United States v. Sabretech, Inc.United States v. Sabretech, Inc.
On May 11, 1996, a ValuJet commercial airliner crashed in the Florida Everglades and all persons on board perished. It was a tragic accident that could have been avoided. Following an investigation, the government, for the first time, indicted an aviation repair station, SabreTech, and several of its employees for various violations related to the transportation of hazardous materials. The record reflects that these aviation repair station personnel committed mistakes, but they did not commit crimes. The jury found SabreTech not guilty of willful violations of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (“HMTA”).
I. BACKGROUND
From July 1995 until June 1999, Sabre-Tech engaged in the repair, modification, and maintenance of commercial aircraft. In January 1996, ValuJet Airlines delivered three used McDonnell Douglas MD-80 aircraft to SabreTech’s facility in Miami, Florida, for major modification and maintenance prior to their introduction into the ValuJet fleet. In the course of overhauling these aircraft, SabreTech’s mechanics determined that many of the oxygen generators 1 had exceeded their 12 year service life. ValuJet personnel issued written work orders instructing the mechanics to remove the old oxygen generators and install new ones. The.work orders listed steps for SabreTech’s mechanics to follow when replacing the old oxygen generators with new ones. The work orders contained a warning that unexpended oxygen generators could generate extremely high temperatures.
In the process of removing the old oxygen generators, mechanic John Taber (“Taber”) noticed the absence of shipping caps. Taber asked his supervisor David Wiles (“Wiles”) about the shipping caps, and Wiles told him to set the old generators aside and continue working. Taber, along with fellow mechanics Robert Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) and Eugene Florence (“Florence”), then proceeded to wrap the lanyards tightly around the firing pins of the generators and tape the ends of the lanyards to the body of the generators to prevent the release of the trigger mechanism. In March 1996, new generators, bearing yellow, diamond-shaped stickers, arrived at the SabreTeeh facility. The mechanics installed the new generators and tagged the old generators with green “unserviceable” tags on which they wrote “out-of-date” as the reason for removal. The mechanics boxed the old generators and stored them in the hangar where they remained for six weeks.
On May 10, 1996, SabreTeeh shipping clerk Andy Salas (“Salas”) re-packed the generators with bubble wrap and placed them in boxes that he sealed with tape. He placed ValuJet “COMAT” labels on the boxes, indicating that the boxes contained ValuJet “company materials.” The shipping ticket described the contents as “5 boxes” of “Oxy Canisters Empty.” The next day, a SabreTeeh driver took the boxes to the ValuJet ramp area where Flight 592 was scheduled to depart for Atlanta. ValuJet personnel placed the boxes in the forward section of the aircraft’s cargo compartment. Shortly after take-off, a fire erupted on the plane. Flight 592 crashed into the Everglades and killed all 110 persons on board.
On July 13, 1991, a grand jury returned a 24-count indictment against SabreTeeh and employees Daniel Gonzalez (“Gonza
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lez”), Florence, and Mario Valenzuela (“Valenzuela”).
2
Count I charged all defendants with conspiracy to make false statements on aircraft maintenance records, in violation of
Prior to trial, SabreTech moved to dismiss the
After trial, the jury acquitted SabreTech of Counts I, III-VII, IX, XI, XIII, XV, XVII, XIX, XXI, and XXIV. The jury found SabreTech guilty of Counts VIII, X, XII, XIV, XVI, XVIII, XX, XXII, and XXIII. The jury acquitted Gonzalez of all charges and Florence of all remaining charges. Following an extensive sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced SabreTech to pay a fine of $2,000,000 and restitution of $9,060,400.
II. ISSUES
1. Whether the district court erred in denying SabreTech’s motion to dismiss the
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict SabreTech on the reckless counts and the failure to train count.
*1022 3. Whether the district court erred in imposing both a fine and restitution on SabreTeeh.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to
de novo
review.”
United States v. Hooshmand,
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Validity of Reckless Counts
SabreTeeh argues that the statutory and regulatory history creates a dichotomy between the HMTA and the FAA that cannot support as a crime the reckless violations of the hazardous materials regulations. It contends that the reckless counts are a legal nullity. In these counts, the government alleged that SabreTeeh should be punished pursuant to
1. Statutory Overview
By way of background, Congress originally enacted
In 1958, Congress passed the FAA, Pub.L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958). This Act, among other things, transferred the safety regulatory authority contained in the Civil Aeronautics Act to a newly- *1023 created independent aviation safety regulatory agency, the Federal Aviation Agency. The FAA retained the provision (Section 902(h)) making it a crime for a person to deliver knowingly, or cause to be delivered, or to cause the transportation of explosives or other dangerous articles if that transportation was prohibited by any rule, regulation, or requirement prescribed by the Administrator under the FAA.
In 1966, Congress created the Department of Transportation to centralize responsibility for the myriad regulatory agencies and cabinet-level departments dealing with transportation. Department of Transportation Act, Pub.L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966). This creation transferred all of the functions of the formerly independent Federal Aviation Agency to the Secretary of Transportation. Moreover, under this new structure, the Federal Aviation Administrator was responsible for the regulation of air safety, including the transportation of hazardous materials by air. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 103 (2001).
This statutory scheme remained in effect until 1974 when Congress enacted the Transportation Safety Act, Pub.L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2156 (1974). Title I of this Act was entitled the “Hazardous Materials Transportation Act.” This Act was a self-contained regulatory and enforcement statute that included its own criminal penalty provision. It established a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of hazardous materials transportation of all modes and gave the Secretary of Transportation responsibility for its regulation. Simultaneously, Congress amended section 902(h) of the FAA to heighten the mens rea necessary for a conviction and increase the penalties for a violation. The amendment made it a crime to deliver willfully for transportation in air commerce or to recklessly cause to be transported in air commerce hazardous materials prohibited by regulations issued pursuant to the FAA.
Shortly after the passage of the HMTA, the Secretary of Transportation created the Materials Transportation Bureau (“MTB”) to implement the new law. The MTB amended and reissued the authority citations for the hazardous materials regulations. The MTB deleted each of the previous authority citations for the hazardous materials regulations and replaced them with references to the regulatory authority for the new HMTA,
The final stage of this evolutionary process occurred in 1994 when Congress codified certain laws related to transportation as Subtitles II, III, and V-X of Title 49 of the U.S.Code. Congress codified the HMTA as Chapter 51,
A person shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both, if the person, in violation of a regulation or requirement related to the transportation of hazardous material prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under this part—
(1) willfully delivers, or causes to be delivered, property containing hazardous material to an air carrier or to an opera *1024 tor of a civil aircraft for transportation in air commerce; or
(2) recklessly causes the transportation in air commerce of the property.
Thus, at the time of the ValueJet crash, criminal liability existed for willful violations of the hazardous materials regulations promulgated pursuant to the HMTA. Criminal liability also existed for reckless violation of regulations authorized by Part A — Air Commerce and Safety, Subtitle VII, an entirely separate subtitle. The criminal penalties were distinct. Therefore, only regulations adopted under the authority of the FAA in Part A could provide the predicate for prosecuting a reckless violation.
See
2. Regulatory Overview
The Department of Transportation’s Research and Special Programs Administration (“RSPA”), the successor agency to the MTB, administered a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of hazardous materials transportation. These hazardous materials regulations are contained in
The statutory and regulatory history demonstrates that at the time of the crash, the HMTA was the only authority for the hazardous materials regulations under which the government indicted SabreTech. That Act punishes willful violations, not reckless ones. In sum, none of the hazardous materials regulations in existence in May 1996, and relied upon in the indictment, were based upon statutory authority contained within Part A — Air Commerce and Safety. Therefore, the reckless counts are invalid, and the district court erred in denying SabreTech’s motion to dismiss them.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence 6
Based on our review of the record, we conclude there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support SabreTech’s conviction for willfully failing to train its employees in accordance with the hazardous materials regulations. The evidence demonstrates that SabreTech had a manual instructing personnel with regard to the handling and packaging of hazardous material. Thus, the jury could infer that SabreTech knew about the regulations dealing with the handling and packaging of hazardous material and knew that it should inform its employees of these regulations. Moreover, several SabreTech em
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ployees testified that they received no hazardous materials training while employed with SabreTech. In light of this evidence, we affirm SabreTech’s conviction on Count XXIII.
See United States v. Massey,
V. CONCLUSION
As stated previously, this was a tragic accident that needlessly claimed the lives of over 100 people. That loss is irreplaceable. However, the record is clear that SabreTech and its employees did not intend to kill these people when it packed the old oxygen canisters and transported them to the ValuJet aircraft. Furthermore, the statutory and regulatory history demonstrates that the regulations cited as predicates for the alleged criminal activity were invalid. Because the district court improperly relied on the hazardous materials regulations as predicates for the alleged criminal activity, we vacate Sabre-Tech’s convictions on the reckless counts. Because there was sufficient evidence presented to the jury on the willful failure to train count, we affirm that conviction. Finally, we remand this case to the district court for re-sentencing. 7
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
Notes
. Oxygen generators provide supplemental oxygen to passengers in the event of sudden loss of cabin pressure. A lanyard runs from a mask to an activation device in the generators. When a person pulls the lanyard, it removes a pin which allows a spring-loaded hammer to strike a percussion cap. This ini-tiales a chemical reaction which produces heat. This in turn causes sodium chlorate to decompose and liberate oxygen gas. Because oxygen generators contain sodium chlorate, the authorities list oxygen generators as hazardous materials subject to federal regulations.
See
. Valenzuela skipped bond pre-trial and remains a fugitive.
. We note at the outset that there is a dearth of case law on this subject.
United States v. Moskowitz,
. Notably, however, at the time, the regulatory authority and responsibility for the regulation of hazardous materials transportation at the federal level was fragmented among several governmental agencies. The Interstate Commerce Commission was responsible for the regulation of surface transportation of explosives and other dangerous articles pursuant to
. We note that in December 1996, after the crash at issue, the RSPA did revise the authority section of Part 173 to add
. In light of our conclusion that the reckless counts are a legal nullity, it is not necessary for us to discuss SabreTech’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions on those counts.
. On resentencing, the district court cannot impose any restitution on SabreTech's conviction on Count XXIII because