16 M.J. 431 | United States Court of Military Appeals | 1983
Lead Opinion
Opinion of the Court
This appeal is another of a disturbing number of cases involving intolerable delay in the post-trial processing of courts-martial which have arisen since this Court, in United States v. Banks, 7 M.J. 92 (C.M.A.1979), withdrew from the “inflexible application” (id. at 93) of the presumption of prejudice from such delay theretofore invoked under certain circumstances, see Dunlap v. Convening Authority, 23 U.S.C. M.A. 135, 48 C.M.R. 751 (1974). Instead, the Court determined that “applications for relief because of delay of final action by the convening authority will be tested for prejudice.” 7 M.J. at 94. Because of the indefensible period of delay at the convening and supervisory
Exactly what occurred in appellant’s case over the next four months is not apparent from the record. However, on October 9, 1981, the military judge who presided at the court-martial executed a certificate of correction so that the record of trial would reflect that prosecution exhibit 2 had not been admitted into evidence because it was identical to defense exhibit F, which had been admitted earlier.
On December 1, 1981, the staff judge advocate signed a supplement to his original review in which he advised the supervisory authority that prosecution exhibit 2 had not been admitted and that a copy of it, marked “Offered but not admitted into evidence,” was then included in the record. Accordingly, after observing that “[i]t is therefore unnecessary to conduct a rehearing,” he recommended that the supervisory authority withdraw his action of six months earlier and approve the findings and sentence without modification. The supervisory authority did just that on December 28, 1981. The delay between the end of appellant’s court-martial and the final action of the supervisory authority on this 38-page record of trial totaled 439 days.
In my separate opinion in United States v. Johnson, 10 M.J. 213, 218 (C.M.A.1981), I observed:
The very difficulty in demonstrating that prejudice to an accused has resulted from delays in completing the action provides a temptation for a convening authority to lapse into dilatory habits in completing his action. Thus, the demise of the Dunlap presumption may produce a return to the intolerable delays that persuaded the Court to adopt the presumption in the first place. Indeed, to help prevént such an occurrence, the Court should be vigilant in finding prejudice wherever lengthy post-trial delay in review by a convening authority is involved.
In the case at bar, appellant has amply demonstrated such prejudice.
In his unrebutted affidavit filed in this Court, appellant detailed his living and working conditions in the nearly one year after he was released from confinement
The post-trial processing of this case is marked by administrative bungling and indifference. The delay occasioned thereby will not be tolerated if there is any indication that appellant was prejudiced as a result. See United States v. Gentry, 14 M.J. 209 (C.M.A.1982); United States v. Clevidence, 14 M.J. 17 (C.M.A.1982). Such prejudice is amply apparent here, and, accordingly, the Government must fully bear the consequences.
The decision of the United States Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review is reversed. The findings and sentence are set aside and the charges are dismissed.4
. Where the convening authority lacks general court-martial authority, see Article 65(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 865(b), the supervisory authority must take his action within the same timely period as must a convening authority who does have such power. United States v. Brewer, 1 M.J. 233, 234 (C.M.A.1975).
. In accordance with his pleas, appellant was convicted by a military judge sitting alone as a special court-martial of four unauthorized absences — for periods of approximately four
. United States v. Goode, 1 M.J. 3 (C.M.A. 1975).
. In light of our disposition of this case, we need not consider a second issue on which we granted review. 14 M.J. 232 (1982). an affidavit to this Court, the Government has neither rebutted nor denied a single aspect of appellant’s rendition.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring):
I agree completely with the majority opinion. I write separately only to explain why I consider this case different from United States v. Clevidence, 14 M.J. 17 (C.M.A.1982), where I dissented. After Clevidence completed his post-trial confinement, he was immediately placed on appellate leave. His assertion of prejudice flowing from the lengthy delay in the post-trial processing of his case was his inability to find “good” employment in the civilian community. He alleged that prospective employers were unwilling to hire him for fear that he might be recalled to active duty. Frankly, I am dubious, as a general proposition, that appellate confirmation of a bad-conduct discharge improves a service-member’s chances of obtaining “good” employment. With only Clevidence’s speculative contentions to rely on, I was unwilling to depart from the rule that
delay in post-trial processing would be error only if there was some other error in the trial proceedings necessitating a rehearing, and that because of the delay, the accused would be prejudiced in presenting his case at the rehearing.
14 M.J. at 20.
In the instant case, there is nothing speculative about the prejudice suffered
Despite the passage of nearly a year since appellant described his post-release conditions in