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United States v. Scott David Lattany
982 F.2d 866
3rd Cir.
1993
Check Treatment

*1 FOR REHEARING PETITION SUR spe- phrase, in that contained terms can- “operations,” “covered” cifically Jan. it. Our resort without defined not be appel- rehearing for petition history leads legislative examination having been case the above entitled in lants cessation that substantial conclude in us participated who judges to the submitted the com- meets activity other business to all normal court and of this decision in standard. the circuit judges of plete withdrawal circuit available who service, and no active regular which courts those join We also having asked decision concurred in which work type of have focused the circuit majority of rehearing, and engaged normally employer —its ser- regular active the circuit judges was clear it Where operations. true rehearing by the having voted vice not business its normal ceased employer had rehearing banc, petition down, a shut preparation operations Alito Nygaard, Greenberg, Judges denied. perfor- held that have courts these rehearing. Roth would incidental tasks non-operational mance not facility does closing of ato total complete finding that the court’s prevent Thus, we find occurred.11 has withdrawal matter aas not err did the district America, Appellee, STATES had UNITED withdrawal complete finding law purposes. for DEFRA v. occurred LATTANY, Appellant. David

Scott No. 91-1826. IV. Appeals, conclude We Third Circuit. exempt from Cork finding Crown err in 12(6) Rule Circuit Third Under Submitted complied it liability because withdrawal 17, 1992. Aug. affirm we will Accordingly, DEFRA. 29, 1992. Dec. Decided court. the decision Rehearing Petition Sur Judge, SLOVITER, Chief Present: 26, 1993. Jan. MANSMANN, STAPLETON,

BECKER, SCIRICA, HUTCHINSON, GREENBERG, ROTH, ALITO, NYGAARD, COWEN, Judges. GARTH,* Circuit

LEWIS gave to contributions activity rise Co., business See, Chevrolet e.g., Speckman v. Barford activity); F.H. i.e., plan, construction (a complete to the (E.D.Mo.1982) F.Supp. 488 Teamsters State York v. New Cobb Co. Confer employer re- even can occur withdrawal Fund, F.Supp. & Retirement Pension ence to terminate payroll employees on its tains business, (where employer retained (N.D.N.Y.1984) termi- dealership had a car thus ranging in number employees, group of a small preclo- employees from but all nated representing between to sixteen from nine employer in to assist force sure work work preclosure company’s percent 5-9 automobile employer's up winding the dealership equipment, em inventory and to move force remaining em- whose business operations under ceased covered ployer had selling had com- cars engaged in ployee was not Retirement MPPAA). National ILGWU Accord withdrawn); Pension Workers Textile pletely Inc., Fashions, 94-Cir. No. Weatherall Fund Co., Finishing Dye & Fund v. Standard (S.D.N.Y.1986). slip op. 1986 W.L. (employer was not (S.D.N.Y.1985) F.Supp. F.Supp. Leishman, Combs But see even assessments pay obligated withdrawal not with (employer had (D.C.Dist.Col.1988) of three crew skeleton though it maintained winding drawn, operations were although its up disman- work and aid in employees to clean mining activities down, it maintained where plant contri- and made dye tling and textile aof normal substantially than different at levels employees); Connors of these on behalf butions periods). work F.Supp. 849 Bldg. Systems, 651 Economy v. (D.D.C.1986) * only as to Judge voted Garth Circuit employer Senior (court determined rehearing. panel "the ceased completely withdrawn when *2 in con- some included motions insanity a defense nection exams *3 psychiatric and to assert

wanted requests for thereto, as as well related changes in occasioned continuances continuance’s including earlier counsel, an standby counsel give extension final case himself to familiarize him- represent Lattany’s request after last exten- This granted. se was pro self still earlier and the sion period. open-ended outstanding were for contemporaneous- not court did con- of its support findings its ly record continu- open-ended either this clusion to serve extension, needed was ance, itsor continu- Unless justice. the ends PA, for Philadelphia, Booker, P. Timothy persis- and properly its extension and ance appellant. which days within seventy tently tolled S. Atty., Walter Baylson, U.S. M. Michael to be defendant requires criminal the Act Ap- Atty., Chief Jr., Asst. U.S. Batty, vacat- must be tried, Lattany’s convictions Atty., Carr, Jr., Asst. U.S. B. peals, William ed. PA, appellee. Philadelphia, already decided has This Court HUTCHINSON, and COWEN Before form the facts require Act does Judges. WEIS, Circuit justice continuance an ends the basis days seventy within recorded to be THE COURT OF OPINION to com requires trial the Act during which Judge. HUTCHINSON, Circuit within court states mence, long as the so (Latta- Lattany David Scott Appellant, contin for the statutory basis that time action criminal in a judgment ny), appeals authorizes Act Whether uance. District in the United question open-ended convicting Pennsylvania District Eastern con After this Court. impression first and one robbery of bank two counts him of contin it, hold sidering we robbery viola- attempted bank count are not justice ends uances serve (West Supp. 2113(a) 18 U.S.C.A. tion length. reasonable they are prohibited his con- Lattany us reverse 1992). asks us, hold that also before record On the indictment dismiss the and viction discre abuse court did is that contention principal His prejudice. con concluding that tion (the Act under rights the interest necessary in was tinuance (West 3161-3174 “Act”), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ and extension that both and violated because were Supp.1992), &1985 circumstances. reasonable indictment. days trial occurred Speedy Trial no Therefore, was there August arraigned on Lattany was violation. trial, scheduled originally His pro se supplemental Lattany has filed several continued October other several listed he also in which brief a succession request of at the times this Court. properly issues begin until did not lawyers violation the asserted addition Lattany was aware 29, 1991. coun- appellate Act, Lattany’s on his pretrial motions intervening issues. other various raised sel has seeking continuanc- behalf, including those There- merit. lack all issues other These any of them. objection no es, made delays and pretrial discussion without reject them fore, we time. On up to that Lattany’s convictions.1 affirm will se time, filed, first for the I. for viola- indictment dismiss the n Act. tion of indicted July robbery attempted bank charged with mo- pretrial filed numerous parties Both 2113(a).2 On U.S.C.A. of 18 in violation requests for contin- tions, including three arraigned he was August filed with that were uances guilty. His plea of not entered pro- During these knowledge.3 *4 Septem- 9, 1989. On for October scheduled to attorneys attempted several ceedings, was indictment 7, 1989, superseding a ber of Ultimately, each Lattany. represent Lattany charging additionally returned represen- accept to either unable them was occurring robberies string four of a with con- because of to had withdraw tation or of six weeks blocks and two within interest, problems, or scheduling flict of September robbery. On attempted earlier Lattany on defense agree with inability to on the arraigned Lattany was strategy. pleas entered indictment superseding Lattany’s mo- denied The district court guilty. of not remaining pre- and all other dismiss tion to sought and 1990, Lattany On hearings pretrial motions after se pro proceed permission was on began Trial January began on stand-by appointed of the assistance with the return days after January December Finally, on counsel. trial, Latta- At original indictment. to set court district asked himself, with the assistance ny represented a set response, date. a trial stand-by counsel. of and, in an date of two Lattany on jury The convicted in stated order dated of robbery one count of bank counts all the of justification in full reasons sheet; court abused and whether pro Lattany se are raises issues 1.The other hearing request a denying for his discretion its discretion abused court district whether the entering prior juror coercion hearing the issue issue request a on the denying his judgment jury’s verdict. entering judgment on the prior to juror coercion verdict; jury panel was jury’s whether the unconstitutionally composed; selected appeal a Lattany filed on this 2. Counsel denying his erred in district court whether Appendix” "Appellant’s by accompanied an brief psy- to hire pretrial authorization Lattany filed paginated. ("App.”) which was the dis- psychiatrists; whether chologists and accompanied brief which se ruling on his improperly deferred trict ("Supp. Se Appendix” Pro "Supplemental Se Pro prior evidence limine exclude motion in convictions; nor of contents containing a table App.”) neither erred in district whether provided addi- government has pagination. The Lattany to to escort allowing marshals armed Ap- "Supplemental Pro Se copies of that tional room; district court whether the jury panel of contents table containing added pendix” denying request to his discretion abused its filed government has also pagination. The cross-examination; during approach witnesses Appendix” Supplemental "Government’s support evidence is sufficient whether there ("Govt.Supp.App.”). verdict; government im- jury’s whether testify; his failure properly commented Didier, 542 upon United States relies permitting erred in whether Cir.1976), arguing he (2d could F.2d 1182 bank sur- during to view jury deliberations he since agreed these continuances not have videotaped testimo- witness films and veillance copies the motions provided with was not shown at had not been purportedly ny which videotape attorneys. pretrial The by his trial; abused its district court whether though however, record, Latta- that even shows interrupt- "repeatedly ‘‘rushing’’or discretion ing" copies of actually may received ny not have closing Lattany during statement. his motions, his case’s informed he such are: wheth- Lattany’s counsel raises issues other was aware process and step in the at each status injustice occurred when er manifest they were motions substance suffering while proceed to trial had only record videotape record is filed. illness; process due whether major mental respect to this available made into evi- the admission rights violated proceedings. spread photo suggestive unduly dence of II. robbery in violation attempted bank February 2113(a) on U.S.C.A. subject mat § denied 6,1991, the August 18 U.S.C.A. jurisdiction § under ter judgment motions post-trial Lattany’s jurisdic 1985). appellate We have (West alternative, a new or, in the acquittal (West Supp. U.S.C.A. under 28 § tion in- arguments, trial, upon various based appellate scope 1992). set out We Act. Speedy cluding violation decision court’s over review F.Supp. opinion, accompanying In an in United 3161(h)(8)continuance court addressed 181, the district Company, Rivera Construction should the indictment argument Cir.1988): (3d F.2d 293 Act: dismissed a continu- review of The standard coming to trial delayed This case 3161(h)(8)of ance difficulty Lat- time because some upon what depends Trial Act at- attorneys who tany had analysis in the district step told, All him. represent tempted to review Where we reviewing. *5 stand-by counsel [Smith] counting of the stat- interpretation court’s district trial and assisted present at who was therefore, and, ute, of law question it is a repre- trial, Lattany was Lattany at If the district review. plenary subject attorneys from indictment by six sented issue, at conclusions are factual Lattany claims conviction. ap- is standard clearly erroneous a a violation trying his delay case in district Finally, when the propriate. following theAs Speedy Trial Act. proper a grants a continuance shows, delays chronology of events statute established of the application entirely attribut- occur which did stan- facts, of discretion then an abuse of his de- management Lattany’s able applied. is dard fense. omitted). There- (citations 295 n. 3 Id. at vii-2, 3.4 at App. over the review fore, plenary we exercise September Act and construction district court’s prison in months to 210 sentenced If the excludable time. provisions He supervised release. years of three ap- properly construed Septem- appeal on timely notice of filed a that are findings of Act to fact plied the ber 1991. decide, erroneous, un- must clearly case, whether of this circumstances der the contend Lattany and counsel Both permitting re- its discretion elapsed between the abused days that run Decem- until July original turn of the indictment trial fixing firm jury 1990 without empaneling of ber 1991 violated date. contends that Act. The III. occa- case was delay in this substantial Act “Congress enacted that tolled pretrial motions by sioned either Amendment the Sixth effect give by Act or contin- set the time limit setting specified speedy right to to serve required that were uances arraignment indictment or limits after needed defendant justice because ends com- trials criminal must which adequate within prepare develop and time to 5 Rivera, (quot- 863 F.2d menced.” defense. provides: “In all crimi- Amendment rely part The Sixth appeared enjoy the responsible the accused shall prosecutions, upon nal the fact trial____” indicates, public U.S. attorney The record right turnover. his however, attorneys Const, only protections one of the Act VI. The amend. inability him. Amendment, to work with withdrew which Sixth those of the exceed accept repre- or withdrew refused The others scheduling problems or because of sentation 12 and note See also conflicts of interest. accompanying infra p. text at war- exclusive circumstances vides nine Cong., 2d Sess. 93d H.R.Rep. No. ing exclusion, including: ranting Cong. 1974 U.S.Code (1974), reprinted 7402). (1) delay resulting from Any period & Admin.News requires: concerning defen- proceedings other guilty dant, including limited to— plea of but not any case which a defendant entered, trial of indictment or an information charged in resulting any pre- (F) delay from an offense shall the commission motion, filing days from seventy within commence the conclusion through (and public) making filing date on, prompt disposition hearing or other indictment, or from or information motion; of, such appeared has date the defendant in which such of the court judicial officer resulting (8)(A) Any date last pending, whichever charge is granted by from continuance occurs.... re- or at the on his own motion added). 3161(c)(1)(emphasis 18 U.S.C.A. § his counsel or defendant or quest “pe certain provides section That attorney for the request of the at the ... excluded delay shall be riods of Government, granted such if the judge the trial the time within computing findings on the basis 3161(h). The Id. must commence.” ... by taking ends served that the seventy- computing the starting point interest of outweigh the best such action *6 1989, 18, August case is day limit this speedy in a the defendant public the arraignment before day after the delay resulting trial. such No v. States See United judicial officer. a the granted by a continuance from (2d Cir.) 1105, 1108 1n. Anderson, F.2d 902 para- with this in accordance in calculat not included (day of indictment this under be excludable graph shall must be which defendant ing time within forth, court sets unless the subsection 867, denied, trial), 498 U.S. brought cert. to case, orally either the in the record of (1990); 182, 146 112 L.Ed.2d 111 S.Ct. finding writing, its reasons inor 208, Richmond, F.2d 735 v. by the served ends the Cir.1984) (because indictment was (6th 211 outweigh such continuance granting of appeár first to defendant’s prior returned the public and interests the best arraignment, judicial officer ance trial. in a defendant day from began to run includable time (emphasis add- 3161(h)(1)(F),(h)(8)(A) Id. §§ seventy- and, calculating arraignment ed). excluded); limit, arraignment day of day under of time excluding period a Before v. Virgin Islands see also Government of pursuant justice” continuance an “ends (3d n. 8 Cir. Duberry, 923 must consider (h)(8)(A), district court to triggering 1991) (excluding days on which determining whether factors certain occurred). events in- granted, be should such a continuance within not commence does If the trial cluding: extended time within seventy days, or a such (i) the failure Whether and allowable period allowed be proceeding would in the information 3161(h), or indictment § pro- of such a continuation likely to make of the defen- on motion must be dismissed in a miscar- result or impossible, ceeding prejudice. dant, or without justice. (h) riage pro- 3162(a)(2). Subsection U.S.C.A. § Amendment violation. directly assert Sixth a a within require that trial commence does not brief, Sixth he lists a Brooks, supplemental se In specified United States time. be- the issues one of violation as Cir.1982) (citing (3d Amendment Barker n. 3 however, Court; not he does address fore this 33 L.Ed.2d Wingo, 92 S.Ct. 407 U.S. Therefore, we will body brief. of his denied, in the (1972)), U.S. S.Ct. cert. 101 1531, appeal. issue on this the constitutional (1983). Lattany consider does not 75 L.Ed.2d filing of by the caused delays Both soor unusual is so case (ii) Whether delays caused motions pretrial defendants, number due complex, exten- exis- or prosecution, nature excludable properly be must sion law, that or of fact questions of novel tence Act are requirements prep- adequate expect unreasonable it is met. or proceedings pretrial aration established limits time within itself Motions Pretrial A. by this section. provides 3161(h)(1)(F) Section motion, from its any pretrial resulting from grant such the failure (iv) is excluded Whether disposition, through filing which, as taken ain case 18 U.S.C.A. limit. from complex or so whole, so unusual 3161(h)(1)(F). deny (ii), clause to fall within arraigned Lattany was When obtain time reasonable defendant filed August deny the de- unreasonably counsel, would detention; dis seeking pretrial continuity of Government or fendant August detention trict for the deny counsel, or would August Therefore, time Gov- attorney for or the defendant excluded properly August through necessary the reasonable ernment seventy- (h)(1)(F).6 The subsection into ac- taking preparation, effective run began clock day speedy diligence. due exercise count scheduled The trial August Id, (iv). (ii), 8161(h)(8)(B)©, and the October repre Esquire Joseph, W. Ben appointed motions case, number September Lattany. On sent trigger subsection could returned indictment superseding addition, the (h)(1)(F). four string of Lattany with charging six-week two occurring within *7 robberies at additional justice” of “ends open-ended attempt earlier the of weeks and six blocks validi- counsel. of defense request the 1989, 14, Latta September robbery. On on ed depends two ty these indict superseding the arraigned on ny was the extension does (h)(8)(A)as subsection By guilty. of not pleas entered and at ment granted the against run had time, twenty-two days appointed this newly Lattany’s request the limit seventy-day Act’s Trial Speedy the the dis- immediately standby counsel arraign and indictment days Lattany’s since favorably ruled court trict 3161(h)(1).7 under § are excluded ment se. proceed request (11th 795, Cir. Yunis, 797 F.2d 723 States pretrial de defendant's regarding the v. 6. Motions 3161(h)(1)(F). 1984); § U.S.C.A. see 18 motions” "pretrial bond and tention from excludable thus purposes and speedy trial sup charges are filed subsequent When 7. v. States United See speedy trial calculation. of charge the same plemental indictment 706, (D.Mass.1990); Bellucci, F.Supp. 708-09 737 required or original indictment as the fense 220, Savoca, 739 case, v. States therewith, also United see this as in joined to be filing Cir.1984) ("time period from (6th original 223 with period commences speedy trial of bond reduction charges filing motion a new subsequent defendant’s [aof filing. If the through hearing] joined an oral request to be offense clearly subsequent filing excluda hearing is charges, ... original conclusion pe new, on other 3161(h)(1)(F)"), independent vacated commences ble Ramos, F.Supp. Cir.), 292, (6th de 588 cert. v. States 294 United See grounds, 761 F.2d riod. (citing United 153, (S.D.N.Y.1984) 1223, 126 852, 88 L.Ed.2d nied, 1226-27 106 S.Ct. U.S. 474 Cir.1972), (7th 791, Tienne, 151 468 F.2d Severdija, De 723 v. v. States (1985); States United 974, 911, 35 S.Ct. 93 denied, 410 U.S. bond Cir.1984) (motion falls to reduce cert. (11th 793 Kripple (1973); States United calculating includable L.Ed.2d (h)(1)(F)). within time, United (E.D.Pa.1978); bauer, F.Supp. 291 or occurs event on which the date both (E.D.Pa. Panetta, F.Supp. 114 the date and is filed a motion 1985). (2d Cir. 1977)), aff'd, 779 F.2d are excluded. a motion disposes a six week continu- granted and motion superseding on the arraignment During the 11, ance, date of December setting a trial to withdraw Joseph indictment, moved Mr. 1989, 23, order, a conflict dated October 1989. This counsel because Act Speedy Trial preprinted appears on interest. Associ- Defender six- and states appointed delay form order (DAP) represent Philadelphia necessary in order was ation week continuance Claire assigned the case to Lattany. DAP and to miscarriage of prevent a Rauscher, Esquire. citing support justice, J. ends of serve the 3161(h)(8)(B)(i).9 ad- Act § 1989, trial date 21, September On dition, the defendant notes that the order 9 to October changed from October We hold the continuance. 25, requested had September clerk.8 On grant- the six weeks’ extension that for an moved Rauscher Ms. procedural compliance with in full motions. On ed Sep- to file time Act and Speedy Trial requirements for extension the motion tember gave to by a accompanied the reasons granted, time was Therefore, proper. order. delay form it are valid justify Act pretrial mo- time October period time between extended proper- and also properly exclud- 1989 is until October December tions through September time, clock still stood ly During excluded ed. from September days. forty-four (h)(1)(F). to subsection pursuant time 8, 1989, Ms. Rauscher November days of non-excluda- Therefore, thirty-two Joyce case to transferred withdrew September elapsed as had time ble psychologist Webb-Eubanks, A Esquire. 1989. 5, 1989and Lattany on December examined moved Rauscher Ms. On October of insani- a notice Ms. Webb-Eubanks a psychia- to hire authorization Latta- defense on ty Lattany. examine psychologist to or trist provided report was expert’s ny’s day on the next This motion In the government on subsection Also October 30, 1989, dis- meantime, were excluded (h)(1)(F), October con- granted its court had trict therefore, thir- computation; the time tinuance, stating on a days of nonexcludable ty-seven the ends to serve needed that was form 5, 1989. elapsed as of October justice. *8 1989, 13, Ms. Rauscher On October 18, 1990, the November while April On of the a six-week moved for still' was 30, open-ended 1989 date, had scheduled been a motion extant, government filed per 1989; requested 23, she also October of evidence to exclude limine Ms. of time. motions out to file mission disorder gambling compulsive claimed she motion that in her stated Rauscher insanity or of basis delays because sought the continuance 1990, 5, Lat- September On defect. mental discovery from receiving requested n authoriza- motion a second tany filed had not she and because psychiatrist. or psychologist to hire a tion While for trial. prepare adequate time en- 1990, 24, district October On subsec pending, motion was pretrial this stating: an order tered clock speedy trial stopped (h)(1)(F) tion 1990, October, day now, 24th 1989, this 20, And October days. On forty-four Mo- Defendant’s upon consideration Ms. on Rauscher’s ruled provides that the (h)(8)(B)(i) Subsection court was involved of the 8. No failure to whether the consider should docketing merely a It was this continuance. a continu- likely to make therefore, clerk; did not it change impossible, or result proceeding such ation of seventy-day period. running of the stop the justice. 18 U.S.C.A. miscarriage 3161(h)(8)(B)(i). 874 Open-Ended The Continuance B. Psychia- to Hire for Authorization tion the Gov- and Psychologists, and trists open- of the propriety validity and The on this Limine Motion in ernment’s 30, November granted ended is motion that said issue, it is ORDERED 21, pres- extension May DENIED. questions. Since resolu- ent troublesome Appendix Pro Se Supplemental

Appellant’s Act issue Lattany’s Speedy Trial tion of add- (emphasis 122a App.) at (Supp. Pro Se resolution, they become their depends on ed).10 analysis. of our focus the main impose a (h)(1)(F) does Subsection delay due on limitation reasonableness v. Unit Henderson See motions. pretrial 1871, S.Ct. States, 476 U.S. ed Ms. Rauscher On November (“The plain (1986) L.Ed.2d him, because Lattany and advised wrote to all appear to exclude statute of the terms schedule, was she trans- heavy her hearing of and the filing between defender, public another ferring the case to hearing was motion whether aon No- Joyce Attorney Webb-Eubanks. see, not.”); e.g., United or prompt 8, 1989, sent Webb-Eubanks Ms. vember (5th Cir. 1315-16 Gonzales, change advising of this letter to at showing that defendant 1990) (absent postponement requested a hearings to obtain unsuccessfully tempted She date. 1989 trial December hearings were or that pretrial motions her problems with having she stated to evade intent deliberately refused more time needed schedule own days Act, delay over Speedy Trial the number for trial prepare fully pretrial motions resulting from witnesses, robberies, legal issues bank seventy-day period excludable insanity of an involved, possibility and the 1029, 111 S.Ct. denied, 498 U.S. Act), cert. court docketed defense. (1991). 112 L.Ed.2d as a 28,1989, treated it November letter on time related excluded properly November it on motions. pretrial filing of above preprinted order, on a appearing 1989. The incident to delays exclusion pursu- delay form order motions, however, cannot these 3161(h)(8), stated U.S.C.A. ant to 18 unless Lattany’s convictions save prevent necessary to a continuance the ends serve miscarriage and to later and its justice” continuance “ends of this continu- It stated justice. also stop the extension request of Latta- at the ance was clock. Act’s ticking to state: “Coun- and went ny’s counsel circumstances Therefore, turn is when this case inform the sel shall rulings. these attendant language court used clearly tressed ambiguous. It does order 10. This open- justifying the April mo- government’s dispose of the *9 granted in been that had ended otherwise does not The record tion in limine. 12, stated: order The December disposed of this case. ever the district court show that 1990, 24, precluded as 1991, on October day ”[T]he be- January prior to motion preferred de- law the defendant’s interprets matter of began. The fore disorder)[.]’’ (a gambling purported Lattany’s to fense only motion denying this order as peri- The time App. 124a-125a. Supp. Se at Pro asserts psychologists and and psychiatrists hire April motion was during which the to od outstanding April motion government’s that covered the time falls within gambling re- compulsive evidence exclude its subse- and open-ended January outstanding until mained erred court the district Unless quent extension. do proceedings on The not, ex- and open-ended continuance granting the April however, government’s mention it, no resulting it is of Therefore, from cluding the outstanding. as still motion ultimately court consequence when construed could be the October limine if April 18 motion disposed of the regarding Lattany's motion dispose of both to open-ended continuance government’s and the psychiatric evaluation proper. is but- construction This April 18 motion. behalf, on based his withdrew anee defense trial[,]” thus ready for at- Lattany’s “fourth” interest. conflict continuance. “open-ended” counsel by an- Rauscher, replaced Ms. torney, Appendix Supplemental Government heavy of her attorney because DAP other informed never Webb-Eubanks Ms. 14a. attorney, Ms. “fifth” Lattany’s workload. trial. ready for she was that court irrec- Webb-Eubanks, because withdrew the extension up to leading events Lattany regard- with differences oncilable are similar. Lattany’s defense. of his ing the conduct of the district clerk May On ap- Smith, was then Mr. attorney, “sixth” set a June sponte sua court only stand- as acted ultimately but pointed, Ms. Webb-Eubanks May date. him- Lattany represented while by counsel Lattany’s as to withdraw a motion during trial.13 self differ- upon irreconcilable based counsel opinion Nevertheless, strategy.11 concerning defense ences Lattany’s dismissing 5, August dated motion that hearing on held a court it consid- that indicates motions post-trial Ms. hearing, 21, 1990. At May responsible for Lattany personally ered irrecon- that explained Webb-Eubanks supra note attorneys. See turnover Latta- regarding existed difference cilable on Mr. relied Apparently, Lattany told strategy. defense ny’s during the the court statements Smith’s lawyers five already had he had that why Lat- hearing explaining 21, 1990 May asked the and him representing Mr. times. five counsel changed tany The court another. still appoint speak- statements made those Smith adjourned Ms. Webb-Eubank’s prior to immediately ing with Gregory arrival hearing until standby counsel as appointment attorney Smith, Esquire, an relying justified think the Mr. Lattany. Smith represent contacted them. one approximately Lattany for with met follow- hearing, the hearing At this and, when hours a half colloquy ing ensued: Lat- that resumed, advised Smith your upon right, based All himself. Smith COURT: THE represent tany wished knowingly have you I think Lattany’s sixth answers be he would stated right your waived voluntarily unique Lattany’s attorney, represent you permit I will with counsel. problems conflict spawned “has Smith, you do Mr. yourself. attorneys,” and the other stand-by as appointed being objection Govt. himself. representing capable counsel? at 14a. Supp.App. Honor, we None, your MR. SMITH: representa- Attorney Smith’s Although anoth- communicating well with accurate, wholly been may not have tions him. with I can work er, think I dissatisfac- Lattany’s indicates record you appoint Okay, I’ll COURT: THE contribute did tion stand-by counsel. Only one in counsel. changes very much. you Thank SMITH: MR. representation withdrew attorneys you contact And Lattany.12 COURT: THE inability to work can, you as soon Attorney ap- the US. two were attorneys, Lattany’s “six” Of know us let my accept but by the court office pointed you, trial —not go to ready to you’d are undiscer- reasons appointments trial, togo ready bewill client your Lattany’s “third” record. *10 nible right? all appear- enter attorney, the first nothing record this in is likewise only 13.There sought withdrawal motion 11. way improperly any in Smith that Mr. asked indicate but Ms. Webb-Eubanks behalf of intentionally court, or inadver- either behalf misled as counsel withdraw leave to tently. office. entire DAP 4. supra note See 12. commence, will. trial of these offenses must I think that will be—I

MR. SMITH: 3161(h); 18 U.S.C. § waiting long THE He’s been COURT: (b) by the ends of served get now, I’d like to this case outweigh the best inter- tried. public ests of the and the defendant Very well. MR. SMITH: trial, 3161(h)(8)(A); § The district court Govt.Supp.App. at 11a. (c) particularly light of the facts Lattany’s request proceed (i) repre- the defendant intends to counsel, se, ex- appointed standby himself, (ii) incarcerated, sent tended the 24, 1990, (iii) the Court on October court made no further continuance. The precluded as a matter of law the defen- provided Speedy Trial Act statement and (a preferred purported defense dant’s giv- justification beyond that no additional disorder), gambling continuance of this 30, en at the time of the November specified case to the date above is nec- origi- the court had open-ended continuance essary permit preparation effective nally granted at Ms. re- Webb-Eubanks’ preclude miscarriage for trial and Webb-Eubanks, quest. Like Ms. Mr. 3161(h)(8)(B)(i) (iv). justice, & the court that Smith never notified Supp. App. at Pro Se 124a-125a. or- proceed ready to with the case.14 supplemented der the district court’s earli- 12, 1990, response to a On December findings by specifically er and orders ex- date, government motion set a trial cluding elapsed January all time January district court set trial for necessary permit prep- 1991 as effective 1991.15 The district preclude aration for trial and to a miscar- part: 1990 order stated in relevant riage justice, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. There have numerous contin- been (B)(iv) 3161(h)(8)(A),(B)(i)and and stated in this case uances of the trial date since specific required reasons that it felt superseding the return of the indictment Thus, earlier continuances. 7, 1989, (1) by: September occasioned text of the December 1990 order sets of new counsel for the the substitution specific findings forth which demonstrate defendant, (2) requests for continuances trial had counsel, (3) by defense a lack of been caused the substitution of new by the certification to the Court defen- counsel, requests defense any dant or of his counsel that he is adequately for continuances order to ready for trial. prepare, well as the failure of the defen- finds, supplement as a 4. The Court any certify dant or of his counsel to their findings to earlier and orders with re- trial. readiness for spect to excludable time to the Act, that: (a)the (h)(8)(A) period delay until Subsection states that trial date shall scheduled be excluded is excluded computing grants the time within a continuance because the ends of protection public 14. Our review of the record convinces us that as well as the defen- Lattany desired all the continuances that Recording for a continuance dant. reason granted. circumstance informs our That deci- long gives appear- often after it is courts, however, sion. We caution district against post induced ance of hoc rationalization practice entering open-ended con- preserve a deserved conviction that oth- wish to them, tinuances, no matter who asks for bright-line afoul of the Act’s rule. erwise falls strongly grant- recommend that the reasons for continuance, including ing any continuances, ends-of-justice government’s stated that "[t]he 15. The at the time the be recorded con- inquire of Mr. has continued granted. tinuance is A district court's reliance ready can be for trial” Smith when Mr. they parties ready on the to advise it when agreed Lattany Mr. Smith had could be and that trial, here, can as the district court ready Supp. in late Pro Se purpose interfere with the Trial Act's App. at 129a. insuring prompt trial of criminal cases for the *11 indict- the a motion dismiss trial dants speedy outweigh the serve Act. the for violation ment defendant. and the public the interests the motion denied court district The statute Id. 3161(h)(8)(A). U.S.C.A. § time that only the its stated justify must dismiss court that the provides also 3161(h)(8)(B)(iv).Id. under written state- excluded oral or by an was con- the defendants appeal, its reasons the record 294-95. on at forth setting ment district permit a If such state- did not Id. that the Act them. tended granting delay occasioned record reasons the on provided, place the is not court ment be excluded the after ordering cannot the continuance continuance by a defendant a criminal run otherwise within Act’s clock would time the F.2d Rivera, 863 delay brought trial. excess to dismiss for must be a motion 520. More- Brooks, Rivera, F.2d at dis- 296; the In at 295. at Id. filed. provide cannot over, court it a district when on record the did state court trict unauthorized justification doing it after-the-fact that was continuance the granted con- ends-of-justice delays granting sufficient new counsel to allow in order so See tunc. nunc tinuance at 296. Id. defense. the prepare time F.2d Carrasquillo, totality in the “Viewed held: This however, held, Cir.1981). We have (3d made circumstances,” district court had record articulating on delay it can that evi- by the supported findings that were the continuance granting reasons that requirement Act’s met the dence is en- the continuance granting In Riv- Id. the record. they be stated limit seventy-day the Act’s before tered strongly would era, indicated that we Rivera, expired. See have otherwise would justifi- after-the-fact any apparent disfavor Brooks, 521- 297; F.2d at at F.2d Carrasquillo, cation, but at id. Carrasquillo, See so held. squarely jus- “ends for an reasons Placing the at 385. F.2d record serves on the continuance tice” grant- court district Carrasquillo, In purposes: two justice continu- ends a retroactive ed to ensure wanted First, Congress judge heldWe at 385. Id. ance. con- careful give judge district after a continuance such grant could balancing the need sideration period seventy-day expiration of de- interest “the against by a motion its attention brought to achieving society in and of fendant There, depu- at Id. dismiss. Second, require- trial.” court clerk, than rather ty ap- so that an record provides ment at Id. date. trial fixed the judge, had the decision. may review pellate argued 385. The Brooks, (quoting F.2d Rivera, at contacted attorney had defendant’s Thus, omitted)). (citations at 520 discussion clerk, deputy clerk’s deputy “requires controlling precedent the trial regarding be- a continuance to decide of a as the viewed could be date run, does it begins [but] fore rejected We the Act. under reasons put its require judge a district held that argument and subsequent A time. at record be- grant a consider must purpose satisfies articulation excluded may be time fore the at 297. Rivera, statute.” at 385-86. 3161(h)(8)(A). Id. court, dis- after Rivera, decision no there Carrasquillo, counsel, a continuance qualifying part whatsoever or reflection Id. months. for three delayed concerning the not use did Rivera expiration until order and delay form Act The reasons at 385. Id. period. at the to the any reference not make wholly an gave for days Five the continuance. contrast, Here, afterthought. date, the defen- scheduled *12 on the record continuance granting such a an ends that stated on November Rivera, 863 F.2d at 297. time. at that After required. justice continuance situation reconsidering the permit district Rivera Brooks and that con- court extended the district subse- grant a continuance and court articulating the basis of tinuance, fully it full reasons quently articulate its extension and original order This is both continuance. support feels that set order December did here when it court what date. 1991 trial January for the statutory basis noted the and con- open-ended continuance is analo- Lattany’s case respect, In this delay was stated temporaneously Brooks, Carrasquillo. not gous to pre- give new counsel time necessary to the time Brooks, excluded court district the November That reason and pare. signed preprinted had it passed after until operative remained 1989 continuance granting delay form Speedy fully when the court 3161(h)(8)(A) pursuant a continuance it. articulated its reasons certain reasons off it had checked on which pre- that were was, however, granting the in Rivera The continuance Brooks, at 697 F.2d time, the form. printed period month specified three its rea- explained The district at is- the continuance open-ended like in more granting the sons otherwise similar to sue here. Rivera seventy-day period later, case, detail that it therefore we believe and Id. run. have otherwise requirements of Riv- otherwise meets Act was not held that We era. It before the had district court days violated because other- seventy would have Trial Act’s the exclud- before en- Although the run. wise Brooks, dis- we Id. at 522. period. ed fully setting before tered the continuance tinguished Carrasquillo as follows: based, findings on which was forth the ... to the Act’s ends-of- [Carrasquillo court did refer district] time it entered justice” requirement at the “ends

granted a retroactive contemporane- during which The court the continuance. for the justified continu- appearances ously specifically attorney’s other the defense necessary for finding trial of that it was by unavailable for ance made him defense, prepare held that a his adequately This Court Carrasquillo. jus- frequent and successive grant considering “ends judge could tunc, attorneys. La- nunc provid- among turnover tice” continuance Rivera ter, permits, the court additional- for unau- justification fact ing after the declared, Rather, reference ly justified we the continuance delays. thorized the mat- must consider unusual nature of the defense the numerous sought present, whether and determine ter at outset superseding in- require resulting from the justice” charges the “ends findings, supported by dictment. These postponed. trial be record, clearly erroneous. are not decide court must Although the district continuance, grant a initially whether order, the dis- In the December Carrasquillo, not, require that we findings supplemented earlier trict entered the decision be reasons excluding time specifically orders time that the at the same on the record necessary to 1991 as prior made. decision is and to preparation for trial permit effective Rivera, miscarriage justice, preclude a Similarly, Id. at 521-22. (B)(i) 3161(h)(8)(A) while to 18 U.S.C.A. Brooks and stated upon relied Lat- recognized that (iv). court to Carrasquillo requires the rep- and intended tany incarcerated a continuance decide to court, on Octo- that the resent himself and does not re- period expires, it of a 24,1990, precluded ber reasons for place quire the court

879 Brenna, curiam). we Cir.1989) (per basis as the disorder gambling purported said: insanity defense. of an pursu- continuance justice rea- ends of requirement [A]n the purpose The 3161(h)(8)(A) be en- cannot to section consid- ant insure careful is to be stated sons tunc, and hold the nunc [we] tered factors the relevant eration must, at a order, court district the in its a reviewable provide court entering an minimum, is it are state purposes Both appeal. record or a contin- continuance order, justice” “ends of taken if the text served 3161(h)(8)(A). to section pursuant subsequent uance detailed more together with must be case continuing the fac- The order statements, explains adequately days to excluded. entered under continuance basis before tual criteria. relevant original). When (emphasis at 122 Id. extension, Rush, 507 F.2d announced 738 court v. district States United preprinted denied, by either unaccompanied U.S. 470 Cir.1984), cert. (1st state- (citing justice” (1985) “ends or an 378 order L.Ed.2d form 105 S.Ct. in this expressed 520-22). Although concern Brooks, 697 F.2d ment. present Brenna is incorporate merely from may not statement court district requirements however, here, out set the reasons by reference from The statement it to articu necessary for met. Rivera statute, were it is in Riv- set the dicta are is in accord obvious Brenna are facts which late hoc rationalization. condemning post continuance era for the in the forth mini- court, at a v. Mitch States requires district (citing United It Id. itself. is enter- Cir.1983) (mo that it mum, order (1st in its state ell, 723 F.2d or a complimenta justice” continuance ing read as an “ends ruling and court tion Janik, section pursuant States United documents); ry Here, for- Brooks Cir.1983)). the minimal Id. 3161(h)(8)(A). (7th 537, 545 Speedy Tri- fully preprinted court mality utilizing district Rivera permit a stating that contin order delay form granting Act al reasons articulate contin- entering Trial Act an “ends even uance pursuant provided a “continuance expired, or uance” have would was met requires 3161(h)(8)(A)” Brenna is entered the continuance granting order granted its limit first seventy-day time district the Act’s November De court’s open-ended run. induced justi the conditions is sufficient Since 1989. order cember May present still to do so open-ended continuance original fy the in the fully articulated contin open-ended and were November Bren- order, under permissible themselves uances After met.16 na requirement was Act. to withdraw leave prior counsel counsel, stand-by Smith appointing its belief court, keeping 1990 extension his new Lattany and to allow it needed continu November prepare, adequately enough time origi counsel separately ance, if treated extant the still however, extended present would, continuance, nal again our decision problem an additional inform should (3d stated that Brenna, to allow granting a Brenna imposed requirements The formal reason prepare trial. This adequate time to in Riv- out set requirements we supplement the provi- special Act’s requirements utilize Rivera, did not themet era. adequate give allowing form preprinted sion See 18 U.S.C.A. the continuance to counsel. preparation time state that or justice.” necessary (iv). the “ends 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii), Act or the Rather, merely that it stated ready go to Lattany was court when

trial. Having disposed problem of the Brenna by May created 1990 extension of the No- When *14 continuance, pre-existing open-ended continuance, open-ended vember yet ques- general we have to address the seventy- was entered before its order open-ended propriety tion of the contin- addition, expired. In day limit have would Speedy If uances under the Trial Act. reasons for stated the the district court open-ended permissible, continuances are continu- the November granting we must also decide whether the Rivera expound- and then contemporaneously ance maxim, allowing supporting reasons for the writ-, subsequent in a ed on those reasons placed continuance to be on the record at a in Brenna did The district court ten order. date, open-ended later extends to contin- prior expira- grant any continuance addition, In uances. we must decide by the Act. It the time allowed tion of depen- a reasonableness limitation whether continuance, or first attempted grant particu- dent on the circumstances of each continuance, after officially recognize the placed lar case must be on such continuanc- expired in the period the time would have so, es and whether the this case Brenna, such continuance. absence of was reasonable. Here, contrast, the dis- F.2d at 118-19. appeals Other courts of have addressed granted open-ended continu- trict court open-ended problem continuances. period ance the time Pollock, In United v. 726 F.2d 1456 expired. It stated that it was otherwise (9th Cir.1984), the United States Court of Speedy granted to the Trial Act’s Appeals rejected for the Ninth Circuit ends-of-justice open-ended exclusion. The continuances, open-ended holding that “an May extant when the continuance was justice’ ‘ends of extension under section granted. 1990 extension was 3161(h) proper only spe- if ordered for a period justified cific of time and on the case, danger there is no the instant record with reference to the factors enu- retroactively using the district court’s 3161(h)(8)(B).” merated in section Id. at continuances to manufacture excludable 1461; Jordan, accord United States being asked to dismiss the indict- time after (9th Cir.1990) (“ends jus- Act. ment for violation of the specifically tice” continuance must be limit- Lattany’s trial before the court continued supported by findings justi- ed in time and Speedy Trial Act clock would have other- record). by fied requisite wise and it also made the run Rush, the Ap- United States Court of Speedy Act statement in its Trial December peals adopt for the First Circuit refused to order, prior Lattany filing Rush, reasoning. Pollock’s 17, 1990 motion to dismiss for There, granted the district court had Brenna, prosecution. lack 878 F.2d Cf. open-ended continuance because a trial (acknowledging danger at 121-22 of retro- involving taking several codefendants was active rationalization where waits un- place jurisdiction. in another Id. at 506. dismiss) (quoting til asked United States appeal, open- concluded that Tunnessen, (2d Cir.1985); 763 F.2d may necessary ended continuances Janik, 544-45). 723 F.2d at stated, however, may some cases. It “[i]t We hold that the district court met the well be some sort of reasonableness requirements of Rivera in both appropriate prevent limitation is contin- the November 1989 continuance and delaying unfairly uances from trials extending circumventing it on the dismissal sanctions in Rather, The Pollock court cited our decision in Car- for that matter. it addressed the Pollock, holding. deputy rasquilla support of its clerk’s failure to set a trial date until however, Carrasquillo, expiration Speedy F.2d at 1461. did not after the pertain to an Trial Act time limit because of the defendant’s court, unavailability by or counsel’s for trial. Act____” have referred open-ended continuances The of at 508. Id. district court’s plans. similar in to decide not have appeals part: plan provides unreasonable. delay was whether Rush may whether to decide The court the need spared It was 3161(h)(8) specif- either had occurred 18 U.S.C. § Act violation deter- period to be of time or dismiss ic motions (such as event to an reference mined grounds defendants jeopardy double illness) control within recovery from weeks several is to If the continuance government. well taken. granted was *15 certain, require shall date not Id. to the parties both one or inform 'per to a objections in dicta stating the circum- when promptly if continuances, barring open-ended rule se no continuance justify that stances the follow- in Rush made First Circuit longer exist. agree: we which observation ing criminal disposition of prompt Plan a con- to limit preferable generally is [I]t Trial Act of Speedy cases, to sake period for the a definite to tinuance 3165(e)(3), United U.S.C.A. 1974—18 at the same certainty; but clarity and Dis- the Eastern District Court States cases, some that in inevitable it is (emphasis in at 16 Pennsylvania, trict one, is forced a court present like the simi- District Plan original). Eastern know- without (h)(8)continuance an post-indictment in cases of larly provides sup- long reasons exactly how ing [granted the continuance delay: “If remain valid. will the continuance porting 3161(h)(8)] to a date is 18 U.S.C. § omitted). The Rush (footnote Id. one or both certain, require shall Court Plan Speedy Trial that on to note went promptly when inform the parties to recog Maine the District by adopted justify the circumstances specifi Plan The Maine this concern. nized at longer Id. no exist.” (h)(8) continuance an cally provided need some that a apparent It thus peri specific either “for may be foreseen continuances was open-ended determined to be time or od Speedy court’s drafters not within ... an event reference to we, circumstance, Plan. Trial Act at 508 Id. government....” control First for the Appeals the Court like Burke, 673 23; States n. see entire- them Circuit, prohibit hesitant are (holding (N.D.Ga.1986) F.Supp. can be continuances think such ly. We relying permissible open-ended provid- Act reconciled specifical which plan heavily on local to continue permitted they are not ed continuances; open-ended ly referred Sub- long period of time. unreasonably an hesitant always be should courts “while make designed to Act is (h)(8)of the section continuances, the extent open-ended grant “ enough to ‘flexible involv instant case complexity ad- of our practicalities accommodate breadth large number such ing ” at 508 Rush, F.2d versary system.’ magistrate warranted motions Mitchell, 723 States (quoting United continuance”), open-ended ... barring altogether 1044). rule at A Cir.1988), cert. (11th aff'd, inappro- be continuances open-ended 908, 109 S.Ct. denied, 492 U.S. purpose. contrary to priate as (1989). L.Ed.2d contin open-ended Thus, hold we by is not bound Although this Court the Act necessarily violate uances adopted by do plan speedy trial of a language sup Rivera, permits and that it is court, appropri- believe we reasons porting existing plan a similar to consider ate period would Court for District the United a later record placed on the be expired to Pennsylvania since District of Eastern continuances. open-ended date, extends propriety addressing of cases number disorder, February bling but can open-ended Since Sloviter, complained Judge unreasonably long, we to Chief not, however, letter question delays that result nerve to Mr. Booker “has the must decide whether con relationship representing my sanity ed from subsequent Appellee extension at 9.18 myself pro se.” Brief for tinuance and its circum particular reasonable under the directly re- Though issues did not these gov as the case. Inasmuch of this stances time, any long period of excludable sult en statutory obligation to has a ernment appropriate they provide do we believe purposes of that the sure court’s decision background for the district out, in that are troubled Act are carried lawyers, including rely length of the only by the respect not counsel, determining stand-by assist that the by the fact but go to trial without the case could over until waited participate Lattany’s right jeopardizing year after the of a full meaningfully presentation in the granted on November been appropriate. along he lines believed extension, before *16 after its seven months circumstances, we cannot hold these Under trial date. a firm taking to insure action findings supporting the the district’s that that concedes they clearly or that are delay are erroneous from the “ortho- departed actions court’s Likewise, we cannot legally insufficient. into consideration but asks us to take dox” delay by the that occasioned conclude case of this unique circumstances [as] “the Lattany sought open-ended continuances at all times de- finding that justifypng] through counsel was unrea- a succession of district court’s to the lays were attributable time as a matter of law. Each sonable defendant attempts to accommodate attorney appoint- changed, the counsel new attorneys.” Brief his succession of represent Lattany had to be ed to Appellee at 38. prepare the case. adequate time to Lattany may not have been Although changes to- Considering these of counsel his “succession solely responsible for Lattany’s acquiescence gether with partially least ac- attorneys,” he was at long continuances those requests for the particularly changes, countable entailed, delays changes we hold the occa- Ms. respect to the withdrawal with open-ended continu- sioned further The situation was Webb-Eubanks. were not unreason- ance and its extension Lattany complicated by the fact court did not and that able insanity defense attempting to assert an by placing its discretion the burden abuse when his proceed to se and wanted attorney notify to on the defendant and his of the of- competence at the time mental they ready proceed to the court when were concern to his coun- fense was a matter of the trial. As the Busk stated: with competence, an issue question This sel. [Although defendants do not bear the pursue to Lattany’s counsel continues responsibility alerting the primary contributed appeal, appears to have deadlines, speedy trial this does court to Latta- between significantly disputes to may deliberately they mean that ob- strategy. lawyers defense ny and his over (h)(8) their tain an own insanity willing assert an Lattany was in the convenience face any attempt ques- but resisted defense by the trial court concerns articulated to stand trial or competence his tion either later claim that Thus, and then he consented conduct his defense. the re- insanity its discretion abused filing counsel’s a notice to his quested continuance. compulsive gam- upon based his below, apparent the record pro se. As is Lattany argues did not want his coun- from he options with insanity had other defense counsel discussed defense and sel to file notice However, filing Lattany Lattany aware of the pretrial at the time these motions. Insanity represented by motions and the Notice motions were filed yet proceeding appointed Defense. counsel and was not compulsive alleged upon an omitted). based fense (citations at 508 Rush, 738 questions There were disorder. gambling to abuse wholly free be cannot Defendants competency. A num- concerning (h)(8)continuanc requesting system attorneys from withdrew of defense ber convictions their argue es and disagreements between representation, vacated should concerning defense counsel Lattany and See granted. in were acquiesced they ultimately to strategy caused Kucik, just before the pro se proceed move actively (where defendant Cir.1990) (7th extended continuance, he obtaining participates newly an earlier give it support period to rely on may not Under prepare. appointed — U.S. —, denied, dismissal), cert. delay circumstances, the six-month these (1991). L.Ed.2d 853 S.Ct. continu- original between urge strongly Nevertheless, extension, as the as well and its ance to wait courts hereafter defen when them inform counsel to rely on of law. a matter not unreasonable trial, but instead go to ready to dants did not Accordingly, appears If it later deadlines. set delayed discretion abuse any postponement require standby counsel, circumstances and later give findings show set, appropriate so Lat- deadline counsel, opportunity consult require upon deciding the interests ing that purpose tany for the contempo made can be We appropriate defense. further preparing extending the court did raneously that the hold therefore *17 the kind to exclude decisions will avoid in procedure This err time. not case, only limit and not Act’s by this presented problems expired when not limit had defendant’s accordingly under Act but for trial. trial. case attached right ato Amendment Sixth affirmed. will be Lattany’s convictions IY. SLOVITER, Judge, Chief Before: ratio- conclusion, summarize MANSMANN, STAPLETON, BECKER, holdWe as follows. our decision nale SCIRICA, HUTCHINSON, GREENBERG, granting in court’s actions ROTH, ALITO, NYGAARD, COWEN, con- ends-of-justice Lattany an Judges. WEIS,* Circuit LEWIS in extension were subsequent tinuance REHEARING Act and FOR PETITION SUR compliance with contin- such for requirements formal 26, 1993. Jan. Brenna. in Rivera set forth uances by appel- rehearing filed for petition The prohibited not Open-ended having captioned matter in above lant open- Act. The by the partici- who judges to the submitted been ended all court and of this in decision pated properly were, extension judges circuit available the other in the necessary 3161(h)(8), service, no regular active circuit findings on which justice. interest having decision in the concurred who of dis- exercise based its majority rehearing, and a asked open- original both cretion regular ac- circuit judges of circuit extension and its ended rehearing having voted service tive clearly erroneous. re- banc, petition by the accommo- attempting continually denied. hearing stage. throughout date con- the motions acquiesced com- strategy was tinuances. insanity de- possible aof plicated because panel rehear- Circuit, voting

* limited Jr., Judge Weis, Circuit Joseph Senior F. Hon. ing. Appeals Third for the the United

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Scott David Lattany
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Date Published: Jan 26, 1993
Citation: 982 F.2d 866
Docket Number: 91-1826
Court Abbreviation: 3rd Cir.
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