*1 America, UNITED STATES
Plaintiff-Appellee, ROSALES-GARCIA, Raul Defendant-Appellant.
No. 10-4224. Appeals, United States Court Tenth Circuit. 7, 2012.
Feb.
Benjamin McMurray, Assistant Federal (Steven Defender, UT, City, Salt Lake B. Killpack, Utah Federal Defender and Scott Wilson, Defender, Keith Assistant Federal brief), him Appellant. on the for the *2 committed the base offense deported and Backman, States Assistant United Dave (Carlie reentry. UT, illegal of City, Lake Attorney, Salt Attorney, with Christensen, United States undisputed are The relevant facts brief), Appellee. for the him on the was convicted uncomplicated. Mr. Rosales trafficking felony in 2008 drug a state of HOLLOWAY, GORSUCH, Before days’ imprison- to 90 state and sentenced MeKAY, Judges. Circuit Ro- years probation. and 3 of ment illegally reen- deported was and then sales HOLLOWAY, Judge. Circuit country, violating the terms tered the Raul Rosales-Gar- Defendant-Appellant and 8 U.S.C. 1326. probation his state (Rosales) count of guilty to one pled da arrested Mr. Ro- Federal law enforcement of 8 U.S.C. reentry violation illegal illegally reentered shortly after he sales to a term of was sentenced 1326 and country. Mr. Rosales’s appeal of months. On imprisonment drug offense was revoked the earlier state sentence, alleg- his challenges Mr. Rosales by a state court as result his Utah incorrectly ap- district court ing that the reentry. Upon proba- illegal Sentencing Guidelines. We plied tion, sentenced-in state Mr. Rosales was to the district court REMAND agree. We of 1 to 15 imprisonment court to a term resentencing. prior drug felony. After years on his state sentence, drug Mr. Ro- serving his state I custody into federal sales was released illegal for his prosecuted Guide- in federal court § 2L1.2 is the USSG reentry. agreed plead Mr. Rosales to defendants provision applicable lines charge part of the country guilty in viola- to the federal reenter the illegally who Ac- sentencing program. fast-track 1326. The District Utah’s tion of 8 U.S.C. Probation Of- imposes, cordingly, §in via the United States embodied scheme Report a Presentence prepared defendant’s base of- fice enhancements (“PSR”) his level, before Mr. Rosales entered punishment more severe fense guilty plea. committed serious who have defendants trafficking felony A is drug crimes. Ro- recommended that Mr. The PSR offense. predicate as one such enumerated offense level enhanced sales’s base length on the Depending pursuant levels USSG trafficking drug for the earlier 2L1.2(b)(l)(A). During subject a 12- or felony, the defendant prosecution’s permis- hearing and with reentry illegal on his 16-level enhancement sion, objected to the 16-level Mr. Rosales imposed” for If the “sentence sentence. alleged government enhancement. crime exceeded drug trafficking the earlier upon revoca- Rosales’s sentence that Mr. months, subject to the the defendant is constituted a state tion of his set out enhancement 16-level felony for which the 2L1.2(b)(l)(A). 13 months. imposed exceeded Rosales contended us on Mr. posed before question
The sole comport did not the 16-level enhancement enhance- the 16-level appeal is whether for the sole 2L1.2(b)(l)(A) Sentencing Guidelines to with the applies ment USSG imposed” did that the “sentence for an earlier reason whose sentence a defendant he commit- months at the exceed 13 time longer made trafficking was illegal reentry. offense of ted the base the defendant than 13 months after Ruiz-Gea, right appeal Mr. Rosales reserved (10th Cir.2003). Ruiz-Gea, application of the 16-level enhancement. In we found plain error in the district appli- court’s rejected The district court Mr. Rosales’s enhancement, cation of the 16-level but *3 argument applied the 16-level en- explicitly difficulty noted the of the issue PSR, as recommended in the hancement litigants invited future to address the advisory resulting range in an Guidelines question proper preservation after judge of months. The district 37 to 46 the district court. Id. at 1188. ultimately pris- Mr. Rosales to a sentenced If on of 37 months. the district court preserved term Mr. Rosales this issue applied had the 12-level enhancement un- district court proceedings, so here we must 2L1.2(b)(l)(B) § der instead of the 16- apply de novo review to the district court’s enhancement, says level as Mr. Rosales of the Guidelines. Because our have, range the Guidelines would opinion in Ruiz-Gea held that the defen- appeal, have been to 30 months. On argument dant’s “plausible” was at least challenges procedural Mr. only Rosales rea- resolved the ground case on the sentence, claiming sonableness of his err, plainly the district court did not improperly the district court applied the in this case we must set out anew Sentencing Guidelines. reviewing § application. 2L1.2’s
Ruiz-Gea,
II B A The Guidelines issue properly ju- The district court exercised case, 2L1.2(b)(l), § provides USSG as fol- involving risdiction over this case a crime lows: against pursuant the United States to 18 “If previously the defendant deport- was § jurisdiction U.S.C. 3231. We have over (A) ed ... felony after a conviction for appeal of the district court’s final sen- that is ... a drug trafficking offense tencing pursuant decision to 28 U.S.C. which the sentence imposed exceeded 13 3742(a)(2). § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. ..., months increase [the base offense ” de novo a review district level] levels.... interpretation court’s l(B)(vii) Application Note 2L1.2 de- Guidelines appellant’s argument where the fines a “sentence including properly preserved before the district “any imprisonment given term of Ford, court. ” probation.... Additionally, (10th Cir.2010). 1263,1268 makes clear that Ruiz-Gea, In United States v. we con- length of the defendant’s sentence is fronted precise issue that Mr. Rosales the maximum term imprisonment for his raises in appeal analogous words, factual prior offense. In other when the circumstances, only but there reviewed for range earlier sentence is for a plain objec- error because the defendant’s years, the term of imprisonment is the tion to the 16-level enhancement was not maximum end of that range, purposes preserved Thus, in the district court. United 2L1.2.1 Mr. Rosales’s ultimate 1. We note that the recent 2011 predi- Amendments offense level increase if the defendant's to the Guidelines altered the substance of cate conviction does not count for criminal by reducing magnitude history points Chapter under Four. U.S.S.G. deporta- § 2L1.2 to refer to the date is a years 1 to 15 sentence of state evaluating whether purposes prison sentence 15-year exceeded 13 imposed” for § 2L1.2. months. challenges the use of Mr. Rosales it was not because year sentence his 15 words, we conclude that In other the base he committed until temporal requirement contained In other 1326. in 8 U.S.C. offense to the defen 2L1.2 with text us to count
words, Rosales asks impo applies also dant’s conviction im that was trafficking sentence for that conviction. of his sentence sition *4 illegally he reentered posed before interpreta with the This view is consistent country. adopted by § 2L1.2 the Seventh foremost, carefully we focus First and Lopez, v. 634 F.3d in United States Circuit consequences on the (7th disposi Our ultimate 948 in its the word “after” use of Commission’s in with results reached tion is consistent Rosales, this to Mr. According provision. circuits, sibling though we three of our that all the elements choice means word circuit has held to the recognize that one 2L1.2(b)(l) § enhancements —convic- v. Bus contrary. Compare United States for a imposition of sentence tion and (5th tillos-Pena, 863, 612 F.3d Cir. occur trafficking felony —must 2010) lenity and (relying on the rule of deportation earlier to the defendant’s concluding implement that “it is error to implicat- to be the enhancement order for enhancement” analo the sixteen-level view, Mr. Rosales’s Under ed. circumstances), States gous factual United 2L1.2(b)(l)(A) enhancement 16-level (7th Cir.2011) 948, 950 v. 634 F.3d him since the 15 apply not plainly does (“We later sen defendant’s] that [the hold drug trafficking felo- for his year sentence after his de probation revocation tence on illegal before his reen- ny imposed not reentry should not count portation and try. 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)(i).”), and under section Guzman-Bera, 2L1.2(b)(l) v. re- States makes United The text of Cir.2000) an (applying (“imposed”; tense past use of the peated 2L1.2(b)(l)(A) “exceeded”) when earlier version referring predicate the defendant had determining whether serving as felony sentence drug trafficking felony and con enhancement, aggravated an implying committed an basis -illegal cluding post-deportation that a must have been previous sentence that the not reentry lengthening “should reference.2 sentence some date of imposed before purposes for enhancement have been used undisputed it is defen- Because 2L1.2(b)(l)(A)”), under U.S.S.G. must have occurred prior conviction dant’s Compres-Paulino, v. Ro- agree with Mr. deportation, before curiam) (2d Cir.2004) (per of F.3d logical reading the most sales C, Ill, (Nov. "imposed” "exceeded” as re- the use App. Amendment 754 Vol. ferring judge to 2011). argued that this has not Mr. Rosales sentencing. Dis- date of imposed before the apply to him. change might benefit or While such a read- senting op. at 1356-57. plausible, the reasons ing may argues indeed eloquently part, the dissent 2. For its agree opinion, we cannot in this elaborated verb tense selection is Commission’s that the “equally” plausible as under- as Specifically, the that it is helpful. dis- particularly standing we set forth. "equally plausible" to read suggests sent illegally “defendant reen- (holding that the to limit the to only enhancement those having tered the United States been defendants who had their sentence in- of a convicted offense for they creased committed the base which the sentence exceeded 13 illegal reentry, they offense of would have analogous factual months” circum- picked myriad one of words more stances) (internal omitted). quotations than “any” restrictive for use in the rele- Jimenez, also vant note. per- We are not (9th Cir.2001) 1120, 1126-27 (stating suaded. presence dictum that vel non of an importantly, commentary Most sim- aggravated felony purposes of 2L1.2 ply temporal does not address the con- statutory turns on whether the elements of straint at the crux of appeal. Invoca- “prior such were met to ... de- tion of the “relation back” doctrine for portation reentry”). increased sentences government argues probation, required by commentary, supports its inter is not inconsistent with understanding our pretation provision. disagree. *5 temporal constraint embodied in the defer to the Commission’s § text of 2L1.2. any reference to expressed view as the un commentary sort of temporal constraint in the relevant manifestly less inconsistent with the portion commentary 2L1.2’s is that Guidelines themselves. United States v. the meaning of “sentence imposed” is Rendon-Alamo, (10th 1307, 621 F.3d 1309 “without to the date of the convic- Cir.2010). Like the Seventh Circuit tion.” interpret We do not this as an Lopez, we conclude that the commentary exception temporal limitation that does support government’s not the con we have concluded is embedded in struction of 2L1.2. See 634 F.3d Instead, § 2L1.2. phrase the “without re- at 953. gard to the date of conviction” simply in- particular We owe no deference to the consider, 2L1.2, structs in applying § us to commentary in this case it because does all of the defendant’s prior convictions to not, despite government’s the contrary illegal reentry, no matter how far in protestations, temporal alter the constraint See, past they the e.g., occurred. United inherent in 2L1.2.3 Seeking persuade to Olmos-Esparza, 1111, States v. 484 F.3d otherwise, government us the directs us to (9th Cir.2007); 1113-14 United States v. Application l(B)(vii), Note which defines Camacho-Ibarquen, 410 F.3d 1313- the term “sentence as including (11th Cir.2005). 15 “any imprisonment term of given upon Moreover, probation.” 2L1.2, revocation of in explaining USSG the rationale for l(B)(vii) Application Note its (emphasis add- definition of imposed,” “sentence the ed). government urges a simple Sentencing Commission clarified that its “any” truism: “any.” means According to definition “is consistent with the case law government, the if the Commission wished interpreting the term [‘sentence im- (embodied 3. The dissent contends that the tary "context” of amending documents commentary, i.e. the Guidelines l(B)(vii)), Application that enacted Note "disarmingly simple” meaning makes temporal makes no mention of the con- guideline provision. Dissenting op. at implicated straint in this case. See U.S.S.G. Quite agree. 1356. We telling, cannot in our C, II, (Nov. 1, App. Vol. Amendment 658 view, explanation is the Commission’s of its - 2003); pp. at 1352 53. infra written directions contained in the commen- C, II, of the Guidelines. See pretation App. USSG Vol. posed’]....” 2003). (10th (Nov. Morris, The Com- v. Amendment support govern- Unfortunately four cases mission cited of the ment, Application Id. None proffered. pertinent Note fails definition discussed the tem- implicated or temporal four cases make reference to the to appeal. 2L1.2(b)(l) at issue poral constraint restraint embodied —that Moreno-Cisneros, 319 v. United States imposition conviction of sen- Cir.2003) (9th (holding that must defendant ille- tence occur imposed” exceeded “sentence country. not gally reenters We are received where the defendant 13 months grounds commentary on ignoring revocation of an increased it is in conflict with the Guidelines prior to the defendant’s probation imposed themselves; instead, we find that the com- Compianr- v. deportation); United States mentary guidance no at all as offers (5th Cir.2003) (reach- Torres, F.3d 514 temporal lying constraint heart of as Moreno-Cisne- ing the same conclusion appeal. We therefore decline to con- had the defendant’s sentence ros where commentary compels clude proba- due increased been by the government. result advocated v. deportation); commentary Our conclusion of- (2d F.3d 281 Cir. Hidalgo-Macias, 300 temporal guidance re- fers curiam) 2002) (same); United States (per §in straint does render Rodriguez-Arreola, F.3d 1064 portion of the mean- relevant Cir.2002) length (establishing that If, ingless superfluous. example, *6 imposed” was maximum a probation pre-depor- is on defendant served could have term the defendant drug trafficking felony and has his tation oc- imposition of sentence only where increased sentence deporta- prior to curred is deported, he the com- probation before tion). Notably, the made Commission that mentary post-revocation clarifies his Guzman- reference United sentence, clearly satisfy the which would (11th Cir.2000) Bera, (per F.3d 1019 §in temporal restraint curiam), ad- explicitly which did a case calculating in his enhancement included temporal con- recognize the dress and in hypothetical The result this ex- level. § 2L1.2 both in straint in- is not at all obvious without the ample sentencing, albeit conviction and offered the com- terpretive guidance The felony temporal context. aggravated mentary §to 2L1.2. in- imposition of constraint for sentences plainly recog- §in 2L1.2 had been herent interpretation of also note that our We the 2003 nized pur- § 2L1.2 is with its overall Guzman-Bera —before consistent were enacted. Commis- amendments part as of Guidelines pose ignored matter sion nevertheless pur- that parties agree scheme. The involving pre-depor- only cases referenced 2L1.2(b)(l) punish illegal of is to pose in its 2003 tation revocations severely reentry more where defen- amendment. has one more certain dant committed (in case, a enumerated crimes had, in its commen-
If the Commission felony). The method for drug trafficking itself, least tary or 2L1.2 addressed or at determining the seriousness that constraint temporal mentioned clearly nu- case, would, is we has arisen in Mr. Rosales’s prescribed length of the merically inter- course, great to its give deference —the is substantially punish- the earlier crime determi- face more increased sentence for degree native of the of enhancement— solely happenstance ment because of the provides it ultimately even a though that.his state revoked be- rough of seriousness. The Com- measure prosecution fore his federal commenced. view, is, straight- in our approach mission’s by This concern has also shared been received a long forward: if defendant Fifth and Seventh Circuits. trafficking a drug crime be- Bustillos-Pena, States v. deported, probably he fore he was (5th Cir.2010); 867-68 United States v. drug offender and we therefore serious Lopez, 634 F.3d 951-52 severely subsequent more his punish must possibility anomaly is not motivat- ( n ie. sentencing) post-increased illegal Guidelines,” ing us to prac- “rewrite the reentry.4 agree with Mr. Rosales against tice which we admonished Unit- not intend the Commission did consider- Dozier, ed States v. as a imposed ation of a sentence result of (10th Cir.2009). Instead, simply we bol- (in case, post-deportation actions ille- conclusion, ster grounded our which is gally reentering country), if even tech- text, by acknowledging Guidelines nically part punishment as it avoids needless and nonsensical aberrant process felony. for an earlier results. illegally Mr. act of reentering Rosales’s Although dispositive to our resolu- country reveals about nothing the seri- hand, tion of the issue at find it note- trafficking his drug ousness of conviction worthy Commission at the time he violated 8 1326. It U.S.C. despite has failed to amend purpose would be inconsistent with the holdings Circuits, of the Fifth and Seventh 2L1.2—whose text draws distinction interpreted § have 2L1.2 in post-illegal reentry between pre- ac- urged tions—to manner proba- consider revocation Rosales. We do not resulting go from the base offense of as far as characterizing Commis- illegal reentry measuring the serious- sion’s silence on the matter affirmative *7 ness of earlier drug trafficking felony. positions circuits, assent to the of these especially that given split the circuit on acknowledge
We
that our decision is
pronounced
this issue has
become
squarely in conflict with the Second Cir-
quite recently;
opinion
the Fifth Circuit’s
in
holding
cuit’s
v. Compres-
Bustillos-Pena,
2010,
in
in July
issued
Paulino,
(2d Cir.2004) (per
1355
of the evidence. Harmless
interpreta
preponderance
issue of
this narrow
silence on
an
that
dispositive
is defined as
error
“did not
necessarily
error
constitutes
and Seventh Cir
the district court’s selection
with
Fifth
affect
agreement
Keck,
imposed.”
F.3d at
disagreement with the Second
798
cuits and
Nevertheless,
Labastida-Segura,
the Commission’s
(citing United States
Circuit.
Cir.2005)).
pro
1140,
issue—the 2011
Hav-
failure to address this
amendments,
April
submitted
error
posed
argue
failed
ing
harmless,
of it—offers
govern-
make no mention
court was
district
support
of further
least a modicum
has not met its burden.
ment
Fifth
and Seventh Circuits’
notion that
has
that he is
Mr. Rosales
conceded
is not incon
construction
12-level
subject
to the
enhancement
intention.
the Commission’s
sistent with
2L1.2(b)(l)(B).
district
court
States,
v. United
U.S.
Braxton
Cf.
guidelines
recalculate
Rosales’s
(1991)
348, 111
Happily, our role isn’t to grade discussing is not grammar, meaning. only discern the And train, next car in prepositional a speaker’s meaning often can be clear that, even the one after but two modifying grammar even when his isn’t. know phrases away. from context what child means when (because talking the telescope about back- parenthetical punctuation ground us, knowledge tells say, grammatical serves accentuate the am- telescope child has a hill the man and (A) biguity. “[D]eported ... a con- after — not). do explains Context likewise what felony” for a us in viction tells no uncertain (because, getting is newspaper terms that the deportation has to come example, first sentence of the article felony after a conviction. But then makes clear the brothers each hadn’t seen felony of both nature and its sentence other in years). gram- Even when the appear separate, punctuationally a pro- gnarled, meaning mar’s can often nounced, (i) “that subsection: is straightforward enough. trafficking offense for the sentence And that well describes case. At imposed exceeded 13 months.” Here blush, first might one wonder whether (“after”) again the time specification only a conviction separated, just not grammatically now but precede deporta- must by punctuation, also from the “sentence tion—or whether conviction and the imposed.” imposition full of a 13 month sentence Neither does tense help verb much. must predate deportation. both The True, guideline asks us whether the grammar language guideline “sentence exceeded thirteen supply support before us ample months,” past but the use of the tense does for each of these competing readings. necessarily mean that a defendant’s But, life, as with much in when we bother sentence must have exceeded 13 months at (the to consult the directions relevant con- deportation. the time The guidelines *9 of case), text in appears this what at first are, all, after aby written confusing proves disarmingly simple. sentencing judge. federal equally And it’s First, jumble the though, parts of that plausible phrase referring to read this as creates the confusion. imposed to sentence before the time of phrase
The prepositional sentencing reentry the focus illegal that’s the federal of our attention —“for reading which the sentence case. This finds further support course, contrary arguments can be— introduces Of guideline fact that the in the guide- been—made about trigger and have the needed to type of conviction But, mind, meaning. my to a careful line’s present tense with the enhancement only serves confirm inspection of them to that suggests a conviction “is.” This verb of the district court’s the correctness if it is—at qualify for enhancement might course. the district court sentences the time trafficking offense defendant —“a say guideline that is “most Some imposed the sentence exceeded naturally” require read to the “sentence
months.”
(or,
deportation
to
a
imposed”
come “after”
presumably, after the defendant remained
can’t
open the box and find we
we
When
See,
country illegally).
e.g.,
United
flowing
parts
of
make sense
the cascade
Bustillos-Pena,
it,
helps
sometimes it
consult
Cir.2010);
(5th
Maj. Op.
seq.
at 1351 et
directions. And here
accompanying
seen,
Yet,
just
as we have
the commis-
commentary on
sentencing commission’s
grammar
punctuation indepen-
sion’s
—
just
provides
apply
guidelines
its
how
dently
together
suggest
plausi-
—
commentary
The
we need.
guidance
ble,
reading
alternate
that the
time
“after”
calculating
us that
expressly instructs
conviction,
applies only
limit
not the
“length
imposed”
of the sentence
—in
where,
here,
imposed. And
a
the sentence
determining whether
guideline
susceptible
plausible
two
include
13 months —we must
exceeded
readings, it is the commission in its com-
upon
imprisonment given
“any term
mentary,
opinion,
not
court in its
that
parole,
super-
or
probation,
revocation
say
natu-
gets to
what
“most
Applica-
vised release.” USSG
Supreme
means.
has
rally”
Court
added).
l(B)(vii)
(emphasis
Note
emphasized just
in-
repeatedly
point,
account
for some
“any” tells us to
not
term
structing
that the
commission’s
“every”
revocation sentences but
commentary
ambiguities in the
resolving
sentences, “of
“all”
revocation
or
must be treated as “authorita-
guidelines
In-
kind.”
New
Webster’s Third
whatever
States,
tive.” Stinson v. United
508 U.S.
(2002).
Dictionary 97
ternational
36, 38,
113 S.Ct.
a conviction. speak question tary doesn’t And felony drug trafficking offense. commentary They suggest that us. must result a sentence that offense only applying guideline that in tells us figuring than But in greater 13 months. may look to “all of courts now be reentry.” of the sentence can length illegal to his convictions 1352-54; 1352; include terms “any that we must see also id. at Maj. Op. sure revocation States v. imprisonment given cf. parole, supervised problem release.” But the probation, 952-53 case, course, argument is that into In this means reads commentary limiting language simply eligible for a sentenc- was indeed Rosales say eventually, there. The does In total and isn’t ing enhancement. includes his sentence for illegal reentry.” “prior to his the district time served 13 months. So well exceeded exactly fact, commentary tells us *10 In the should affirmed. got right and be 1358 that, It when cal- fences when opposite. altogether trying instructs to measure
culating the sentence im- “length of the seriousness defendant’s offense. account of “any we are to take posed,” view, long rejected precisely We’ve given upon of imprisonment term revoca- explaining that defendant “[a] who does direction plain tion.” And that tells us all by probation not abide terms of his ... we need to know.1 that he should not have demonstrate^] given place” been the first
Retreating
language of
from the
and
the full
commentary,
prison
merits instead
term he
guideline
say
and
some
is
policy
(eventually) required
better
to
by
sound
would be
served
serve. United
Ruiz-Gea,
limiting
2L1.2’s enhancement
to de- States v.
340
1186
F.3d
(10th Cir.2003)
omitted).
fendants who were sentenced to more than
(quotation
deportation.
thirteen
to
months
say
Some
that restricting our attention
Only
prison time,
pre-deportation
the ar-
to
time
to
served
the defendant’s
gument goes, is a
measure
valid
of the
(or
deportation
unlawfully
remaining
underlying
seriousness of
felony.
country)
necessary
is
to avoid “disparate”
Post-deportation revocation sentences are
treatment
similarly
between
indi-
situated
only “technically
part
of the
Maj. Op.
1351;
viduals. See
at
Bustillos-
1354;
felony.” Maj. Op. at
“earlier
Bustil-
Pena,
867-68;
F.3d at
F.3d
los-Pena,
867; Lopez,
612 F.3d at
at 952. On this line of
it is
thinking,
however,
argument,
at
951. This
unjust
that the
sentencing
of a
simply mistakes our
role. Sentencing
might
enhancement
turn on whether state
may
vary
courts
of course choose to
or federal officials happen to collar the
guidelines,
but that doesn’t mean we
defendant
objection
first. But this
once
may rewrite them or their commentary to
again
mistakes
nature of our role
our penological preferences.
suit
See
interpreting
guidelines, failing
abide
Dozier,
United States v.
the fact
possibility
that “the
of anomalous
(10th Cir.2009). Neither,
for that
results is
reason to”
no[ ]
rewrite the sen-
matter, is it
why prudent
clear
penological
tencing
guidance.
commission’s
See Dozi-
policy would distinguish
pre-
between
er,
Neither,
2050, 124 (quotation L.Ed.2d 138 omitted). And, marks and alterations just taking that’s our case after again, commission’s into account the (authoritative) in its commen- directions SHERROD, Plaintiff-Appellee, Curtis tary. v. then, objec- the common ways
In these JOHNSON, in this Defendant- to the district court’s course Dr. Arthur tions case, best, Appellant. nothing at to call it into do worst, they actually tend at question and,— Individually Sherrod, Curtis right to confirm that district Surya Sherrod, on behalf target. on Plaintiff-Appellee, Still, observation, really plea, one final v. assistance, syntactical is in or- plea meaning Though guideline’s der. Crutchfield, Defendant- Gloria commission’s com- comes clear Appellant.
mentary, getting around the fact there’s 10-11804, Nos. 10-11876. prepositional snarl of guideline’s tie circuit managed to us phrases has Appeals, Court of United States the provision knots. Some read judges Eleventh Circuit. do, Compres- I see Jan. 2012. (2d Cir.2004) Paulino, Bustillos-Pena, curiam); (per (Clement, J., dissenting); others
869-70