United States v. Santiago Sanchez

850 F.3d 767

5th Cir.

2017

Check Treatment

Docket

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Santiago SANCHEZ, also known as Santiago Sanchez, Jr., Defendant-Appellant

No. 15-51217

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 9, 2017

848 F.3d 767

When imposing a special condition of supervised release, district courts must explain, on the record, how the condition is reasonably related to at least one of the sentencing factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1).¹⁸ If a district court fails to articulate its reasoning, and its reasoning cannot be inferred from the record, the special condition will be vacated.¹⁹

The district court offered no explanation for its decision to impose a separate mental health treatment condition on top of the sex offender treatment condition, and its reasoning cannot be inferred from the record. The record reflects that Billups has no known history of mental problems, no known history of emotional problems, and no known history of illicit drug use.

Both Billups and the Government request that we remand with instructions to vacate, rather than remand for resentencing.²⁰ However, in this circuit, “[w]here a timely objection is made to a special condition and the record does not clearly contain any discussion, factual finding, or other support for that special condition, we must vacate and remand for resentencing.”²¹ On remand, the district court must either “articulate a reasonable relationship between [the mental health treatment condition] and [one of] the [four § 3583(d)(1)] factors or dismiss the condition.”²²

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court‘s application of the pseudocount enhancement, VACATE the mental health treatment condition, and REMAND for resentencing in light of this opinion.²³

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Mark Randolph Stelmach, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorneys, U.S. Attorney‘s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Shannon Willis Locke, Locke Law Group, P.L.L.C., San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before JONES and OWEN, Circuit Judges, and ENGELHARDT*, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Santiago Sanchez pled guilty to aiding and abetting a bank robbery and received a six-point enhancement for otherwise using a firearm during commission of the robbery. On appeal, he challenges this six-point enhancement. We hold that any alleged error is harmless. The judgment is AFFIRMED.

BACKGROUND

Sanchez pled guilty to aiding and abetting a bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The Presentence Report (PSR) established a base offense level of 20. It also applied various other enhancements for conduct specific to this offense, including a six-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) for “otherwise using” a firearm during commission of the robbery. Sanchez objected to this six-level enhancement. The district court overruled Sanchez‘s objection and determined that a six-level enhancement was proper under the Guidelines because there was testimony that the defendants entered the building and announced that they had a gun.

Sanchez‘s total offense level was set at 31. Given his criminal history category of III, the resulting advisory Guidelines range was 135-168 months of imprisonment. The district court adopted the PSR and sentenced Sanchez to 135 months followed by supervised release for five years. The court explicitly stated that even if it had erred in applying the six-level enhancement, it would have imposed the same sentence. Sanchez timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Sanchez asserts that the district court erred by applying a six-point enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B) for using a firearm during the robbery. Sanchez contends that a four-level or five-level enhancement was more appropriate because his conduct was more consistent with “brandishing” the firearm than “otherwise using” it. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C)-(D).

When a defendant objects to a sentencing enhancement, this court “reviews the district court‘s interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error.” United States v. Johnson, 619 F.3d 469, 472 (5th Cir. 2010). The factual statements in a PSR are “presumed reliable and may be adopted by the district court ‘without further inquiry’ if the defendant fails to demonstrate by competent rebuttal evidence that the information is ‘materially untrue, inaccurate, or unreliable.‘” United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 287 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).

Assuming arguendo that the district court procedurally erred, any error was harmless. Not every procedural error requires reversal. United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 2009). An error is harmless, and does not mandate reversal, if “the error did not affect the district court‘s selection of the sentence imposed.” Id. Even when a district court does not consider the correct guidelines range, an error is harmless if the district court would have imposed the same sentence for the same reasons, regardless of an erroneous Guidelines calculation. United States v. Ibarra-Luna, 628 F.3d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 2010). When it is clear that the “court wanted to ‘moot’ the defendant‘s objection—by ordering a sentence that effectively grants counsel‘s objection—the appeal of the ‘sentencing error’ makes no sense.” United States v. Shepherd, 848 F.3d 425, 427 (5th Cir. 2017).

In imposing a 135-month sentence, the district court stated “to the extent that I erred in the application of the enhancement of plus six, the sentence would still be the same.” This court has held that similar statements during sentencing provide sufficient basis to conclude that any potential error resulting from an improperly calculated Guidelines range is harmless. United States v. Castro-Alfonso, 841 F.3d 292, 298-99 (5th Cir. 2016); United States v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 2013). We do not require the district court to recite “magic words.” Shepherd, 848 F.3d at 427. The district court made it abundantly clear that it would have imposed this sentence, regardless of whether it improperly calculated the appropriate Guidelines range by including the six-level enhancement.

CONCLUSION

The appellant‘s sentence is AFFIRMED.

Notes

See, e.g., .

(emphasis added).

Because we vacate the mental health treatment condition on evidentiary grounds, we need not reach Billups‘s alternative argument that the district court‘s imposition of the mental health treatment condition was an impermissible delegation of judicial authority.

District Judge of the Eastern District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

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