United States v. Ronald Wright

423 F. App'x 515

6th Cir.

2011

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Docket

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-3791.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

May 13, 2011.

642 F.3d 515

Before: MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; GRAHAM, District Judge.*

* The Honorable James L. Graham, Senior United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

the issue. Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 584-85. Nor does Carson offer any evidence that Abruzzo was motivated by racial animus, or indeed had any racial animus, in making the decision to discharge Carson. In the final analysis, Carson has offered no evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the company discharged him on account of his race.

III.

For these reasons, we affirm.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronald WRIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-3791.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

May 13, 2011.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge.

Ronald Wright challenges his classification as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Relying on binding precedent, we affirm.

Wright pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. In calculating his sentence, the district court determined (1) that he was subject to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), requiring a statutory minimum of 180 months, and (2) that his guidelines range was 180-210 months. The court imposed a 180-month sentence.

On appeal, Wright argues that neither of his two fourth-degree burglary convictions under Ohio law, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2911.12(A)(4), amounted to a “violent felony” under ACCA. Wright did not raise the objection below, and accordingly plain error applies.

No plain error occurred because there was no error. In United States v. Skipper, 552 F.3d 489, 492-93 (6th Cir.2009), we held that a conviction under the same Ohio law amounts to a “crime of violence” under the career offender designation in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. See also United States v. McBee, 364 Fed.Appx. 991 (6th Cir.2010) (same). Because, as relevant here, “we treat a ‘crime of violence’ under § 4B1.1(a) of the guidelines the same as a ‘violent felony’ under [ACCA],” United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 421 (6th Cir.2009), Skipper governs this case.

In asking us to overrule (or sidestep) Skipper, Wright asks us to do what we cannot. Only the en banc process, a material intervening Supreme Court decision or a relevant change to the guidelines or ACCA would permit us to override Skipper. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 319 (6th Cir.2010); see also 6th Cir. R. 206(c). Nor does Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 129 S.Ct. 687, 172 L.Ed.2d 484 (2009), decided the same day as Skipper, count as intervening Supreme Court precedent. Chambers asked whether a statutory offense could contain multiple categories of offenses, and Wright does not argue that Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.12(A)(4) presents a categorization problem. His complaint about Skipper goes to its application of Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), which the Supreme Court decided nine months before Skipper.

Because the district court properly sentenced Wright to the statutory minimum sentence, his reasonableness challenge is also meritless. See United States v. Higgins, 557 F.3d 381, 398 (6th Cir.2009).

For these reasons, we affirm.