UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, v. ADAM SADLOWSKI, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 19-2004
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
January 23, 2020
2020 WL 370355
Before BRISCOE, KELLY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
PUBLISH. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (D.C. No. 1:16-CR-00847-JCH-1). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit. Christopher M. Wolpert, Clerk of Court.
Jason Bowles of Bowles Law Firm, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant - Appellant.
Frederick Mendenhall, Assistant United States Attorney (and John C. Anderson, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Adam Sadlowski entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,
Background
On February 21, 2016, a state metropolitan court judge issued a search warrant for Mr. Sadlowski‘s residence and vehicle. Aplt. App. 78. In support of probable cause, Detective Gerald Koppman of the Bernalillo County Sheriff‘s Office (BSCO) included information provided by a confidential informant. Id. at 81. The informant told Detective Koppman that on several occasions, he or she had purchased methamphetamine from Mr. Sadlowski. Id. These transactions occurred at either Mr. Sadlowski‘s residence, located at 808 Rio Arriba Avenue SE in Albuquerque or at other locations; Mr. Sadlowski would arrive in a black Bentley or red motorcycle. Id. The informant also stated that Mr. Sadlowski always carried a pistol and the informant had seen other firearms in Mr. Sadlowski‘s residence, garage, and vehicle. Id. Detective Koppman further stated that Mr. Sadlowski had prior felony convictions,
The next day, BSCO detectives, a detective from the Valencia County Sheriff‘s Department, and Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearm (ATF) agents executed the search warrant at Mr. Sadlowski‘s residence. Id. at 180. Once inside, they found several firearms and ammunition. Id. at 16.
Mr. Sadlowski filed a motion to suppress the evidence recovered at his residence. Id. at 19. The district court held a hearing on the matter and ultimately denied the motion.
Discussion
“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court‘s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Katoa, 379 F.3d 1203, 1205 (10th Cir. 2004). We afford a magistrate judge‘s probable cause determination “great deference” and review “merely to ensure the Government‘s affidavit provided a ‘substantial basis’ for reaching that conclusion.” United States v. Biglow, 562 F.3d 1272, 1280 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–239 (1983)). However, “[d]eterminations relating to the sufficiency of a search warrant,” including whether the warrant is sufficiently particularized, “are conclusions of law . . . which this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir. 2000).
A. The Metropolitan Court Properly Issued the Warrant
Mr. Sadlowski first argues that the metropolitan court lacked jurisdiction to issue a felony-related search warrant because it lacks jurisdiction over felony cases. But this argument asks the wrong question. As the district court emphasized, a court‘s authority to hear a case and a court‘s authority to issue a search warrant are two separate concepts. See Bevington v. United States, 35 F.2d 584, 584 (8th Cir. 1929) (“[T]he procuring of a search warrant . . . is not, in any sense, the commencement of a prosecution.“). The state‘s
A warrant may be issued by the [metropolitan] court to search for and seize any
(1) property which has been obtained or is possessed in a manner which constitutes a criminal offense;
(2) property designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense;
(3) property which would be material evidence in a criminal prosecution; or
(4) person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully restrained. A warrant shall issue only on a sworn written statement of the facts showing probable cause for issuing the warrant.
Mr. Sadlowski argues that the state court system cannot determine the jurisdiction of its courts as this is a task properly left to the legislature but this argument
B. Rules 4.1 and 41 Are Not Applicable
Mr. Sadlowski next argues that the search warrant was sufficiently federal such that it should have been issued in accordance with Rules 4.1 and 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Further, even if we assume the search was federal in character and that Rules 4.1 and 41 were violated, suppression is only warranted if the rule violation was (1) of constitutional magnitude; (2) prejudicial; or (3) intentional and deliberate. See United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 2015). Mr. Sadlowski does not attempt to argue or point to evidence showing that any of these requirements for suppression are met. He instead merely contends that rule violations occurred. Accordingly, suppression under these arguments is not warranted.
C. The Warrant Was Not Deficient
Mr. Sadlowski next argues that the warrant was deficient as it was neither based on probable cause nor sufficiently particularized to authorize a search of his residence. We disagree. First, the metropolitan court had a substantial basis for making the probable cause determination, see Biglow, 562 F.3d at 1280, based on the detailed information Detective Koppman provided in the underlying affidavit. Further, the underlying affidavit‘s reliance on both a confidential informant (who was known to Detective Koppman and the court through ex parte proceedings) and a confidential source that corroborated the account of the confidential informant provided
As to the argument that the search warrant was deficient because it did not describe the residence with sufficient particularity, the warrant‘s supporting affidavit belies this. While “[t]he Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents,” the Supreme Court does not prohibit “a warrant from cross-referencing other documents.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004). A search warrant may incorporate the underlying affidavit by reference where it “expressly refer[s] to the affidavit and incorporate[s] it by reference using suitable words of reference.” United States v. Williamson, 1 F.3d 1134, 1136 n.1 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 603 (10th Cir. 1988)). Here, the warrant plainly incorporated the underlying affidavit when it authorized BSCO agents to search “the persons and/or place described in the [a]ffidavit,” Aplt. App. 78. The warrant also contained the following description of his residence:
The residence to be searched is located in the City of Albuquerque, County of Bernalillo, and State of New Mexico. The residence is a single story dwelling with a pitched, shingled roof. The exterior of the residence is grey in color. The door to the residence faces north. The garage door is red in color and also faces north. The numerics “808” are posted on the mailbox, which is in the front of the residence, as well as on the curb.
Id. at 79. Mr. Sadlowski‘s address is also printed in the upper-left hand corner of every page of the warrant application. The warrant is sufficiently particular.
For the same reasons, we dismiss Mr. Sadlowski‘s additional arguments that the search exceeded the scope of the warrant because a search of his residence was not authorized, and that the warrant was deficient for failing to detail the items that law enforcement officers anticipated seizing. First, the search of Mr. Sadlowski‘s residence is clearly authorized by the above language. Second, the affidavit lists the anticipated fruits of the search including firearms, controlled substances including methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin, and “US currency in denominations consistent with sales of” controlled substances. Id. at 79–80. As the affidavit is incorporated into the search warrant, we find no particularity issue present on these points.
Finally, Mr. Sadlowski argues that the warrant lacked particularity as to the confidential informant. Information from confidential informants is reliable “so long as the informant‘s statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer‘s knowledge.” Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960) (overruled on other grounds by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980)). The evidence was sufficiently corroborated by Detective Koppman‘s independent surveillance that indicated drug trafficking was taking place at Mr. Sadlowski‘s residence, and the fact that a second confidential source also identified Mr. Sadlowski as a drug-trafficker. Aplt. App. 81–82. As such, we find the warrant sufficiently particular in this regard.
D. Franks Hearing Issue
Finally, Mr. Sadlowski argues that he was entitled to a Franks hearing to determine whether Detective Koppman either
AFFIRMED.