*2 TJOFLAT, Chief Judge: Scott Evan having been convicted of bank larceny, appeals from the sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. We note at the outset that since Jones’ occurred after November governed sentence is by The Sentencing Reform Act of 98-473, Pub.L. No. (codified, Stat. 1987 amended, in scat- tered U.S.C.) sections 18 and 28 and the guidelines promulgated thereunder. Jones challenges the district court's fac- tual on the basis of which the court determined the final level. He also asserts that the district court erred failing to state its for imposing reasons sentence. We find both con- tentions to be without merit and affirm. (3) that I. Jones showed remorse and that argument at trial that he briefly facts on which state only the lesser-included offense was based. jury verdict tactic rather than true of re- 13, 1987, Jones entered November On *3 Finally, placed sponsibility. the court Jacksonville, Florida, approached a bank III, History Category Jones in Criminal see hand, and, covering teller, jacket with Pt. A Guidelines Ch. sentenc- demanding money. After a note presented (4) ing commentary, tbl. and after finding alarm, a silent activating cameras and prior that the two for convictions were $2,568in approximately handed teller Jones separate independent offenses. Jones money.” away ran “bait Jones from findings. challenges these four We exam- bank, least two individuals follow- with at turn, challenge ine each mindful that we ing agent An FBI and a him. Jacksonville accept must the district court’s factual pursued police joined the chase officer erroneous, clearly blocks, shouting at Jones Jones for several 3742(d) (1988); see 18 U.S.C. § firing The eventually one shot. halt Erves, States v. flee but he continued to shot struck Cir.1989). and, until the two officers overtook minutes, sub- struggle after a of several security A. help private
dued him with guard. sentencing guidelines group robbery for bank un- larceny
Jones was indicted bank with other theft offenses 2113(a)(1988). pled (which, embezzlement, der 18 U.S.C. like involve no § counsel, guilty victim) and went where contact whatsoever with the statement, opening conceded that Jones provide that the theft was from the “[i]f larceny. jury was guilty another, was bank person of increase [the two_” robbery both on bank and on instructed by Sentencing.Guide level] larceny, see lesser-included offense of bank argues lines 2B1.1. Jones that the dis § 2113(b). It returned a verdict of id. wrongly § con trict court determined that his robbery charge but guilty on the bank taking duct because there involved such larceny. found him of bank physical was no intimidation or invasion of personal “space” and that the teller’s sentencing purposes, conceded For Jones provision the enhancement does therefore convictions, prior that he had two apply. attempted robbery and one bank bank underlying robbery. The offenses these Indeed, argument is without merit. This day. convictions occurred on the same specifical- 2B1.1 commentary to section They involved two different in Orlan- banks ly excludes as an enhancement intimidation do, Florida, ninety approximately and were “This nonforcible theft crimes: factor for apart. minutes include an enhancement guideline does not person by means for thefts from larceny guidelines, Under bank fear; crimes are robberies.” force or such level of 4. See Sen carries base offense Rather, explains, commentary 2Bl.l(a) (1990). The tencing Guidelines § “ person of another’ refers proper district court determined that ‘[f]rom force, the use of property, taken without level for Jones’ offense was person or being by held another (1) taking from that was finding was after 2B1.1, Examples include another, arms’ reach. and was within person see id. § purse-snatch- non-forcible suscep pick-pocketing or particularly victim purse from a conduct, ing, theft of id. tible to the criminal see undisputed It shopping to deduct lev cart.” 3A1.1.* The court refused money from the bank tell- finding Jones took els for * resisting justice by arrest had obstructed the offense lev- Jones The district court also enhanced giving Jones finding by false name after arrest. el that the crime was committed challenge planning enhancements. does more minimal and that actually
er’s hands. The district court was there- which he clearly determining fore correct convicted. property person took 3E1.1 directs the district Section another. reduce the offense level two levels “[i]f a rec- demonstrates B. ognition per- and affirmative challenge Jones’ next is to the dis responsibility for con- sonal his criminal finding trict court’s the bank teller duct,” 3El.l(a) Sentencing Guidelines § particularly was a vulnerable victim under added), (emphasis but cautions that “[a] 3A1.1, provides section two-lev guilty plea defendant who enters a is not *4 el enhancement or the defendant knew “[i]f a sentencing entitled to under reduction should have known a of victim the right,” this section as a matter of id. unusually offense was due to vulnerable 3El.l(c). Thus, even Jones’ concession § condition, age, physical or mental or that guilt equivalent guilty plea, of is the particularly susceptible the victim was still not entitled to an automatic argues criminal conduct.” He that be Rather, commentary deduction. refers pro cause the teller was surrounded a factors, the district court to a of number cage, cameras, tective teller’s alarms and including, but not limited to: personnel, security trained and because she (a) voluntary termination or withdrawal herself was trained to deal with a thief’s associations; from criminal conduct or money, actually demands for she was less (b) voluntary payment pri- of restitution average “vulnerable” than the victim. to adjudication guilt; or of We think that Jones confuses vulnera- (c) voluntary and truthful admission to bility susceptibility of victim with authorities of involvement in the offense the criminal a Although conduct. bank conduct; and related physical injury teller risk less than (d) voluntary surrender to authorities unprotected the untrained and “man promptly after commission of the of- street,” although some would-be fense; thieves are no doubt aby deterred bank’s (e) voluntary assistance to authorities in measures, security very likely a teller is a recovery of the fruits and instrumen-
target of criminal conduct that consti- offense; talities of larceny. tutes A bank teller is stationed at (f) voluntary resignation from the office an designed of public area the bank during held of commission access; duty the teller’s tois transact busi- offense; customers, ness with the bank’s and he or (g) the timeliness of defendant’s con- easily (or she cannot avoid contact with manifesting duct of elude) those customers or other members responsibility. public, including thieves. Further- more, commentary. a teller is known to handle considera- Id. 3E1.1 ble money, making amounts of a him or her Jones cannot avail himself of these particularly promising According- victim. support his factors claim a deduc- ly, agree we with district court’s find- tion. The at sen- district court noted ing that the particularly bank teller was tencing hearing that Jones did not volun- susceptible larceny. crim- tarily terminate withdraw from his inal nor did he conduct surrender to author-
C. ities; rather, flight ap- he took and was challenges prehended Jones also and subdued after a sever- court’s refusal strug- to reduce his offense level al-block chase and a several-minute for acceptance provid gle as enforcement law officers. ed in section 3E1.1. He bases claim for made no admissions law enforcement upon authorities; instead, deduction his trial counsel’s conces he first refused to sion all, gave larceny, give any that Jones was of bank at then false name relinquish the freely He did name. of- for unrelated prior sentences “instrumentality of the two note, an demand (each ex- prior sentences If the pried fenses. to be crime,” month) involved year ceeding concluded also fingers. cases,” have received guilty of the Jones should he was “related concession Jones’ larceny history” points “criminal of bank three total serious less overwhelming 4A1.2(a)(2) evi- 4Al.l(a) and Given tactic.” sections “trial under prior his two two plus points for of six against a total dence than rather offenses, we the same for bank-related under convictions sentences prior unrelated erroneous regard total would three-point do A sections. the concession finding Category History court’s in Criminal placed Jones Spraggins, v. strategic. placed total six-point II, whereas Cir.1989) (per 1541, 1543 Guidelines III. See Category clearly erroneous (holding curiam) sentencing tbl. APt. Ch. finding confession defines 4A1.2 commentary to section lengthy avoid attempt an constituted occurred “if related re- rather *5 single occasion, (2) part of were single con- take Jones’ if we Even sponsibility). (3) consol- were plan, or or scheme common manifesting an as cession Tracking sentencing.” or for idated a “trial tac- rather his rob- that definition, Jones asserts did timely; it not was tic,” that concession attempt- his and Orlando bank bery of one one-half and two the until not come (1) another occurred robbery of ed offense. the after months separat- they were because single occasion which findings, above to the In addition hours”; (2) and one-half by a “scant one ed in the listed specifically to factors relate scheme single common part of were that court found commentary, vir- were operandi modi plan because On whatsoever. remorse showed Jones (3) consolidated identical; were and tually to parents Jones’ a letter the basis sentencing purpose of for the case into found that also court, court district con- to run were two sentences because that, at the maintain continued Jones (2), the (1) and respect to With currently. walking to the arrest, he was time inci- the two that observed court district to surren- Office Marshals’ distinct temporally were question in dents this assertion regarded The court der. two and banks different two involved and that concluded and implausible highly not We do as victims. tellers different he had up to what faced not had still Jones errone- clearly was court believe that done. not did the two offenses finding that in ous empha- 3E1.1 commentary to section The occasion single occur on is in sentencing judge sizes “[t]he scheme single common part of were a defendant’s evaluate unique (3), the district respect to plan. With therefore, responsibility”; led offenses that the court observed is entitled ... “determination judge’s sentences. different trials different and should review deference great clearly court believe do not founda- without it is be disturbed concluding that in erroneous at 868 Spraggins, also See tion.” sentencing” for “consolidated on ac- court’s district 1543. for imposed merely because are not responsibility ceptance concurrently run ample founda- Indeed, is there erroneous. other imposed sentence will findings, for those tion offense. them. disturb II. D. district contends also challenge to the final In his awith imposing a erred contends findings, Jones factual
1102 guideline range that twenty-four exceeds Cir.1989). report After the pre- is months stating without pared, its reasons as re- have the opportunity to quired by 3553(c)(1) (1988). object U.S.C. probation to the officer’s recitals of statute, Jones misreads the fact provides guideline recommended applica- court, tions; probation at the sentencing, time of “[t]he officer then reviews objections, open shall state in court the report amends the reasons imposition extent he particular deems sentence, and, necessary, and sets forth addendum to report any [imposed disputes is under the sentence— guidelines remain unresolved. See and the applicable] Committee on range ex- Admin, months, Sys., Probation ceeds Judicial reason imposing a U.S., Conference of the Recommended sentence at a Pro- point within the cedures for Sentencing Guideline range.” Com- (emphasis added). Id. appli- mentary: Model Rule Local for Guideline cable sentencing range reprinted Sentencing, in T. Hutchison & History Criminal Category III with an of- D. Yellen, Federal Sentencing Law and fense level of fifteen is from twenty-four to app. Practice (1989); at Wise, thirty months. Guidelines 972. at At the sentencing hear- Ch. Pt. A sentencing Although tbl. ing, court, engaging a colloquy Jones received a sentence in excess of with both prosecution defense, and the twenty-four months, the range resolves all factual and legal disputes months, six 3553(c)(1) and section raised in Wise, the addendum. 881 F.2d at does not apply. 972. The addendum serve, cannot however, to III. *6 limit objections the cognizable appeal, on appeal note this could have because it does not take into account what court, been avoided if the pronounc transpires at the sentencing hearing itself. ing sentence, had asked counsel whether For example, the might district court not there were any objections —to adopt as its own of the fact facts the to in manner pro which the court recited in report apply the guidelines the nounced it—other than those previously in the proposed; furthermore, manner new stated for the record. appellant If voiced causes objection, parties which the objections, he would have waived the could not reasonably anticipated, have may points presents he in appeal. this To en during arise the hearing or during the im- sure in future cases that objections all are Therefore, of sentence. the dis- raised in the trial court ground and that the trict give court must the oppor- objection each is clearly stated, we now tunity not to resolve objections the exercise our supervisory power over the contained in addendum, but also—after courts, district see Cupp v. Naughten, 414 the court states its findings, factual applies 141, 146, U.S. 396, 400, 94 S.Ct. 38 L.Ed.2d guidelines, imposes sentence—to (1973); McNabb v. States, United 318 object to the district court’s ultimate find- 332, 340, U.S. 608, 613, 63 S.Ct. 87 L.Ed. ings of fact and conclusions of law and to (1943), and instruct the district courts the manner in which pro- sentence is fully elicit objections, articulated follow nounced. This will serve purpose the dual ing imposition sentence, of to the court’s of permitting the district court to correct ultimate findings of fact and conclusions of on spot any error may it law. of guiding appellate review. circuit, In this pre-sentence investiga- The district court should also elicit from tion report, prepared by a United counsel an of grounds articulation on probation officer, serves a function similar which objection is based. Clear articu- to that pre-trial stipulation in a civil lation will aid the district court in correct- trial: it the factual legal ing “establish[es] any error, tell appellate pre- court backdrop for sentencing hearing,” cisely objections which pre- have been Wise, States v. 972 served and waived, which have been EDMONDSON, Judge, Circuit apply court appellate enable concurring: pre- those of review standard proper dis- that the example, assume For served. judgment in the court’s I concur sentence, fashioning the court, trict III, part III. In except part opinion, its ob- counsel finding and factual states procedural detailed creates a today’s court objecting that might be Counsel jects. by remands— be enforced guideline—to in which evidentiary support, finding lacks to handle are district courts how about “clearly apply would court case this procedure de- hearings. The might Or counsel standard. erroneous” good be a III well part scribed sup- the evidence that some objecting judicially cre- I distrust practice, but have been finding should porting in the govern that are to guidelines ated evi- court, i.e., by the considered adjudi- kind. a certain future purpose inadmissible dence was sweep- suited for poorly cating process re- case, sentencing. In that that, I think And pronouncements. ing Clearly articulated novo. be de would view to district much dictate we too when ap- thus would a case in such objections creativity courts, lose the benefit we iden- need to court working district prise the inde- judges district different upon which the evidence record problem. tify solving bring to pendently can finding: making factual it relied on up my view summed Harlan Justice it did explains that court this: he wrote when guideline decisions but evidence the inadmissible rely on of these seriously the wisdom I doubt evidence, this other, considered properly They suffer the decisions. “guideline” defer- more know go usually pitfalls danger of re- standard ential, “clearly erroneous” carefully However vacuum. in a judging appropriate. view is application written, in their apt consequences carry unintended court has Where easy always accomplished are once objections follow fully articulated elicited daily matters respecting repair. Rules sentence, imposition ing the *7 ultimate- courts arising the federal remand vacate will solid formulation find more likely ly give in order further case-by- adjudication to focused left explain raise opportunity an rule-making basis, normal to the case Where the objections. their Conference, the Judicial processes object and opportunity has offered pronounce- to ex cathedra rather than grounds to state or fails silent party is Court, is remote ments to the objections objection, arena. from the appeal, and purposes will be waived type, I of this dealing with In appeal entertain will this court ourselves to confine better we do think refusal objections upon based presented.... particular issues injustice. in manifest result do so States, today is to 373 U.S. announce v. United that we Sanders procedure 1085-86, 10 L.Ed.2d imposed sentences S.Ct. for all followed J., dissenting). twenty (Harlan, hundred of one expiration opinion. date of following the days
IV. has enter- case, this court
In current has found claims appellant’s
tained The sentence merit. without to be
them accordingly by the district imposed
AFFIRMED.