) Subsequеnt investigation revealed Ms. Matus to be Snell‘s wife. (Id.)
There is little, if anything, more to be said of law enforcement‘s investigation until July 2024. On July 2, 2024, SA Mendelsohn received a report of a missing 17-year-old girl, identified in the First Superseding Indictment (Doc. No. 27) as “Minor 1.” (Doc. No. 33-16 at PageID 224.) SA Mendelsohn was purportedly familiar with Minor 1 and her family from prior child exploitation investigations where Minor 1 had been victimized. (Id.) Hoping to find her daughter, Minor 1‘s mother turned over Minor 1‘s laptop and cell phone to local authorities and granted law
In the month that followed, SA Mendelsohn issued 13 more administrative summonses to various third parties, all in an effort to identify the individual Minor 1 had been speaking to on Reddit. (See Doc. Nos. 33-3 through 33-15; Doc. No. 33-16 at PageID 241-43.) Each summons requested basic subscriber information related to the Reddit accounts in contact with Minor 1. (See Doc. Nos. 33-3 through 33-15.) Notably, Reddit allegedly tied these five user accounts to the same IP address as Resident_Phrase7, the individual SA Mendelsohn spoke to in March while posing as a 12-year-old girl. (Doc. No. 33-16 at PageID 241.) Production by the corresponding ISP again identified Ms. Matus, in Dayton, Ohio, as the associated subscriber. (Id. at PageID 241-42.)
Additionally, throughout July and August of 2024, SA Mеndelsohn continued to check law enforcement databases to monitor for CyberTipline reports made to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC“). (Id.) Pertinent here, on July 14, 2024, SA Mendelsohn allegedly located three reports made to NCMEC by Reddit on or around June 25, 2024. (Id. at PageID 241.) In short, Reddit reported instances of child exploitation оn the platform, in connection with one of the user accounts that had communicated with Minor 1. (Id.) These reports allegedly came with images uploaded by the suspect user account, which Reddit reportedly
Having allegedly tied Snell to the sexual abuse and exploitation of children through the investigation described above, Snell was charged by criminal complaint on August 29, 2024. (See Doc. No. 1.) The grand jury returned a formal indictment against Snell several months later, on November 20, 2024. (Doc. No. 20.) Finally, the grand jury returned a six count First Superseding Indictment against Snell on February 11, 2025. (Doc. No. 27.) In the end, Snell has been charged with: two criminal counts for the production of child pornography, in violation of
In short order, Snell filed his current Motion on February 21, 2025. (Doc. No. 28.) At the Government‘s request, and with Snell‘s consent, the Court vacated any suppression hearing to be held in this matter and set a briefing schedule for Snell‘s Motiоn. (See Doc. No. 34.) Pursuant to that briefing schedule, Snell filed a Brief in Support of Defendant‘s Motion to Suppress (the “Brief“) (Doc. No. 36) on May 7, 2025. The Government submitted the United States’ Response in Opposition to Defendant‘s Brief in Support (the “Response“) (Doc. No. 39) on May 27, 2025, and Snell filed his reply on June 6, 2025 (Doc. No. 41). Accordingly, the Court finds Snell‘s Motion to be ripe for review and decision.
II. ANALYSIS
To start, a criminal defendant may seek the suppression of evidence by filing a pretrial motion with the Court.
To that end, the Fourth Amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
With these principles in mind, the Court looks to Snell‘s arguments in favor of suppressing evidence obtained without a warrant here. In essence, Snell advocates for the suppression of all evidence regarding his alleged online activity that law enforcement discovered by way of administrative summonses. (Doc. No. 36 at PageID 440.) Further, because informаtion derived from those summonses formed the basis of a search warrant, Snell would have all evidence obtained as a result of that search warrant suppressed as well. (Id.) To his point, Snell argues that the summonses issued by SA Mendelsohn were so broadly worded as to solicit the contents of Snell‘s alleged private communications without the issuanсe of a warrant. (Id. at PageID 445-50.) Consequently, says Snell, law enforcement was able to circumvent his reasonable expectation of privacy, thus violating the Fourth Amendment. (Id.) Upon review, the Court finds Snell‘s position to be unsupported by either law or fact.
Consistent with the Supreme Court‘s holding in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), when considering a purportedly warrantless search “the application of thе Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard demands a two-pronged inquiry: first asking, “whether the individual, by his conduct, has ‘exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy‘“; and, second, “whether the individual‘s subjective expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.‘” Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361). Here, there can be no question that Snell held a subjective expectation of privacy in the subscriber informаtion that allegedly tied him to
With the advent of new technologies, courts must read the Fourth Amendment to keep pace with that technology, lest it “erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment” altogether. Kyllo v. U.S., 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). The Supreme Court considered the privacy implications of such a technological advancement in Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. 296 (2018). There, the Supreme Court analyzed whether law enforcement needed to acquire a warrant bеfore obtaining an individual‘s cell-site location information (“CSLI“) from third-party wireless carriers. See id. This question was answered in the affirmative, with the court finding that CSLI offers a means to constantly track an individual‘s movements for indefinite periods of time. Id. at 310. The Supreme Court reasoned “that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privaсy in the whole of their physical movements,” and allowing law enforcement to obtain an individual‘s CSLI without a warrant “contravenes that expectation.” Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 310-11 (citing U.S. v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (J. Alito Concurring)). However, while the mere fact that certain information is maintained by a third-party will not defeat Fourth Amendment protections, the holding in Carpenter can only be narrowly applied to CSLI and оther technological tools that track the whole of an individual‘s movements. 585 U.S. at 316.
Stepping away from the narrow holding in Carpenter, more generally, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party ... even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in a third party will not be betrаyed.” U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (quoting United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976)) (internal quotation marks
Returning to Snell‘s Motion, the Court first finds that the administrative summonses used to ascertain Snell‘s identity were not overly broad. Snell offers no case law to support his overbreadth argument and the language of the summonses at issue clearly sought basic subscriber information for an individual using multiple online services under varying usernames. As illustrated by the precedent cited above, such information is undoubtably fair game for an administrative summons. Indeed, the only party who seems to think the summonses were worded to impermissibly solicit the alleged contents of Snell‘s private communications is Snell. None of thе providers summonsed returned substantive communications in response to SA Mendelsohn‘s summonses and a large contingent of the substantive communications SA Mendelsohn found were not turned over by third-party service providers at all. Instead, SA Mendelsohn acquired the bulk of Snell‘s alleged conversations by acting in an undercover capacity himself or by getting consent to view the contents of Minor 1‘s electronic devices. The substantive communications that were
Getting to the heart of the matter, again, SA Mendelsohn only sought basic subscriber information with administrative summonses. The law is clear, Snell simply does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such information. For good measure, basic subscriber information does not track the whole of an individual‘s movements or otherwise intrude on the areas of an individual‘s life that he can expect to keep from public view. Rather, it amounts to information used to record an individual‘s identity. Along these lines, to say that Snell has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his online subscriber information is to say he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his identity; an identity that he had to share with third-party service providers to access their platforms in the first place. The Court finds this notion to be wholly unsupported by relevant legal authority. Accordingly, the Court finds that the summonses issued by SA Mendelsohn in this case, and the evidence derived therefrom, do not amount to a “search” requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court hereby DENIES Snell‘s Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support (Doc. No. 28.)
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Monday, July 7, 2025.
s/Thomas M. Rose
THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
