delivered the opinion, of the court.
This case has been sent here by the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Arkansas, under a certificate of division of opinion between the justices ,of that court.
It appears by the'record, that William S. Rogers, a white man, was indicted in the above-mentioned court for murder, charged to have been committed upon a certain Jacob Nicholson, also a white man, in the country now occupied and allotted by the laws of the United States to the Cherokee Indians.
The accused put in a special plea to the indictment, in which he avers, that, having beencitizen oí the United States, he, long before the offence charged is supposed to have been committed, voluntarily removed to the Cherokee country, .and made it his home, without any intention of returning to the United States, that he incorporated himself with the said tribe of Indians as one of them, and .was so treated, recognized, and-adopted by the said tribe, and the proper authorities thereof, and exercised all the rights and privileges of a Cherokee Indian in the said tribe, and was domiciled in their country ; that by these acts he becáme a citizen of the Cherokee nation, and was, and still is, a Cherokee Indian, within the,true intent and meaning of the act of Congress in that behalf made and provided; that the said Jacob Nicholson had in like manner become a Cherokee Indian, and was such at the time of the commission of the said supposed crime, within the true intent and meaning of the act of Congress in that behalf made and provided ; and that therefore the court had no' jurisdiction to cause' the defendant-to make a further or other answer-to the said indictment.
This is the substance of the plea, and to this plea the attorney for the United States demurred,, setting down the causes of demurrer which appear in the foregoing statement of the case. .
. Several questions have been propounded by the Circuit Court, which dó not arise on the plea of the accused, and some of. them we think cannot be material in the decision of the case, and need not therefore be answered by this court.
'The country in which the .crime is charged to have been committed is a part of the territory of the United States, and not with
It would be useless at this day to inquire whether the principle thus adopted is just or not; or to speak of the manner in which the power claimed was in many instances exercised. It is due to the- United States, however, to say, that while they have maintained the doctrines upon this subject which had been previously established by other nations, and insisted upon the same powers and dominion within their territory, yet, from the very moment the- general government came into existence to this time, it has exercised its power over this unfortunate race in the spirit of humanity and justice, and has endeavoured by every means in its power to enlighten their minds and increase their comforts, and to save them if possible from the consequences of their own vices. . But had it been otherwise, and were the right and the' propriety of exercising this power now open to question, yet it is a question for the law-making and political department of the government, and not for the judicial. It is our duty to expound and execute the law as we find it, and we think it too firmly and clearly established to admit of dispute, that the Indian tribes residing within the territorial limits of the United States are subject to their authority, and where the country occupied by them is not within the limits of one of the States, Congress may by law punish any offence committed there, no matter whether the offender be a white man or an Indian. Consequently, the fact that Rogers had become a member of the tribe of Cherokees is no objection to the jurisdiction of the court, and no defence to the indictment, provided the case is embraced by the provisions of the act of Congress of the 30th of June, 1834, entitled “ An act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve the peace, of the frontiers.”
By the twenty-fifth section of that act, the prisoner, if found guilty, is undoubtedly liable to punishment, unless he comes within the exception contained in the proviso, which is, that the provisions of that section “ shall not extend to crimes committed by one Indian against the person or property of another Indian.” • And' we think it very clear, that a white man who at mature age is adopted in an Indian tribe does not thereby become an Indian, and was not
. It may have been supposed, that the treaty of New Echota, made with the Cherokees in 1835, ought to have some influence upon the construction of this act of Congress, and extend the exception to all the' adopted members of the tribe. But there is nothing in the treaty in conflict with the construction we have given to the law. The fifth article of the treaty stipulates, it is true, that the United States will secure to the Cherokee nation the right, by their national councils, to make and carry into effect such .laws as they may deem necessary for thé government and protection of the persons and property within their own country, belonging to their people, or such persons as have connected' themselves with them. But a-proviso immediately follows,'that such laws shall not be inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, and such acts of Congress as had been, or might be,.passed, regulating trade and intercourse with the Indians. Now the act of Congress under which the prisoner is indicted had been passed but a few months before, ■ and this proviso in the treaty shows that the stipulation above mentioned was not intended or understood to alter in any manner its provisions, or affect its construction. Whatever obligations the prisoner may have taken upon himself by becoming a Cherokee by adoption, his responsibility tó the laws of the United States remained unchanged and undiminished. He was still a white man, of the white race, and. therefore not within the exception in the act of Congress.
■ We are, therefore, of opinion, that the matters stated in the plea of the accused do not constitute a valid Objection to the jurisdiction of the court, and. that, if he is found guilty upon the indictment, he is liable to the punishment provided by the- act of Congress before referred to, and is not within the exception in relation to Indians.
