Thе plaintiff has filed this motion for summary judgment as to part of its claim. The suit is based upon the provisions of the False Claims Statute, 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 231-233. The complaint alleges that the defendants presented the Isthmian Steamship Company, acting as agent for the War Shipping Administration, a lawful agency of the United States of America, fourteen specific false, fictitious or fraudulent invoices for lumber furnished by the defendants, claiming that the quantity of the board feet filled was overstatеd in each instance. It asks for summary judgment for part of its claim under Rule 56, 28 U.S.C.A., in the amount of $2,000 for each transaction, as well as an additional $2,000 under and by virtue of a conspiracy undertaken by the defendants and as provided by the Statute. The defendants have denied liability, asserting in their defense that the invoices were not false or fraudulent and that thе running of the Statute of Limitations prevents a recovery.
In support of its motion, plaintiff argues there is no question оf fact to be determined and the defense is without merit. It has attached to the motion a certified copy of the criminal record in indictment No. 13855 covering fifteen counts for violation of Title 18, U.S.C.A. §§80 and 88, * under which indictment both defendаnts were found guilty on all counts in this District of “fraud against the U. S. Government by making and causing to be made false vouchers and сonspiracy to defraud the U. S. Government.” The counts in the indictment enumerate the identical and separatе transactions detailed in the present complaint giving the same specific invoice dates, amounts, boаrd feet delivered and destination. Plaintiff contends that the matter is now res judicata and the defendants are cоnclusively estopped in the present civil suit from again asserting the same defense as was advanced in the fоrmer criminal action. The court is of the opinion this contention should be upheld.
The general doctrine of rеs judicata or conclusive estoppel by judgment has been stated in State of Oklahoma v. State of Texas, 1921,
“The general principle, applied in numerous decisions of this court, *472 and definitely accepted in Southern Pаcific R. Co. v. United States,168 U.S. 1 , 48, 49,18 S.Ct. 18 ,42 L.Ed. 355 , is, that a question of fact or of law distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction as a ground of recovery or defense in a suit or action between parties sui juris is conclusively settled by the final judgment or decree therein so that it cannot be further litigated in a subsequent suit between the samе parties or their privies whether the second suit be for the same or a different cause of action. * * * ”
This prinсiple is as applicable to the decisions of criminal courts as to those of civil jurisdiction. Sealfon v. Unitеd States, 1948,
A prior judgment of conviction in a criminal case for the identical acts set forth in a subsequent civil aсtion conclusively establishes the issues adjudged in the criminal case against the defendants who were found guilty. Locаl 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 1934,
“The judgment in the criminal case conclusively established in favor of the United States and against those who were found guilty that within the period covered by the indictment the latter werе parties to the conspiracy charged. The complaint in this suit includes the allegations on which that - prosеcution - was based. The defendants in this-suit who had been there convicted-could not require proof of what had been duly adjudged between the parties. And, to the extent that the answers attempted to deny participation оf convicted defendants in. the conspiracy of which they had. been found guilty, they are false- and sham and the District Court, rightly so treated them. [State of] Oklahoma v. [State of] Texas,265 U.S. 76 ,44 S.Ct. 457 ,68 L.Ed. 908 . Cf. Coffey v. United States,116 U.S. 436 , 442,6 S.Ct. 437 ,29 L.Ed. 684 . Stone v. United States,167 U.S. 178 , 184,17 S.Ct. 778 ,42 L.Ed. 127 .” (Emphasis supplied.)
This case has been reaffirmed recently in Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 1951,
In United States v. Bower, D.C.E.D.Tenn.1951,
“* * jf ^ were treating; the proceeding as one on motion for summary judgment, the Court, in view of the transcript which it holds, to be admissible, would unhesitatingly rule that the Government is. entitled to judgment. The Court perceives no reason for rеaching a different result when -the same end is sought in different language and procedure.”
The defendants further claim thе Statute of Limitations bars the present action. The suit was based upon transactions occurring between August 28,. 1944 and October 6, 1944. It was filed July 25, 1955. -Suits under the False Claims Statute must be brought within six years from the commission of the act. 31 U.S.C.A. § 235. However, under *473 the provisions of the War-Time Suspension of Limitations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287, the commencement of the running of the six-year period was extended until January 1, 1950. Accordingly, the Statute does not expire in this case until December 31, 1956.
There is no doubt the War-Time Suspеnsion of Limitations Act applies in this case as is shown by the cases decided in this District recently. See United States v. Murрhy-Cook & Co., Inc., D.C.E.D.Pa.1954,
From the foregoing, it would appear that there are no issues of fact to be determined on the matters submitted by the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and it should be Granted.
An appropriate order may be entered.
Notes
Now 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 287, 371, 1001.