Aрpellant Sammy Joe Cooper challenges his conviction by the district court 1 of three counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. We affirm.
Appellant operated a used сar business in Lebanon, Missouri and in July of 1976 entered into a banking arrangement with officers of the Commerce Bank of Lebanon (Commerce). Under this arrangement Commerce extended a $30,000 line of credit to appellant secured by an inventory of his used cars. Additionally Commerce agreed to give appellant immediate credit on sight drafts presented to Commerce by the appellant for collection on cars sold by him.
The government’s chief witness was Marc Gorges. Gorges testified that in October 1976 he purchased cаrs from the appellant for his used car business under an agreement whereby appellant delivered the ears to him and a sight draft containing the titles was forwarded to the First Bank and Trust in Sand Springs, Oklahoma (First Bank) where Gorges honored the drafts. From this course of dealing the scheme forming the basis of the three count indictment 2 developed. The appellant presented seven sight drafts to Commerce on three separate occasions 3 on cars that Gorges had not and did not intend to purchase. The bank then forwarded thеse drafts to First Bank to be honored by Gorges. Gorges was to honor the drafts with money furnished by appellant by means of presigned blank checks drawn on his account at Commercе. This scheme permitted appellant to borrow the money on the sight drafts for the period of time it took for the transactions to clear the two banks. This float was possiblе because appellant received immediate credit in the amount of each sight draft deposited *329 with Commerce. Gorges testified that prior to the seven sight drafts forming thе basis of the indictment the scheme operated successfully and was not detected by either bank. The scheme broke down when Gorges refused to honor the seven drafts and they were returned unpaid to Commerce. He refused to honor them because several of appellant’s presigned blank checks failed to clear Commerce due to insufficient funds. When the sight drafts failed to clear First Bank they were returned unhonored to Commerce. Commerce contacted appellant and at a meeting betwеen officers of Commerce and appellant the scheme was uncovered. Gorges testified that appellant felt this scheme was necessary because he was at the limit of his line of credit with Commerce and needed money to repair used cars for resale.
Appellant raises several issues on appeal. First he argues that the district court evidenced “residual doubt” about his guilt and therefore erred in submitting the case to the jury. In this regard he argues that the mailings were not shown to be sufficiently closely related to his scheme to bring his conduct within 18 U.S.C. § 1341. Additionally he contends that the evidence was not sufficient to show his willful misuse of the mails. He also claims that the court erred in refusing to give an unrequеsted accomplice instruction and finally, Cooper contends that the trial judge erred in his interrogation of him.
Appellant testified in his own behalf after his motion for a directеd verdict of acquittal was denied. Therefore we view all the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict and accept as established all reasonable inferences which support the verdict.
United States v. Lambros,
To establish a violation of § 1341 the government must prove a scheme to defraud and the mailing of a letter or other instrument for the purpose of executing the scheme.
Pereira v. United States,
Check kiting schemes are within the reach of the federal mail fraud statutes.
United States
v.
Gross,
Aрpellant argues the evidence did not show that he personally mailed the sight drafts or that there was a willful
*330
misuse of the mails. The mailing requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 requires only that the defendant caused the use of the mails and that this use was for the purpose of executing the scheme.
United States v. Maze, supra,
Next, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to give an accomplice instruction on its own motion regarding Mаrc Gorges’ credibility. The appellant did not request the instruction and concedes he must demonstrate plain error in order to prevail on this issue. We have reviewed the record and are convinced that the trial court’s failure to give an accomplice instruction does not rise to the level of plain error.
United States v. Cady,
Finally, appellant argues that because the trial judge briefly interrogated him when he took the stand in his own defense he was denied a fair trial. The record reflects that appellant’s testimony was сonfusing and consisted chiefly of attempting to show that it was Marc Gorges who defrauded appellant of a large sum of money. The district judge clarified this theory when he asked аppellant a series of questions developing the way in which Marc Gorges was supposedly able to benefit by a monetary float allegedly generated by him from the use оf appellant’s personal checks.
Rule 614(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence specifically permits the trial judge to interrogate witnesses. Rule 611(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence imposes a duty on the trial court to make the interrogation of witnesses and presentation of evidence effective for the ascertainment of the truth. It is the trial court’s duty to clarify the testimony of a witness in order to avoid any misunderstanding of the testimony by the jury.
United States v. Hauck,
The appellant’s conviction is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable William R. Collinson, United States District Judge for the District of Missouri presiding.
. The indictment originally contained five counts of mail fraud. Two of the fivе counts were dropped by the government before trial because the dates of the alleged mailings were erroneous. Appellant contends that this constituted an unlаwful amendment of the indictment and that the renumbering of Counts III, IV and V as Counts I, II and III led to confusion in the minds of the jury. This argument is without merit. The original Counts I and II were dropped before trial. A review of the record reveals that the original Counts III, IV and V were simply renumbered as Counts I, II and III and were never referred to by the court or counsel as anything other than Counts I, II and III.
. The evidence adduced at trial established that on November 15, 1976, appellant presented three sight drafts to Commerce, that on November 18, 1976, appellant again presentеd three sight drafts to Commerce and finally, on November 23, 1976, appellant presented one more sight draft to Commerce. On each occasion appellant reрresented the drafts were for used cars sold by him to Gorges and would be honored by Gorges at the First Bank and Trust in Sand Springs, Oklahoma. On each occasion Commerce mailed the drafts to First Bank and credited Cooper’s account for the amount of each draft.