Defendant Jupiter Lamar Rogers was charged and convicted for (1) conspiring to distribute crack-cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) possession with intent to distribute crack-cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) possessing two handguns in furtherance of a drug-trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and (4) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Defendant raises five issues on appeal. First, Defendant contends the district court erred in excluding a hotel departure record and accompanying testimony by the record’s alleged custodian. Second, Defendant argues the arresting officer illegally seized him in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Third, Defendant maintains the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions on all four counts. Fourth, Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s allegedly improper remarks during closing argument violated due process. Fifth, Defendant urges reversal based on the district court’s alleged cumulative error. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
I.
Because a jury convicted Defendant, we recount the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the Government.
See United States v. Weidner,
Officer Lindsey searched the hotel suite. He first retrieved the object he believed Defendant discarded, later identified as a sack of twenty-six crack-cocaine rocks individually packaged for sale. After making his way into the bedroom, Officer Lindsey found a woman he recognized as a local crack addict and prostitute. Officer Lindsey also noticed a razor blade covered in white residue located on the bedroom nightstand. Finally, Officer Lindsey saw an open shoe box on the bedroom desk holding a set of digital scales, two vials of POP, plastic gloves, and plastic bags containing marijuana, crack-cocaine crumbs, and a large “crack cookie.” 1 Officer Lindsey subsequently placed Robertson, Defendant, and the prostitute under arrest.
Further search of the hotel suite, which was registered under the name “Ricky Smith,” revealed seven cell phones, Pyrex measuring cups, a wire whisk, and baking powder next to the suite’s microwave oven. In the nightstand, police found two handguns, as well as ammunition. Officers later determined that one of the phones belonged to Defendant. The contact list in Defendant’s cell phone contained Robertson’s phone number. In addition, Officer Lindsey’s search of each suspects’ person revealed ninety-seven twenty-dollar bills on Robertson and seven twenty-dollar bills on Defendant, along with smaller bill denominations on both defendants. At the time, neither defendant could explain to Officer Lindsey how they obtained the money.
At trial, Officer Lindsey and Sergeant Billy Moon, an Oklahoma City narcotics officer, testified as to the significance of the evidence discovered in the hotel suite, explaining that the materials located in the hotel suite — such as the baking powder, pyrex cups, plastic gloves, and digital scales — were frequently used to manufacture crack-cocaine. In addition, both officers testified that the large number of cell phones was consistent with the common practice of drug dealers to use multiple cell phones in conducting their business. Officer Lindsey and Sergeant Moon also testified that the hotel where Defendant was arrested was a well known hotbed for drug trafficking. Sergeant Moon further testified that all of the discovered items were typical of a hotel drug trafficking operation in which a “stash” room — where the crack-cocaine is manufactured — is manned by one or two dealers. A “runner” then distributes individually packaged crack-cocaine rocks to buyers and other runners located throughout the hotel. Sergeant Moon testified that drug dealers in charge of such operations generally do not check into hotel rooms under their own names.
After the Government rested its case-in-chief, Defendant offered the testimony of Angelique Mousel, the hоtel desk clerk on duty the night of the arrest. Mousel testified that Defendant entered the hotel and engaged in conversation with her at the front desk just prior to the arrest. Mousel stated that while she was speaking with Defendant, Officer Lindsey called for Defendant from the hotel’s hallway. Mousel claimed that Defendant then walked into the hallway towards Officer Lindsey. *1136 Mousel testified that she walked over to the hallway no more than three minutes after Defendant was called by Officer Lindsey, and saw Defendant on the hallway floor in handcuffs. Despite the conflict between Mousel’s testimony and Officer Lindsey’s version of the events, the jury convicted Defendant on all counts.
II.
Defendant first argues the district court erred in excluding a hotel departurе log, as well as accompanying testimony from the hotel manager, Robert Van Raamsdonk.
2
The document indicated that “Ricky Smith” checked out of the hotel room where Defendant was arrested one day after the arrest. We review evi-dentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Pulido-Jacobo,
Because the hotel departure log was offered for its truth,
i.e.,
“Ricky Smith” checked out of the hotel room the day after the arrest, the document is hearsay.
See United States v. McIntyre,
During voir dire, Raamsdonk testified he was general manager of the hotel dur *1137 ing the time of the arrest, that the hotel was obligated to keep an accurate departure log for tax purposes, and that he was the custodian of the hotel departure log. The Government objected to the departure log and Raamsdonk’s testimony, arguing the document was hearsay and not sufficiently reliable to meet the business records exception under Rule 803(6). The Government contended the departure log at issue was different from the original log provided to investigating officers and offered by Defendant during the suppression hearing. The district court sustained the Government’s objection on the ground that the departure log was unreliable. The district court further held that the log did not meet Federal Rule of Evidence 403’s requirements because the jury already heard the room was registered to “Ricky Smith” and the document would only cause undue delay and confusion.
Given the “fact and case specific” nature of hearsay determinations, and the consequent heightened deference we afford to the district court when evaluating such determinations, we do not believe the district court abused its discretion in excluding the hotel departure log under Rule 803(6).
United States v. Trujillo,
The district court’s exclusion of the departure log is further supported by its minimal probative value to Defendant. The jury heard the hotel suite was checked out to “Ricky Smith.” Moreover, the hotel departure log does little to cast doubt оn Defendant’s presence in the hotel suite the night of the arrest. Because of the questions surrounding the departure log’s reliability and its minimal probative value, we cannot say the district court erred in excluding the hotel departure log.
See
Fed. R.Evid. 403 (“evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by ... considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence”);
see also F.D.I.C. v. Oldenburg,
III.
Defendant next alleges that he was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment when Officer Lindsey approached him in the hallway outside the hotel suite. As such, Defendant argues that all the evidence collected after the alleged seizure should have been suppressed. We review de novo “the relevant circumstances to determine whether an interaction between an individual and a law enforcement officer is a consensual encounter that does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.”
United States v. Abdenbi,
Here, Officer Lindsey was alone when he approached Defendant outside the hotel suite. Officer Lindsey did not touch Defendant, use aggressive language, brandish a weapon, or retain any of Defendant’s personal effects. The encounter did take place in the absence of any other members of the public, but “this one factor by itself does not determine whether a seizure has occurred.”
United States v. Zapata,
IV.
Defendant next argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to uphold his convictions. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.
See United States v. Bowen,
A.
We first address Defendant’s conspiracy conviction. The Government must prove four elements beyond a reasonаble doubt to sustain a conspiracy conviction.
See United States v. McCullough,
Here, the Government presented more than sufficient evidence to uphold the conspiracy conviction. Officer Lindsey approached Defendant while exiting the room of a hotel known for frequent drug-trafficking and prostitution. Lindsey testified that Defendant appeared significantly more nervous than on previous encounters. Officer Lindsey testified that he believed Defendant threw something into the corner of the hotel room — precisely where Officer Lindsey later found a sack of twenty-six crack-cocaine rocks individually packaged for sale. Officer Lindsey and Sergeant Moon both testified that Defendant’s and Robertson’s actions were consistent with a typical narcotics distribution operation run out of a hotel room. Sрecifically, a search of the hotel suite revealed numerous items used for narcotics production and distribution, including copious amounts of drugs and various drug paraphernalia. Defendant was found with over $200 in cash, including seven twenty dollar bills. Both Officer Lindsey and Sergeant Moon testified that this denomination is most frequently used in purchasing crack-cocaine. Defendant could not explain how he obtained the money. Defendant’s cell phone was located inside the hotel room and the phone contained his co-defendant Robertson’s phone number in the contact list. Finally, the jury heard that Defendant had a prior drug-trafficking conviction for participating in a nearly identical narcotics distribution operation run out of a different hotel room.
With such facts, a rational jury could reasonably infer that the hotel suite was the “stash” room — described during Sergeant Moon’s testimony — and that Defendant knowingly acted as the “runner” by distributing the crack-cocaine individually packaged for sale.
See Bowen,
*1140 B.
We next address Defendant’s conviction for possessing two handguns in furtherance of a drug-trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to connect him to the handguns found in the nightstand of the hotel suite. A violation for “pоssession in furtherance, requires the government to show that the weapon furthered, promoted or advanced a drug trafficking crime.”
United States v. Luke-Sanchez,
The handguns — a loaded .40 caliber Glock semi-automatic pistol and a .22 caliber revolver — were found in the bedroom nightstand only five feet from a shoebox containing large amounts of crack-cocaine, as well as PCP and marijuana.
See McCullough,
V.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor made improper remarks during closing argument that violated due process and warrant reversal of his conviction. Al
*1141
legations of prosecutorial misconduct are mixed questions of fact and law that require a two-step process for review.
See Pulido-Jacobo,
A.
Defendant first argues the following statement of the prosecutor at closing argument improperly invoked religious support for Defendant’s conviction: “And [Officer Lindsey] would walk in [to the hotel], as he did on this occasion, alone,
armed with a cross on his belt
and a gun on his side, into the belly of the beast like a surgeon aiming for the cancer as he came across it.” R., Tr. of Jury Trial, at 363 (emphasis added). Defendant contends that the jury would have to be voting against the cross to find him innocent. Because Defendant did not object to this statement at trial, we review only for plain error.
See United States v. Taylor,
We assume without deciding that the prosecutor’s comment about the cross was improper.
See, e.g.,
Fed.R.Evid. 610 (“Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the witness’ credibility is impaired or enhanced.”). If this was error, however, it does not rise to the level of plain error. As described in our discussion of Defendant’s insufficient evidence argument, the Government introduсed very strong evidence to support Defendant’s convictions.
See United States v. Pena,
*1142 B.
Defendant next argues that the following general narrative by the prosecutor during closing argument improperly inflamed the jury’s passions and impermissi-bly vouched for the police witnesses:
Imagine in February 2007 a family was traveling from somewhere in rural Kansas to visit Oklahoma City, to visit family, for a vacation, or maybe for business. And they had hеard about the new Bricktown development with the restaurants and the canal and the ball yard and ... looked up a motel room and found the Bricktown Suites.... And as they drove toward Oklahoma and as they drove down 1-35 past Oklahoma City’s downtown area, ... they found their hotel. They exit the interstate, walked inside, and saw drug dealers, crack addicts and prostitutes. Shocking. Absolutely shocking.... But fortunately for us it wasn’t shocking to one other group of people, for brave Oklahoma City Police Officers like Shawn Lindsey, who each and every night during the month of February made it their job to patrol those halls in an attempt to stop the drug trade, to stop the crime. And he would walk in, as he did on this occasion, alone, armed with a cross on his belt and a gun on his side, into the belly of the beast like a surgeon aiming for the cancer as he came across it.
And, more importantly, sometimes in this world, sometimes luck smiles on the good folks. As you heard how this case happened, Officer Lindsey that night got lucky and these guys just flat got caught.
A case arises most times because the community cries out and says to law enforcement, “We need help. We’ve got a problem and we feel helpless to do anything about it. We need you to come in and help us.” And an officer, like Shawn Lindsey Sergeant Moon, Sergeant McKee, they answer the call. They arrive and they say, “People of the community, we will do everything we can to hold these people responsible, we’ll do everything we can to give you piece [sic] of mind,” and they do the job and they make the arrest and they catch the guys.
R., Tr. of Jury Trial, at 361-62, 367, 373.
6
At trial, Defendant did object to this narrative as improperly inflaming the jury’s passions and vouching for the police witnesses.
7
See id.
at 374. Because Defen
*1143
dant objected to this general narrative and the district court overruled the objection, our review is de novo.
See Taylor,
Our first task is to determine if the prosecutor’s comments were improper.
Pulido-Jacobo,
Assuming the narrative was improper, we nonetheless believe that the prosecutor’s commеnts were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Pulido-Jacobo,
C.
Defendant also alleges the prosecutor’s following statement damaged the presumption of innocence owed to Defendant:
As you can see, ladies and gentleman, there simply aren’t any real defenses under the law in this case. We’ve got a textbook example of hоw these drug operations work. And because there really are no defenses available and because *1144 the evidence is so clear, we’re going to ask you at the end of this trial to hold these individuals responsible for what they’ve done.
R., Tr. of Jury Trial, at 372. Because Defendant never objected to this statement, we review for plain error only.
Regardless of the standard of review, however, Defendant’s argument fails. The record demonstrates that one of Defendant’s primary defenses was that he was in the hotel suite only briefly (if at all), and that he was unaware of the drug trafficking activity. The prosecutor was simply stating that Defendant cannot explain away the evidence presented against him. Defendant stretches this statement far beyond its context or effect in suggesting that it somehow impairs the presumption of innocence. Moreover, the jury instructions used at trial are clear that the Government bears the burden of proof and that Defendant is not obligated to prove his innocence or produce any evidence in his favor. Again, we presume the jury follows its instructions.
See Almaraz,
VI.
Defendant’s fifth and final argument is that cumulative-error by the district court requires reversal of his convictions. In situations involving “both preserved and unpreserved errors, cumulative-error analysis should proceed as follows: First, the preserved errors should be considered as a group under harmless-еrror review. If, cumulatively, they are not harmless, reversal is required.”
United States v. Caraway,
The purpose of cumulative error analysis “is to address whether the cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error.”
United States v. Harlow,
Here, we identified two possible errors: (1) an unpreserved error — the prosecutor’s statement about the cross on Officer Lindsey’s belt; and (2) a preserved error — the prosecutor’s narrative about the general societal ills at issue in this trial. Thus, our inquiry is whether the combined effect of these statements can overcome plain error review.
See Caraway,
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s convictions on all counts.
Notes
. Investigators later determined that the crack-cocaine located in the hotel suite totaled approximately 50 grams.
. On appeal, Defendant argues that Raams-donk's testimony is relevant, not only as the custodian of record for the hotel departure log, but also to rebut testimony by the Government’s expert that the hotel did not regularly check identification when checking individuals into the hotel. When arguing for the admission of Raamsdonk’s testimony to the district court, however, Defendant never made this argument and we consider it waived.
See United States v. Porter,
. The business records exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) is for:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a rеgularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business” as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
. Defendant also alleges insufficient evidence for his possession with intent to distribute crack-cocaine conviction, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). To sustain this conviction, the Government had to prove that Defendant "(1) possessed a controlled substance, (2) knew he possessed a controlled substance, and (3) intended to distribute the controlled substance.”
United States v. Burkley,
. Because the Government presented sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking conspiracy, we likewise find sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (statute barring convicted felons from possessing firearms or ammunition). Defendant’s status as a felon is undisputed, thereby making his possession of firearms in furtherance of this conspiracy a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as well.
. In his brief, Defendant also argues that this narrative encouraged the jury to convict him as part of their civic duty. Defendant’s co-conspirator, Curtis Robertson, also made a civic duty argument on appeal to this court. Although we affirmed Robertson’s conviction in
United States v. Robertson,
. We do not believe the prosecutor’s statements regarding the bravery of the police officers qualifies as vouching for the officers' testimony. Nowhere in his closing argument
*1143
does the prosecutor refer to the credibility of the police witnesses.
See, e.g., Thornburg
v.
Mullin,