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United States v. Ronald Joseph Kurka, United States of America v. David Lee Combs
818 F.2d 1427
9th Cir.
1987
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*1 America, STATES of UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee, KURKA, Joseph

Ronald

Defendant-Appellant. America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, COMBS, Lee

David

Defendant-Appellant. 86-3064, 86-3065.

Nos. Appeals, Court of

Ninth Circuit.

Argued Nov. and Submitted June

Decided Or., Bachers, Eugene, D.

Marianne Lerner, Portland, Or., for defend- Kenneth ant-appellant Kurka.

1428 Or., Eugene, Phillips, crime,

Michael V. for de- an essential element of the it then fendant-appellant Combs. was essential that both the indictment and jury instructions included that element. Sutherland, Or., Eugene,

James L. for plaintiff-appellee. II. INTERPRETATION OF 18

U.S.C. 33§ September On a grand jury indicted Kurka and Combs under 18 U.S.C. ANDERSON, Before and HUG states, 33 and 2. 18 U.S.C. 33 §§ § CANBY, Judges. Circuit pertinent part: HUG, Judge: Circuit Destruction Motor Vehicles or Motor convicted, Appellant Combs was under Vehicle Facilities (1982), criminal statute U.S.C. § Whoever willfully, with intent to endan- damaged, having disregard with reckless ger the safety any person on board or life, safety for the human motor ve- anyone he who believes will board the hicle in Appellant interstate commerce. same, or with a disregard convicted, Kurka was under 18 U.S.C. § life, safety damages, of human dis- (1982), having aided abetted Combs ables, destroys, tampers with violating 33. dispositive 18 U.S.C. The § used, motor vehicle is operated, presented on appeal issue “will- whether employed in interstate or com- ful” vehicles an essen- merce ... shall be fined not more than proscribed by tial element of the crime $10,000 imprisoned not more than U.S.C. The indictment did not § twenty years, or both. the vehicle been The indictment read as follows: done and the instructions to the jury require finding did not such a in order On or August about in the Dis- to convict defendants. Oregon, We hold that trict of RONALD JOSEPH willful to a motor vehicle is an KURKA and DAVID LEE COMBS de- proscribed herein, did, essential element of the crime fendants awith reckless dis- and, therefore, by 18 U.S.C. regard safety life, we re- for the of human dam- judgment vehicle, verse the both age conviction for a motor bus defendants. Greyhound Corporation, being then

operated, in interstate Portland, Oregon commerce from to San I. FACTS Francisco, by firing California two rifle presented by The evidence the Govern- bus; at all shots said violation Title Combs, ment was .that Kurka and after a Code, Sections 33 and party, carrying passen- beer followed a bus gers in interstate commerce. Kurka was The above indictment omits the word the driver and passenger Combs was the “willfully.” appellants moved to dis- pickup Kurka’s truck. Combs took a rifle ground miss the indictment on the that it gun from the rack of the truck and fired allege to the bus the rifle at the on two separate bus occa- willfully. was inflicted The motion was sions, hitting the bus both times. given by denied. The jury instructions convincing Government introduced judge district also omitted the element of evidence that Combs had at shot the bus willfulness. and, aid, damaged willfully. Kurka’s However, it is fatal to a if question presented conviction all of is whether a statute, the elements of a crime have not been can be convicted under the he, jury on if disregard instructed those with reckless for the elements, regardless life, merely damaged of human has adduced. a motor Thus, vehicle, he, if vehicle is whether with reckless dis- board; (2) will be on if will- believes he for the

regard fully damaged a vehicle in com- damaged motor vehicle. disregard a reckless for human our attention merce with been called to No cases have Thus, issue, nor have we discov- Government would have that discuss that first, prove, willfully damaged he any. ered *3 vehicle, prove and also that he either inten- Language tionally endangered persons A. the Statute on board or of disregard safety a for the of reckless language used We first look to the actual life. human grammatical construction and the statute. Interpretation 3. Government’s Interpretation The Government reads the statute as Magistrate’s

1. follows: magistrate, of The recommendation the (willfully, to Whoever with the intent adopted by the district court which safety person the endanger any of on dismiss, to stated: denying the motion anyone he board or believes will board charges defend- indictment same,) (with or disregard the a reckless disregard for acted with reckless ants life,) safety damages for the of human safety human life and therefore the of any op- motor vehicle which is ... of 18 charges a violation sufficiently erated, or in interstate com- fact, a 33. In willful action U.S.C. § ____ merce inconsistent action seem a reckless Defendant's motion to dis- definition. its brief to Government seems miss ... should be denied. point argue at one that the word “willful- inconsistent, are mental states not two “endanger ly” safety any modifies the of however, willful intent relates because the person merely and thus a ...” is redundant vehicle, to and the reck- damage to the endanger of to expression the intent to the risk to human lessness relates safety any person. Grammatically, such Congress to It is not at all inconsistent for possible. is If “will- this construction not required a willful intent to have modify “endanger” to fully” were would damages act a before an the vehicle provide “willfully endangers.” to have ... endangers recklessly hu- motor vehicle and Therefore, only way statute punished by years man life can be grammatically, be read as bracketed could prison. above, “willfully” modifying the is with Appellants’Interpretation this con- vehicle. Under struction, clause, which would re- the first interpretation of the statute can be This endanger quire an actual intent to the safe- readily seen the insertion of brack- more board, ty require also of those on would ets: vehicle; whereas, damage to the “willful” (with willfully, the intent to en- Whoever clause, requires only a the second which safety any person danger the on board life, disregard for human would reckless anyone he believes will board the or only damage the vehicle and not require same, disregard a for or with reckless would be a most damage. This life,) safety damages human result, greater threat to peculiar where the used, operat- any motor vehicle which is “intent,” life, require would willful human ed, employed in interstate or or vehicle, lesser threat commerce____ life, “reckless,” require would to human statute, interpretation this Under not “will- vehicle and urged by appellants, person damage. ful” (1) willfully if he would violate the statute sec- symmetry An examination commerce damaged a vehicle apparent that the Govern- safety 33 makes it endanger the tion intent to with the the intended interpretation was not anyone he ment’s any or who person on board Willfully construction of the statute. Section 33 opera- disables driver or set forth in as follows: vehicle, full tor such a “with like in- tent.” motor 33. Destruction vehicles or vehicle facilities If the require did not with intent to en- plus willful pre- the vehicle any danger on board scribed intent of intentionally or recklessly anyone he who believes will board the endangering phrase then the same, or disregard “with like intent” in the succeeding two life, damages, of human dis- paragraphs point no reference ables, destroys, tampers with, places meaningless. and would be apparent It is placed explosive or causes phrase “with like intent” refers to in, upon, other destructive substance the threat to human life mentioned in the *4 to,

in any proximity motor vehicle which paragraph. first or in operated, inter- commerce, foreign cargo state or or its Legislative B. History or intended material used or to be used legislative history confirms that its operation; connection with or “willful” to the vehicle is an essen- intent, Whoever with like tial element of the original crime. The damages, disables, to, destroys, sets fire Senate was designed bill to deal with will- with, tampers places or or causes to be ful damage to or aircraft aircraft facilities. placed any explosive or other destructive 1472, 8, Report, See Senate No. Feb. in, upon, proximity any substance or in to (To 2972). accompany S. The House bill terminal, structure, garage, supply, or included “willful” to motor ve- facility of, operation used or in hicles or motor vehicle facilities. See of, support operation motor ve- Report 1895, 15, (To House No. Mar. engaged hicles interstate or accompany 319), Cong. H.R. U.S.Code & commerce or makes otherwise or causes 1956, p. Admin.News pro- Both bills unworkable, property such to be made only scribed “willful” conduct. The House unusable, use; or hazardous to work or then amended S. 2972 and it was sent to the Conference Committee of the two Whoever, intent, like dis- wording Houses. The final of the statute incapacitates ables or any per- driver or developed by was the Conference Commit- son employed in op- connection with the point tee. at this wording was eration or maintenance of the motor ve- 33, of section here in hicle, any or in way ability lessens the issue, developed. Every provi- was other perform such to his duties as sion of pertaining the Act such; or proscribed aircraft or motor vehicles willfully attempts to do any Nothing “willful” conduct. in the Confer- of the aforesaid be acts—shall fined not Report depar- ence indicates intended $10,000 imprisoned more than not ture requirement from the twenty more than years, or both. throughout the Act. There nois indication 18 U.S.C. 33. relating in the one instance to to motor vehicles that pattern “recklessness” would the section is to punish a enough for a violation. person who See Conference 2287, 8, (To Report accompa- June No. 1. Willfully damages a motor vehicle in 2972), ny Cong. S. U.S.Code & Admin.News commerce, pre- with the 1956, 3145, pp. scribed intentionally intent of recklessly endangering human III. DEFECTIVE INDICTMENT 2. Willfully damages facility charge used in The indictment to failed

interstate commerce “with like in- vehicle tent” or it an “willful” and thus introducing testimony by The Sixth certain of the crime. from Offi- essential element cer Gorman Gorman. related Combs requires that a defendant be Amendment that, stated to him while Combs was and cause of the of “the nature informed bus, shooting at the Kurka had told Combs has Supreme Court stat- accusation.” it! Shoot it!” Kurka did “Shoot not protections which an ed that one to exclude all Combs’s seek statements guarantee is intended to mea- indictment is sought par- but to exclude this Gorman by the indictment contains sured “whether ticularly damaging statement. Neither de- the offense intended to be the elements of by fendant testified. The statements made apprises the de- sufficiently each interviews with Officer Gorman prepared he must be fendant what brought testimony were out in Officer v. United meet.” Russell Gorman. The district court instructed the L.Ed.2d 240 82 S.Ct. testimony regarding jury that “[t]he (1962). We held that “the indictment have statements made each Defendant should allege the elements the offense only against be considered that Defendant facts which inform the charged and the or which which made the statement is al- specific offense with defendant of made the leged statement. You charged.” which he is you may deciding not consider when are (9th Cir.1985). Lane, proven whether or not the Government has include the element of will- The failure to beyond a reasonable doubt that the other *5 renders the indictment consti- fulness thus has committed the crime.” Defendant A tutionally defective. correct citation to properly statement was admit compensate the statute is not sufficient to against part as of his ted Combs confes v. Housewright, for the exclusion. Givens sion. issue whether the admission 1378, (9th Cir.1986); 1381 F.2d United 786 rights of this statement violated Kurka’s as 1415, (9th 727 1418-19 Rojo, v. F.2d States secured the Confrontation Clause of the Cir.1983). Sixth Amendment. In Bruton v. United distinguishable This case is from United States, 123, 1620, 391 88 U.S. S.Ct. 20 (9th Cir.1987), 809 F.2d 579 Gray, v. States (1968), Supreme 476 L.Ed.2d the Court held that, there, in the elements of the crime rights that the confrontation of one defend but, alleged properly an incorrect his were ant were violated when codefendant’s joint trial, prosecutor confession was admitted at their was cited. The had an statute limiting despite a careful instruction. open policy, file and was not the defendant However, Evans, 74, in Dutton v. because all elements of the prejudiced 210, (1970), 27 91 L.Ed.2d 213 the S.Ct. indictment, the crime were in by a Court held that an admission cocon at the defendant was not misled. Id. testify spirator who did not did not violate case, fatally In this the indictment was pos because it the Confrontation Clause defective in that an reliability.” indicia of sessed “sufficient of Further- essential element the crime. judge case relied on four The district this more, interpretation persist- the erroneous and in factors enumerated in Dutton our throughout the trial and in the instruc- ed Morris, 761 F.2d decisions in Barker v. deny jury. was error to the tions Cir.1985), 1396, (9th denied, 1402-03 cert. motion to dismiss the indictment. — 814, U.S.-, L.Ed.2d 106 S.Ct. 88 788 Monks, (1986), and 774 United States v. IV. OTHER ISSUES (9th Cir.1985). judge The district 945 F.2d by the Because two other issues raised factors, which are: balanced those may again in the event a appellants arise 1) whether the statements are assertions retrial, we them here. address fact, 2) whether the declarant had past knowledge he relat- facts personal A. Admission Combs’s of Codefendant ed, faulty 3) possibility of recollec- Statement tion, 4) and whether circumstances misrepresen- trial, suggest Kurka filed motion in the declarant Before that the defendant's role. seeking prevent ted limine Government meaning Harrington at 952. He found the statements to be California, Id. acknowledged reliable. He asser- U.S. 89 S.Ct. 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). past tions were of fact but noted that personal speaking Combs from knowl- B. Intoxication to the Crime edge. Although Officer Gorman’s inter- Defense Aiding and Abetting incident, ten

view was months after the judge district concluded that the risk Kurka contended that he was enti faulty great recollection was not because tled an intoxication instruction. Kurka likely something this would not be Combs 2,1 was convicted under 18 U.S.C. of aid § forget. It is with the fourth factor ing abetting Combs his violation of most we concern. 18 U.S.C. 33. Because an aider and abet § punished principal, tor is as “the case, Since the time trial this — encompass the same elements as Illinois, Supreme Court decided Lee v. required would be to convict other -,U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 514 principal.”- Hernandez United (1986), light which sheds further on this (1962). Since we hold factor. The Court stated: opinion this that willfulness is an element danger type true inherent in this required proved to be under 18 U.S.C. § fact, hearsay reliability. its selective this specific makes U.S.C. 33 a intent consistently recognized, As we have Kurka, abettor, crime. as an aider and presumptive- codefendant’s confession is must also shown to have shared in the ly detailing unreliable passages as willfulness of principal, Combs. Her or culpability defendant’s conduct be- nandez, 300 F.2d at 123. passages may cause those well be the product of the codefendant’s desire to prosecution aIn a specific intent blame, favor, spread curry shift crime, voluntary precludes intoxication that himself, avenge or divert attention to requisite formation of the may intent portions If another. those of the code- be established as a defense. United States *6 purportedly “interlocking” fendant’s Echeverry, (9th Cir. significant 1985). Thus, statement which bear to voluntary intoxication aof degree on the participation high degree defendant’s may constitute a defense thoroughly in the crime are not substan- the element “willfulness.” Stenzel v. confession, States, (8th by Cir.1919). tiated the defendant’s own United 261 F. 161 poses Therefore, the statement the admission Kurka would be entitled to such too serious an instruction if the accuracy a threat evidence intoxi supports cation it. verdict to be countenanced Sixth Amendment. REVERSED. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 2064-65. ANDERSON, J. BLAINE Judge, Circuit Although the statements of Combs concurring and dissenting: do many respects, Kurka interlock in respectfully I dissent from Parts II and they important respect. differ one opinion. me, III of majority places particular Combs’s statement em overly reading strained and technical phasis on participation Kurka’s other than plain language, meaning and structure of case, as the driver. In this the inclination the statute. spread appears blame to Kurka too

great justify admission of the statement. paragraph The first U.S.C. 33§ We also conclude that statement disjunctive read in the should be and as quite damaging and could not be harm creating separate quite two distinct beyond doubt, acts, less prohibited requiring proof reasonable within the one of will- b) 1. 18 U.S.C. 2 states: causes an act to be done a) directly performed against which if him another Whoever commits an offense aids, abets, counsels, against United States or mands, com- would be an offense United commission, procures induces punishable principal. its as a punishable principal. as a requiring the other fulness and meaning and disregard.

of reckless re- plain. We are seem

facial structure of a statute their give words

quired to meaning, unless everyday

ordinary and special meaning.

Congress prescribes Riddell,

See, e.g., Malat (1966). It seems L.Ed.2d

S.Ct. engage in the unnecessary to to be

to me performed by gymnastics

grammatical just result a correct and to reach

majority

in this case. act is direct- separate prohibited safety of willfully endangering the

ed to pro- The second

anyone on the bus. board damaging a bus with

hibited act is disregard for the part of the The first the individual directed at

speaks of action to action direct- speaking second is bus, may have the

ed toward endangering the of those

effect certainly free to Congress was

on board. qualities of mens rea

adopt different separate and distinct acts.

these charged in properly defendants were by reckless with violation

the indictment part para-

disregard of the second instructed, and so jury

graph, ample evidence more than

there was jury verdict.

support the *7 WOOL, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Howard INCORPORAT

TANDEM COMPUTERS Marshall, Henry ED, Mor V. Robert C. Treybig, Defendants-

gan, and James G.

Appellees.

No. 85-2674. Appeals, Court

Ninth Circuit. Dec.

Argued Submitted 3, 1987.

Decided June

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Ronald Joseph Kurka, United States of America v. David Lee Combs
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 3, 1987
Citation: 818 F.2d 1427
Docket Number: 86-3064, 86-3065
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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