DECISION
The sole issue before us is whether the military has jurisdiction over a felonious assault off-base by one military member against another.
The record established that the assault occurred in Victorville, California, approximately four and one half miles from George Air Force Base. There were three witnesses to the assault: the victim, Senior Airman Martin; the accused; and the accused’s wife, Tammy, whose father was stationed at George Air Force Base. The accused and Martin first met in September 1982, when Martin gave the accused a ride. Later they had casual contact and each knew the other was stationed at George. Martin dated Tammy prior to her marriage to the accused in April 1983.
As Martin was leaving the base on the evening of 3 May 1983, he saw the accused and his wife in a car ahead of him. Apparently, Martin began “tailgating” the accused’s car, and when he pulled along side some remarks were made, but neither could understand the other. The “tailgating” continued as both cars left the base with Martin being in front. Ultimately, both ears stopped and the accused and Martin got out. Again words were exchanged and the accused stabbed Martin in the upper left chest and cut him on the left side of the neck. These injuries required Martin to be hospitalized for 12 days. The incident was investigated by the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office which declined to prosecute due to perceived evidentiary problems.
It is hornbook law that for a military court to have jurisdiction the offense must be “service connected.” O’Callahan v. Parker, supra; Relford v. Commandant,
Appellate defense counsel contend the Government’s assertion of jurisdiction is bottomed primarily on the military status of the accused and the victim a concept which was rejected by the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Hedlund, 2 M.J. 11 (C.M.A.1976). They also argue that notwithstanding indications that the Court of Military Appeals has expanded the limits of military jurisdiction, until Hedlund, supra, is directly overruled, there can be no finding of “service connection” in the accused’s case.
We need not speculate whether Hedlund, supra, was overruled by implication in Trottier, Murray v. Haldeman or Lockwood, all supra. We base today’s holding that military jurisdiction exists on the fact that the military has a distinct and greater interest in the prosecution of this case than does the civilian community. United States v. Hollis,
The jurisdictional limit of a court-martial has not remained static; it has ebbed and flowed throughout the history of the armed forces. It reached its nadir with the O’Callahan decision which made “service connection” the basis for military jurisdiction, but the precise employment of this term is not immutable. As Chief Judge Everett indicated in United States v. Lockwood, supra, at page 10:
[T]he criteria for service connection should be reexamined periodically in light of changes in the conditions under which the Armed Services perform their assigned missions and the accompanying changes in the impact of off-post crimes upon their ability to accomplish those missions.
An assault with a dangerous weapon by one servicemember on another, regardless of where it occurs, has a clear and measurable impact on the morale, reputation and integrity of the installation. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the court-martial could properly try the offense referred to it. United States v. Hollis, supra; see generally United States v. Campbell,
AFFIRMED.
Notes
The accused was charged with assault with the intent to commit murder; the convening authority approved the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. He was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, confinement at hard labor for three years, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to airman basic.