Sergio Estrada was convicted of knowingly and intentionally attempting to possess with the intent to distribute mixtures containing cocaine. Estrada now appeals his conviction, arguing that: (1) the government engaged in outrageous conduct through its arrangement with informant Jose Antonio Varela; (2) the district court erred when it allowed the government to introduce into evidence translated transcripts of Spanish conversations without ever playing the tapes of those conversations; and (3) he was the victim of sentenc *468 ing entrapment. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
Background
Sergio Estrada’s current legal problems arise out of his coming into contact with Jose Antonio Varela (“Varela”). Unbeknownst to Estrada, Varela worked as a confidential informant for the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”). On January 13, 2000, a woman named Deysi who worked at the Sin Frontera bar, introduced Estrada to Varela. Estrada discussed with Varela the possibility of purchasing cocaine from him, Varela said a kilogram of cocaine would cost Estrada $17,000, but if he purchased more than five kilograms, then the price per kilogram would be reduced to $16,000. Although Estrada desired to buy a kilogram that night, Varela would not accommodate this request. When the two ended their conversation, they exchanged phone numbers. On January 14, Varela spoke with Estrada and told him that he really needed the cocaine right away. Varela, however, was going to be in California and could not supply Estrada with cocaine until he returned. Once again, on January 17, Estrada and Varela spoke and they arranged to meet the next day. Estrada on January 18, accompanied by his brother Otoniel Estrada, who was going to supply the money for the cocaine, met Varela in the parking lot of the Hillside Holiday Inn to inspect the cocaine. Also present was Richard Alvarado, a police officer working undercover and posing as Varela’s partner. Otoniel Estrada inspected the cocaine and determined that it was fine. Despite Estrada’s desire to go ahead with the deal that day, it was decided that the transaction would be completed the next day. Varela spoke with Estrada on the phone after the meeting at the Hillside Holiday Inn and it was agreed -that Estrada would purchase five kilograms of cocaine and take two kilograms on credit. As Estrada arrived in the parking lot of the Hillside Holiday Inn on January 19, undercover officer Alvarado met him and entered Estrada’s car. Estrada showed Alvarado a large amount of cash that he was carrying in a fanny pack strapped to his waist, which contained approximately $35,000. After a brief exchange, Alvarado gave a signal and DEA agents arrested Estrada. After the arrest of Estrada, agents recovered an additional $25,000 from a Jeep parked in back of Estrada’s car.
Estrada was charged with one count of knowingly and intentionally attempting to possess with the intent to distribute approximately 7 kilograms of mixtures containing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On May 3, Estrada was convicted by a jury and the district court sentenced him to serve 121 months of imprisonment.
Discussion
I. Outrageous Government Conduct
Estrada contends that the government’s employment of Varela as a contingent fee informant constituted outrageous conduct in violation of the Due Process Clause. The origins of the outrageous conduct doctrine can be traced to
United States v. Russell,
Estrada claims that several aspects of Varela’s involvement in procuring his arrest raise questions about the government’s behavior. To begin with, Varela testified that he receives 25 percent of whatever money the DEA seizes during a sting. Estrada argues that such a compensation arrangement is contrary to the agency’s alleged goal of reducing the supply of narcotics. Estrada contends that Varela had total discretion to select his target, and as a consequence, he selects a target based upon the amount of money that he believes can be seized from that person. Accordingly, Estrada advances that when Varela decides to select a particular target, he does not take into account the more traditional law enforcement factors, like a target’s prior criminal history. Estrada asserts this is evidenced by the fact he had no history of drug trafficking or other criminal activity. He believes that Varela targeted him because he knew that Estrada worked as a cook at the restaurant that his brother owned and so Varela determined that Estrada’s brother would be able to raise the cash necessary for the deal, thus ensuring that he would receive 25 percent of the cash seized. Estrada suggests that not only was Varela allowed to select his targets, but he also was authorized to assume the lead role of seller in the sting operation. According to Estrada, typically informants are used to introduce the target to an undercover agent who then assumes control of the transaction and ensures that the deal furthers legitimate law enforcement concerns. In this particular case, Estrada argues that Varela was given complete discretion to negotiate the deal to serve his own interests, which was to induce him to agree to a purchase that involved the greatest amount of cash so that he maximized his commission. Estrada warns that one must remember that Varela was given such extensive discretion even after he failed a polygraph examination just three months before he targeted Estrada. Further, Varela’s discretion was not limited to selection of a target. Estrada claims that Varela had complete control over what conversations he chose to tape record when dealing with him and so he was able to limit the amount of exculpatory evidence available after the sting operation; thus, ensuring that the government would be able to successfully prosecute Estrada and that Varela would receive his commission.
Estrada finally notes that Varela’s involvement with his case did not end when he was arrested. During the trial, Estrada argues that Varela was the star prosecution witness despite the fact Varela had a history of deception and incentive to perjure himself to assure a conviction and his own commission. In support of this position, Estrada points out that Judge Wiggins in
United States v. Cuellar,
The government contends that Estrada’s claim of outrageous government conduct cannot be sustained in light of this Circuit’s refusal to recognize the existence of such a doctrine. In
United States v. Boyd,
During oral argument, we opined that in some situations the government uses either money or promises of lenience to induce testimony, which is commonplace and permitted. Varela’s arrangement does not seem to quite fit within the aforementioned scenario. Varela was paid prior to testifying at Estrada’s trial $1000 and at the time of the trial he was still expecting to receive 25 percent of the cash seized from the sting operation. This type of arrangement we suggested at argument can appear to make the witness’s compensation uniquely dependent on the outcome of the case. Apparently, if Varela testified truthfully, but Estrada was not convicted, he would not receive 25 percent of the money seized, which amounted to $15,000 or $20,000. 1 While Estrada has framed the issue as one of outrageous government conduct, what appears to be his true concern is the admission of Varela’s testimony during his trial.
Varela during the trial stated that he was involved in about 60 to 70 investigations and that he testified in about 10 to 13 trials. He claims to not have figured out how the DEA pays him, yet he acknowledged that since 1996 he has had an agreement with the DEA providing that they would pay him 25 percent of the cash seized during an operation. Although Varela said he expected 25 percent of the money seized from the Estrada sting, he contended that he was not sure how much money was confiscated during the investigation. Further, Varela was unsure about when he would be paid the 25 percent, except that he believed it took up to six months and perhaps even longer. When questioned about whether he had to testify to get paid, his response was “[w]ell, because I never known it like that, that they pay me to testify. I just know they only pay me 25 percent.” Just prior to making this remark, Varela in response to a question asking whether he must testify and follow through with a case, said “Well, whatever — whatever I have to do.” It is apparent from Varela’s testimony that he was somewhat unclear about the conditions of his arrangement with the DEA. He was, however, definitive about his desire to receive 25 percent of the cash seized from the Estrada investigation. It is understandable that this was of concern to Vare- *471 la, as it represented a significant, depending on the case, source of income for him.
Varela testified that he had received only $1000 before Estrada’s trial and had yet to receive his 25 percent commission. During the trial, the district court instructed the jury in the following manner with regard to Varela’s testimony, and in doing so framed the issue as one of credibility: “You have heard testimony from Jose Antonio Varela who received benefits from the government in connection with this case, namely received money and the promise of additional commission payments. You may give his testimony such weight as you feel it deserves, keeping in mind that it must be considered with caution and great care.” We have stated that “[t]reating fee arrangements with witness/informants as a credibility factor for the jury rather than an outrageous conduct issue appears to be a more reasoned approach.”
United States v. Valona,
Instead, the instruction underscores what promotes unease about the arrangement in this case, which is that Varela’s fee arrangement was dependent, in part, on the conviction of Estrada. The First Circuit has remarked that “[cjourts have generally allowed paid informants to testify as long as the agreements are not contingent upon the
conviction of particular persons.” United States v. Palow,
At base, the government’s arrangement with Varela can be characterized as a problematic means of pursuing a drug case. During all of the critical junctures of the case, from the initial investigatory stage, up to and through the period in which Varela testified, he was motivated to convict Estrada so that he would receive the much sought after and elusive 25 percent commission. Such an incentive structure does little to enhance overall confidence in the criminal justice system. Notwithstanding, as will be seen in Section III, there is such overwhelming evidence of Estrada’s drug involvement that we conclude his sentence does not carry with it the specter of a miscarriage of justice.
II. Admission of Translated Tape-Recorded Conversations
The government recorded several conversations between Estrada, his brother, and Varela. All of these conversations took place in Spanish. Prior to trial, the government prepared transcripts of English translations of these tapes. However, at trial, the government did not play any of the tapes. Estrada argues that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the introduction of the English translations as substantive evidence.
Estrada concedes that the jury was properly instructed that “[wjhether a transcript is an accurate translation, in whole or in part, is for you to decide.” Estrada nonetheless advances that this instruction was rendered meaningless because the tapes were not played. During the trial, Estrada believes the crucial issue was his intent to purchase cocaine from Varela. Accordingly, it is Estrada’s contention that the tapes became the most critical item of evidence to show his lack of intent. The jury heard only Varela’s version of what was on the tapes because Estrada did not testify. Estrada claims that if the government had been required to play the tapes, then the jury would have had the opportunity to evaluate whether Varela’s version of what transpired was credible. According to Estrada, allowing the tapes to be played would have given the jurors an opportunity to make judgments about the transcripts. From Estrada’s perspective, even jurors with no knowledge of the Spanish language would have been able to judge the speaker’s particular tone and inflection, such as whether the speaker was joking or serious and sincere or deceitful. Estrada therefore asserts that the tapes should have been played for the jury.
The district court’s refusal to allow the Spanish tapes to be played was not an abuse of discretion. Although Estrada argued that the “transcript is merely an impression or an aid to the tape itself,” the
*473
district court responded, “It’s more than an aid in this case because it’s a translation from another language.” To which Estrada countered by remarking that “I know that, but the tape has to be in evidence for it to be an aid to the translation, because, clearly, the jury has to have the right to go back to the original evidence.” The district court dismissed this point on the practical grounds that “[w]ell, they can’t. It’s in Spanish.” From this exchange, it becomes apparent that the district court saw no value in allowing a presumably English speaking jury to hear tapes that were recorded in Spanish. It is difficult to second-guess such a decision. Understandably, the district court may have doubted whether a jury not proficient in Spanish would be able to properly comprehend from the tapes an individual’s tone or inflection.
See United States v. Grajales-Montoya,
III. Sentencing Entrapment
We now reach Estrada’s last challenge. Estrada contends that the district court improperly determined that he was responsible for five to fifteen kilograms of cocaine because the court did not make any findings that Estrada was predisposed to buy said quantity. The district court made the following remarks on the matter: ‘Well, I find that based on the trial testimony, that the use of a base offense level of a 32 is appropriate. That base offense level incorporates an amount from 5 kilograms to 15 kilograms. So I think it’s sustained by a preponderance of the evidence. So that objection is overruled.” The district court apparently determined that Estrada’s behavior caused him to fall within § 2D1.1 (c)(4) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides for a base level offense of 32 for “[a]t least 5KG but less than 15KG of Cocaine.” The district court’s decision regarding the quantity of drugs that Estrada is responsible for is a finding of fact that we review for clear error.
United States v. Pagan,
Estrada maintains that the record shows that he was predisposed to purchase a much smaller quantity of cocaine and that Varela used bargain basement pricing and generous credit terms to induce him to agree to accept delivery of a larger quantity of cocaine. Consequently, Estrada argues that he was the victim of sentencing entrapment “which occurs when the government causes a defendant initially predisposed to commit a lesser
*474
crime to commit a more serious offense.”
United States v. Garcia,
Estrada holds steadfast to the notion that he was not predisposed to engage in a five kilogram cocaine transaction. Estrada stresses that he has no prior convictions or arrests and worked as a cook at his brother’s restaurant. Accordingly, Estrada believes that Varela targeted him because his brother owned a restaurant and had the ability to raise the cash necessary for the cocaine transaction. In essence, Estrada is contending that his background belies the suggestion that he was predisposed to deal in cocaine at all, let alone five kilograms.
Estrada argues that the record shows that he had neither the intent nor the resources to engage in a five kilogram cocaine transaction. According to Estrada, Varela admitted that he and his brother initially only wanted to buy one kilogram of cocaine, but Varela refused to sell them such a small quantity. Further, Estrada contends that the transcripts of the tape-recorded conversations reveal that he and his brother asked Varela to arrange a smaller deal for one or two kilograms of cocaine. Varela’s apparent response was that he did not want to waste his time arranging a deal for one or two kilograms. According to Estrada, his brother, who was going to supply the money for the deal, asked Varela to sell a smaller quantity of cocaine to them, and Varela said, “with two I can’t,” and proceeded to explain to Estrada’s brother that the price would rise from $16,000 per kilogram to $18,000 or $19,000 per kilogram if he bought only one or two kilograms of cocaine. All of these exchanges, Estrada argues, demonstrate that he wanted to purchase only one or two kilograms from Varela; nevertheless, he decided to purchase more because Varela resisted going *475 through with a deal that was of a smaller magnitude.
Estrada believes that DEA Agent Stanley M. Grobe’s testimony regarding drug trafficking bolsters his position. Grobe testified that the wholesale price of cocaine in Chicago around January of 2000 was about $18,000 per kilogram and that $16,000 would be a “rock bottom” price. Further, Estrada maintains that Grobe testified that a first time buyer would pay full price and would not receive any cocaine on credit. Therefore, Estrada argues that Varela agreed to sell him five kilograms at the below wholesale price of $16,000 per kilogram and to give him two extra kilograms on credit in hopes of inducing him to accept a larger quantity of cocaine.
Finally, Estrada claims that it is clear that he lacked the predisposition to engage in a five kilogram transaction because he had only $85,000 with him at the time of his arrest. Accordingly, Estrada claims that this suggests that he hoped that at the time of delivery, he would be able to persuade Varela to agree to a smaller deal for one or two kilograms. In addition, even if one considers the cash ($25,000) possessed by Estrada’s brother in a separate vehicle, Estrada would have had only enough cash ($60,000 in total) to buy 3.75 kilograms at the $16,000 price and perhaps even less if Varela had decided to raise the price because the deal was going to be for a smaller amount. Estrada also points out that Agent Alvarado said that if the Estrada-Varela arrangement had been a real cocaine deal, it would not have taken place because the buyer did not bring enough money for the transaction.
Despite Estrada’s claim that he was a victim of entrapment, we find this argument to be a failing one. In an entrapment situation, a person’s lack of predisposition is the critical issue.
See United States v. Theodosopoulos,
Estrada was in a position to become involved in the purchase of drugs and willingly acted upon his desire to do so. One must remember that Varela spoke with Deysi, a woman who worked at the Sin Frontera bar, and she put Varela in contact with Estrada. When Estrada arrived at the bar, he and Varela began “talking about cocaine.” It is rather clear that Deysi was aware that Estrada desired a source to supply him with drugs, and had it not been Varela (the government) who
*476
had done so, it would have been some other dealer.
See Hollingsworth,
Estrada agreed to buy five kilograms and take two more kilograms on credit and he did so under no duress. At one point during the conversations between Estrada and Varela, Estrada asked, “What do you think, if, if I go for, for two, but bring me five. I have here, I’ll bring you for two.... ” Later on Estrada told Varela, “I, right now I have the five sold.” Shortly thereafter, he told Varela, “Ok, I’ll go for the five, and you’ll give the two on credit?,” to which Varela said, “Fine, Sergio.” It appears that Estrada needed to receive five kilograms of cocaine from Varela because he already had sold this amount to an individual or several people. Varela never pressured Estrada to go through with the deal. In fact, when Estrada told Varela that he did not want the deal to take place in Hillside because he was scared to go there with all the money necessary to purchase the cocaine, Varela told him, “Look, if you don’t want to, there’s no problem, Sergio. For me, there’s no problem, Sergio ... and we’ll remain friends, you know.” However, Estrada did agree to go through with the deal in Hillside and on the morning of January 19, the day the deal was to take place, Estrada asked Varela, “But they’re going to be seven, right? And five?” Estrada was fixated upon Varela providing him with five kilograms of cocaine.
Although Estrada would like us to accept that he only had enough money ($60,000 if one includes the $25,000 found in the vehicle) at the most to purchase 3.75 kilograms of cocaine, this story is not convincing. From the beginning, Estrada was anxious to buy cocaine from Varela. Throughout the negotiation period, Estrada remained focused on obtaining five kilograms of cocaine and for good reason because he had sold this amount to someone else. Therefore, it is more than likely that Estrada arrived at Hillside with the intention of paying Varela for approximately 3 kilograms of cocaine and obtaining the other two kilograms. This would ensure that he would have the requisite amount he needed for resale. Varela could have charged Estrada the higher price of $19,000 per kilogram and Estrada would have had enough money to purchase 3 kilograms (total costing $57,000) and still receive two kilograms on credit. Unquestionably, Estrada was predisposed to purchasing the cocaine and more than capable of buying at least 5 kilograms.
See Cotts,
Having addressed Estrada’s sentencing entrapment claim, we still need to briefly *477 explore whether Application Notes 12 and 15 as stated in the Sentencing Guidelines (thus we are setting aside the issue of whether these Notes address sentencing entrapment) apply to Estrada’s situation. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment, (nn.12, 15). Application Note 15 centers around the issue of whether “the government agent set a price for the controlled substance that was substantially below the market value of the controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. This was not the case here. Agent Grobe testified, “It [the price of one kilogram of cocaine] can go down. But, generally, I’ve never seen it go down below 16,000 in this area. That’s usually the rock bottom.” Earlier, he had said that the wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine in the Chicago area around January of 2000 was “[a]nywhere from 16 to 20,000, with an average of 18,000.” The clear implications of Agent Grobe’s testimony is that $16,000 was the lowest wholesale market price and that paying less than $16,000 for a kilogram of cocaine would be below market. Consequently, Estrada cannot prove that he was sold cocaine at below market prices, since Vare-la offered him the cocaine at $16,000. As for Application Note 12, Varela as discussed earlier, was reasonably capable of paying for five kilograms of cocaine, so even if the district court did not consider the additional two kilograms that originally Varela intended to give Estrada on credit, he still would be eligible for the same sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision to find Estrada accountable for 5 to 15 kilograms of cocaine.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we Affirm the decision of the district court.
Notes
. During oral argument, we learned that the government recovered $60,000 from the parking lot at the Hillside Holiday Inn. An additional $20,000 was recovered from the restaurant owned by Estrada's brother, although it is not clear whether the $20,000 is connected in any way to this case. Therefore, the government may have confiscated with regard to this case either $60,000 or $80,000 and Vare-la would be due 25 percent of either amount — that is, he would be due either $15,000 or $20,000.
. Application Note 12 states, in relevant part: If, however, the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide, or was not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance, the court shall exclude from the offense level determination the amount of controlled substance that the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide or was not reasonably capable of providing.
Application Note 15 states, in relevant part:
If, in a reverse sting (an operation in which a government agent sells or negotiates to sell a controlled substance to a defendant), the court finds that the government agent set a price for the controlled substance that was substantially below the market value of the controlled substance, thereby leading to the defendant's purchase of a significantly greater quantity of the controlled substance than his available resources would have allowed him to purchase except for the artificially low price set by the government agent, a downward departure may be warranted.