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United States v. Shawn Gementera
379 F.3d 596
9th Cir.
2004
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 RE- district court and testimony, decision of the extensive YE Even without to remand disability benefits MAND with instructions entitlement Benecke’s an Security for testimony establishes of Social The VE Commissioner is clear. perform unable to Benecke would award of benefits. telemarketer, a seden- as a past her work demands. physical limited

tary job with (remand- Reddick, at 729-30 of benefits immediate award

ing for an testimony expert estab- vocational

where perform the claimant could

lished that job, was classified which previous

her work). There is no basis on sedentary America, UNITED STATES ALJ, the evidence of crediting an Plaintiff-Appellee, physical and serious pain severe Benecke’s

limitations, that Benecke could conclude sedentary job, a different perform could GEMENTERA, Defendant- Shawn testimony light of the YE’s especially Appellant. telemarketing employers make con- No. 03-10103. disabled to accommodate siderable efforts quite activities are workers. Benecke’s Appeals, United States Court difficulty. out with limited and carried Ninth Circuit. dating appli- Benecke’s pre Doctors’ notes May Argued and Submitted attempts manage her cation document that she at- and demonstrate pain her Aug. Filed to work unsuccessfully to return tempted disease, found but after the onset her treating to do so. Several

herself unable that Benecke would

physicians have stated employment her to maintain unable estab- Because the evidence

condition. be unable to

lishes that Benecke would managing her employment

maintain while for further ad-

pain fatigue, remand serves no useful proceedings

ministrative

purpose and is unwarranted.

III. CONCLUSION held, the im-

As the district ALJ the evidence.

properly discredited much of remaining issue that

Because there is no

must be it is clear resolved and

record that Benecke is entitled to disabili- benefits,

ty that the district we conclude by remanding

court abused its discretion proceedings further administrative

rather than for an immediate award of Accordingly,

benefits. we REVERSE the *2 Wachtel, Francisco,

Arthur K. CA, San argued appellant the case for the and was on the Maitreya briefs. Badami was also on the briefs.

Kelley Snyder, Brooke Department U.S. Justice, DC, Washington, argued the case for the appellee and was on the briefs. Ryan, Kevin Attorney, States Horsley Hannah Mas- Anne-Christine sullo, Attorneys, Assistant United States were also on the briefs. Falk,

Elizabeth M. Office of the Federal Defender, CA, Francisco, Public San ar- gued the case amicus curiae Federal Public Defender for the Northern District Barry and was on the California briefs. Portman, Defender, J. Federal Public was also on the briefs. age At nine- steadily more serious.

ing of misdemeanor teen, he was convicted convicted He twice mischief. criminal suspended with a twenty driving age *3 a domestic twenty-two, age At license. driving convictions led to dispute SILER, JR.,* O’SCANNLAIN, Before: failing pro- to and for license suspended a Judges. HAWKINS, Circuit By responsibility. of financial proof vide O’SCANNLAIN, Judge: was misde- the conviction twenty-four, Circuit arrests and cita- battery. Other meanor super- of a legality We must decide Investiga- Presentence in the tions listed a con- requires release condition vised drug possession included Report tion day standing a spend thief to mail victed driving offenses additional paraphernalia, signboard wearing a post a office outside (most driving on a li- of which involved my punish- mail. This stating, “I stole to take for his failure suspended cense ment.” twenty- tests), and, after his soon chemical a without birthday, taking vehicle fifth I consent. owner’s pilfered letters Gementera Shawn 25, 2003, Judge Vaughn February On Francisco’s along San mailboxes several Court District of the United States Walker police May A on Fulton Street sen- District of California for the Northern episode immedi- who observed officer Sentencing The Gementera. U.S. tenced partner and his ately detained Gementera eight to months range was Guidelines two Choi, been crime, who had Andrew incarceration; sentenced Judge Walker jacket into his as letters stuffing the stolen to the lower bound Gementera After watch. anxiously kept Gementera incarceration imposing two months range, plea indictment, entered Gementera supervised release.1 He years and three pled to which he pursuant agreement supervised conditions of re- theft, see 18 U.S.C. guilty to mail lease. second dismissed a government required Gementera One such Treasury U.S. receiving a stolen count of community ser- 100 hours of “perform to § 641. check. See 18 U.S.C. vice,” “standing in front of consist of to first county city was not Gementera’s of San facility The offense in the postal only which in a sandwich board Though with the law. Francisco with encounter time, mail. This declares: T stole large at the Gement- letters twenty-four years old ”2 later my punishment.’ for a lengthy history criminal era’s the sentence a motion to correct grow- filed and was youth, man of his relative * Siler, Jr., for himself at that he has set the course Eugene The Honorable E. Circuit, facing more age going to be a lot serious Judge Sixth he's States Circuit in the future.” sitting by designation. charges that, while it would explained court sentencing, judge addressed Gement- 2. At impose home strongly have been inclined you the fact that also discussed "[WJe've era: histo- confinement Gementera’s criminal had way very graphic to be in a better, need reminded "given the ry felt that been you exactly the crime committed means what has been unpromising that the defendant road is, you standing society. That idea following, have a taste needs to he one, post with a board office out front of but he custody, a brief federal be sure somebody labeling you who has stolen he continues needs to that if understand removing sandwich mail; board condition. stole this is my punishment,” in 35(a). See Fed.R.Crim.P. front of a San Francisco postal facility identified by officer. For Judge Walker modified the af- sentence safety of defendant general pub- inviting ter parties present both “an lic, postal facility designated shall be alternative form or forms of service one employs one or security more comport would better with the aims of guards. Upon showing by the court.” lieu of sign- the 100-hour that this condition would requirement, likely impose board the district court im- upon defendant posed four-part psychological special harm condition in its effect or terms, stead. result Three new proposed unwarranted jointly risk of *4 counsel, defendant, mandated harm to the the public or postal defendant postal patrons observe employees, visiting probation the “lost or may officer missing window, mail” or write letters of withdraw modify this condition or apology any to apply identifiable victims of his to the court to modify withdraw or crime, and deliver several lectures at a this condition.

local school.3 It also included scaled- On March 2003, the court denied the down version of signboard require- Rule 35 motion and amended the sentence ment: as described above. timely Gementera ap- The defendant shall perform 1 day of 8 pealed.4 total of community hours service during II (i)

which time he shall either wear a two- (ii) sided board-style sign sandwich or We first address Gementera’s ar carry a large sign two-sided stating, “I gument eight-hour sandwich case, replied, mail.” Gementera "If that's the United States to identity determine the I would post stand in front of a office with a all ascertainable victims of the defendant’s my penalty board as crime; for the crime that I did having persons, identified those long commit. And as get as I can home compose defendant shall per- address get my detention so family I can togeth- back sonal letter to persons each of these individ- er, get back on track and my- rehabilitation ually expressing defendant’s remorse for incarceration, self.” imposed After the court specific per- conduct harmed detention, rather than home Gementera's son; provide the defendant shall each such counsel asked that changed the 100 hours counsel, victim with the address of his "up to 100 hours at the discretion of the through any whom victim who wishes to probation request officer.” That was denied. directly contact the may defendant do so. Though the acknowledged had explicitly c.The defendant shall three deliver edu- humiliation, that the condition would cause cational at three lectures Francisco San challenge did the condition’s schools, high proba- be identified legality nor explain did he ask the court to or probation tion officer and under the offi- elaborate purpose its at hearing. the first direction, cer’s in which the defendant shall committed, describe the crime he has ex- parts 3. The first four-part special three press his remorse for his criminal conduct condition mandated: and articulate to the students in attendance shall, a. The defendant at the direction of how his conviction sentence af- officers, probation spend days 8of plans. fected his life and future postal total hours facility each at a where window, there is a observing lost found 4. Gementera was ordered to surrender on postal patrons 12, 2003, who visit that March prior window to 2003. On March mail; inquire surrender, missing about lost or to his Gementera was arrested for shall, b. The mail, possession with the assistance of stolen he was counsel, carefully all examine Rule 16 convicted and a twenty-four received month discovery possession materials in the of the sentence. 3583(d). Thus, comply Sentencing U.S.C. condition violates board 3583(d). any requirement, condition must be Act.5 18 U.S.C. this Reform “reasonably to “the related” nature Sentencing Act affords Reform histo circumstances of offense in fashion broad discretion district courts ry and characteristics defendant.” supervised ing appropriate 3553(a)(1). Moreover, See 18 U.S.C. release, mandating that such condi while “reasonably both related” to and must be objectives. addi legitimate tions serve greater deprivation liberty “involve no as a “any set forth discre tion to reasonably necessary” to “afford than is section tionary condition of conduct,” deterrence to criminal adequate (b)(12) 3563(b)(1) (b)(10) and through 3553(a)(2)(B), see at “protect id. (b)(20),” explicitly au the statute through defendant,” from further crimes of see “any impose other thorizes the court 3553(a)(2)(C), id. the de “provide at appropriate.” to be condition it considers or voca fendant with needed educational added). § 3583(d)(emphasis 18 U.S.C. care, training, cor tional medical other conditions, however, may only special Such most rectional treatment effective “to the extent that condi 3553(a)(2)(D).6 Ac manner.” See id. *5 tion— statutory three cordingly, legitimate (1) reasonably related to factors deterrence, purposes protection 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), set forth section analy public, and rehabilitation frame our (a)(2)(D); (a)(2)(C), and Rearden, E.g., sis. United States v. 349 (2) greater deprivation of involves no (9th Cir.2003); 608, 618 United States F.3d reasonably necessary than for liberty (9th T.M., 1235, v. 330 F.3d 1240 Cir. set forth section purposes 2003).7 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D); and and bounds, recog- have Within these flexibility any pertinent poli- with nized the and considerable dis- is consistent im- cy Sentencing issued cretion district courts exercise to statements release, pose Commission supervised up to 28 U.S.C. conditions of pursuant 994(a)”; including upon limits exercise generally supervised Though statutory underlying 7. reviews re authorities The court discretion, abuse supervised lease conditions for see probation re conditions of Williams, 1045, distinct, States v. 356 F.3d United compare lease are 18 U.S.C. (9th Cir.2004), though 1052 we review de 3583(authorizing supervised § release condi Sentencing interpretation novo the tions) 3563(authorizing § U.S.C. 18 Guidelines, Garcia, v. see United States 323 conditions), probation supervised the court’s 1161, Cir.2003), (9th F.3d 1164 and [w]heth jurisprudence release often relied has ” 'illegal,' imposed er see the sentence was See, authority probation context. 1446, Fowler, United States v. 794 F.2d 1449 Hurt, 1033, e.g., v. United States 345 F.3d (9th 1986), example, by exceeding "the Cir. (9th Cir.2003); Pinjuv, 1035 United States v. permissible statutory penalty crime[] for the 1125, (9th Cir.2000); 218 F.3d 1131 United [by being] the Constitution." violation Bee, 1232, (9th F.3d States 162 1234-35 Johnson, 941, United States v. (9th 988 F.2d 1998). context, probes Cir. In that the court 1993). Cir. extent objectives serve "dual of rehabilitation Any consistent with condition must public safety.” Sentencing policy See v. Con state- United States Commission’s 3583(d); suelo-Gonzalez, 259, (9th § ments. See U.S.C. U.S.C. Cir. 521 F.2d 994(a). § argu- 1975) parties (en banc). raised respect requirement. ments with to this rights. fundamental See 18 U.S.C. A 3583(d) § (granting authority impose Gementera first urges that the condition “any other condition it considers to be an impermissible purpose appropriate”); Hurt, States v. United of humiliation. 3553(a). 18 U.S.C. (9th Cir.2003) (“[T]he dis- points He to certain remarks of the district trict court ... has wide discretion to act in the first sentencing hearing: the interest of the defendant pub- and the lic.”); [H]e needs to understand Bolinger, States v. the disapprov- (9th (“The al that Cir.1991) society has for this kind of sentencing con- duct, and judge that’s the has broad idea discretion in behind the hu- setting pro- miliation. conditions, bation And it should including restricting fun- be humiliation of having to stand rights”). reflects, damental This in part, be labeled in front of people greater coming their knowledge experience going from a post office particular somebody with the who offenders has before them. stolen have, mail. for example, We upheld conditions barring possession of sexually stimulating According Gementera, remarks, these material, Bee, United States v. 162 F.3d among others, indicate that the district Cir.1998), with mi- contact court viewed humiliation as an end in itself

nors, id., association or membership in and the purpose. condition’s “motorcycle clubs,” Bolinger, F.2d at Reading the context, record in internet, and access Rearden, to the however, we cannot but conclude that the 349 F.3d at 620.

district court’s stated aligned rationale *6 course, Of the district court’s dis permissible statutory objectives. At cretion, broad, while is sig limited —most the second sentencing when hearing, the here, nificantly by the require statute’s sentence was amended to is what now ment any that condition reasonably us, relate before the court explained: “[U]lti- a legitimate statutory purpose.8 mately, “This objective is, the one, here to deter is applied test a two-step process; first, in conduct, and, criminal two, number to re this court must determine whether the habilitate the offender so that after he has sentencing judge imposed the conditions paid punishment, his reoffend, he does not permissible for purposes, and then it must public and a expiation having offended determine whether the is, conditions are rea or be, at least it should in rehabilitating sonably related to the purposes.” United its effect.” Although, general, criminal (9th States v. Terrigno, 371, 838 F.2d punishment “is or at least humil should be Cir.1988). appeal Gementera’s implicates iating,” the emphasized court that “[h]u- steps analysis. both of the miliation is the point.” not The court’s points 8. Gementera to several (making cases in reparations only for crime to which a our sister found circuits that conditions did pled guilty). co-defendant had He also cites reasonably not States, relate. See Springer United States v. v. United 148 F.2d 415- Abrar, (2d 1995) 58 F.3d (9th Cir. (repayment 1945), lb Cir. in which this court vacated debts); unrelated Prendergast, States v. a a draft-dodger that convicted do (8th Cir.1992) (abstinence 979 F.2d 1289 pint nate a of blood to the Red Cross. Id. In conviction); cases, from alcohol for wire fraud however, Unit each of these the condition Smith, (8th ed States v. 972 F.2d 961-62 was unrelated to the nature and substance of Cir.1992) (not siring except by Here, children wife the offense. there is no reasonable conviction); for States, narcotics dispute Fiore v. United signboard that the declaration relat (2d 1982) 208-10 Cir. ed to the offense. consequences legal the real aware that similarly stresses order written theft.” engaging mail subject defendant “to not goal court’s sake, but for humiliation’s humiliation record unam- entirety, in its Read in which a situation create rather the district that establishes biguously crime of defendant’s public exposure for the stated the condition court defendant exposure public of reha- statutory purpose legitimate pur- will serve crime” of his victims extent, gener- for and, to a lesser bilitation defen- of “the rehabilitation poses of the protection al deterrence public.” of the the protection 3553(a); dant gen- see 18 U.S.C. public. Clark, F.2d States v. erally United concern particular expressed Cir.1990) (9th (affirming public 843, fully under- did not sup- record “[t]he when apology Mail offense. of his gravity stand judge im- the conclusion ports and, by crime anonymous an theft apology aof requirement posed to defendant home “bringing] rehabilitation.”), on other overruled real significance to palpable has conduct Keys, 133 States by United grounds community,” the court within his people banc). (en Cir.1998) We illu- of the the defendant to break aimed purpose. in the condition’s no error find or was victimless his theft sion that short, explained: In serious. B may well be—indeed humiliation

While of defendant’s be—a feature likely will legiti- articulated Assuming the court post of- standing before experience asserts, under purpose, mate humiliation sign, the fice with test, Terrigno, see of our prong the second serve should experiences he shame or so- humiliation F.2d at bringing defendant salutary purpose “rea- are not “shaming” conditions called significance the real touch with in close sup- to rehabilitation. sonably related” com- acknowledged has crime he statements general our he cites port, should experience an mitting. Such reasonably related to must effect rehabilitative specific have a objectives, see Consuelo- statutory *7 accom- not be could (“[E]ven defendant though Gonzalez, at 262 521 F.2d means, certainly not by other plished very broad discretion has judge trial imprisonment. term of a more extended proba- conditions of terms and fixing the reasonably relat- tion, must terms such Moreover, deterrent also have “[i]t will Act.”), several purposes to the ed and others defendant effect on both this decisions,9 law re- several court made state been have not might who otherwise purpose be- 1049, the rehabilitative Hackler, not serve Cal.App.4th could 13 People v. In unem- Cali- defendant (Cal.Ct.App.1993), it would render Cal.Rptr.2d cause requiring contrast, a condition By court vacated fornia Gementera’s ployable. year probation to hours) during first his temporally (eight sharply limited was his was outside a t-shirt he wear whenever city), (one large in a post office spatially read, plus two- "My record The t-shirt home. would any its effects eliminating risk that back, years," and on the equal four packs six aspects of the similarly spill all over into Noting felony theft.” probation for "I am Indeed, court’s the district life. defendant's inten- stated disapproval the trial court's lengthier in lieu of imposition the condition to era "going to extent some back tion enter Gementera to enables incarceration transforming the defendant of stocks” market. private labor 1058, [sic],” id. Prin into "a Hester 681, t-shirt that the Cal.Rptr.2d court held view articles that were not presented to uncertainty about whether the condition the district court. aids rehabilitation suffice; does not rather, persuade he must us that the condition’s supposed relationship to rehabilitation is evaluating supervised unreasonable. conditions, release we have emphasized We considered a similar question in the “reasonable relation” test is nec- Clark, a case involving police two officers essarily a “very standard,” flexible convicted of perjury in a civil rights law- flexibility is necessary because of they brought suit against their depart- uncertainty “our about how rehabilitation Clark, ment. 918 F.2d at 844. In a depo- accomplished.” Id. at 264. While our sition, the officers lied about a past episode knowledge limited, of rehabilitation is we they falsely had phoned in sick explicitly nonetheless held that “a actually while public en route to a apology may serve a vacation. As a rehabilitative Clark, probation condition, purpose.” 846; required F.2d at see also States, publish Gollaher v. them to detailed apology in the (9th Cir.1969) (“It local newspaper axiomatic and in police almost depart- step first toward ment rehabilitation of newsletter. Id. at 845. Though they an offender is the recognition challenged offender’s the condition based fault”). that he course, was at Of Amendment, for First applied the same to prevail, introducing mere applicable here, test concluding that “[b]e- Johnson, People Ill.App.3d imposed upon a DWI offender. If (1988), Ill.Dec. 528 N.E.2d 1360 regained in- he driving privileges, the offender volved a condition that a pub- DWI offender required was sign affix a fluorescent to his lish a newspaper apology advertisement with plate, stating license "CONVICTEDDWI”. Id. mug Interpreting shot. supervi- the state at 147. The court the condition un sion law as intended "to aid the defendant in der a provision catch-all of the New York law rehabilitation avoiding and in future authorizing viola- "any other reasonably tions," and purpose, for no other the court related to his [or her] rehabilitation.” Id. at held that publication requirement “possi- (quoting New York Penal Laws bly, adds ridicule 65.10[2][I]). as a condition” of statute, Under the New York supervision psychological and could inflict rehabilitation "in the sense of that word that goal harm that disserves the distinguishes rehabilitation. it goals pun from societal (noting Id. at 1362 that the Illinois statute ishment or "singular deterrence” was the fo others”). does not "refer deterrent to Re- cus of the statute.” Id. at 149. Because the lying on the fact that young defendant was a design condition’s “true advance lady good and a prior rehabilitation, student with no crimi- defendant's but rather 'warn record, one, nal injured had and otherwise public' presented threat drug had no problem, wheel,” alcohol presence found the behind the id. at *8 impermissible, given perceived 159, court voided the condition. Id. at contrast, mental health By 105, Id. 146; risk. we have N.Y.S.2d 655 N.E.2d also id. see at specifically mandatory public ("[P]ublic held that apolo- crime, person’s disclosure aof gy may Clark, be rehabilitative. 918 F.2d at and the public attendant humiliation and dis ("[A] public apology may grace, serve rehabili- historically has regarded been strictly Moreover, purpose.”). tative (internal the condition as a punishment.” form of citations specifically provided signboard omitted)). that the re- In contrast to the New York quirement scheme, would be if the defen- withdrawn court plain district made the re dant showed that condition would inflict habilitative purpose of the We condition. psychological harm. system, also note that the federal in unlike the case, The defendant's People third system, Letter New York is not rehabilitation 259, lough, 105, 86 N.Y.2d legitimate objective. N.Y.S.2d sole See 18 U.S.C. (1995), N.E.2d 3583(d), probation 3553(a). §§ involved commit- that he kind of the a crime that reason- cause place people that trust abuses ted of re- end permissible related ably there that to see He needs the mail. in not an abuse it was habilitation, requiring on the mails count who people are at 848. Id. of discretion.” can he How else mails. of the integrity de- involve and Gementera Both Clark by coming than that to realize made be to confront seemingly failed who fendants use who people with face-to-face in the defendants wrongdoing, their the idea. That’s postal service? apolo- expiation public faced each case concluded Clark, court the district with As neither had Clark, defendants gy. of- of one’s acknowledgment that responsibility taken nor guilt admitted plea yet sterile the formal beyond fense— Here, by con- at 848. Id. their actions. necessary courtroom —was in a cloistered plea His trast, pled guilty. to his rehabilitation. given unremarkable, though, is decision red-handed. apprehended had been that he criminal the defendant’s Reflecting upon uncer course, much true, that of It is that concern expressed the court

history, how rehabilitation as to tainty exists the conse- fully understand did he Consuelo-Gonza See accomplished. best criminality, and continued of his quences picture lez, at 264. Were responsibility.10 accepted truly had not would justice system clearer, criminal our explained: The court im different, substantially vastly be to be needs man who young ais [T]his estimate, two-thirds By one proved. the conse- with face-to-face brought inmates who 640,000 and federal state going He’s conduct. of his quences will in return released will be At age in life. path wrong down Price years. The a few within prison offense, he’s kind of an committing this Times, Prisons, June N.Y. history category already in a criminal Statistics, Bureau of Justice A26. the criminal way up two-thirds Prisoners Justice, Recidivism Dep’t call. wake-up He needs history scale. re (finding 67.5% Released study that Gementera among population also determined rate cidivism 1994). The the serious- 300,000 about released prisoners to be educated needed in these given ignorance humanity of our particular, mail crimes cost ness of staggering. victimless: appear to matters they might Gementera’s features Mr. of the One contend and amicus he, offenders some unlike is that offense be rehabilitative cannot shaming conditions of- very of this not, nature by the necessarily cause did conditions such because victims. fense, society come face-to-face to withdraw offender damage, and mail psychological stealing inflict shown otherwise needs He against bar per they who would erect se victims; people there are has Shame, Massaro, Toni security conditions.11 See integrity depend Law, 89 Culture, Criminal American ways and very important mail in some shaming were Even if pre-surren- post-sentencing, 10. Gementera's *9 rehabilitative, urges Gementera mail times possession of stolen der conviction psychologically would of the district confirms reasonableness case, given his "lack specific damaging his respect. in this For observation court’s conviction, abuse, skills, and his his coping substance sentenced Gementera father.” personal issues unresolved imprisonment. twenty-four months (1991) (“When Mich. L.Rev. 1920-21 Kahan, Dan M. What Do Alternative works, it person redefines a in a nega Mean?, Sanctions 63 U. Chi. L.Rev. 591 tive, often way” irreversible and the “psy (1996) (arguing that shaming sanctions re- chological core” it affects cannot thereafter public inforce against norms criminality). rebuilt.); see generally June Tag- Price By no means is this conversation one-sid- al., ney et Relation Shame and Guilt to ed. Constructive Versus Destructive Respons offenses, Criminal penalties and the Anger es to Across the Lifespan, 70 J. accompany them, nearly always cause Psych. & Psych. (1996); Soc. 797-98 shame and embarrassment. United States al., June Price Tagney et Shamed into Koon, Cir.1994) ? Anger The Relation Shame and Guilt (“Virtually all individuals who are convict- to Anger and Self-Reported Aggression, ed of serious crimes suffer humiliation and Psych (1992). J. & Psych. Soc. 669-675 shame, many may be by ostracized Though the court district had scientific communities.”). their Indeed, the mere it, evidence before as Gementera com fact conviction, without which state- plains, we do not insist such evidence sponsored rehabilitation efforts do not in our Moreover, deferential review.12 commence, is stigmatic. The fact that a fact is that vigorous, multifaceted, schol condition causes shame or embarrassment arly debate on shaming efficacy, sanctions’ does not automatically render a condition desirability, and underlying rationales con objectionable; rather, such feelings gener- tinues See, within the academy. e.g., Dan ally signal M. defendant’s acknowledg- Kahan & Posner, Eric A. Shaming ment of his wrongdoing. See White-Collar Criminals: A Webster’s Proposal for Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary Federal Sentencing Guide Reform of (1986) lines, 42 (defining J.L. & Econ. shame as painful “a emo- tion (urging stigmatic use of punishments caused guilt, consciousness of criminals); white-collar shortcoming, Stephen P. or impropriety”); Gar see also vey, Shaming Gollaher, Can Punishments Edu 419 F.2d at 530. have recog- We cate?, 65 U. Chi. (1998); L.Rev. 738-39 nized that “the societal consequences that public expiation, contended, Better than he into vision providing an avenue be mandatory would substance abuse coun present for Gementera to more reliable evi seling First, training. vocational dence psychological harm: note that the require district court did Ge- Upon showing by defendant this condi- undergo mentera to substance abuse counsel likely tion would impose upon defendant ing Second, training. and vocational the rec psychological or harm or effect result ord establishes that the fairly district court defendant, unwarranted risk of harm to considered Gementera’s claims he was postal or employees, particularly somehow vulnerable to the con may officer sequences modify withdraw or of his this crime condi- being publicly ex posed. apply tion or At to the hearing, court to asked withdraw court de counsel, modify fense this "is condition. there some feature of his personality that No him such particularly presented. makes substantiation was By vul you condition, nerable that can the terms of the substantiate?” The at any if there were torney replied, evidence, "I anything can't offer my but Gementera faces no bar to his personal own observations and anecdotal presenting ob it. my servation based one-year repre almost sentation did and his Nor the district any reaction evi- family's and his contrary. reaction to By occurred dence citing what not these persuaded court.” While scholarly articles appeal, attor until this ney’s evidence, lay untutored psychological provide failed any the district court oppor-

the district court pro nonetheless inserted a tunity potential to assess their value. *10 Reintegrative (stigmatization). grative virtual- are conviction a from criminal flow com- of expressions that means shaming to cause tendency unlimited,” and ly range from may which munity disapproval, condi- a extinguish to insufficient is shame ceremonies, degradation to mild rebuke inso- at least promise, rehabilitative tion’s reacceptance of gestures by are followed flexible reasonable for our required far as citi- law-abiding community of into the Koon, 1454. test. relation sig- highly zens.”). as this factor seeWe a not short, consider here we nificant. solely to intended condition stand-alone sandwich court’s district While set comprehensive humiliate, but rather crude, and was somewhat condition board to expose the that provisions of with- of risk social entail could by itself then that also but disapprobation, coupled social it was stigmatization, drawal to for Gementera opportunity an provide in- provisions, socially more useful with society relationship with repair and writ- high school lecturing at a —first cluding by and then forgiveness seeking its by under- loosely be might that apologies, ing community, an of the a member as making, social offender’s promote to stood for- the moral to Shame, contribution independent Note, Stigma, reintegration. provisions,14 youth.13 These of its mation Efficacy Evaluating and Crime: of of the offend- needs Law, the specific to tailored Criminal in Shaming Sanctions concluding that er,15 counsel favor (2003) how (proposing L.Rev. Harv. being the threshold passes to may be structured sanctions shaming to rehabilitation. reasonably related effec- reintegration most social promote Crime, Braithwaite, Shame tively); John (“The crucial Reintegration im- lengthier aware Finally, we are shaming that between distinction to available was an alternative prisonment that is disinte- shaming reintegrative law-abiding citi- community of tion analysis looking faults our dissent 13.The an zens, generate contrition in order to provi- to signboard clause other beyond the community, rejoin that to desire authentic [Dissent at four-part condition. sions to reference without not, evaluated need char- the dissent as purpose is Our 612.] to recon- provisions program's affirmative it, con- improper an suggest that acterizes community and with the offender cile the setting merely by may be cured dition reintegrate into it. eventually him Rather, our ob- proper alongside conditions. individual an ligation is to assess whether more on the difficult pass here We do not purpose of reasonably to the relates provision original 100-hour court's the district case of condition, part provision is Where rehabilitation. reintegra- significant lacked scheme, we see integrated rehabilitative anof aspects. tive aspects of the looking at other bar to and reason- evaluating purpose scheme purpose of acknowledge one We do at issue. provision of the individual ableness promote was to Sentencing others, Guidelines provision By acting with concert sentencing, and uniformity rehabilitation, in federal greater even may reasonably relate super- conditions permitting certain virtue primarily though the existed relation here, release, may lead as provi- vised complementary its interaction described As regularized sentences. less A boot program. integrated an sions in however, above, previously upheld by “break- operates camp, example, that supervised re- array diverse lease, “building them before ing participants down” author- contemplated statute’s impermissible again” rendered up is not district [the alone, "any other ization standing step, merely the first because appropriate.” to be considers court] Similarly, pro- might impermissible. 3583(d). separa- U.S.C. emphasizes an offenders’ gram *11 court, however, promote the court. The reasoned better this defendant’s rehabilita- rehabilitation would be better tion and of amendment life than would a sentence, aby coupled achieved shorter term lengthier By of incarceration. con- trast, with the “It a per additional conditions: would se rule that mandatory off a public airing seem me he’s better with of can one’s offense never prison, longer pris- taste of rather than an duty assist offender to reassume his of sentence, on and some form of condition obedience to the law would impose nar- brings of him face-to-face penological orthodoxy release that row contemplat- consequences with by of crime.” ed express approval Guidelines’ of judge’s reasoning “any that rehabilitation would other condition [the district court] by be served means other than ex- better considers to be appropriate.” U.S.C. 3583(d). punishment tended incarceration reasonable, Kahan,

plainly see Dan M. Mean?, Ill What Do Alternative Sanctions (“[I]t 63 U. L.Rev. 653 n. Chi. urges Gementera also that the sandwich by the became clear middle the [19th] board condition violates the Constitution. century imprisonment was ill suited First, Fifth, with respect Claims ” (internal .... to rehabilitation citations Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments are omitted)), light sig- particularly presented. disadvantages nificant at- economic prolonged tach to imprisonment. gen- A Western, erally Jeffrey Kling, Bruce & argues Amicus condition vio- Weiman, David Market Labor Conse- First, Fifth, Eighth lates the and Four- Incarceration, quences De- Crime & teenth Amendments. Gementera bases linquency lit- (reviewing 410-27 solely his appeal upon Eighth Amend- erature); Jeffrey Grogger, The Effect of ment, and government contends that

Arrests on the Employment and Earn- the additional arguments constitutional Men, ings Young Quarterly Eco- J. presented by the amicus have been waived. (1995) (finding nomics 51-72 that incarcer- ative sentences have on we “Generally, substantial effects do not consider on earnings comparison parole). appeal only an issue raised an amicus.” Peterson, Swan v. 6 F.3d Cir.1993). The court has argu considered

Accordingly, jurisdictional we hold that the of a only condition ments nature raised amici, Francisco, reasonably Stone v. relat- San 968 F.2d (9th Cir.1992) (“Issues legitimate statutory objective ed touching holding, rehabilitation.16 so are comity may federalism and consid careful not to articulate a principle sponte.”), broader ered sua and it has addressed than that presented by purely legal questions parties the facts of this when the case. With care and an specificity, express adopt arguments the dis- intent to trict court logic outlined sensible under- as own. v. Van their United States Win conditions, row, (9th Cir.1991) lying its conclusion that a set (“Because including signboard provision, [litigant] but also states in his brief that including reintegrative provisions, he to adopt arguments would wishes [amicus’] reasonably holding, objectives In view of this we do not reach relates to deter- separate protection public. issue of whether the condition rence and era, *12 the colonial common severity were pure present they own, and because 84, 97-98, Doe, 538 U.S. see, v. Smith e.g., them consider law, will we of

issues (2003); 164 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d Cal. Joe’s S.Ct. 123 here.”)- Artichoke 712, Friedman, Punish- Norton, 353 F.3d Crime Lawrence v. Casino Grand (1993), and Cir.2003) (“In ex- History absence of 38 719(9th in American ment not circumstances, point. are which on this quarrel do not ceptional parties address issues not here, dowe present extends prohibition The Amendment’s brief.”); Russian an amicus only in raised barbarous deemed practices those beyond City v. Comm. Protection River Watershed See Stan- century, however. in the 18th 1136, 1141 Rosa, Santa of 361, 369-70, 492 U.S. Kentucky, v. raised Cir.1998) issue ford to address (declining (1989). 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 109 S.Ct. appeal when time for first by amicus are not of the Amendment words “[T]he the amicus’ adopt not did appellee not static. scope is their brief). [] precise, not did Gementera in its argument meaning draw its must Amendment on The arguments constitutional adopt amicus’ decency of standards urged evolving government Though the from appeal. maturing soci- had aof arguments progress these mark the reply brief its 100-01, 78 S.Ct. declined waived, again at Trop, Gementera 356 U.S. ety.” been (“Fines, otherwise or im- arguments 100, incorporate 590; 78 S.Ct. at id. own in its argument may the waiver address execution and even prisonment to address decline Accordingly, reply. enormity of imposed depending Amend- Fourteenth First, Fifth outside the crime, technique any but ment claims. penalties is these traditional bounds assessing In constitutionally suspect.”). B evolved, we look have so standards what Eighth to the then turn We society as a American of modern “to those infliction Amendment, forbids 369, 109 at whole,” U.S. Stanford, 492 U.S. punishments.” unusual “cruel and factors 2969, “objective relying upon S.Ct. Const, concept basic “The VIII. amend. extent,” v. Coker possible the maximum was Eighth Amendment underlying 2861, 592, 584, 97 S.Ct. U.S. Georgia, 433 of man.” dignity less than nothing (1977) opinion), (plurality L.Ed.2d 100, 86, 78 S.Ct. Dulles, U.S. v. Trop of de- conceptions own than “our rather dena (finding 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 369, 109 492 U.S. at Stanford, cency.” military deserters cruel tionalization 2969. S.Ct. dignity, human unusual). Consistent punish power its must exercise evidence the state offered parties standards.” civilized assertion, limits of “within whatsoever, bare aside Id. contemporary violate shaming sanctions occasional But the decency. standards violates punishment A particular hardly un- of such sanctions imposition constitutes if it Eighth Amendment courts. our state usual, particularly punishment “those modes acts one of Shaming Garvey, Can See, P. Stephen e.g., unusu cruel considered that had been Educate?, L.Rev. 65 U. Chi. Punishments Rights the Bill of time that al at the (1998) (describing proliferation 733, 734 477 U.S. Wainwright, v. adopted.” Ford punish- shaming creative unorthodox 2595, L.Ed.2d 106 S.Ct. from a Aside ments); at note (1986). greater far Shaming sanctions infra single presenting ease do, concerns however, is- We note that Blanton v. N. here,17 sue we are aware of no case holding Vegas, Las 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. that contemporary shaming sanctions vio- 103 (1989), L.Ed.2d 550 instructive, if late our prohibition Constitution’s against only indirectly. Blanton, the Court cruel and unusual punishment.18 considered whether a Nevada DUI defen- State, points Williams day, business night; not at in front aof *13 37, Ga.App. (1998), 505 S.E.2d 816 in Office, which United States Post "high not a crime” a defendant soliciting convicted sodomy of neighborhood where criminal oc- solicitation was to days, ordered walk for ten curs; between 7 sign's and the message pro- does not p.m. p.m. day, and 11 along each portion that by voke violence threatening the criminal live- occurred, of the street where the solicitation lihood of illegally those who trade sex in red a holding large sign a stating, "BEWARE district, light as the sign Williams might. HIGH CRIME police AREA.”The were to be Moreover, the district court in Gementera ex- notified in advance in order to monitor his plicitly provision included a allowing for performance provide and appropriate an level withdrawal of upon the condition showing a safety. of Id. at 817. While the court com- that the impose condition would safety risk judge mended the trial for his "initiative” in upon the defendant. Gementera made no developing a "new and creative form of sen- showing. tencing might very positive well have effect [the on defendant] and be beneficial to 18. Numerous state rejected courts have public,” explained and that shaming pun- Eighth Amendment challenges shaming to forbidden, ishments are not it nonetheless See, e.g., sanctions. People v. Letterlough, 205 found that exposed the condition the defen- 803, 804, A.D.2d 613 N.Y.S.2d (N.Y.App. 687 dant a constitutionally impermissible to dan- Div.1994) ("CONVICTED sign DWI" li ger. Mat 818. plate); State, Ballenger cense 627, v. 210 Ga.App. (1993) (fluorescent 436 S.E.2d 793 pink Georgia The language relied bracelet); State, DUI Lindsay v. 606 So.2d DeShaney Winnebago v. County Dep’t Social of 652, (DUI (Fla.App.1992) 656-57 Servs., 189, advertise 199-200, 998, 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. newspaper); ment in State, Goldschmitt v. (1989) 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (rejecting claim 123, 490 (Fla.App.1986) ("Convicted So.2d 125 against county department social services for D sticker); UI- Restricted bumper License” failing protect to private child from violence McDowell, People 807, father), Cal.App.3d 59 by his in Supreme which the cf. Court 812-13, Cal.Rptr. (Cal.App.1976) (tap held: "[W]hen the person State takes a into purse shoes thief who custody its used tennis shoes to against holds him there his approach will, quietly his swiftly). victims flee imposes Constitution upon it a corre- Developments also sponding duty in Law: to to Alternatives responsibility assume some Incarceration, 1944, HARV. safety for his L. general REV. well-being.” Id. at (1998) 199-200, ("Eighth challenges Amendment S.Ct. 998. have The Court ex- conditions, plained: failed to shaming overturn despite arguments The rationale ‘modern principle for this scarlet-letter simple enough: punishment conditions when the State constitute in the affirmative and of power exercise of its so themselves' and that shaming certain restrains an individ- liberty impose psychological ual's cruelty renders him unable to while himself, yielding care for at the better results same time than fails conventional provide punishments.”); to basic id. at human e.g., Cal.Rptr. needs — food, shelter, clothing, care, ("Courts simply have adopted medical the reason ing safety transgresses shaming reasonable is not cruel sub- or unusual when —it stantive limits on state imprisonment.”); action set alternative is M. Dan Eighth Kahan, Amendment and Mean?, the Due What Do Process Alternative Sanctions Clause. U. Chi. L.Rev. 646 n. 226 Id. at ("Although S.Ct. 998. The condition exceedingly doctrine is inde terminate, expose Gementera does not the defendant fairly it seems obvious that sham any significant danger. of By ing risk penalties contrast are not 'cruel and unusual’ for Williams, with signboard the Gementera purposes Amendment, Eighth particu during eight worn daylight hours during of larly when the imprisonment.”). alternative is six than onerous less garb DUI jury pursuant trial ato was entitled dant stretch it would imprisonment, months into inquiry The Amendment. the Sixth eight hours with to conclude reason a petty constituted offense

whether incarceration, consti- in lieu of signboard, Amendment the Sixth subject to crime and unusual constitutionally cruel tutes evalu- required Court provision trial punishment. author- the maximum severity of ate any 109 S.Ct. evidence Id. the absence penalty. ized comparison sentence particularly a maximum contrary, and provided statute prison, alternatively, forty-eight the modern or, reality of months six to conclude while dressed no reason community simply service hours the bounds us exceeds identifying defen- sanction before garb distinctive “evolving offender, other standards” payment “civilized DUI as a dant prog- license, decency that mark driving fine, standards loss $200-$1000 *14 society.” Trop, maturing Id. course. a abuse ress of at an alcohol attendance 100-01, 590. S.Ct. Court at 539-40, U.S. 109 S.Ct. at wrote: AFFIRMED. fact by the unpersuaded

areWe dissenting: HAWKINS, Judge, Circuit sentence, DUI a prison a that, of instead perform ordered may be be offender must release supervised Conditions in dressed service community hours “involve to- and related reasonably of- a DUI him as identifying clothing rea- liberty than is deprivation greater outfit is assuming the Even con- fender. criminal to deter necessary” sonably during embarrassment some source rehabilitate duct, protect public, will a penalty 3553(a)(1)- period, the 48-hour §§ 18 U.S.C. the offender. onerous less embarrassing Williams, less v. 3583(d)(2); States (2); jail. Cir.2004). months in than six Clear- at issue shaming punishment1 1289; ly, at but see id. 544, 109 S.Ct. Id. Ge- humiliate case was intended this (“We review hampered our are n. 10 Any do. all will And that the mentera. because clothing requirement punish- of the goal classify the attempt to nei- contains courts the state record humiliation than other anything as any ment clothing nor description a ther humilia- disingenuous.2 Because it must be would when to where details goals proper the three one of tion is not worn.”). concluded Court as the Just Act,3 I Sentencing Reform under in distinctive dressed service 48 hours of forthright his state- judge was The district "shaming” pun- a has defined 1.One scholar first, condi- imposed the why he regarding two features: ment "marked ishment as debase, degrade, or to understand needs attempt to "[Gementera] an tion: there second, offender; deg- society for this kind has disapproval humiliate eye, often conduct, before the humil- occurs radation idea behind that’s the public.” aid of the always but iation.” Markel, Shaming Beauti- Punshments Are Dan Im- and the fully Retributivism Retributive? deterrence, rehabilita- goals are 3. The three Debate, Sanctions Alternative plications U.S.C. tion, public. 18 protection (Nov.2001). This L.Rev. Vand. 3553(a)(2). §§ to wear requiring Gementera condition— public post office board outside sandwich clearly qualifies as declaring his crime'— "shaming” punishment. would hold that the district court abused tion that a convicted draft dodger donate a its discretion in imposing the pint Cross). condition. of blood to the Red State, Ballenger v. 210 Ga.App. precious

There is little federal authority- (1993), S.E.2d 793 approved a sentences that include shaming compo- that a convicted drunk driver wear a nents, fluor- perhaps indicative of recognition pink escent identification bracelet identify- justification whatever legal may be ing him as such. By my lights, the dissent in support marshaled of sentences involv- in Ballenger is far persuasive. more Con- ing public humiliation, they simply have no cluding that the purpose of the condition place in majesty of an Article III clearly humiliate, Judge Blackburn courtroom. Some state courts have re- argued that “a rationale of rehabilitation viewed such sentences and the results may not be used to vest ... authority[to have been mixed. prescribe this type of punishment] in the People Hackler, 13 Cal.App.4th 1049, judiciary.” Id. at (Blackburn, 795-96 J. 16 Cal.Rptr.2d (1993), 686-87 involved dissenting). a condition required a shoplifting of Just as in Hackler and Ballenger, fender to wear a court-provided t-shirt true intention in this case towas humiliate whenever he left the house “My that read: Gementera, not to rehabilitate him or to record plus two six-packs equals four deter him from future wrongdoing. When years” on the front and “I am on felony *15 the district court initially imposed the probation for theft” on the back. Applying sandwich condition, board the judge ex- a state sentencing regime similar to the plained that Gementera should have to federal the guidelines authorizing imposi — suffer the “humiliation of having to stand tion of reasonable conditions of and be labeled front of people coming to foster rehabilitation protect and to pub and going post from a office as somebody lic safety court struck down the con —the who has stolen the mail.” Subsequently, dition. Id. at 13 Cal.App.4th 1049. Gementera filed a motion to correct the The court held that relationship be by sentence having the sandwich board tween required conduct (wearing the t- condition removed. He urged that humili- shirt) and the defendant’s crime (stealing ation was not legitimate objective of beer) so incidental that it was not punishment or release conditions. Only at reasonable and that the true intent behind hearing on Gementera’s motion did the condition was expose Hackler to district court change its characterization of “public ridicule and humiliation” and not the shaming punishment, remarking that “to foster 686-87, 13 rehabilitation.” Id. at the punishment was one of deterrence and Cal.App.4th 1049. rehabilitation not merely humiliation. As in case, Hackler’s the purpose behind Although majority opinion initially the sandwich board condition was not to seems to accept the district court’s retro- Gementera, rehabilitate but rather to turn justification active punishment, him into a day modern Prynne.4 Hester later much as as concedes that the sand- This sort condition is simply improper wich board condition amounted to a sham- under Sentencing Reform Act. See also ing punishment. Admitting that the condi- Springer States, v. United tion was “crude” and “could entail risk 415-16(9th Cir.1945) (invalidating a condi- social withdrawal stigmatization,” Hawthorne, 4. Letter; Hackler, The Scarlet Cal.Rptr.2d at 686. punish- of such imposition affirm the To the condition finds nonetheless

majority history when in our a time recalls ments with “coupled it was because acceptable order were the and stocks pillories [Op. at provisions.” socially useful more runs power use of such To sanction day. says majority way, the Put another 606] doing so we risk very great “a stand-alone considering not it is crimi- for the disrespect “a sense instill humiliate, but soley to intended Ballenger, 436 system” itself. justice nal conditions.” set comprehensive rather (Blackburn, dissenting). J. at 796 S.E.2d to no majority cites But the 606] [Op. Act Sentencing Reform in the provision and remand sentence I vacate would that condi indicating case law to no instructing district re-sentencing, re be should release supervised shaming tions humiliation individually, or jus- a set system viewed in our place proper has be hu ceases to somehow humiliation tice. punishment. other with combined when miliation Eyler, 67 v. States Cf . Cir.1995) (“Any 1386, 1393-94 each meet must

discretionary condition in [the set forth three broad add (emphasis Act].” Reform

Sentencing seems

ed)). majority’s position a sentence FELIX, if one Jacoby even Petitioner- Lee Act, it Sentencing manifestly violates Appellant, provision coupling cured can When other, ones. proper MAYLE, Warden, A. Deneice and no forward put proposition novel Respondent-Appellee. *16 it, there is support is cited law case day, end of At the usually a reason. No. 02-16614. a condition evaluating charged with we are Appeals, Court States humiliate, and is to purpose primary whose Circuit. Ninth upheld. not be simply should Nov. 2003. and Submitted Argued the sandwich I believe Although Sentencing 2004. April violates Withdrawn board Submission reverse and we should Act Reform July 2004. Resubmitted reason, I believe for that district Aug. 2004. Filed A fan- policy. bad simply this is its society is how of a civilized measure between space in the behave

institutions do and power to may have

what it component shaming do. it should

what fails that test. case this the sentence person, another one shames

‘When shame, to object of degrade

goal is being, to chain in the him lower

place him.”5

dehumanize Markel, supra note 1 at

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Shawn Gementera
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Aug 9, 2004
Citation: 379 F.3d 596
Docket Number: 03-10103
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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