United States v. Rodriguez-MoralesUnited States v. Rodriguez-Morales
Case Information
*1 United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-1021
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. JESÚS L. RODRÍGUEZ-MORALES A/K/A DANIEL,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge, Torruella and Siler, Circuit Judges. [*]
José R. Olmo-Rodríguez, for appellant.
Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, were on brief for appellee.
July 26, 2011
*2
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. The appellant in this case argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, and that we should not enforce the waiver of appeal contained in his plea agreement. Finding his claims unconvincing, we now affirm his conviction and sentence.
I.
On March 30, 2009, an indictment was filed against defendant-appellant, Jesús L. Rodríguez-Morales ("Rodríguez"), charging him with two counts of unlawful possession with intent to transfer five or more identification documents, two counts of aggravated identity theft, and two counts of selling a social security card. Specifically, Rodríguez was accused of selling a total of eighty-six genuine social security cards and birth certificates to undercover agents during two separate incidents in August 2008.
On July 22, 2009, Rodríguez changed his plea to guilty on
one count of aggravated identity theft, based on an agreement
whereby the prosecution agreed to file a motion to dismiss the
remaining counts of the indictment. The plea agreement stated that
the guidelines sentence was the two-year term of imprisonment
required by the statute,
Rodríguez subsequently filed four pro se motions raising various contentions regarding, inter alia, his attorney's performance, computation of the applicable guidelines range, and his lack of awareness of the consequences of pleading guilty to aggravated identity theft. The district court construed the first two filings as motions to withdraw his guilty plea, and denied them. The district court responded to the last two filings by explaining, via line order, that any issues would be discussed at the upcoming sentencing hearing.
A sentencing hearing was held on December 1, 2009. At
sentencing, the prosecutor stated that "[h]ad this case gone to
trial . . . [Rodríguez] was looking at a statutory maximum of 44
years and a guideline sentence minimum of 107 months with a
guideline sentence maximum of 131 months." The court, as well as
defense counsel, immediately concurred in the prosecutor's
statement. Rodríguez subsequently addressed the court, and claimed
that he should not have been charged with aggravated identity
theft, as he had not sought to steal anyone's identity. The court
responded by clarifying that the statute in question (
II.
A.
The parties dispute the applicable standard of review.
The government argues it should be for abuse of discretion, whereas
Rodríguez argues it should be de novo. As noted above, the
district court construed two of Rodríguez's pro se filings, entered
after the change-of-plea hearing but prior to sentencing, as
motions to withdraw the guilty plea, and denied them as such.
Generally speaking, appeals of a district court's decision to deny
*5
a motion to withdraw is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Rivera-Gonzalez,
However, as we have previously noted, other standards
apply to certain sub-issues related to denials of motions to
withdraw. "Abstract questions of law are reviewed de novo,
findings of raw fact are tested for clear error, and law
application and balancing judgments are usually reviewed for
reasonableness." United States v. Padilla-Galarza,
We need not resolve this issue, as Rodríguez's claim fails under any of the applicable standards.
B.
The gist of Rodríguez's argument is that the prosecutor "drastically" overstated what his sentencing exposure would have been had he stood trial and been convicted on all counts. Appellant claims that had he stood trial and been convicted of all counts, he was looking at a guidelines range of twenty-four to thirty months. He argues that the prosecutor's inflated estimate of 107 to 131 months, agreed to by the court and by defense counsel, induced him to agree to the government's proffer. The proffer recommended a two-year term of imprisonment, which is what he ultimately received, once he decided to accept the government's terms and plead guilty. Rodríguez now claims that there was a strong probability that, had he known the true extent of his sentencing exposure, he would have rejected the government's proffer. As it is, he wound up accepting the government's proffer, and waiving many of his rights, in return for little or no discount *7 from what he would have received had he gone to trial and been convicted on all counts.
The government appears to concede that the prosecutor
overstated the defendant's potential exposure during the sentencing
hearing. However, the government disputes that this overstatement
rendered Rodríguez's plea involuntary or unintelligent, and argues
that we should enforce the waiver-of-appeal provision of the plea
bargain. The government also contests Rodríguez's calculation of
twenty-four to thirty months as the correct guidelines range for
conviction on all counts. While the government does not provide a
specific range, it notes that his potential exposure on counts
three and four alone was forty-eight months. Counts three and four
alleged violations of
*8
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea after it has been tendered, but
prior to sentencing, for a "fair and just reason."
The validity of a waiver-of-appeal provision in a plea
bargain is reviewed under the three-part test set forth in United
States v. Teeter,
Although the standard for reviewing a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea differs from the standard for reviewing the validity of a waiver-of-appeal provision, Rodríguez makes the *9 same argument under these two standards. He argues that the prosecutor's misestimation of his probable guidelines range post- trial rendered his plea involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent. Rodríguez argues that this both establishes a "fair and just" reason to allow withdrawal of his guilty plea, and establishes that there has been a miscarriage of justice under Teeter such that this appeal must be allowed. In addressing this argument, we need not assess the relationship between the standards governing waiver of appeal and withdrawal of a plea. It is clear that there has been no miscarriage of justice within the meaning of our case law governing waivers of appeal under Teeter, and that disposes of this appeal.
As the appellant rightly notes, the Supreme Court has
recognized that a guilty plea must be not just voluntary, but
knowing and intelligent as well, and that a defendant's "awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences" of his plea
bears on whether a guilty plea is "knowing" or "intelligent."
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). The Supreme
Court has also explained that "[t]he standard was and remains
whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant."
North Carolina v. Alford,
None of this helps the appellant. The central hurdle
Rodríguez faces on appeal is that the prosecutor's statement to
which he draws our attention occurred at sentencing, i.e., months
after he had already decided to plead guilty. Rodríguez was
sentenced on December 1, 2009, but the change-of-plea hearing took
place approximately four months earlier, on July 22 of that year.
Therefore, even though he is surely correct that "erroneous
information" which "dramatically alter[s] the sentencing stakes for
the defendant" may bear on whether someone who has pleaded guilty
will be allowed to subsequently withdraw his plea, United States v.
Rivera-Maldonado,
During the plea hearing, the district court ensured that Rodríguez understood what he was being charged with and the consequences of a guilty plea, and that he had discussed his options with his attorney. He admitted to committing the charged *11 crimes, and stated that he understood the penalties he might receive. Rodríguez does not claim, and the record does not [6]
indicate, that the prosecutor advised him that the applicable guidelines range was 107 to 131 months prior to or during the change-of-plea hearing.
The pro se motions filed by Rodríguez after the change-
of-plea hearing do not undermine this conclusion. In those
motions, Rodríguez insisted that aggravated identity theft under
We conclude that, because the prosecutor's statement was made months after the appellant decided to plead guilty, the prosecutor's overestimate of the applicable guidelines range did not render Rodríguez's decision to plead guilty unknowing, unintelligent or involuntary. In light of this conclusion, the dispute between the parties as to what the precise guidelines range would have been, had appellant proceeded to trial and been convicted on all counts, is moot.
favorable one if he balked. The closest Rodríguez comes to making such an assertion is in a
statement contained in his notice of appeal, filed shortly after
sentencing, in which he stated that his lawyer never explained to
him the nature of
III.
For the reasons given above, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rodríguez's motions to withdraw his guilty plea. The same reasons lead us to believe that enforcing the appellate waiver would not work a miscarriage of justice under Teeter. We affirm Rodriguez's conviction and sentence, and dismiss the appeal.
So ordered.
Notes
[*] Of the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
[1] At oral argument defense counsel indicated that he had been unable to reach his client for some time, and was not sure whether he wished to further pursue this appeal. On March 8, 2011, we requested that the parties locate the defendant and seek clarification from him on this matter. On March 21, the U.S. Attorney's office informed us that Rodríguez had been removed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement to the Dominican Republic on March 10, and that his present whereabouts are unknown. Defense counsel was similarly unable to locate Rodríguez. In the absence of a contrary indication by Rodríguez, we now resolve the merits of the appeal.
[2] Rodríguez does not challenge the district court's construal of two of the pro se motions as motions to withdraw his guilty plea.
[3] Rodríguez points out that a sentencing court may, in its
discretion, impose concurrent terms of imprisonment for multiple
violations of
[4] The appellant does not contest the other elements of the Teeter
test, i.e., the scope of the waiver or the
[5] Rodríguez has not alleged that his decision to plead guilty was affected by any purported misstatement by the prosecution prior to sentencing.
[6] This is not to say that there were no misstatements at the
change-of-plea hearing. During this hearing, the prosecutor stated
that the statutory penalty for Rodríguez's guilty plea under
[7] It is not clear whether Rodríguez, or his attorney, is referring to the possibility of a harsher outcome after trial, or to the possibility that the proffer might be replaced with a less