United States v. Roger Eagle ElkUnited States v. Roger Eagle Elk
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Magill
Roger Eagle Elk appeals from the district court’s
1
order denying his
I. BACKGROUND.
On October 1,1980, Eagle Elk was indicted under
Testimony at trial indicated that on the night of Stoneman‘s death, both Eagle Elk and Leader Charge had gone to Stoneman’s house, where Stoneman and Remina Eagle Elk, Eagle Elk’s sister and Leader Charge’s wife, were in bed asleep. Eagle Elk had thought that Stoneman had been involved in the killing of Eagle Elk’s mother, to which Eagle Elk’s father had pleaded guilty. Eagle Elk fired a shot into the bedroom, which apparently killed Stone-man.
On February 13, 1981, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder in violation of
On or about July 12, 1985, Eagle Elk filed a motion under
II. DISCUSSION.
Eagle Elk argues that given the trial court’s instructions, some of the jurors could have found him guilty of the acts of the principal, while others only found him guilty of aiding and abetting, in the murder of Gary Stoneman. The challenged instruction read, in .pertinent part:
Title
“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
“Whoever willfully causes an act to be done, which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal.”
So, if the acts or conduct of an associate of the Defendant are willfully directed or authorized by him, or if the Defendant aids and abets another person by willfully joining together with such person in the commission of a crime, then the law holds the Defendant responsible for the acts and conduct of such other person just as though he had committed the acts or engaged in such conduct himself. [Emphasis supplied.]
Under the sixth amendment, a criminal defendant in federal court has a nonwaivable right to a unanimous jury verdict. United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 456 & n. 4 (5th Cir.1977). The Constitution thus requires jurors to reach substantial agreement as to the nature of a defendant’s guilty act before they may reach a verdict of guilty. Id. at 457; see also United States v. Mastelotto, 717 F.2d 1238, 1247-48 (9th Cir.1983). The mere fact, however, that an instruction could conceivably permit a jury to reach a non-unanimous verdict is not sufficient to require reversal when the jury has been instructed that it must reach a unanimous verdict. Fryer v. Nix, 775 F.2d 979, 992 (8th Cir.1985).
In the present case, the jury returned a unanimous verdict finding Eagle Elk guilty under
Accordingly, we hold that Eagle Elk has failed to demonstrate any violation of his right to a jury trial. Likewise, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim also fails. The district court’s order denying a writ of habeas corpus is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable Donald J. Porter, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of South Dakota.