UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Sael Moh‘d Tumah MUSTAFA, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 11-3556.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Sept. 17, 2012. Filed: Sept. 24, 2012.
695 F.3d 860
In light of the express disclaimer of agency and the lack of any evidence that UHS consented to Chimes acting as its agent, Chimes was not UHS‘s agent under prevailing Minnesota law. Chimes’ suppliers have no basis for suing UHS for the amounts Chimes owed them when it went bankrupt.
IV.
For these reasons, we affirm summary judgment in favor of UHS and do not reach the issue of whether the district court properly denied class certification.
Matthew P. Wolesky, Philip M. Koppe, Asst. U.S. Attys., Kansas City, MO (David M. Ketchmark, Acting U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Sael Moh‘d Tumah Mustafa pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting mail fraud, in violation of
I.
The government charged Mustafa for his participation in a scheme involving the use of stolen credit card information to purchase gift cards from several businesses. Mustafa pleaded guilty without a plea agreement, and the district court ordered a presentence report (PSR). The PSR set Mustafa‘s base offense level at 7 under United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines)
At the initial sentencing hearing in April 2011, the district court heard testimony
At a second sentencing hearing, the district court found that the PSR‘s enhancements were supported by a preponderance of the evidence presented at the April 2011, hearing. The district court calculated Mustafa‘s advisory Guidelines range at 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment but varied downward and imposed a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. Mustafa argues that the district court‘s calculation of the Guidelines was error because the district court should have required the government to prove the facts enhancing Mustafa‘s sentence by clear and convincing evidence.
II.
We review the district court‘s interpretation and application of the advisory Guidelines de novo. United States v. Gayekpar, 678 F.3d 629, 639 (8th Cir. 2012). In United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court rendered the Guidelines advisory. Since that time, we have repeatedly held that “due process never requires applying more than a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for finding sentencing facts, even where the fact-finding has ‘an extremely disproportionate impact on the defendant‘s advisory guidelines [sentencing] range.‘” United States v. Lee, 625 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2009)).
Mustafa argues that because the uncharged relevant conduct used to enhance his sentence could have been charged independently as other federal crimes, his case is distinguishable from Lee, Villareal-Amarillas, and other similar cases. We have rejected a similar argument before and again decline to draw such a distinction. See United States v. McKanry, 628 F.3d 1010, 1020 (8th Cir. 2011) (district court did not err by basing defendant‘s loss calculation on fraudulent transactions for which defendant was acquitted or not charged because a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that defendant had engaged in conduct furthering the fraudulent transactions at issue). Mustafa is not being sentenced for crimes for which he was not charged. As the Supreme Court explained, “sentencing enhancements do not punish a defendant for crimes of which he was not convicted, but rather increase his sentence because of the manner in which he committed the crime of conviction.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997).
III.
The sentence is affirmed.
