Defendant, Sharon Pollard, appeals from her convictions under 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) 1 for two counts of unlawfully purchasing food stamps. During the 1981-82 winter, the Department of Agriculture and local law enforcement officials conducted a joint undercover investigation to curtail the illegal trafficking of food stamps in the Chattanooga, Tennessee аrea. As part of the investigation, undercover agents offered known dealers a ten percent commission for introductory sales that the dealers arranged to new customers. Under this arrangement, Thad Lewis, a known dealer, introduced two undercover agents, Special Agent Billy Brown of the Inspector General’s Office, United States Department of Agriculture, and Officer Eddie Cooper of the Chattanooga Police Department, to defendant.
On February 3, 1982, Lewis arranged a transaction in which defendant purchased $1,000 in food stamps for $500 from Brown in Lewis’ apartment. During the transaction, defendant made arrangements to buy more food stamps the following day. The next day, February 4, 1982, the agents sold defendant $850 worth of food stamps for $425. This sale also occurred in Lewis’ apartment. Again defendant made arrangements for another purchase that would occur that evening. When defendant was not in the building when the agents arrived, the agents left the stamps with Lewis, as defendant had instructed the agents to do if she was not there. On February 5, 1982, defendant called Special Agent Brown to ask for a ten percent commission if she purchased food stamps for other people. Defendant requested a commission on all sales to her and not merely on introductory sales to new customers. Brown recorded the telephone conversation. Defendant indicated that she had a line of customers ready to buy. After Special Agent Brown refused defendant’s request for a blanket ten percent bonus, defendant called Officer Cooper to make the same request. Cooper also recorded the phone conversation.
Defendant filed a motion in limine objecting to the admission of the tape recordings that took place on February 5, 1982. The District Court, over defendant’s continuing objection, ruled that the conversations were admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) as evidence of defendant’s state of mind during the charged offenses of February 3 and 4, 1982. After the government’s case in chief, and again аfter her defense, defendant moved for a directed verdict arguing that the prosecution had failed to prove that defendant made the purchases knowing that she was violating a law or regulation. The District Court denied both motions. The jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts. The District Court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial and sentenced defendant to one year on the first count and two years probation on the second count, assessed a $500 fine on each count, and ordered $925 restitution. At sentencing, the government acknowledged that defendant was pregnant and was expecting a baby on approximately January 25, 1985 and requested that defendant remain on bond until four months after delivery. The District Court ordered defendant to remain on bond until May 24, 1985. Upon the prosecution’s motion and under the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3143, the District Court denied bail pending appeal concluding that defendant’s appeal did not raise a substantial question of law. This Court later denied defendant’s motion for a stay of judgment pending appeal and defendant’s motion for reconsideration.
Defendant raises three issues on appeal:
(1) Whether the District Court erred in admitting into evidence tape recordings of *1179 conversations about subsequent activity pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 404(b); (2) Whether the District Court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict because the prosecution failed to prove that defendant knew her acts were illegal at the time she committed them; and (3) Whether the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2), unconstitutionally violates the due process clause. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm defendant’s convictions.
I.
Defendant argues that the District Court improperly admitted tape recorded conversations оf telephone conversations that occurred on February 5, 1982 between defendant and Special Agent Brown and defendant and Officer Cooper. The District Court ruled that the evidence was admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) 2 as evidence of defendant’s intent, knowledge, or state of mind. Defendant contends that Fed.R. Evid. 403 3 required exclusion of the evidеnce because the prejudicial effects far outweighed any probative value.
In
United States v. Holloway,
In
Liparota v. United States,
— U.S. -,
II.
At the conclusion of the prosecution’s case in chief and again at the conclusion of her defense, defendant moved for directed verdicts. Such motions, technically motions for judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29, “raise[] the question of whether the evidence is sufficient to support a verdict.”
United States v. Cox,
In Liparota v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution must prove that the defendant in a § 2024(b) case knew that his conduct violated a statute or regulation. The Court observed that “the Government need not show that [a defendant] had knowledge of specific regulations governing food stamp acquisition or possession.” Id. at 2092. Rather, “the Government may prove by reference to facts and circumstances surrounding the case that [the defendant] knew that his conduct was unauthorized or illegal.” Id. at 2092-93 (footnote omitted).
The District Court instructed the jury that “the government need not prove that [the defendant] knew what particular law or regulation she was viоlating, but rather it need only show that she knew she was violating some law or regulation.” We hold that, from the evidence introduced at trial, a reasonably-minded jury could have found the evidence sufficient to support a guilty verdict, especially when evaluating the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing every reаsonable inference in the government’s favor. Defendant purchased relatively large amounts of food stamps at a fifty percent discount from their face value. Special Agent Brown testified that defendant carefully examined the food stamps and counted them. The government introduced evidence that each fоod stamp contains a notice: “[N]ontransferable except under conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture.” The government also introduced evidence that each book of food stamps contains, printed on the inside of the back cover, the following warning:
Warning: Persons illegally using food stamps or authorizаtion cards, ATP’S, may be found guilty of a felony and may *1181 be fined and/or imprisoned, Penalties are severe.
Special Agent Brown testified that defendant referred to food stamps as “the hottest thing going, it’s better than dope.” The two phone calls that occurred after the last transaction also indicated that defendant knew that buying food stamps was illegal.
Defendant testified that she purchased the food stamps for Lewis, using his money, and that she did not know that the purchases were illegal. Defendant admitted she counted the food stamp books but testified that she did not see any warnings that illegally using, transferring, acquiring, altering, or possessing food stamps was a crime. On cross-examination, however, defendant admitted that she knew that the gоvernment had eligibility requirements governing who can legally have food stamps and that she did not meet those requirements. Finally, on rebuttal, Lewis testified that defendant did not purchase the food stamps for him. We hold sufficient evidence supports defendant’s convictions.
III.
Defendant contends that the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2), 4 which the government invokеd to deny defendant bail pending appeal, unconstitutionally deprived defendant procedural due process. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) requires a district court to make two findings before granting bail pending appeal. First, a district court must find that the convicted person will not flee or pose a danger to the community if the court grants bail. Secоnd, the district court must find that “the appeal is not for purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.” The District Court denied bail pending appeal solely on the ground that the appeal did not raise a substantial question.
Defendant contends that 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2)’s requirement that she convince the District Court that it made an error likely to result in reversal or a new trial represented an exercise in futility because she was in effect asking the District Court to rule on the District Court’s own ruling and because the District Court had already overruled defendant’s motion for a new trial. Defendant weakly compares the statutоry requirement under the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to the statutory scheme in
Connally v. Georgia,
We reject defendant’s argument. Although this Court has not yet had occasion to interpret the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2), the appellate courts which have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(2) have all concluded that the statute does not require the district court to find that it
*1182
committed reversible error.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller,
In United States v. Miller, supra, the First Circuit was the first court of appeals to interpret the language in the Bail Reform Act of 1984. The Eleventh Circuit improved upon the Miller court’s interpretation in United States v. Giancola, supra. The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all followed Giancola. After considering the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, we adopt the further refinement that the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, espoused in United States v. Powell, supra. In Powell, the Eighth Circuit concluded that an appeal raises a substantial question when the appeal presents a “close question or one that could go either way” and that the question “is so integral to the merits of the conviction that it is more probable than not that reversal or a new trial will occur if the question is decided in the defendant’s favor.” Id. at 1233-34. After interpreting the statute, the court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b), as amended by the Bail Reform Act of 1984, is constitutional. The court specifically rejected due process, excessive bail, and ex post facto clause challenges. Id. at 1234-35.
As an additional observation, policy considerations support the statutory scheme. Since the district court is familiar with the case, the district court is in an excellent position to determine in the first instance whether the defendant raises a substantial question on appeal. Although the district court makes the initial determination, this. Court may review, on appeal, an order denying bail pending appeal. Furthermore, since the issue whethеr an appeal raises a substantial question presents an issue of law, this Court reviews the question de novo. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure use a similar scheme in other contexts. For example, Fed.R.App.P. 8(a) requires that a party apply in the first instance to the district court for a stay or injunction pending appeal. Consequently, we hold that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 does not violate a defendant’s procedural due process rights by requiring the district court to determine that an appeal raises a substantial issue before granting bond pending appeal.
Accordingly, defendant’s convictions are affirmed.
Notes
. Title 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) provides in pertinent part:
(1) ... whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters, or possesses coupоns or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to this chapter shall, if such coupons or authorization cards are of a value of $100 or more, be guilty of a felony____
. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) provides:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
. Fed.R.Evid. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
. Title 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b) provides:
(b) Release or detention pending appeal by the defendant. — The judicial officer shall order that a person who has beеn found guilty of an offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment, and who has filed an appeal or a petition for a writ of certiorari, be detained, unless the judicial officer finds—
(1) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released pursuant to section 3142(b) or (c); and
(2) that the appeal is not for purpose of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact likely to result in reversal or an order for a new trial.
If the judicial officer makes such findings, he shall order the release of the person in accordance . with the provisions of section 3142(b) or (c).