Bеfore us are the separate appeals of defendants/appellants from their respective conviсtions on substantive charges of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, which, in pertinent part, provides:
18 U.S.C. § 2314. Transportation of stolen goods, securities, moneys, fraudulent Statе tax stamps, or articles used in counterfeiting
“Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent transports in interstate ... commerce any falsely made, [or] forged securities ..., knowing the same to have been falsely made [or] forged ... [s]hall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisоned not more than ten years, or both.
They also appeal from their joint convictions of a charge of consрiracy to violate the aforesaid 18 U.S.C. § 2314.
In these appeals defendants contest their respective convictiоns on the ground that the indictment setting forth these charges (Counts Two and Five — Ronnie D. Drew) and (Counts Three, Four and Six — Duane Drew) fails to include the statutory language “with unlawful or fraudulent intent,” and that this omission so taints the respective substantive convictions that they must be overturned.
Of course, the defendants also seek reversal- of their joint conspiracy convictions under Count One (18 U.S.C. 371 — conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. 2314), in that the language in Count One is identical to the language in Counts Two through Six, in omitting the statutory language “with unlawful or fraudulent intent.”
The Government replies that although the Indictment does not include the precise statutory language “with unlawful or fraudulent intent,” nevertheless the Counts do include charges that the defendants performed the prohibited activities “knowingly and wilfully” and that the defendants well knew the securities to have been falsely made, and forged. The Government, therefore, contends that the language of the Indictment was sufficient to adequately apрrise the defendants of the charges against them, such that they were able to fully prepare their defenses. We agree.
While an indictment may be insufficient if it fails to allege an essential element of the offense,
United States v. Keith,
*553
In
Keith, supra,
the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter. The indictment, tracking the words of the applicable statute
verbatim,
chаrged that the defendant had operated his vehicle “without due caution and circumspection.” The usual legal implicаtions of this phrase is that of mere negligence.
Keith,
In our case, the indictment does not track the words of the statute
verbatim.
The indictment’s language doеs, however, carry with it the precise intendment of the elements of the statute. The legal definition of the word “wilful” in the criminal context includes a specific intent to do an act forbidden by law. E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice & Instructions § 14.06 (3rd ed. 1977); Black’s Law Dictionary 1434 (5th ed. 1979);
Screws
v.
United States,
In contrast, the phrase from the indictment in
Keith,
“without due cautiоn and circumspection,” “has not been consistently defined by judicial decision to include the knowledge requirement of § 1112.”
Beсause the indictment here states in both legal and common terms the implicit requirement made explicit in the statute, we find it to bе sufficient.
We further find that the indictment, when taken together with the thorough and comprehensive instructions by the trial Court, clearly and сompletely set forth the essential elements of the offenses charged so that the jury could and did understand that the phrasе “with unlawful or fraudulent intent” was an essential element of those offenses. 1
*554 Accordingly, we hold that the language of the Indictment wаs sufficient to put the defendants on notice of the charges against them, and when coupled with the Court’s instructions adequately informed the jury of the requisite elements of the offenses charged. The appeals of both defendants are thus lacking in merit, and the judgment of the District Court must therefore be and is hereby:
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. It should be noted that here the trial Judge instructed the jury, in pertinent part, with respect to each offense charged:
Proof of a violation of Title 18 U.S.Code, Section 2314 as charged in Counts II through VI of the indictment requires the establishment of the following elements:
One, unlawful or fraudulent intent;
Two, Transportation in interstate commerce;
Three, any falsely made or forged securities with knowledge that the securities were falsely made or forged.
Each element must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial court then went on to define the words “knowingly” and “wilfully,” using the standard Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions (3d ed. 1977), §§ 14.-04 and 14.06:
An act is done “knowingly” if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or аccident or other innocent reason.
The purpose of adding the word “knowingly” was to insure that no one would be conviсted for an act done because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.
As stated before, with respect to an offense such as charged in this case, specific intent must be proved beyond a reasonable dоubt before there can be a conviction. Id., at § 14.04
* * * * * *
An act or a failure to act is “wilfully” done if done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids, or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey the law or to disregard the law. Id., at 14.06
*554 Finally, the trial Court gave a definitive instruction on “with intent tо defraud”:
To act “with intent to defraud” means to act wilfully and with the specific intent to deceive or cheat, ordinarily for thе purpose of either causing some financial loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to one’s self. However, the evidence in the case need not establish that the United States or any person is actually defrauded; only that the accused acted with the intent to defraud. Id., § 16.05.