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United States v. Samuel Loring Morison, the Washington Post Cbs, Inc., Amici Curiae
844 F.2d 1057
4th Cir.
1988
Check Treatment

*1 equitable claim on the accrued facts concerning interest of this agreement case accounts,10 fund, of the we have not been and the escrow escrow matters that are best presented practical evidence as a why, left to the district court.

matter, equitable that claim would be limit- litiga- to the of the HRA ed forum Bank v. IV. CONCLUSION Indeed, argument, at oral tion. counsel for above, For the reasons discussed we will FAB to concede intervention seemed reverse the district court’s orders and re- litigation HRA not the only Bank v. mand proceedings consistent with this interest, attaching avenue to but con- opinion. tended instead intervention was the logical approach.

most direct and

Finally, also we note the existence of a

separate possible denying basis for the in- viz.,

tervention, FAB’s to comply failure procedural requirements

with the of Rule

24(c). The Bank contends FAB did not upon par-

serve a motion intervene grounds ties stating the for intervention as America, UNITED STATES required by that rule. Ryer See v. Harris- Plaintiff-Appellee, Bros., Inc., burg Kohl 53 F.R.D. (M.D. 1971) (refusing Pa. to discuss wheth- MORISON, Loring er Samuel proper given intervention is would-be Defendant-Appellant, comply intervenor’s failure to with Rule 24(c)). longstanding Given FAB’s desire to Post; Washington CBS, Inc., et investigate agreement, the settlement al., Amici Curiae. effort it enormous underwent to unseal action, the record in the Bank v. HRA No. 86-5008. certainly FAB’s intervention was no sur- Appeals, United States Court of However,

prise. many we note Fourth Circuit. lingering questions we have about FAB’s right might Argued intervene been cleared Oct. 1987.

up had FAB set out its clearly. contentions April Decided 1988. Because the district focused court its Rehearing Rehearing In Banc analysis question, on the timeliness April 29, Denied 1988.

parties same, question did the right whether FAB as of intervene

was never adequately addressed. Al-

though have, point, given we at this been

no indication that the requirements for met,

Rule 24 can right intervention as of

we question will nevertheless remand this inquiry.

for further answer question depends

intervention

legal arguments, specific upon also right perceive involving way protect of an debtor cause the in a its interest. no case the distribution of We county government inability escrow between a comparable protect part on the FAB to bankruptcy. interest, The court held that be- any. its nor has FAB asserted performance surety bank posted county by

bond favor the debt- opinion ability express We as to FAB’s no or, compel it was entitled to intervene funds, or on the its recover the interest ability escrow county right against assert setoff the debt- in excess arbitration to recover thereby liability or and reduce the bank’s award. stressed, however, county. The court that ab- sent such intervention the had no other bank *3 (Charles Ruff, Lynch

Mark H. F.C. Neil Roman, Reich, F. Covington K. Steven & Burling, Stein, Muse, A. Jacob F. Robert Stein, Mezines, Washington, Mitchell & D.C., brief), defendant-appellant. on for Willcox, Breckinridge Long Atty., Baltimore, Md., plaintiff-appellee. (Daniel Utica, N.Y., Popeo, D. J. Paul Kamenar, D.C., Washington, Michael P. McDonald, brief), M. on Marianne Hall Washington Legal amici curiae Foundation. Goldman, (Patti A. B. Alan Morrison brief), for amicus curiae Citizen. Public (Kevin Baine, Kendall, T. David E. Victo- Radd, Washing- Connolly, ria L. Williams & D.C., brief), ton, for amici curiae The Post, Washington et al. RUSSELL, PHILLIPS,

Before WILKINSON, Judges. Circuit RUSSELL, Judge: Circuit approved DONALD been for access to it and I under- procedures.... stand these he had [that appealing The defendant conviction advised that direct or indirect been] unau- of an under four counts indictment for disclosure, thorized retention, unauthorized of 18 U.S.C. and of two violation § negligent handling Compart- Sensitive Act, Espionage provisions U.S.C. mented Information me could ir- cause (e). The violations of the Es- § reparable injury to the United States or be pionage Act involved the unauthorized used to advantage by foreign nation.... pho- transmittal of certain satellite secured obligated he understood he [that tographs preparations was] naval Soviet regulation law not to any disclose (count 1) clas- entitled receive them” “one not sified information in an unauthorized obtaining fash- posses- and the of unauthorized ion.... he had reports sion of secret advised that [that been] unauthorized disclosure retaining delivering of them without of Sensitive them Com- (count 3). partmented to “one entitled to them Information receive” me consti- *4 charged 2 and 4 of the Counts indictment tute violations of United States criminal provisions laws, violation of the theft of 18 U.S. including provisions of Section essentially C. 641. His defense was 798 and § Title ” encompass the statutes did not the conduct States Code.... and, charged against did, if they him prior For some time to the incidents with trial, statutes were unconstitutional. At he concerned, which this evidentiary also found error certain rul- doing defendant had been off-duty certain

ings by judge. the district We find the work for Fighting Ships, Jane’s an annual claims of error unfounded affirm the English publication provided current conviction. information on operations naval interna- tionally. July, 1984, Sometime before I. Jane’s, many years which for had been Summary the Facts Jane’s, publishing begun publica- had employed defendant was at the Na- periodical tion of another weekly on a ba- Intelligence Support (NISC) val Center This publication sis. new was called Jane’s Suitland, Maryland from 1974 until Octo- Weekly and its editor-in-chief was Defence ber, Wood, 1984. At the time of the incidents Derek with an office in London. prosecution, involved in this he was as- The paid varying defendant had been signed amphibious hospital ship as an amounts for such services as rendered analyst and mine warfare in the NISC and dependent Jane’s on the value of the infor- given as such security had been clearance mation he arrangement furnished. This of “Top Compartmented Secret-Sensitive with Jane’s had been submitted to and place Information.” His work approved by was what Navy subject area,” was described as á “vaulted agreement closed defendant’s that he would not persons to all Top without a Secret supply any Clear- obtain and classified informa- ance.1 In connection with his security tion on the Navy or extract unclassi- clearance, signed he had any subject Non-Disclosure fied data on and forward it to Agreement. Agree- his Non-Disclosure off-duty Jane’s. The defendant’s services ment, acknowledged the defendant that he with Jane’s had subject become a of some security had received “a controversy indoctrination con- him Navy. between cerning protection result, the nature and of Sensi- aAs the defendant had become dis- Compartmented Information, tive including satisfied employment with his Navy procedure to be followed in ascertain- and wished employment to secure full-time ing persons whether other I whom con- began with Jane's. The defendant a corre- template disclosing this spondence information have prospects with Wood on the secrecy imposed 1. Because of employees they away. in such an while were area, “Secret” material could be left on the desk periodical. with employment fendant full-time Wood and after the defendant requested opportunity had He interview sent Wood the material described in Washington preceding when the latter was in paragraph. Wood At that time the saw, next. defendant on the desk of another em- ployee in the vaulted area where he Washington June, 1984, Wood visited worked, glossy certain photographs depict- and, by arrangement, saw the defendant ing a Soviet aircraft carrier under construc- request em- connection with latter’s tion in a Black Sea shipyard. naval time, ployment. At that Wood discussed photographs, produced by a KH-11 recon- report ap- with the defendant a which had machine, naissance satellite photographing regard peared in the American given analyst had been so that he explosion recently had to an occurred analyze could and determine capabili- the Severomorsk Soviet Naval base. capacities ties and of the carrier under expressed publica- Wood the interest of his construction. The photographs were in securing additional details since stamped “Secret” and also had a “Warning an explosion very was “a mat- serious Intelligence Notice: Sources or Methods ter.” The defendant told Wood that the imprinted Involved” on the borders explosion larger subject “was a much than photographs. The defendant later thought even had and there was a lot confession said he had earlier sent an art- more behind it.” The defendant also said ist’s sketch of a Soviet carrier under con- “provide more could material on it” if struction paid Jane’s had been $200 responded Jane’s were interested. Wood *5 for his photo- services. When he saw the receiving that he was interested addition- graphs, recognized the defendant them as explosion and, al on material the if the photographs satellite of the ship, Soviet such, provide defendant were able he taken secret method utilized the use could for transmission of such material Navy in its operations. Unob- “the facsimile Jane’s machine for direct served, picked photographs up, the se- Washington transmission in our [Jane’s] them, and, cutting creted after off the bor- editorial office.” The defendant told Wood photographs ders of the which recorded the provide also that he could Wood with other “Top Warning Secret” the words No- material. While there was no direct state- any well of tice as as indication their compensation about ment what the defend- source, person- mailed them to Derek Wood ant would receive if he sent material to ally. Weekly published Jane’s the practice Wood that the was used had been Defence weekly photographs edition few past that when the defendant had the days pictures later and made the available furnished material of interest had Jane’s agencies.2 to other news One these paid the defendant. When Wood returned published August 8, photographs was on days later, London a few he received in Washington the Post. the from the When typed defendant “about three Navy pages photographs, they officers saw the background of material on Severo- began later, A a search and discovered that the days morsk.” few the defendant photographs been transmitted had stolen. An investi- to Wood “two other items on begun explosions gation immediately further ascertain that had the was occurred at identity on site different the of the thief. dates also a mention particular explosion of one in East Germa- theft, investigation the of the the de- ny.” interrogated. fendant was He denied ever activity seeing photographs professed of the defendant which led the prosecution began July nothing on purloining know about days a few after photographs.3 persevered the interview of the de- He in this denial Shortly payment denying after Wood was that he authorized 3. Even while the defendant this. photographs responsible delivery was during $300 the defendant for his services Wood, telephoning Wood in period Derek he was when the had defendant furnished photo- London to exult that the theft of the graphs him this information. to ["him"]. could not traced time, cers, however, so going for some even far as to day obtained a second identify employees fellow who he said two warrant to search the defendant’s home. disappear- questioned should about That presence search revealed the of two August 22, photographs. On ance of the intelligence reports “secret” NISC on the seized the authorities defendant’s explosion at Severomorsk an envelope typewriter analysis An ribbon work. only” marked “For Derek Wood in defend- numerous letters to ribbon revealed apartment. ant’s summary Jane’s, including a of a secret At trial the Government offered evidence explosion. report Severomorsk At on the of defendant’s admission theft of the time, Navy about the same also was photographs, cutting of his off the “Se- photographs a return of able to secure “Intelligence cret” and Service” statements fingerprint from A Jane’s. discovered photographs outer sides of the and of photographs finger- on one of the his mailing photographs of the to Derek print was identified defend- Wood. proof There was also of the defend- information, ant. the FBI inter- With this attempt ant’s employment secure viewed the defendant anew arrest Jane’s and of payment Jane’s to the de- followed defendant October fendant. The presented proof Government 1984.4 of much of this letters of the defendant arrested, repeated When defendant to Jane’s or Wood. The Government also many any his connection denials with the offered in evidence military the “Secret” photographs, though theft of the ar- found in apart- information the defendant’s resting told him had officer discovered way ment. The defendant of defense photographs, on the fingerprints dem- presented witnesses who testified that the onstrating that he was not truthful when photographs and the secret documents photographs. he said he never seen the had secretary found in the apart- defendant’s point, At defendant asked for a nothing way ment involved of infor- interrogation. break in the When the inter- mation that could be harmful resumed, view was the defendant renewed advantageous States or to the Soviet Un- his denial of connection with the theft. ion. The Government offered rebuttal tes- *6 However, arresting the officers told him timony photo- to that the demonstrate they accept his did not denial and one of graphs, governmental as well as the other proceeded the officers to summarize the military defense secret documents found in demonstrating material had the de- apartment, provided defendant’s informa- guilt. At fendant’s the end of the summar- advantage tion of to the Soviet Union and ization, suggested one of the officers that against the interests of the United States. perhaps publi- the defendant had felt that At testimony, the conclusion of the the cizing progress the the Soviets were mak- defendant moved for a directed verdict. ing in developing a naval force would en- The motion was denied. The cause was greater Navy appropria- able the obtain jury then submitted the which returned jump tions. The defendant seemed to guilty verdict of on all counts. Sentenc- suggestion. The Government did not ing appealed The followed. defendant has accept proposed because excuse of all his conviction on various claims error. indicating the it had that evidence the de- the We find all claims without merit and making fendant was available secret mate- judgment affirm the of conviction. rial and to Wood Jane’s as a means of The furthering application employment denying defendant’s claim of error his for He, payment. however, his motion naturally Jane’s and directed verdict did separate arguments: not that he divides the admit had sent other infor- into two Wood, mation particularly relating charges first set forth in addresses the explosion charging Severomorsk. The offi- counts 1 and of the indictment objection rogation. There was no entered the defend- legality ant to the voluntariness or of the inter- (e); 793(d) organization London, and the located in England, of sections violations and 4 agent foreign relates to counts 2 and and not to power. second short, charges of section 641. His con- violations he press; leaked the he did not respect with to the first claim un- foreign tentions transmit to a government. 793(d) (e) and follows, sections are his der therefore under his construction of activity as set forth the two counts of statutes, the he guilty that was not of their not the literal or the indictment was within violation his transmittal of this national prohibitions intended of the relevant stat- material, security though, even under the that, prohibition and if within the utes government’s proof, he had without autho- statutes, literally or in the whether read rization clandestinely and abstracted that intent, legislative with such statutes accord highly material from the secret national constitutionally vagueness invalid for office which he worked and position His with refer- and overbreadth. had, publica- with reason to know that prosecution ence to the under 641 is section tion of reasonably such materials would simply covered by that his conduct imperil secrecy and confidentiality of statutory prohibition. shall discuss We intelligence-gathering nation’s capabili- begin- error separately, the two claims of ties, communicated such materials to one ning relating to convictions with those them, “not entitled receive” reasonably 793(d) (e). sections and under knowing receiver material publish it to all the world. Such is

II. ground the initial on defendant acquittal declares that his motion for The under Convictions Sections charges 793(d) (e) in counts one and three of the (section 793(d) (e)) indictment was erro- defense of the defendant initial neously overruled. stated Counts and (sections 793(d) (e)), predicate 3 of indictment defendant does not his ar- gument relating scope rests what he conceives to be mean statu- ing scope tory meaning language on the espionage two statutes actual facial charged violating. posi It is his It is fair to say statutes themselves. that, themselves, properly applied, construed and he concedes statutes prohib phrasing, ambiguous these two subsections of 793 do their literal are not charged provide in on their no warrant for conduct of which he is face specifically, plainly ap- those counts. more it is his contention.6 Both statutes Stated prohibitions ply having to national his view that the of these two “whoever” access narrowly strictly subsections are defense information has section communicate[d], “in represented “wilfully confined to conduct classic delivered] *7 5by person not spying espionage activity” persons and or ... to a entitled transmitted] who, it,” activity in or it in the course of that had receive has retained violation 793(e). language of section of the security transmitted “national secrets to two governments spies no agents foreign of with intent statutes includes limitation or to injure agent government,” argued foreign He “an of a either United States.” transmittee of charged of which is as to the transmitter or the conduct information, simply they does fit within of declare no ex- the mold “clas defined, spying” emption in of leaks to the sical as that term favor one who was It security press. “anyone.” since he It is difficult transmitted covers more any language secret definite materials involved the indictment conceive of recognized to a naval and clear. international news Congress Appellant’s only choose has brief at 19-20. the harsher when spoken language,” United in clear definitive 6. Because we find the statute involved to be 347, 515, 336, Bass, 404 92 S.Ct. States v. U.S. unambiguous, clear and the rule "when 522, (1971), inappli- 488 is 30 L.Ed.2d therefore readings there are a two rational of criminal cable here. statute, other, one we harsher than the are to

1064 Cases, however, 631, 643, 2053, the statutes 436 U.S.

Admitting, 98 S.Ct. 2061, (1978), Com- facially citing are 56 L.Ed.2d 591 literally as stat construed Brown, missioner conduct, 563, 571, v. 380 the defendant U.S. 85 apply ed did 1162, 1166, (1965), 14 legislative history S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 75 or demon posits that the statutes, absolutely reading where “an literal of a conclusively that these strates statutory provision irreconcilably language, war were to be their facial whatever congressional purpose, the clear with spying” “classic and that applied only [in less literal construction ... application case] limited their they should be [may] be considered.” United States v. The thresh legislative intent. to this clear Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 298, 92 difficulty pressing this contention old 471, 474, (1971). S.Ct. 30 L.Ed.2d 457 None rule that when the terms of this case is the “exceptional” of those conditions for a de- clear, language is conclu a statute parture from the rule for literal construc- replace are “not free to ... and courts sive tion exists in this For case. that reason language] with an unenacted clear [that looking is no there reason or warrant INS v. Cardoza- intent.” legislative legislative 793(d) history of sections Fonseca, 480 U.S. -, -, 107 S.Ct. (e) meaning. to ascertain their 434, (Scalia, 1207, 1224, J. 94 L.Ed.2d recently re concurring) We convinced, though, areWe that the v. United States rule in affirmed this legislative history support will not the de (4th James, 92, Cir.1987): “If F.2d 793(d) fendant’s construction of sections unambiguous on this statute are terms of (e). part aWhen statute is a of a face, light ordinary principles their or are, larger asAct these statutes the start interpretation, ‘judicial then statutory ing point ascertaining legislative intent complete,’ Rubin v. United is to look to other sections of the Act inquiry is 698, States, 424, [101 pari materia with the statute under re (1981); there is no need 66 L.Ed.2d 701] States, Erlenbaugh v. view. legislative history nor to look to to consult 239, 244-47, 477, 480-82, U.S. 93 S.Ct. applied lenity’ con the ‘rule (1972).8 793(d) L.Ed.2d 446 Section was a criminal struing ambiguous statutes.”7 1917;9 part Espionage of the Act of sec only from in those departed This rule is 793, however, is but one section of the circumstances,” Bur “exceptional rare and 1917; Espionage equally Act of as im — W.E, lington Northern R. Co. B.M. portant a section the Act was section 1860, U.S.-, 1841, 95 L.Ed.2d 107 S.Ct. Act, 794. That with its inclusion of (1987), reading “a literal where Department [the] submitted produce result statute ‘demonstra- Congress. [will] Justice to had been bly at odds the intentions of its draft- Department super drafted in under the ” Locke, ers,’ United States v. Attorney vision Assistant General Warren,10 85 L.Ed.2d 64 respected authority on Charles “ (1985), acceptance or of that ‘where of one of constitutional law author distinguished meaning would lead to absurd results ... his most exhaustive purpose Supreme the obvious tories of the of the United would thwart Court Pipeline statute,”’ Trans Alaska Rate States when published.11 purpose Bass, Therefore, refer, we 7. See also United States v. 404 U.S. at Act in the revision of 1950. Act, leniency,” supra, speaking original on "the rule of 92 S.Ct. at when in terms *8 793(d) general Note 6. of section but the same consider- (e) apply intended to ations will since was Erlenbaugh singularly like this case. The 8. is (d) by criminalizing supplement retention. construing a statute within an Act Court was sought spectrum "a to cover broad in 50 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1218 describes 10. Rabban ” activity,’ by attacking to do and 'unlawful the "chief author" of the Act. Warren as "activity” aspects by separate of such various Espionage provisions does. much as Act Warren, History Supreme 11. The Court in the vols., Little, Brown, States, original (e) 1923. the United 9. In the Act of was subsection included; Rehnquist cites this work in that subsection was added to the Chief Justice “punish[ment] was to down the Act into be by drafter break or by imprison- death sections, very specific prescribing separate ment for any years term of or for life” crimes, provid and offenses or and (Italics distinct added). punishment for viola- ing punishments varying for conviction un 793(d) tion of section is considerably more dependent der each section on the serious A $10,000 lenient: fine of “not more than purpose ness This of each the offenses. imprisoned or not more years, than ten recognized us in by the Act was Boeck short, both.” In section 794 covers “classic States, enhaupt v. F.2d 28 spying”; 793(d) (e) sections cover a (4th Cir.1968), denied, 393 U.S. cert. much lesser offense than of “spying” that (1968) 21 L.Ed.2d 177 and we and extends to disclosure to any person upheld power in that case of the Con “not entitled to receive” the information. gress Espionage so to break down Act that, It follows considered in connection sections, separate with and distinct cover with purposes structure and ing activities, separate and saying: distinct Espionage Act aas whole and with other power We do not doubt author- sections of pari it, the Act in materia with ity Congress break sepa- down into 793(d) section was not apply intended to aspects espio- rate offenses various narrowly “spying” but was intended to nage activity separate and to make each apply to disclosure of the secret defense aspect punishable provided separately material to anyone “not to re- entitled in 18 U.S.C. 793 18 U.S.C. 794. § § it, ceive” whereas section 794 was apply quotation It is from obvious narrowly spying. to classic from Boeckenhaupt that we that case this, Beyond legislative itself record concluded that sections were unmistakably 793(d) shows that section separate intended to and did cover apply was intended to simply disclosure offenses, separate distinct with distinct anyone “not entitled to receive” national punishment provided for each offense. specifically defense information and was therefore, important, to ascertain the agent not restricted to disclosure to “an essential element in each section which foreign Thus, government.” ... a] [of separate made it and distinct from the oth Espionage when the Act was submitted to er. Both statutes dealt in common with the Senate Senator Overman behalf national defense materials and both stat Judiciary of the Senate he was Committee utes define the national interest materials queried language on the in what was later substantially covered them in the same 793(d) identifying codified as section language. prohibit Both disclosure. The person to whom disclosure secret nation- two statutes differ—and this is the critical prohibited by al defense information was point analyzing to note in the two stat section; is, that asked to inter- person utes—in their identification of pret meaning of phrase to “one not prohibited. whom disclosure is In sec His entitled receive it” in the statute. tion party to whom disclosure is (i.e., response was: “That entitled prohibited under criminal sanction is one receive) against means any statute of “not entitled to receive” the national de against regula- United States or rule or fense material. prohibits Section 794 dis (later Justice) prescribed.”12 Senator “agent foreign closure to an ... a] [of Sutherland, Judiciary government....” also a member of Manifestly, section 794 Committee, time “the is a far more observed serious offense than section 793(d); phrase nothing 'lawfully act entitled’ means spying”; it covers the of “classic and, seriousness, nothing partic- more and less than that the because it autho forbidden, punishment rizes a far more ular must serious information have been than provided 793(d). Congress; be- necessarily section section not act of punishment provided military dealing matters the stated to cause bibliography publication, Cong.Rec. in his recent Su- *9 Court, (Wm. Morrow, 1987). preme 1066 13 powers.” very great themselves, has President As so statutes to the of structure 793(d) explained accepted section was the Act of which the sections part, were a interpreta- the time and this the Senate legislative or history, 793(d) sections throughout legislative tion remained (e) may and limited in scope their to process accepted as the definition of the spying,” “classic as the argues. defendant meaning phrase. Later, of the critical As a argument final for narrowing the Congress enacting when was a revision of statutes spying, points defendant Espionage by adding Act in 1950 cer- publicized the fact one case has 793(d) language tain to sections and a new sought prosecute any- Government (e), Judiciary subsection the House Com- one who had disclosed national in- defense mittee, report statute, in a revised formation agent to one who not “an again had occasion to advert to the mean- foreign ... a government” but to one sim- ing of the words “one entitled to receive” ply “not entitled to receive” the informa- secret national defense information. It tion and in case one said: had prosecutorial been dismissed for mis- 1(d) provides [793(d) Section that those ] conduct.16 It describes all the prose- other having possession lawful of the items Espionage cutions under the Act to involve relating to described therein the national delivery agent disclosures or to an of a willfully defense who communicate or foreign government. From this failure communicated, attempt cause to be or prosecution of anyone disclosure to one to an communicate them unauthorized agent foreign not an government, of a person, willfully or who fail to deliver proof defendant find would person demand, them to an authorized government itself had considered the stat- guilty shall a crime.14 utes, language, ap- whatever their clear abundantly leg- It seems clear from this ply solely spying. 793(d) history (e)

islative that sections prosecutions It is true that some were not intended to be appli- restricted in these statutes involved defendants al- spying” cation to “classic were intend- leged acting foreign ed to have been for a anyone criminalize the disclosure to government though many “not entitled to it.” Accordingly, receive of them also con- language 793(d) whether we look to the literal (e) tained counts under sections (1917). Cong.Rec. 13. 54 did That statute not include clas- assumed, provision. (la- sification as Senator Justice) H.R.Rep. Cong., ter 14. Sutherland later No. 81st 1st indicated in the Sess.1949. Act, Obviously the Committee has discussion of blended the later the 1917 that the administra- (e) (d) point. (e) particular authority codified with tion—in Later was President had —the provide by regulation" made a new might subsection. "rule who lawfully "not receive" defense information un- Schmidt, Edgar Espionage 15. der both the as 1911 statute well as under Statutes Information, authority depend Publications Co 1917 statute and did not of Defense (1973), lum.L.Rev. quent refer to the Espionage subse on the section 6 enactment of Act, finally Certainly, elimination from Congress enact per- Act of 1917. if had ed, Act section 6 of the as drafted ceived that the failure enact a classification Department gave This of Justice. section 6 act in the 1917 Act made section a nulli- power censorship (prior President re ty, unlikely Congress it would seem straint) through classification of defense infor in the 1950 revision have reenacted such a de- argue mation. The authors that this action of fective statute. Congress way application in some nullified the update by Edgar For an the article 793(d). of section Schmidt, written after district court trial in agree Morison, Schmidt, validity We do not that the Edgar Curtiss-Wright of section see depended on the enactment of Section 6 Comes Home: Power Executive and National (the censorship provision). It must be remem- Security Secrecy, 21 Harv. C.R.C.L.L.Rev. 349 new; bered that section was not (1986), it was particularly its discussion of “The Mori merely a Case,” restatement of earlier statute enact- pages son to 407. ed in 1911 which criminalized disclosure of "any Russo, knowledge anything document 16. United ... or States v. No. 9373-WMB-CD (C.C.Cal.), "any prosecutorial connected with person national defense” to dismissed miscon Times, May entitled to receive it.” 36 Stat. section duct. New York *10 prosecution apparently only public one Haig and that trial. Agee, v. 453 U.S. prior “spy” this one someone not a has (1981). 101 S.Ct. 69 L.Ed.2d 640 All solely under these been initiated statutes these suggest circumstances that the rarity —a prosecution by prose- that was aborted prosecution under the statutes does not statement, cutorial This misconduct.17 indicate that the statutes were not to be though accurate, strictly misleading. is enforced as written. We any think in only is true that the case Russo case rarity event that of the use of the prosecution in which the based solely was statute prosecution as basis for is at best (d) (e), aon violation sections and but it questionable basis for nullifying the clear say is not correct there have not statute, language of the and we think the other in which been cases the defendant revision of 1950 and its reenactment of 793(d) prosecuted was under sections and 793(d) Congress section demonstrate that (e). Actually, v. Truong United States did not meaningless consider such statute (4th Cir.1981), Hung, Dinh 629 F.2d 908 or intend that the statute and prohibi- its denied, cert. tions were to be abandoned. (1982), 71 L.Ed.2d 296 United States v. legisla- We therefore conclude that the (7th Kampiles, Cir.1979), 609 F.2d 1233 history justify tive does not rewriting (9th 594 F.2d 1246 Boyce, United States v. of this to nullify plain statute so as Cir.1979) Smith, and United States by language limiting applica- the statutes’ (S.D.Va.1984), F.Supp. 424 vacated and re spy, tion if “classic” even we should grounds, manded other F.2d 1102 opinion, assume—in our improperly—that (4th instance, Cir.1985), sep all included appropriate it was legislative to look to covering arate counts violations of sections history in order application to ascertain the (d) (e) and and the defendant was convicted plain language literal of sections under these Practically counts. all these 793(d) (e). Nor do we find of course, included, of cases counts under sec relevance whether there have been few 794, too, and the defendants were con prosecutions under these sections. impor victed under these But counts. 793(d) (e) tant fact is that sections are legislative similarly record is silent not treated as obsolete sections but have any Congressional enacting intent prosecution been the basis a number 793(d) (e) exempt sections from its Moreover, of cases. Congress has not application the transmittal of secret mili- treated these statutes as obsolete. In the tary information a defendant revision, strengthened it section 793 press representative press. or a Ac- adding (e) and, strengthened, so reen tually, there was little no discussion of acted the section. legislative the First in the Amendment directly relating record to sections unquestionably prose- It is true that the (e) was, in this connection. There generally Espionage Act, cutions under the true, discussion the First Amendment just 793(d), and not those under section during Espionage the enactment of the Act great. been have not This is understanda- whole, Rabban, of 1917 as a Professor ble. Violations under the Act easi- carefully legislative who reviewed ly established. The violators act with the record, concluded that the focus of such of concealing intention their They conduct. provision discussion was on of the bill try, case, as the defendant did in this “[a] Moreover, that would have allowed the President to any prosecu- leave few trails. press congressional every tion under the Act censor the dominated pose will case problems eventually difficult eliminated balancing the need for discussion possible “[ijroni- damage the conference committee” but that a require by way ultimately trial will bill cally, of the dis- the section provided prosecu- closure of vital national interest secrets in the basis for most of press Duty 17. Freedom of the issues arise when Know and the to Withhold: The Case of governmental secrecy Pentagon Papers, the enforcement of im- 120 U.Pa.L.Rev. Henkin, pacts Right itself. *11 793(d), tracing included section subsec of the theft to

tions him. doWe not [which (e) being until not added the 1950 think that the First Amendment asy- offers any hardly received attention” in lum under circumstances, revision] those proven, if Rabban, Emergence The discussion. that merely the because transmittal towas a Doctrine, First Amendment Modern representative press. the This conclu- 1205, (1983). leg What U.Chi.L.Rev. sion in our view follows from the decision 793(d) section as there discussion of islative in Hayes, Branzburg v. 408 U.S. meaning phrase of the was related S.Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d 626 receive it” to “one not entitled In Branzburg, reporter a news had writ- respecting the “information term ten, paper and his had published, an article these We deal with discussions defense.” describing activity by certain criminal two disposition in later our consideration of by individuals reporter witnessed the under vagueness and the defendant’s overbreadth pledge by him that he protect the however, is, claims. There no evidence identity of grand the two offenders. A legislative whatsoever the record that jury investigating the activity criminal sub- Congress exempt intended from the the poenaed reporter the in order to examine coverage of section national defense him identity on the of the two individuals governmental employee, information and on their activity. sought criminal He purloined had particularly by one who from process to avoid ground the the that it Department the files of the such informa would be a violation his First Amend- tion, simply because he transmitted it to a ment right news-gathering require representative press. him expose identify or his informants. But, point though anything he cannot He him deny protection said to in this re- legislative in the record which intimates gard difficult, extremely it would make if Congress exempt intended to “leaks to impossible, for him gather news. it, press,” the as the defendant describes Supreme and, plea, denied Court argues that, exemption unless doing, the course of so made rul- certain read into these sections will run afoul ings pertinent which are in this connection. Actually of the First Amendment. we do Court, opinion Justice White’s perceive any rights First Amendment case, 691-92, said at 2661- implicated certainly here. This is no 62: prior restraint case such as New York It would be frivolous to no assert —and States, Times v. United one does in these cases—that the First (1971), 29 L.Ed.2d and Unit- Amendment, securing in the interest of Inc., Progressive, ed States v. F.Supp. otherwise, news or confers a license on (W.D.Wis.1979). F.Supp. and 486 either reporter or his news sources prosecution statute, ais of which Although violate criminal valid laws. defendant, who, an employee as in the stealing private wiretap- documents intelligence the military service of estab- ping provide could newsworthy informa- lishment, expressly had been noticed of his tion, reporter neither nor is im- source obligations by the terms his letter of conduct, mune from conviction for such Navy, agreement being prose- with the impact whatever the on the flow of news. purloining cuted for from the immune, Neither is on First Amendment Navy files of the national defense materi- grounds, testifying against from oth- “Intelligence clearly als marked as Infor- er, grand jury before the or at a and for criminal transmitting mation” and “Secret” trial. The Amendment does not so that material to “one not entitled reach to receive premises far as to it.” And the override interest of pros- its establishing public ensuring reporter ecution on that he that neither did this knowingly “wilfully” invading rights nor other as source is evidenced sought reprehensible the manner in through which he conduct conceal citizens persons. “Secret” other character information forbidden to all To assert and the efforts he taken any contrary proposition had to thwart it, since

“is to answer it involves in Thus right Marchetti retains the speak the contention very statement and write opera- about CIA and its freedom of the is the freedom to tions, and to criticize other wrong impunity implies do may, citizen he may not disclose clas- right to frustrate and defeat sified information obtained him dur- discharge governmental those ing the employment course of his upon performance duties of which already is not domain. all, including the freedom of *12 in Subsequently Snepp States, v. United press, the depends.... suffices to 507, 508, 444 U.S. 763, 764, 100 S.Ct. 62 that, right say complete is however the (1980), which, L.Ed.2d 704 another case public things to state and though directly not on point, is them, relevant right, that every discuss as other Supreme here. There the right enjoyed society, in human is Court sub reviewed ject separate right the restraints which of the United States to enforce an right wrong-doing.” from Toledo agreement by a former employee, CIA that States, Newspaper v.Co. United 247 he “publish would not ... information 402, 419-20 [38 relating or material Agency, to the its ac- (1918) L.Ed. 1186 ].18 specific prior tivities ... without approval Marchetti, v. United States 466 F.2d Agency.” The defendant had violat- (4th Cir., denied, cert. agreement by ed the publishing a book (1972), L.Ed.2d 516 relating with some material to the inCIA it though directly point not as on as Branz- securing prior without CIA approval for burg, regard. is instructive In that publication. Supreme such Court as- case, sought injunc United States an propriety sumed the on restraint prevent tion to a former Central Intelli publication agreement. in this gence Agency employee, who had [CIA] Marchetti, If Branzburg, and Snepp are signed confidentiality agreement a followed, beyond to be it seems controver- divulge naval classified information sy intelligence that a recreant department publishing which he had from access classi employee had who abstracted from the fied CIA information after left he the CIA. files secret infor- The employee contended a such restraint wilfully giv- mation and had transmitted or rights. violated his First Amendment We en toit one “not entitled to it” receive as granting affirmed of the restraint. In case, did the defendant in this enti- so doing, the Court made this statement response tled to employee’s First invoke First Amendment as a Amend ment claim: of thievery. shield immunize his act To (4th Cir.1986). opinion, say his Justice White in did that F.2d a footnote gathering U.S., "news ment if faith, is not without its First page (Branzenburg, Amend- 92 S.Ct. on grand protections, jury investigations and 2671), page expressed dis- Justice Powell his good or instituted conducted other than in agreement dissenting opinion’s ruling pose wholly for would different issues it, which, court under viewed trial First resolution under the U.S. Amendment.” 408 permitted protect would be "to newsmen from And, 92 S.Ct.at 2670. his concur- improper prejudicial questioning" de- or and ring opinion, emphasize Justice Powell wrote to ruling, heavily applied, if clared ruling be what he conceived to He of the Court. in the subordinate "the essential societal interest right said newsmen had a constitutional detection and a of crime” and "defeat protected to be down a from harassment and he laid balancing” fair interest. procedure steps in three for determin- here, None these comments is relevant since ing requiring expose whether newsman right informer, clearly it is the an who had his source constituted harassment. Under the law, a news- violated valid criminal not a test, right journalist require expose precisely in issue. is in here is man What issue his source is one ing determined consider- quoted in the lan- what Justice White declared guage, "(1) relevant, (2) whether the information Amendment, ¿a, in the that the First whether the information can be obtained otherwise, securing means, (3) news or does not interest alternative whether there is reporter compelling "confer license either the interest the information." See Co.,Inc., Broadcasting criminal Larouche National news source to violate valid laws.”

permit though the thief thus to misuse the Amend- Even the statutes are not to be prostitute salutary strictly ment spying would be confined to “classic” purposes though they of the First Amendment. Sec- implicit even contain no excep- 793(d) (e) unquestionably crimi- tions tion in favor of transmittal of secret de- by delinquent govern- press, nalize such conduct fense material to the the defendant and, applied employee argues mental when to a themselves, the statutes are position constitutionally defendant of the defendant infirm vagueness here, right prosecutions there is no First Amendment overbreadth and the implicated. necessary We, And therefore, it is not to read them should stricken. (e) exception proceed into sections to address these attacks on the given defense constitutionality secret materials of the statutes. press, in order to sustain the constitutional- vagueness admittedly While and over- clear, ity of such statutes. It is as we have breadth are concepts, related constitutional said, Congress any- did not indicate separate doctrines, and distinct legislative history where that it in- subject application to different standards *13 exempt coverage from tended and pur- intended to achieve different 793(d) who, (e) section one after steal- poses.19 vagueness doctrine is rooted material, ing defense secret “wil- process principles in due basically and is fully” representative delivered it to a clarity directed at lack of sufficient press. statute;20 precision overbreadth, in the hand, the other would invalidate a statute summary, we conclude that there “infringe[s] expression when to a de- legislative is no in the basis record for gree greater justified by legit- than finding Congress that intended to limit the governmental imate need” which is the val- 793(d) applicability (e) of sections purpose id of the statute.21 Because of the spying” exempt “classic or to transmittal concepts, differences in the two we discuss by governmental employee, a who entrust separately disposing them of the defend- material, ed with secret national defense argument, beginning ant’s with the defend- had in violation of the rules of his intelli vagueness ant’s claim of in sections unit, gence press. leaked to the Nor do we (e) applied as to him. any authority proposition find for the that Congress validly prohibit could not It repeatedly has been stated that a stat- government employee having possession requires ute which “either forbids or military intelligence doing vague secret material from of an act in so terms that men transmitting necessarily that material to “one not enti of common must it,” tled recipient guess meaning to receive whether that at its and differ as to its not, infringing application, was the without violates the first essential of employee’s rights process Connolly the First due of law.” v. General Co., 391, Branzburg definitely supra, Amendment. is 269 Construction U.S. contrary. 127; Goquen, 46 S.Ct. Smith v. 415 U.S. "chilling protected speech 19.The difference in the two doctrines was stat- risks of effect” to ed Flipside, Justice invalidity. Marshall in Estates v. produces rulings of facial But Hoffman 489, Estates, 497, 455 U.S. 102 quite specific i.e., a statute can be not Hoffman — 1186, 1192, (1982): S.Ct. 71 L.Ed.2d 362 "vague” yet vague- overbroad. The be —and constitutionally A law that does not reach challenge ultimately proce- ness rests on the protected conduct and therefore satisfies process adequate requirement dural due may overbreadth test lenged nevertheless be chal- notice, challenge though special it is a unduly vague, on its face as in viola- bite in the First Amendment area. process. tion of due also, Gunther, Law, p. See G. Constitutional 385, Co., Connally 20. v. Const. General 1156, (Foundation Press, 1985): 11th ed. 391, 126, 127, (1926). 46 S.Ct. 70 L.Ed. 322 challenge An "overbreadth" should "vagueness,” confused with one based on Redish, Court, Burger The Warren Court though challenger will often assert both Doctrine, the First Overbreadth Amendment grounds invalidity. unconstitutionally An (1984). 78 Nw.U.L.Rev. 1034 statute, one, vague like overbroad creates 572-73, 1242, 1246-47, however, S.Ct. have the same require- scienter Levy, (1974); Parker v. (f)(2). L.Ed.2d ment as They prescribe subsection 2559, 41 L.Ed. U.S. prohibited that activity must be “wil- (1974). sufficient, though, is 2d judge ful.” The district “wilfully” defined satisfy requirements of “reasonable cer- jury instructions as follows: tainty,” prohibitions that “the while [of All four of these I counts as satisfy those intent on statute] referred to in my description them finding cost, they any fault at out in set them you wilfully. used the word An ordinary person terms exercising wilfully act done if it is done voluntar- ordinary sufficiently common sense can un- ily and intentionally and with spe- with, derstand and comply without sacrifice intent something do cific they] to the interest... will not [and law say, That is to a with bad forbids. vague, though be struck down as even mar- purpose disobey either to or to dis- ginal put cases could where doubts regard the law. With respect Kennedy, Arnett might arise.” charged offenses that are in the indict- 134, 159, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 ment specific proved intent must be be- And, event, it is settled any yond a reasonable doubt before a defend- beyond controversy if one not of intent, ant can Specific be convicted. “entrapped” rare innocents one suggests, requires term more than a clearly applies, irrespec- whom the statute general intent engage a certain vagueness, tive claims he has no conduct. To specific establish intent the challenge standing successfully the stat- prove must that the defend- charged vague- ute under which he is *14 knowingly ant did an which the act law Levy, supra, ness. Parker v. at government’s forbids. It is the burden Finally, 2561. the statute present affirmative evidence of the vague- must be in entirety read its and all required existence of the unlawful intent. may ness judicial be corrected construc- Again, determining in whether or not the sweep tion which the the narrows stat- you may intent existed look all the range ute within the of reasonable certain- facts and the circumstances involved in ty. (Italics added) the case. Applying these standards for mea Moreover, instructions, in his the district suring vagueness, a statute for we turn to judge gave also this definition of “national specific provisions the of sections defense”: (e) which the defendant would find term, And that the term national de- vague. unconstitutionally He identifies fense, directly includes all matters that says two terms in the statutes which he are may reasonably or be connected with the vague prohibition. within the constitution against the defense of United States first phrase, “relating The of these is the military enemies. It refers the the national defense.” The defendant con and naval establishments and the related phrase cedes that this was assailed as un preparedness. activities national To constitutionally vague in United States v. prove photo- that the documents or Dedeyan, (4th the Cir.1978), 584 F.2d graphs relate to national defense there prosecution 793(f)(2). under section In re things government are two the contention, must sponding to that we stated in First, Dedeyan prove. prove it must that the dis- term “relating photographs po- closure of the would be “vague national defense” was tentially damaging to the States constitutional sense.” The United defendant distinguish might Dedeyan enemy would or useful to an this case from be prosecution govern- Secondly, because the there United States. was under (f)(2) prove subsection which contains a scienter ment must that the documents or requirement.22 (d) (e), closely Subsections photographs are held Appellant’s brief at 31. posed “potentially made sel

[they] damag- ... have not been issue as general public.23 not available to ing” and it would not seem that the defend- may complain ant because the now district instructions, Combining the one on the two judge adopted qualifying phrase defining and the one wilfulness developing defense, used his counsel judge gave in this case the district vagueness on this record for precisely the instruction submission issue to the approved Moreover, said, that we States v. jury. issue United as we have this ex- Truong Hung, supra, Dinh 629 F.2d at language ap- act in this same context was 919.24 defendant, proved by Dedeyan. us in however, however, would dismiss this fact would, argue

The defendant Dedeyan espionage comment that was an judge’s jury district instructions any possibility of find removed case and that instructions which we application of the stat- vagueness permissible espionage in an case “are not utes, vagueness actually imparted into the sufficient a leak case where First national defense” and phrases “related to weighed Amendment interests must be argument His on the term “wilfulness.” supports argument the balance.” He defense” is directed at “related to national with a citation to a law review article in 9 that, in judge’s instruction or- the district Pub.Order, (1982), Yale J.World at 87 “prove photo- that the documents or der which he contends states that “no First graphs” herein involved “related to nation- espi- Amendment values are at stake” in an defense,” prove must al however, onage argument, case. This photographs “the disclosure of the overlooks the fact that the to the United potentially damaging the defendant was not under section 794 of might enemy be useful to the States 793(f)(2), the Act but was under section the United States.” He attacks use of very section related sections damaging,” phrase “potentially itali- charged. which the defendant in this case indefinite; cized as above as too he con- and, We find no error in the instruction tends the word “actual” should have been particularly “poten- in its use of the word used, “potentially.” phrase “po- tially” in the district court’s instruction. tentially damaging” was used Justice goes point The second of the defendant opinion in concurring in his White *15 “wilfully” in to the definition of as included Times, supra, v. York 403 U.S. States New jury the district court’s instructions. The 740, 2154, Dedeyan 91 and in S.Ct. court, in defendant asserts that the district judge in his the district used the term regard, in this had said that instructions instructions, expressly an instruction we motives, “[p]roof or of the most laudable this, approved appeal.25 Beyond when on all, any motive at is irrelevant under both the and defense counsel brief, gives statute.” In his three examining on the issue were witnesses support in of his contention record citations photographs in whether the and documents point. Two of these citations are on “damaging issue in this case were to the opinion extracted from the district court’s States,” they “po- phrase United used the Thus, on the defendant’s motion to dismiss the damaging.” tentially as demonstrat- argument his indictment herein. In the way they presented ed which defendant, counsel, motion, through question jury, to the the defendant’s coun- did, saying pp. finding a J.A. at that it that "there is ‘rea- 23. 1123-24. danger’ informa- sonable that revelation of the 51, Mitchell, Ellsberg 24. See also v. 709 F.2d 59 sophis- question tion in would either enable a- denied, 1038, (D.C.Cir.1983) cert. 465 U.S. 104 analyst gain insights nation’s ticated into the 1316, (1984), S.Ct. 79 L.Ed.2d 712 in which the capabilities intelligence-gathering methods and dealing issue arose whether certain material disrupt diplomatic with for- or would relations intelligence operations with met the test of "re eign governments.” lating to national defense" and whether as such protected it was as a The state secret. district F.2d at 39. 25.584 and, appeal, court had found it did the Court material, Appeals reviewed in camera the

1073 urged adopt defini language the district court to Supreme Court in Hartzel v. Hartzel “wilfully” tion of as used States, 680, 686, summary, we find no basis this case 1236, 1238, That 88 L.Ed. for the invalidation of the statutes for ei- “pure speech” a case one and not vagueness ther or or overbreadth for void- was “in shadow of First Amend ing the 793(d) defendant’s conviction under ment” here. The defendant in that as case (e). published had written and a scurrilous Moreover, the defendant in this case pamphlet attacking our allies in World War dealing knew that he was with national peace II favoring Germany with “foreign defense material which a govern order to eliminate war “between whites.” in possession ment of ... would be in a Espionage He was indicted under the Act position itself, use either for in follow “wilfully” attempting for to “cause insub ing the agents movements of the reported ordination, disloyalty, mutiny or refusal of upon, or upon as country’s check duty, military in the or naval forces efficiency ferreting foreign out espio Supreme United States....” Court States, Gorin v. United nage.” found the statute under which the defend L.Ed.2d ant required specific was indicted “a intent (1941). He experienced was an purpose” evil violate statute. officer. hadHe been instructed on all the said: “That [wilfully], word when viewed in regulations concerning security of se penal highly context of a statute re cret national defense materials. See Unit stricting of expression, freedom must be ed Jolliff, States v. F.Supp. deliberately taken to mean Wilson, (D.Md.1981); United States purpose specific proscribed to do the acts F.Supp. (S.D.N.Y.1983). 1426-27 by Congress.” 322 U.S. at 64 S.Ct. at requirement With the scienter sections (Italics added) district court (e), bulwarked with the defend “wilfully” this case construed the language own expertise govern ant’s in the field require Hartzel prohibited “that the secrecy intelligence operations, mental deliberately act be specific done and with a language statutes, “relating

purpose to do proscribed.” that which was security” the national was not unconstitu That the manner in which Hart- precisely tionally vague applied to this defendant zel said the instruction should given true, especially and this is the trial since precise was the instruction that was proper instructions, judge, under left given in this case. have, jury, as he should the determina fact, As a matter of the instruction as tion whether the materials involved met the given language, does not include the “no test defense material or information showing of purpose required evil did. Gorin v. jury found *16 States, statute,” language, “proof this the or of United supra, 32, 312 61 U.S. at motives, 436, 429, (“The the most or question laudable motive at S.Ct. 85 L.Ed. 488 all, statute;”26 is irrelevant under the of the connection of the information with given essentially question instruction as conformed is of be national defense a fact to interesting, though, showing necessary of ele- House Com- No intent as an mittee, 793(d) Report offense, in its on section in provided con- possessor ment of the nection with the 1950 revision of the Act used has reason to material com- believe 647, language (H.R.Rep. Cong., this No. 81st 1st be to of municated could used the detriment (1949), Sess. at 3-4: advantage States or to the of a the United [793(d)] 1(d) provides Subsection having that those foreign requirement absence of a nation. The possession lawful of the items de- believed, justified, intent is it is in contrast for relating scribed therein to the national de- express requirement of intent in subsec- to willfully fense who communicate or cause to 1(b) 1(c), 1(a), fact in of tions view the communicated, attempt be or to communicate persons pre- deals that subsection person, them to an unauthorized or who will- sumably relationship closer the Govern- in fully fail deliver them to an authorized betray. ment which seek demand, person guilty shall crime. 1074 negligence upon Reagan President by jury as mid-1982. Essen-

determined determined”); undisputed tially, facts is may this Order information (9th F.2d 1251 Boyce, v. 594 States reasonably be classified if “its disclosure Cir.1979); Note, Constitutionality expected damage could be to cause to the Espionage Act and Its Section security_[and] national harms to na- Leaks, Application Wayne to Press security” impairment tional include of de- (1986). Further, 205, 214-17 L.Rev. capabilities, fense disclosure of intelli- alleged in the materials involved here gence gathering techniques capabili- proved at trial to be indictment and were ties, disruption diplomatic rela- plainly marked and that classifica- “Secret” tions with other countries. is said in the Order to be Classification Tamanaha, A Critical Review the Clas- information, properly “applied to the unau- Act, Procedures sified Information AmJ.Crim. Law thorized disclosure of which could reason- (1986). 284-85 damage ably expected to cause serious Order, Under this Executive the classifi- security.”27 That definition to the national “Secret,” given cation which was the one may in re- of the material be considered prosecu- all the information involved viewing constitutionality the statute un- tion, information, knowledge applied der which a defendant with the was “be security classification that the defendant unauthorized disclosure of which reason- Walker, charged. had is United States v. ably expected to could be cause serious Cir.1986). (4th 796 F.2d We are thus damage security.” Exec. language statutory convinced that the “re- 12,356, (1982), Order No. 3 C.F.R. 166 re- defense,” lating applied to the national printed in 50 U.S.C. 401 note § defendant, constitutionally is not to the Regulations Those were well known to the prior reviewing vague under our decisions agreed writing defendant he had section 793. by The defendant abide them. worked where, vaulted area as the district court The defendant would also indict the observed, employees “even other of NISC phrase vague. to receive” as “entitled enter,” were not allowed to much less to phrase vague finds this because defendant read or transmit materials be- exactly spell it does not out who “re However, ing Certainly phrase any omis reviewed therein. ceive” such material. supplied sion in the statute is clarified and it” “not authorized receive was well government’s system him, classification understood the defendant. As to provided App. 1 under 18 U.S.C. for the vague in the statute was not its reference protection security of the national “one not to receive it.” entitled judge so ruled.28 And courts have district Girard, 601 F.2d 69 United States v. recognized legitimacy looking (2d Cir.1979), denied, cert. system fleshing out the classification 62 L.Ed.2d 96 which there phrases question that in here. such as We under 18 U.S.C. § (629 specifically F.2d at Truong did involving a or disclosure to an outsider sale 919) Casey, and the court in McGehee (DEA) confidential law enforcement 1137, 1143-44(D.C.Cir.1983) 718 F.2d did it. records, defendant raised a similar ob As Professor Tamanaha said: jection to that asserted the defendant [sjince primary method of classi- regard. found neither The court fying through information has been Ex- vagueness nor in the statute. overbreadth Order. The current Order on ecutive *17 12,356, agree reasoning of the We with this Gir-

classification No. 3 [Exec.Order (1982) court, reasoning lies at the promulgated by C.F.R. ard which also 166] 1, Act, 12,356, (1982), U.S.C.App. see Procedures 18 27. Exec. Order No. 3 C.F.R. 166 mation (1982). Note, reprinted Security 50 U.S.C. 401 note Civil § Interest and The National 1130, 1198, Liberties, seq. et 85 Harv.L.Rev. statutory 28. For a discussion of the and consti- (1972). authority system for the tutional classification prior to the enactment of the Classified Infor- 1075 in Casey, v. when limiting heart of the decision McGehee construction could save the (D.C.Cir.1983), 1137 and was rule defects,” 718 F.2d from citing constitutional (629 adopted by Truong Pfister, us F.2d at 919 479, 491, Dombrowski v. 380 U.S. 10) already 1116, 1123, n. 85 as we observed. S.Ct. 14 (1965), 22 L.Ed.2d Casey, dealing v. court was v. Hampshire, 569, McGehee Cox New 312 U.S. 762, vagueness phrase with a 61 (1941). claim S.Ct. 85 L.Ed. 1049 More over, security.” It term “national found a distinction must be made by could be fleshed out reference to the connection between regu statutes which very Classification look Order to we late “conduct in the shadow First clarifying the term “entitled to receive.” regulate Amendment” and those which pure 718 F.2d at 1143-44. We hold speech. therefore The rule makes a distinction words “entitled to receive” in the speech “where conduct and merely not is statute in this case can context, be limited involved.” In the conduct “over- by clarified Regulations Classification scrutiny breadth has generally been some and, clarified, as so limited and rigid are not what less the context of statutes vague. Jolliff, regulating United v. 548 States conduct in the shadow F.Supp. 229, (D.C.Md.1981); Amendment,” 230 First and in such a case “the Wilson, 1422, F.Supp. States v. 571 1426- overbreadth of only a statute must not be (S.D.N.Y.1983); L.Rev., Wayne real, 27 well, See su but substantial as judged in rela pra at 218. tion to the plainly legitimate statute’s sweep.” Oklahoma, Broadrick v. 413 U.S. Turning overbreadth, to the claim of 615, at at 93 S.Ct. 2918. To be “substan that, we note at the outset unlike the situa context, tial” in that the statute must reach presented claim,29 vagueness impermissible “a ap substantial number of overbreadth “is exception doctrine an plications....” Ferber, New York v. 458 practice,” our traditional rules Broad 771, U.S. at 102 S.Ct. at 3362.30 601, Oklahoma, v. rick 413 S.Ct. U.S. 2908, authority scope An L.Ed.2d 830 and has been doctrine recognized outside the has formulated a limited context of statement of what he the First Amendment. United v. characterizes as the three States “fundamental — Salerno, -, -, U.S. 107 S.Ct. circumstances” under which the doctrine 2095, 2100, (1987); applied L.Ed.2d discussing after the fore- Martin, 18, going Schall v. n. “(1) rules. These are: circumstances governmental 2412 n. sought 81 L.Ed.2d 207 when ‘the interest (1984); Ferber, insubstantial, New York implemented v. is too or at 767-74, 3348, 3359-63, 73 L.Ed.2d least insufficient relation to the inhibito- limited, freedoms’; “strong ry So it is medi- effect on first amendment cine,” (2) applied to be “with employed hesitation when the means little bear only resort,” then as a last governmental if the relation asserted inter- est; (3) given narrowing statute cannot be con- and when the means chosen legislature struction to remove the overbreadth. New do in fact relate to a substantial Ferber, supra interest, York v. at governmental 102 S.Ct. at interest Thus, 3361. Casey, F.2d could McGehee be achieved a ‘less drastic means’ 1146, Judge is, “over- Wald held that —that a method less of free invasive analysis Redish, speech breadth deployed should not be interests.” The Warren vague- “upshot” subsequent 29. There is one clear difference between 30. The of Ferber and cases it, it, ness and overbreadth doctrine: "Overbreadth puts mounting Tribe as Professor "is a analysis perceived exception is anas rule ap- burden the individual to show that ordinarily permitted that an individual is not parent protected expression [in inhibition rights litigate parties; vagueness of third highly probable review] statute under in fact Tribe, perceived exception." such an L. Tribe, socially significant.” L. American 12-28, This, however, supra § at 719-20. is not Law, 12-25, supra, § Constitutional application rule invariable but one whose depends on the facts of each case. McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d at 1146. *18 fense materials. It follows that there is no Court, and the First Burger Court Doctrine, in the either overbreadth two terms as Amendment Overbreadth 1031, 1035 by narrowed court instruc- NW.U.L.Rev. have been by or as fleshed out the Classification are ex- these statutes Unquestionably, Act. govern- important vital pressions of an a direct relation and have mental interest here, are, interests involved m. therefore, the first and second re- without Conviction application of the over- of Defendant quirement for the section 641 plain It is thus doctrine. breadth posited by Profes- circumstances

first two appealed also The defendant has met; “circumstanc- sor Redish are under 18 U.S.C. 641. That conviction § es,” these statutes could be under which case, statute, imposes as it relates to this overbreadth, would be that the voided anyone penalties criminal who “embez governmental interest reflected substantial steals, zles, purloins knowingly or converts by could achieved means in the statutes another, the use of or without to his use or speech of free interests.” “less invasive sells, conveys disposes any authority, or court, by nar- record, voucher, money, thing It has said that the been or of value statute, may rowing of a constructions any department or of of the United States conformity with bring the statute within agency or thereof....” Count Two requiring applied it be the rule charged indictment herein the defendant speech inter- invasive of free means “less “knowingly wilfully embezzl[ing], with find a The defendant would viola- ests.” convertpng] stealing], purloinpng], and in the fail- tion of the overbreadth doctrine another,” and did his use and the use of judicial rul- the statute or ure of either “thing[s] knowingly sell of value limiting ings construing and the statute photographs, each ... three United States employ “a less invasive of free method ‘Secret,’ photographs being classified said speech represented interests” than is Sup Intelligence Naval property defense” and “one not enti- terms “national greater having a value port Center tled to far as overbreadth receive.” So similarly In Count Four he was than $100. defense” con- the term “national selling “portions charged stealing and cerned, reasonably it was narrowed Intelligence Support Center of Two Naval to confine district court its instructions Wires,” Weekly classified “Secret” national defense to matters under the stat- Intelligence Support of the Naval property “directly may reasonably ute which or supporting cite as Both counts Center. defense of the United connected with the ample authority 18 641. At trial U.S.C. § States,” the of which “would be disclosure sustaining the was established evidence potentially damaging to the United States charges. enemy of the might be useful to an section noted at the outset that It will be “closely United States” and which had been indict- these counts of the on which “not government held” and was rest, is not a disclosure statute ment public.” This nar- general available to (e); it is a criminal as section de- rowing the definition of “national covering the theft of statute removed fense” information or material terms with It is written in broad property. objection to the any legitimate overbreadth sweep broadly clear intent to phrase “to one not entitled term. recognized in Morissette Supreme Court legislative in the his- receive” was defined States, “not autho- tory of the statute to mean one (1952): L.Ed. 288 receive,” already rized to as we have ob- of the lar- has concerned codifiers What served, “not authorized to receive” was gaps or crevices Act, ceny type offense is by the clearly covered Classification particular crimes of this separated referred, already because of we have es- guilty men have general class and national de- its classification as “Secret” *19 1077 caped through give The books but in breaches. order to it to for drawing fine public a surfeit of cases contain dissemination and information. He slightly different distinctions between claims criminalize his conduct under may one circumstances which ob- section 641 would be to invade his first wrongful advantages from another’s tain rights. amendment The mere fact that one reach property. The codifiers wanted to has stolen a document in order may that he all such instances. it press, deliver money whether for personal gain, or for other not will immun- the Court Morissette said as Manifestly, responsibility ize him from for his criminal simply the statute was not intended to cov- act. To use the first amendment for such a “larceny” er and “embezzlement” as those purpose would be to convert the first terms were understood at common law a amendment into warrant for apply thievery. was also to “acts which shade into Supreme As the which, Court strictly those crimes but con- made clear in most 665, Branzburg, 408 U.S. sidered, 2646, might not be found to fit their S.Ct. 269, 28, may First fixed definitions.” 342 n. Amendment not U.S. at be used for such 253, Following purpose, 28. sordid analy- gov- 72 S.Ct. at n. either enable the sis, Judge Truong employee ernmental Winter wrote that to excuse his act of him, not or Snepp section 641 was to be confined theft to excuse as Marchetti, application to “the technical of definition from his obligation. contractual tort of conversion.” 629 F.2d at 924. Actually, may it parenthetically noted Post, though The amicus Washington ar- government contends, and the gues that the statute has “as an essential record affords substantial sup- evidence in permanent depri- element a or substantial port contention, of such that the defendant interest,”31 property vation of identifiable by public this case was fired for zeal property right by and since the asserted debate into his larceny govern- acts of government possessory relates to “a property; using ment he was fruits right proper- to information or intellectual ingratiate his theft himself with one 42, Id. ty,” appli- section 641 is without seeking from whom he was employment. pure Whether “information” con- cation. by can said that was motivated not property subject stitutes be the patriotism by and the interest but protection 641, of statutory under section self-interest. largely matter which has been clarified The defendant’s reference to Pearson v. Carpenter v. United Dodd, recent case (D.C.Cir.1969), cert. 410 F.2d — States, 316, -, U.S. 108 S.Ct. 98 denied, 23 L.Ed. (November Cr.L.Rep. L.Ed. (1969), Dowling v. United 2d 465 and to 16, 1987), not, however, involved here. States, dealing with specific, identifiable We (1985) misplaced. L.Ed.2d 152 Those tangible property, qualify which will copying. The cases involved defendant’s for larceny embezzlement under possession in both cases was not disturbed. possible definition of the crime of copying; This ease does not involve photographs reports theft. The depriva case involves the actual theft and clearly illegally were taken stealth tangible tion of its own disposed the defendant to a third We find no property. error in convic gain, party personal monetary both the defendant under section 641. request job. That would seem to represent application a textbook IV. crime set forth in section 641. Evidentiary Objections deny The defendant applica- Defendant

tion of the statute his theft because he says objec- that he Finally, did steal the “for the defendant’s material we review private, illegal enterprises” rulings covert use in dis- evidentiary tions to the Washington Amicus, 31. Brief of al. at Post, et. passing exceptions judge on such judge. contractors. The district prop-

trict acted apprais in mind that “the erly denying borne must be the introduction of such *20 prejudicial and value of probative al the of evidence. 403 is the Rule entrusted to

evidence under judge The district also ruled that judge; of the trial absent discretion sound foreign evidence the of countries circumstances, the Courts of extraordinary exchanged whom the Government intelli not intervene its resolution.” Appeal will 224, gence MacDonald, pos information and also v. 688 F.2d evidence of United States Cir.1982), (4th denied, sible cert. countermeasures the Soviets 227-28 had tak 726, 74 L.Ed.2d 951 en to by counter the information derived Moreover, any error admission or exclu them from the disclosure of the materials test: subject sion is to the harmless error question here was inadmissible. There probable it is the error could “whether is no foreign govern contention that by affected the verdict reached the have ment responsible was for the disclosure of particular the particular jury in circum the information which the defendant dis the trial.” stances of United States Further, closed. disclosure of the nations Cir.1981). (4th Davis, F.2d programs with whom we have for the by these standards we find no Measured exchange information would in the judge’s error district evi- reversible grave diplomatic create and serious con rulings. dentiary would, more, cerns for us and without that, suggest as a result of disclosure to objection first evidentiary we The any foreign government with whom hadwe directed at the trial court’s consider was exchange intelligence, confidential many evidence refusal to admit on how here had pub information involved become government persons were in un there Moreover, licly require known. government der contracts with a “Secret” produce Government to evidence of coun judge The trial ruled such classification. termeasures the Soviets likely would ruling inadmissible. We find this evidence force the ongo Government to disclose point in this case was not erroneous. ing intelligence operations in a critical area many people could not how might seriously compromise our receipt of intelli qualified for this informa gence-gathering (i.e., capabilities. entitled to receive mate Such evi “Secret” rial); nothing dence point decisive Derek Wood would add little defend great Weekly, damage ant’s defense but could be of the ones to Jane’s Defence intelligence capabilities. to our whom the defendant transmitted the secret We think case, judge correctly in this did material not have “Se district refused to be thus, and were presen cret” clearance diverted into such excursions defendant, knowledge qualified of the tation of no particu evidence which offered gone information. receive the To have lar benefit to defendant’s defense but em into all the evidence number of pose the likelihood grave would ployees in the Government who had “Se injury to interests. our national issuing and the cret” clearances methods sought to The defendant introduce such classification the limitations that testimony newspa into of two evidence attached to the of such were often issuance per reporters employee in that an the Exec particular classification cases would utive Branch of the Government had leaked the record with have cluttered needless “to them information in evidence, Jane’s irrelevant result Defence prosecution. Weekly, involved in this would introduction which have been to testimony was catch their confuse the basic issues in this case. Moreover, identify would their source. A development refuse of such evi allowing extensive, ruling requested them to re likely dence would have been agencies inquiry fuse to answer an source covering various methods alleged on cross-examina assigning clearances with limita disclosure various that, if the agencies judge tion. ruled tions the various and defense The district defendant intended to offer testimo- accepted Jane’s was published ny, given the Government would one publications. of Jane’s Jackson testi- right to require identify witnesses on fied, primarily on the basis the material cross-examination their informant. es- accepted defendant, Jane’s from the sence, sought develop defendant [i.e., had never “seen him the defendant] through testimony of these witnesses suggest anything or do anything that that some of the information which the suggest a lack of commitment to the prosecution was had been based disclosed best interests of the United (App. States” employee in the Executive Branch 693) and that he had never seen him “do but the Government was to be denied the anything against the best interests of the *21 right to the name of the so-called “leaker” 721). United States” (App. at leading In a so that it could test the correctness question against that offended the rule testimony. agree We with the district leading questions, Jackson was asked that, judge if the defendant wished use defendant’s counsel witnesses, he had to afford the Q: [referring And he to the defendant] Government the opportunity to rebut patriot rank, is a of the first you would testimony and the Government could do agree? given this if the name of the infor- A: Yes.33 way mant. There was no other Jackson, though, testified categorically Government could rebut such testimony. company that his did not “knowingly pub- objection Another of the defendant lish classified information” and it did not is directed judge’s at district disallow reason, “because there would be a first of question ance of the on the defendant’s all, why they would have been classified “patriotism, strong navy, his devotion to a and secondly, because we work on the basis propensity and his anything po not to do Finally, of trust.”34 Mr. Jackson was tentially damaging to the United States or asked this clincher: advantageous foreign power.”32 to a He Q. Assuming jury that the in this case identifies in his brief in this court the evi beyond concludes a reasonable doubt dence he wished to introduce in this area. that defendant L. Samuel Morison is Such evidence testimony consisted person photo- who furnished the witnesses, i.e., two that witnesses Jack graphs to Jane’s Weekly Defence —and son, who managing was the director of referring “the photographs,” I’m Publishing Jane’s Company, and Derek 1-A, Government 1-B Exhibits and 1-C Wood, the editor of Jane’s Week Defence assuming jury —and further England; Both ly. lived neither of these beyond a finds reasonable doubt that the relationship witnesses had an intimate with time, photographs were classified personally Morison. Their contacts with assuming jury further finds abbreviated; the defendant were rare and beyond a reasonable doubt that the de- was, however, correspondence there be fendant knew they were classified them tween and Mr. Morison. It was a time, assuming jury further that this correspondence “lot” since the between beyond finds doubt that the reasonable generally Morison and Jane’s was defendant had no authorization to fur- Moore, Captain another employee of notices, photographs nish furnish those testimony basically Jane’s. Their related you, you would that his fur- conclude correspondence to their with the defendant nishing photographs of those was capacity latter’s as their American best interests of the United States? “stringer” whose material was used Objection. MR. MUSE: agreement under an Jane’s between Jane’s the defendant. The I multipart question. A: will defendant was That’s paid for these services as his material try you sent to remember said. If those what Appellant 34.Appendix 32. Brief for at 50. at 722. App. at 671. question not authorized for re- materials in were had “not told the

photographs lease, they were not authorized anything he knew Soviets did not already release, I have to conclude that then know”37 and that such materials did not interest of the acting the best he’s not anything intelligence about “reveal our col- States. capabilities lection not otherwise [was] include, known [which all this testimo- court struck The district Moreover, of course the Soviet Union]”.38 damaging testimony including very ny, expert the defendant offered three witness- conduct as that the defendant’s of Jackson Inslow, Pike and Richelson—on the conclusively proved in the case was it was es— “analysis information con- interests of the United “against the best cerning military Soviet matters.” Even testimony striking all this States.” accepted expert, had Anderson been as an opinion incor- court filed a written district testimony on the matters for which he ruling, opinion pub- porating his proffered by the defendant as an ex- F.Supp. 1009. We are satis- lished in 622 reasoning pert clearly the district court’s witness would have been fied with that, may add point. simply We far decision on cumulative. So conten- court retained the record qualified had the district tion that Anderson as witness *22 including point, on this all the evidence monetary on the value of the information the conduct of opinion Jackson’s final on disclosed, important isit to note two facts: tried, being he the defendant for which was first, the proffered defendant was never as clearly far more the result have been would value; and, second, on witness the de- help- defense than harmful to defendant’s showing any qualifica- fendant made no of circumstances, those it could ful. Under testify expert tion of Anderson to as an striking that the of such testi- not be said accordingly the value of the material. We mony affected the verdict “could have rulings find no reversible error the of particular jury” the this case. reached regard. the district court in this Davis, supra. See United States complains in Finally, the defendant Conclusion says he was the district his brief of what Having all of the defendant’s reviewed qualify the witness court’s refusal claims of error herein and found them with- give expert, Anderson as an entitled to merit, judgment affirm of con- out we opinions Weekly that and the Wires viction of the defendant herein. photographs potentially damag were AFFIRMED. ing, Weekly that the were not worth Wires more than and would have contradict $100 way testimony ed in of some the rebuttal WILKINSON, Judge, Circuit not, This

Hazzard and Kerr.35 was how concurring: ever, ground the defendant at on which Judge opinion. I I concur Russell’s proffered expert trial as an wit Anderson analysis his of the relevant stat- believe time, ness., said that he was At utes, instructions, evidentiary rulings and offering expert on Anderson as an “the use is both careful and correct. analysis of information challenge spe- Morison’s constitutional is matters,” concerning military Soviet notice, cifically phrased in terms of statu- ruling response the district court’s tory vagueness, and overbreadth. Yet proffer was that Anderson would be argument in much of the this case has been “accepted relating as a facts witness Amici, per these cast broader terms. The Wash- matters.”36 And Anderson was Post, al., this case testify opinion ington mitted to et warn affect, background experience perhaps dramatically with his al- that the “will App. 35. Brief at 48-49. 37. at 966. Appendix Appendix

36. 38. at 969.

X081 ter, way government officials participate which fewer still in making it. For way reason, press, deal with the which the press provides the “means news, press gathers reports people receive that free flow way public in which learns about its information and ideas essential to effec- government.” organizations self-government.” tive The news Washing- Saxbe v. Co., raising amici, ton necessarily Post their concerns 2811, 2821, 41 parties. press (1974) (Powell, not as No member of L.Ed.2d 514 J., dissenting). searched, excluded, being subpoenaed, or right as in a typical of access case. Mori- The First Amendment interest in in- son newsgathering as a source raise would formed popular simply debate does not van- rights on press organizations behalf of ish at the invocation of the words “national being, be, are not and probably could not security.” National security public se- prosecuted , espionage under the statute. curity, government security in- from formed criticism. No Perhaps decisions press rights because these are more touching serious than those personal Morison, peace access are not we war; none are more certain every have to affect import weighty thus been asked society. member Elections turn on assortment First Amendment into values foreign conduct of notice, affairs and strategies of vagueness, Morison’s and over- defense, dangers Although breadth claims. this is more secre- tive freight Supreme been well document- lately than the Court has ed. Morison claims he released allowed these I satellite carry, doctrines to photographs revealing construction of purposes assume for this discussion that first Soviet nuclear carrier in order to alert Morison is entitled to raise the serious to the dimensions urged Indeed, of a claims I Soviet amici. buildup. naval Although open this claim is fully express my cannot *23 own view this question, to serious addressing claims, case undeniable effect without these of the public disclosure was to unspoken enhance aspects vagueness aof knowledge projection and interest in the analysis, of overbreadth on directly but power sea Soviet such as that in their revealed own terms. photos. satellite I. way photographs which those released, however, were public threatens a I do not think the First Amendment in- important interest that is no less se-—the insignificant. terests here are Criminal re- of curity government operations. sensitive straints on the disclosure of information world, governments In an ideal would not ability press threaten of the to scruti- keep need to secrets people, from their own report government activity. nize and hinges this world much on events tendency, There exists the in a even consti- place that take outside of view. In- democracy, government tutional telligence gathering is critical to the forma- reports withhold disquieting develop- of policy, tion of sound so and becomes more manage ments and to news a fashion every year with the refinement of technolo- debate, most favorable to itself. Public gy growing of and the threat terrorism. however, is diminished without access prevents Electronic surprise surveillance unfiltered As put facts. James Madison by attacks hostile forces and facilitates in- popular Government, in 1822: “A without ternational peacekeeping and arms control information, popular or a of means ac- diplomatic exchanges efforts. Confidential it, quiring Prologue is but a to a Farce or a are the essence of relations. international or, Tragedy; perhaps 9 Writings both.” of (G. 1910). go James Madison 103 ed. Hunt We None of these activities can forward placed knowledge, have our faith in secrecy. without When the identities ignorance, most, known, agents and for this means re- our are press. may liance Few Americans are be killed. When surveil- our electronic acquainted policy, revealed, with capabilities those who make lance are countermea- “aggres- cases the courts have taken an circumvent them. taken to can be sures role, balancing directly comparing the sive” that confidences fear

When other nations served restraints on the interest bargaining table will exchanged at the newsgath- the interest unhindered with press, our in the become embarrassments ering. terror- helpless. When are left diplomats intelligence, they of our ists are advised Although aggressive balancing may have escape retribu- apprehension can avoid judicial con- characterized the role other Note, 71 Ya.L.Rev. generally tion. See texts, persuaded I am not that it should do (1985) (citing numerous leaks field, 801-03 security In the national so here. major covert sal- compromised have judiciary performed has its traditional bal- development exposed the vage operation, ancing role deference to the decisions with aircraft, stymied political government. Stealth secret branches treaty). Amendment, international Presented First Fourth progress on may Amendment, Morison leaked and other constitutional type information claims, hampering damage by the Court has held that widespread cause imper- restrictions that would otherwise be expensive surveillance the effectiveness may be sustained where national expect- missible otherwise be systems which foreign policy implicated. security and years of reliable information provide ed to States, See, e.g., Snepp v. United U.S. means. by any other not obtainable 100 S.Ct. 62 L.Ed.2d compromised security can thus be Public terminology associated with a bal- In the by attempts to choke off the ways: in two ancing analysis, “the Government has a democracy to func- needed for information protecting ... compelling interest tion, imperil leaks that the environ- secrecy important information to our security a function- physical ment of security.” Haig Agee, ing democracy requires. The tension be- 69 L.Ed.2d going interests is not tween these two (1981) Snepp, 444 at 509 (quoting abate, respon- question is how a 3). Recognition n. 3,n. 100 S.Ct. at 765 sible balance be achieved. compelling state interest reflects an such a limita- understanding of the institutional II. regard for the judiciary and a tions long powers. performed separation the bal Courts *24 rights ancing Amendment task where First balancing that courts aggressive The implicated. Supreme The Court has are in other contexts is differ- have undertaken unre often had to balance the value of required here. ent from what would be newsgathering against public stricted other security government’s interest in the The See, Newspa e.g., Richmond interests. by law proceedings, searches judicial of 555, pers, Virginia, Inc. v. U.S. officers, grand jury oper- and enforcement (1980)(access 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 S.Ct. presented Newspa- ations Richmond proceedings); judicial Zurcher v. Zurcher, Branzburg readily and are pers, Stanford 98 S.Ct. 56 L.Ed. Daily, Indeed, they pertain by courts. scrutinized (1978) (search office); newspaper 2d 525 of systems of evidence. judiciary’s own Branzburg Hayes, v. 408 U.S. 92 S.Ct. government’s interest of the Evaluation (1971) (disclosure of hand, require 33 L.Ed.2d here, on the other grand jury). fair op- sources to about the judiciary to draw conclusions “[A] reading majority’s analysis sophisticated of electronic eration of the most result Branzburg plain makes of their systems potential effects competing intelligent inquiry of this hinged on an assessment An disclosure. require in that case rath to the most sensi- societal interests sort would access involved information, background that First and er than on determination tive technical intelligence op- implicat knowledge range of were not Amendment freedoms presented in Saxbe, 859-60, easily be erations that cannot ed.” 417 U.S. at S.Ct. controversy” to which (Powell, J., single “case or dissenting). In these confined. Even as a courts are with sufficient veritable satrap. Vital decisions information, obviously courts lack the ex- expensive programs set into motion pertise Judges for its evaluation. needed representatives elected subject would be operation a subpoena can understand summary pleasure derailment at the of one readily more than that of a satellite. disgruntled employee. question, The how- short, questions security of national ever, is who, not one of motives as much as foreign affairs are “of for which the kind finally, must decide. The answer has Judiciary aptitude, has neither facilities nor Congress those accountable responsibility long and which has been held periods Chief pro- Executive. While belong power in the political domain of found disillusionment with subject judicial not or inquiry.” intrusion brought intense demands for in- Lines, Chicago & Air Southern Inc. scrutiny, creased those elected still remain 103, 111, Corp., Waterman S.S. repositories public of a trust. Where (1948); 92 L.Ed. 568 see exquisite matters of sensitivity ques- are in Agee, 453 U.S. at tion, invariably we install, cannot as the balancing process

The must thus disclosure, accord ultimate arbiter even the con- Congress latitude to control to na- access well-meaning science of the employee. security tional secrets statute and the through executive some so latitude do III.

the classification I scheme. do come solely this conclusion because enumer- remaining then, question, is whether powers foreign ated for the conduct of application particular of this law to this lodged affairs the executive and particular place defendant took in accord- legislative branches. First Amend- requirements. ance constitutional For presupposes ment the enumerated carefully analyzed the reasons Judge so powers raising of no armies less than —the opinion, Russell’s I am persuaded that it raising revenue—will be executed process did. Neither Morison’s due claims an atmosphere I debate. also concerning vagueness notice nor his recognize that the democratic accountabili- argument First Amendment overbreadth ty legislature executive supports reversal of his convictions. wholly explanation satisfactory for defer- Morison’s claim that he was not on notice ence in security the area of national se- might prosecution conduct lead crets. may pass Years before basis unpersuasive. Morison was a trained portentous decisions becomes known. The Top officer with a Se- public cannot call officials to account signed security cret clearance. He a disclo- the basis of material whose existence agreement specifically stating sure more, content is unaware. What is mis- criminal could result from classification decisions well have been information, handling of and he secret line, made far bureaucrats down warnings clipped explicit classification public accountability may quite whose *25 photo- of from the borders the satellite indirect. sending them to graphs before Jane’s. Rather, judicial the role must be a defer- prosecu- use the fact that Morison cannot ential one because the alternative would be espionage under statute have not tions the grave. To reverse conviction Morison’s frequent from the been shield himself general ground the that it chills ac- provided by notice these facts and the clear judicial cess be would tantamount to a dec- language of the statute. government may laration that the never limiting given by The careful instructions penalties use criminal to secure the confi- any vague- the suffice to cure óf district court dentiality information. (e). in The district enhancing operation Rather of ness sections than the “relating to the nation- democracy, suggests, court’s definition Morison this- requirement course of the scienter every would install al defense” and worker our hold- with access to classified informa- in the statute are consistent with

ings prospect. v. istic Truong potential United States Dinh Because the over- (4th Cir.1980), Hung, 629 F.2d 908 and breadth of espionage the statute is not real (4th Dedeyan, 684 F.2d 36 States v. comparison United substantial plainly its Cir.1978). The district court’s definition of legitimate sweep, “whatever overbreadth by “entitled to receive” reference to the may exist cured through ease-by- should be logical classification scheme is both analysis case fact of the situations to which See, supported by precedent. e.g., Truong, sanctions, assertedly, may ap- not be Vagueness F.2d 919 n. 10. 615-16, plied.” Id. at S.Ct. at On edges might exist around the of these stat- case, the agree facts Morison’s I with does not conduct at utes absolve the core Judge limiting Russell’s conclusion that the statutory proscription. the Parker v. given by instructions the district court 733, 756, 2547, 2561, Levy, 417 U.S. were sufficient. (1974). 41 L.Ed.2d notice, through vagueness, It is and over- potential Morison’s contention fu- analysis judiciary breadth that the effectu- applications espionage the ture statute ates the interests First Amendment it other sources render invalid as him balancing cases where classical does not Amici, not, ultimately, persuasive. place. requirement take The notice insures al., Post, Washington et describe various speakers not be will stifled the fear illegal domestic press reports of surveil- they might commit a violation of which CIA, design defects of lance they could not have known. The district tank, Abrams M-l Soviet arms control vio- limiting properly court’s instructions con- lations, military procurement cost over- prosecution fine under statute to disclo- if runs. Amici contend that the sources of potentially sures of classified information reports prosecution hypo- face damaging military security of statute, applications of then thetical way require- States. In scandal, “corruption, incompetence vagueness ments of the and overbreadth pro- the defense establishment doctrines the possibility restrain that the scrutiny.” tected from language broad this statute would ever indicate, examples As the above investi- be punishing used as a means of mere gative reporting component is a critical incompetence criticism of corruption goal the First Amendment’s of accountabil- government. undertaking Without ity government. might stifle To leave government’s detailed examination prey interest the manifold secrecy interest in required would be power. abuses unexamined It is far balancing analysis, a traditional however, clear, from that an affirmance limiting strictures of these instructions con- here to that would ever lead result. The fine cases of serious conse- Supreme Court has cautioned that to re- quence recog- security. to our national I verse conviction on basis of other application vagueness nize that purely hypothetical applications of a stat- overbreadth doctrines is not free of diffi- ute, the must “not only overbreadth culty, limiting and that instructions real, but well.” substantial as Broadrick point some can reconstruct a statute. Oklahoma, however, case, in- district court’s ques- 37 L.Ed.2d 830 I guarantee structions important served presented spectre whether the safeguards constitutional without under- examples is in above sense real or mining legitimate operation of the stat- have much common whether ute. if juries Morison’s conduct. Even could ever be found that would convict those who *26 IV. truly expose governmental waste and mis- conduct, may be, government political firestorm well as the con- that would tends, exposed follow of one who that Morison released the satellite an ineptitude photos and wires in order weekly administration’s own to receive prosecutions make such ingratiate a rare and cash and himself with to unreal- Jane’s secrecy deception I gain employment. government. But not in future do press But the expect Morison’s motives are what is cannot from think that guarantee any Constitution here. Morison’s conduct has raised it crucial will There importance. succeed. is no constitutional questions right of considerable At particular time, government to have access important emphasize it is to the same information, or require openness today. prosecu- This from what is not before us bureaucracy.... attempt apply espio- tion was an press nage Constitution, for either the words, statute to The in other es- publication receipt contest, of classified materi- tablishes the not its resolution. Congress may als. provide resolution, See New York Times Co. United States, 713, 714-63, instances, through S.Ct. least in some careful- 2140, 2141-66, (1971) (sep- legislation. ly rest, L.Ed.2d drawn For the we rely, opinions expressing system arate views of the must as so often our we must, on espio- tug pull applications political Justices on such statute). society. forces American nage Neither does this case in- prior on any publication. volve restraint Stewart, Press”, Hastings “Or questions presented Id. Such are L.J. 631 case, Judge I and do not read Russell’s is at What issue this case the consti- opinion any express view on them. tutionality particular of a conviction. As to parties presented and amici that, prepared I Judge am to concur with implications us the broader of this case. imposes Russell that the First Amendment high We have been that even officials prohibition prosecutions told no blanket routinely public secrets, divulge classified damaging unauthorized leaks may imposed information, that alternative sanctions security particu- behavior, an and that affirmance prosecution comported lar with constitu- presents newsgather- here a vital threat guarantees. tional ing process. and the democratic On the PHILLIPS, JAMES DICKSON Circuit argument other side of com- lies the Judge, concurring, specially: in govern- monsense observation that those motives, political ment have their own and, only I in the judgment concur with otherwise, continuing that ensure the avail- reservation, Judge one Russell’s careful ability press relationship sources. “The opinion My for the court. reservation has many press symbi- informants to the is a critically, opinion's only, to do but with that otic one.” U.S. at Branzburg, 408 of the first issues discussion amendment of source identifi- Problems by the defendant. While these are raised cation and the in- security increased risks ultimately rejected, are discussed and there discovery proceed- volved in and trial make suggestions applied as to con- earlier ings against press sources difficult. More- Morison, charged type duct of the over, espionage applica- statute has no simply impli- do not Espionage Act statutes bility pose to the multitude of leaks that no rights. cate first amendment On that security, conceivable threat to national point, agree Judge dif- I Wilkinson’s threaten one or another to embarrass fering is- view that the first amendment high government official. are real and sub- sues raised Morison require the serious attention stantial and What Justice Potter once said in Stewart gives concurring then opinion which his has address to the Yale Law School opinion. them. I therefore concur meaning here: goes, au- So far as the Constitution clear, Espio- thing is it is that the If one press may publish tonomous what broadly nage Act statutes as now drawn knows, seek to learn what it imprecise unwieldy instruments for can. prosecuting government “leakers” autonomy ways. press opposed

But this “moles” cuts both Judge against of other countries. Wil- free do battle the service *27 opinion convincingly appropriately kinson’s demonstrates limiting one in application only that those statutes can constitu- be of these and related sections of Espio- tionally applied to press convict leakers nage statute. While applica- both those (acting purposes) by limiting for whatever spy” conduct, tions were to “classic jury sufficiently instructions which flesh precedential effect those decisions can- key out the “relating statutes’ element of disregarded. be which, to facially the national defense” Judge Wilkinson expresses the view that stated, view, my constitutionally is in both judicious case-by-case ap- because use of vague. Though point overbroad is propriate limiting available, instructions is one, I agree limiting to me a close that the espionage “the applicability statute has no required proof instruction which that the pose the multitude of that leaks no con- leaked “potentially information was either ceivable threat security, damaging might United States or be only threaten to embarrass one or another enemy” sufficiently useful to an remedied high government official.” On this basis the facial vice. Without such a limitation he concludes that prop- these statutes can reach, apparent on the statute’s leaks of erly applied press (whether be leakers which, though undoubtedly information venally or patriotically or however motivat- marginal way, “related to defense” some ed) threatening without the vital newsgath- threaten embarrassment to the official ering press. functions of supports He guardians government “defense” se- convincing discussion of the crets, could lead to criminal convictions. practical dynamics developed rela- Such necessary a limitation is therefore tionship government between of- very define the line at I which believe the ficials to bolster his estimate that this use precludes prose- first amendment criminal significantly of the statute will not inhibit cution, rightly because the interests rec- investigative reporting needed about the ognized Judge concurring Wilkinson’s workings in matters of na- means, opinion. This as I assume we reaf- security. tional defense and today, notwithstanding firm that informa- concurring By opinion, in his I accept may classified, govern- been have general estimate, I consider required ment prove must still that it judicial be the critical determination forced “potentially damaging ... or fact arguments the first amendment ad- useful,” i.e., fact of classification so, in this doing vanced case. But in I conclusive, merely probative, on that jury case-by- observe instructions on a issue, though it must be conclusive basis upon case are a reed slender which to question authority possess or receive rely application constitutional of these the information. This must be so to avoid statutes; critical instructions converting Espionage Act into the sim- necessary surely press we find here ple Government Secrets Act which Con- judiciary’s right obligation limit the gress has refused to enact. narrow, “reconstructing,” without statutes Here, writing slate, we were on a I clean constitutionality ques- whose is drawn in might grave have doubts about suffi- tion. ciency limiting instruction used in passage quoted by Judge In the Wilkin- requirement Morison’s trial. that in- son, Justice Stewart observed that “Con- relating formation to the national defense may provide gress through resolution ... merely “potential” damage carefully legislation.” surely drawn That sweeps extremely usefulness broadly. still provide long-term the better resolu- One wonder whether information tion here. shown to related somehow to national defense fail to could have at least some “potential.” But write we do not slate,

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Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Samuel Loring Morison, the Washington Post Cbs, Inc., Amici Curiae
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 29, 1988
Citation: 844 F.2d 1057
Docket Number: 86-5008
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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