UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert William JONES, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald Eugene JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 89-5032, 89-5034
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Argued Oct. 5, 1989. Decided July 3, 1990.
James T. McBratney, Jr., Florence, S.C., argued, John Herman Hare, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Columbia, S.C., for defendants-appellants.
Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., argued (E. Bart Daniel, U.S. Atty., Paul Stroebel, Third Year Law Student, Columbia, S.C., on brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before PHILLIPS and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and BRITT, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge:
I
Johnson and Jones were convicted after a four-day trial in September 1988. At trial, the government presented the testimony of an FBI expert, who evaluated bank surveillance photographs of the two
Other evidence showed that Jones and Johnson were together when they were arrested and that both had in their possession at that time a large quantity of five-dollar bills with sequential serial numbers. The government presented other circumstantial evidence, including testimony that the defendants were in the area of the bank at the time of the robbery, that they had had no cash immediately before the robbery, and that just before he was arrested, Johnson denied that he was Donald Johnson when asked.
The jury found both defendants guilty on both counts. Following recommendations in the presentencing reports, the court sentenced both Johnson and Jones as career offenders under
II
The first of the Johnson and Jones assignments of error focuses on an allegedly improper comment made by the court:
You will recall yesterday, I mentioned that there are a variety of reasons why a person accused of a crime may choose not to testify. And more often than not, that reason not to testify will have nothing to do with the merits of the case on trial.
Sometimes a defendant has a not too complimentary background and does not wish the United States Attorney to have the opportunity to bring these matters out before the jury.
And yet, such a person could be innocent of the offense being tried before you. So, that could be a reason a defendant might choose not to testify.
So once again, if one or both defendants were to choose not to testify, you should place no inference against them in that regard, since the constitution affords them the right not to testify.
I remind you that the defendants are presumed to be innocent. And the government must prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendants do not have to prove their innocence.
Joint Appendix at 81 (emphasis added).
The appellants point to the underlined portion of this excerpt from the trial judge‘s opening remarks and claim that this comment violated their fifth amendment right not to testify and to have no adverse inference suggested from the decision not to testify. They argue that the court‘s comment violated the dictates of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965), which forbids negative commentary on a criminal defendant‘s failure to testify.
Viewed in hindsight, the district judge‘s effort to drive home the irrelevance of a defendant‘s silence may have involved an improvident choice of example that was not worth the risk of misapprehension now seized upon by defendants. We do not condone it, precisely because of the obvious risk that in some contexts it could be prejudicial. But we are satisfied that, viewed realistically in total context of this case, it could not have been here. The remark was made as part of a strong admonition to the jury not to draw an unfavorable inference from silence, came before a four-day trial at which abundant evidence was presented, and was not repeated in the jury instructions, which included a cautionary state-
III
The appellants next contend that their right to an impartial jury was violated when two jurors saw them in handcuffs. They concede that a taint of this sort can be corrected if the court takes the necessary steps, but argue that in this case the court‘s general questions to each of the jurors were inadequate to ferret out bias.
Our review of the record indicates that the trial court was solicitous of the defendants’ wishes on how to question the jurors and that, in fact, defendants’ counsel had no objection at trial to the form of questioning. They now object to the generalized nature of the questions and to the fact that each juror was questioned. Ironically, both of these features were designed to protect the defendants: the general questions were meant to avoid any improper suggestion, and the blanket questioning was meant to test whether more than the two jurors might have heard about the handcuff scene.
Even assuming that these objections may now be heard, the questioning appears to have been thorough and careful. Each juror was asked whether he could reach a decision solely on the evidence and whether he had seen or heard anything out of court that might affect his decision. All answered no, and some were even probed further by the judge. In light of the trial court‘s broad discretion in conducting voir dire and in formulating questions for jurors, United States v. Robinson, 804 F.2d 280 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Griley, 814 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1987), this form of questioning was not an abuse of discretion.
IV
Johnson and Jones next challenge the line-ups in which they were identified. They make two arguments: (1) that they were denied their sixth amendment rights to counsel because, although their lawyers were present at the line-ups, they were not allowed in the witness’ viewing room to monitor remarks of FBI agents conducting the line-up, and (2) the line-ups were overly suggestive because (a) other participants were joking with each other but not the defendants; (b) the others wore a variety of hats and sunglasses, but only the defendants wore ones like those used in the robbery; and (c) one of the defendants was required to repeat “Hit the floor!“—which the robbers had shouted—whereas the others said it only once. They contend further that the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress both of these allegedly unconstitutional out-of-court identifications and tainted in-court identifications, which they claim had no independent basis.
We see no merit to the claimed violation of the right to counsel. Counsel was present in the line-up room with Johnson and Jones and had the opportunity to confer with them after the line-up. The appellants have cited no authority to the effect that counsel needs to be present in the witness room itself. There was testimony from one of the FBI agents that in his 22 years, lawyers had never been allowed in the viewing room. Furthermore, the defendants’ counsel had opportunities to cross-examine the witnesses who made the identifications and the FBI agents who conducted the line-up, and a picture of the line-up was presented to the court when it ruled on the suppression motion.
Likewise, we see no merit to the various arguments that the line-up was impermissibly suggestive. As testimony heard on the suppression motion indicates, the defendants were themselves smiling, so that they did not stand out noticeably from the participants who were joking around; the defendants were given the chance to choose which set of hats and sunglasses they wanted to wear; and, finally, Johnson may have been asked to repeat “Hit the
Because the out-of-court identifications were sound, the in-court identifications need not be justified by any independent basis. If such a showing were required, however, the government has presented ample evidence of the reliability of the identifications under the relevant factors set out in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972).
V
The appellants next contend that the admission into evidence of some semi-automatic weapon ammunition seized from the defendants’ residence was error. They argue that even though the court later withdrew that evidence and instructed the jury to disregard that evidence, its previous admission was nonetheless so inflammatory that the cautionary instruction was inadequate to cure the prejudice caused.
Of course, the only issue is the adequacy of the curative instruction; any question of admissibility is irrelevant because the evidence was finally kept out. After testimony from an FBI agent that he did not know whether the ammunition seized could fit a revolver, the appellants successfully moved to have the previously admitted evidence excluded, and the court gave the following warning to the jury:
In that the court perceives no relationship to [sic] the box of ammunition to this case, the court has reconsidered its earlier ruling, admitting that item of evidence for your consideration.
And I‘m now removing it from evidence. And I ask that you give it no consideration.
Joint Appendix at 126.
It appears that the appellants neither objected to this instruction nor requested any additional instructions. Even if the issue is properly before us, however, it lacks merit. The jury is generally presumed to be able to follow an instruction to disregard evidence, absent some strong indication that the evidence is so powerful that a jury could not ignore it and that the defendant would be harmed as a result. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 107 S. Ct. 3102, 97 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1987). In light of the abundant evidence against the defendants, there is no reasonable probability that the jury‘s verdict was influenced by the jury‘s seeing this later-excluded evidence. United States v. Barnes, 747 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1984).
VI
The appellants next challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on their conviction under
This argument is also without merit. The government need not present expert testimony to support a conviction under
VII
Finally, at the sentencing hearing both defendants sought to challenge the constitutional validity of prior convictions that were expressly “counted” for purposes of classifying them as career offenders under United States Sentencing Guidelines
At the sentencing hearing, Johnson‘s attorney proffered the facts of the allegedly involuntary guilty plea that led to the 1983 conviction and attempted to put Johnson on the stand to testify to the circumstances of the plea agreement. The district court refused to hear Johnson‘s testimony, believing that it lacked the authority to entertain a collateral challenge to the constitutionality of the prior New York state conviction. The court stated that if Johnson wanted to invalidate the New York conviction and then argue for a reduced sentence on his current federal conviction, his remedy was to first challenge the state conviction by means of any available state postconviction procedures or, if appropriate, by application to the proper federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. If the prior conviction was ultimately invalidated by a court with authority to entertain the collateral challenge, Johnson could at that point return to the court currently sentencing him and challenge the sentence on a motion under
A
The district court erred in thinking it lacked the power to entertain Johnson‘s and Jones’ challenge. The court‘s error lay in its perception that its jurisdiction to hear the challenges turned on satisfaction of the same prerequisites that apply to a habeas corpus application under
In habeas corpus, the federal court may actually invalidate a state conviction and order the petitioner‘s release from state custody. In light of this extraordinary power, federal habeas review of state criminal cases is significantly circumscribed by the complex body of rules and doctrines that protect, among other things, values of comity and finality in our federal system. Most critical, of course, is the very structure of the habeas proceeding in which the affected state, through its prisoner‘s custodian, is effectively a party to the proceeding, hence able to defend its conviction against constitutional challenge. Incident to this is the further requirement imposed by the exhaustion requirement, see
In federal sentencing hearings, however, the exercise of federal judicial power as exemplified in its party structure is of an altogether different character. Involving only the United States and a federal defendant, it is limited to the federal court‘s meting out an appropriate sentence for violation of a federal crime. To consider prior state convictions in making that determination involves no assertion of federal jurisdiction over a state criminal case, as occurs in a habeas corpus proceeding. The exercise of the federal judicial power to sentence in federal criminal cases raises questions not of federal jurisdiction but only of the proper exercise of the sentencing court‘s discretion and the permissible breadth of the sentencing court‘s inquiry.3
Congress has given clear directives on those questions. The sentencing court‘s discretion is guided by the Sentencing Guidelines. See
No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.
One type of information thought to be critical to accurate, uniform, and proportional
sentencing is criminal history. See United States Sentencing Guidelines, Chapter Four, Part A “Criminal History,” Introductory Commentary (“A defendant‘s record of past criminal conduct is directly relevant” to the aims of sentencing.).4 Hence, the Guidelines direct a sentencing court to take account of prior convictions—including prior state convictions—to structure the use of a defendant‘s criminal history in sentencing. The critical question becomes one of Guidelines interpretation: How have the Guidelines structured the inquiry into criminal history? As explained more fully below, the general approach is that a court may “count” or assign points to certain prior convictions; other convictions may not be formally counted, but may be used as the basis for an upward departure when they reliably indicate past criminal activity. The district court in this case “counted” Johnson‘s and Jones’ prior convictions, instead of using them as the basis for upward departures. We are thus confronted with a clearly presented, albeit unusually difficult, question of Guidelines interpretation: whether the Guidelines require the sentencing court to inquire into the validity of a challenged prior state conviction before formally “counting” that conviction in the computation of a defendant‘s Criminal History Score or Career Offender status under Guidelines
B
Some further explication of the use of a defendant‘s criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines is necessary to understand the narrow Guidelines interpretation issue presented. Under the Guidelines, a defendant‘s “Criminal History Score” or
The Guidelines also forbid the counting of “invalid convictions,” but permit their consideration in making an upward departure under
Sentences resulting from convictions that have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law, or because of subsequently-discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, are not to be counted. Any other sentence resulting in a valid conviction [sic] is to be counted in the criminal history score. Convictions which the defendant shows to have been constitutionally invalid may not be counted in the criminal history score. Also, if to count an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction would result in the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment under circumstances that would violate the United States Constitution, then such conviction shall not be counted in the criminal history score. Nonetheless, any conviction that is not counted in the criminal history score may be considered pursuant to
§ 4A1.3 if it provides reliable evidence of past criminal activity.
As noted, the district court in this case did not choose to make an upward departure under
C
We have already held that
Nonetheless, the dissent would read Application Note 6 as permitting a sentencing court to treat as invalid challenged convictions only when the state court has already invalidated the conviction. This interpretation both disregards our holding in Davenport and is without foundation in the language of the Guidelines. The first sentence of Application Note 6 plainly instructs that previously invalidated convictions are not to be counted: “Sentences
ing purposes, the validity of a prior conviction—a decision we affirmed—the dissent makes the curious assertion that ”Davenport is silent on the central issue of who has the power to determine validity.” Op. at 473 n. 4.
resulting from convictions that have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law, or because of subsequently-discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, are not to be counted.” In other words, the Guidelines already provide that convictions previously “show[n]” to be invalid, whether in state postconviction proceedings or on federal habeas corpus, may not be “counted.” The separate language in the Application Note stating that “[c]onvictions which the defendant shows to have been constitutionally invalid may not be counted in the criminal history score” obviously contemplates a different opportunity to “show[]” a prior conviction‘s constitutional invalidity. As we held in Davenport, that showing can come in the form of a challenge to a conviction not previously vacated or reversed.
Similarly, the dissent‘s reading nullifies the Application Note‘s clear directive that “if to count an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction would result in the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment under circumstances that would violate the United States Constitution, then such conviction shall not be counted in the criminal history score.” The theory of the dissent appears to be that it would be an impermissible expansion of federal judicial power for the sentencing court to determine that any state conviction—even one shown on its face to have been uncounseled—was invalid to the extent it might be used to increase a federal sentence. Such an arbitrarily restrictive view of the sentencing court‘s power would deny the defendant his basic right, well established in the Supreme Court‘s cases and safeguarded in the Guidelines, not to suffer an enhanced punishment predicated on the fact of a prior constitutionally invalid conviction. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S. Ct. 258, 19 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1967); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972).6
One might justifiably be concerned that this interpretation of the Guidelines could result in unduly protracted or delayed sentencings, inconvenient reexamination of old convictions from far-flung jurisdictions, and immobility in the criminal justice system. But the Guidelines are carefully structured to avoid these potential problems. The dissent‘s parade of these horribles is simply illusory in light of two critical features of the Guidelines not adequately taken into account in the dissent: the sentencing court‘s power to impose procedural requirements for the presentation of disputed sentencing factors and its power to make an upward departure.7
The Guidelines contemplate that the presentence report will serve the crucial function of addressing all information relevant to sentencing, hence obviating the need for delays or prolonged hearings. Section
appropriate inquiry into prior convictions before “counting” them:
74. QUESTION: Are prior uncounseled convictions considered invalid convictions and therefore not countable under criminal history?
ANSWER: Not necessarily. If a conviction was constitutionally invalid, it is not counted in the criminal history score. (See
§ 4A1.2 , Application Note 6.) However, the fact that a conviction was uncounseled does not automatically mean that the conviction was constitutionally invalid. In the case of a felony or misdemeanor, for example, the defendant may have waived counsel. Or, in the case of a misdemeanor, a term of imprisonment may not have been imposed and thus provision of counsel would not have been constitutionally required.
port, giving the court a sufficient basis for its inquiry into the validity of the convictions.
The presentence report also serves the important function of putting the defendant on notice of any prior convictions that might be used in sentencing. A sentencing court would be free to insist that the defendant, aware of the contents of the presentence report, make a timely objection to the validity of any prior conviction in the report or else waive that objection. Section
Courts should adopt procedures to provide for the timely disclosure of the presentence report; the narrowing and resolution, where feasible, of issues in dispute in advance of the sentencing hearing; and the identification for the court of issues remaining in dispute.
In sum, while a sentencing court may not arbitrarily disregard a challenge to a prior conviction, nothing about our holding is meant to suggest that the court would not have broad discretion, within bounds of due process, to control the manner of the challenge‘s presentation.
Second, the dissent fails to appreciate the substantial flexibility afforded the sentencing court by
Appellate courts have held that evidence of a standard practice or customary procedure in a particular jurisdiction can be used to establish the probable constitutional validity of a prior conviction. Courts have also held that the defendant must carry the burden of establishing the invalidity of a prior conviction when the government demonstrates habit and custom that meet constitutional standards. (See, e.g. United States v. Dickens, 879 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Davenport, 884 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 1989).)
Furthermore, a departure under this provision will often result in the same sentence that would have been imposed had the invalid conviction been counted. If the court is satisfied that the criminal history score “significantly under-represents the seriousness of the defendant‘s criminal history, and that the seriousness of the defendant‘s criminal history most closely resembles” that of defendants in the higher category that would have resulted from counting the invalid conviction, then that higher category should guide the court‘s discretion in setting the sentence. The only effect of using
The distinction between the impermissible counting of an invalid prior conviction and the permissible use of the conduct underlying that conviction in an upward departure is consistent with the Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972). In that case, the Supreme Court ordered a remand for resentencing where the district judge had given explicit attention in sentencing to three prior convictions later invalidated by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963). The Court ordered the remand because the sentence had not been “imposed in the informed discretion of [the] trial judge, but [was] founded at least in part upon misinformation of a constitutional magnitude.” Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447, 92 S. Ct. at 591-92. The Court, however, emphasized that the judge would have been well within his discretion in considering the conduct that underlay the previous convictions: “a judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.” Id. at 446, 92 S. Ct. at 591 (citations omitted). Indeed, the dissent in Tucker did not take issue with the majority‘s exposition of sentencing law, but only with its conclusion that the fact of the prior conviction was material to the sentence. Id. at 449-50, 92 S. Ct. at 592-93. The dissent noted that the judge would almost certainly impose the same sentence on remand, a possibility that the majority acknowledged would be a wholly permissible exercise of discretion. Id. at 452, 92 S. Ct. at 594. In other words, Tucker rested squarely on the distinction between the impermissible mechanical counting of the fact of an unconstitutional conviction and the permissible consideration of that conviction‘s reliable evidence of prior criminal activity.
In permitting the sentencing court to treat as invalid some prior convictions and
No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.
Section
quiry; when a procedurally proper challenge to a prior conviction is made, however, the court must either satisfy itself of the conviction‘s validity or use it in an upward departure if circumstances so warrant. Put another way, those Guidelines sections have neither limited nor expanded the reach of the sentencing court‘s traditional and statutory power to consider prior convictions, but have instead simply required a more rigorous, and honest, exercise of that power—they provide the “guidelines” whereby the sentencing court can assure itself of “informed discretion” and avoid the possibility of sentencing based “upon misinformation of a constitutional magnitude.” Tucker, 404 U.S. at 447, 92 S. Ct. at 592.8
E
Read in context,
We have previously rejected the notion that a court could impose an exhaustion requirement when Congress had provided for an opportunity to challenge an allegedly invalid prior conviction before its use in sentencing. In United States v. Scarborough, 777 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1985), the defendant was to be sentenced under the now-repealed “Dangerous Special Offender” statute,
strained the sentencing court‘s discretion. The issue, as the dissent refuses to recognize in its zeal to rhapsodize on larger themes, is not whether, but how, that discretion has been constrained in the Guidelines.
It is true that we have in the past found it appropriate to impose an exhaustion requirement where to do so would not frustrate the legislative intent of a sentencing scheme. Specifically, we have imposed an exhaustion requirement on a motion under
Here, we deal with a situation, as in Scarborough, where Congress has directed courts to examine the prior convictions as an incident to using them in sentencing. Congress’ clear intent to establish through the Sentencing Guidelines a scheme for accurate, uniform, and proportional sentencing, evident in the language of Application Note 6 and the interaction between
F
The conclusion we reach might nevertheless give us pause if the sentencing court‘s determination that a prior state conviction could not be “counted” under the Guidelines would effectively invalidate the state conviction before exhaustion of state remedies. But, of course, it would not. It is important in analyzing the nature of the defendant‘s challenge under the sentencing procedure here in issue to emphasize again its narrowness and limited consequences. The issue it presents is a narrow one: can a prior state conviction be “counted” in a criminal history score or
G
Finally, the dissent‘s claim that to read the Guidelines as we do here—and as we already have in Davenport—would create undue burdens on sentencing courts is misconceived. First, as noted, a court‘s ability to adopt procedures to hear such challenges and to make upward departures can substantially facilitate the proper (and constitutional) consideration of prior convictions. Second, to require exhaustion, apart from disregarding the language of the Guidelines, would create a set of burdens on the state and federal court systems that the dissent does not acknowledge. Take a simple case of an uncounseled prior conviction sought to be used to increase the criminal history score of a federal defendant. While the sentencing court might have to resolve other much more difficult disputed sentencing factors, it would be forbidden from considering the validity of the prior conviction at the sentencing hearing.
VIII
For the reasons stated in Parts I-VI, we affirm the district court‘s judgments of conviction. For the reasons stated in Part VII, however, we vacate the sentences imposed by the court and remand for resentencing not inconsistent with this opinion. On remand, the district court should first determine whether the defendants’ challenges were properly presented under the court‘s procedures. If so, the court should give the defendants such opportunity to present evidence concerning the prior convictions as the court deems necessary to a meaningful exercise of its sentencing authority. See Guideline
den, the court may nonetheless consider making an upward departure under
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
The majority holds that the Sentencing Guidelines confer upon federal sentencing courts the power to entertain challenges to the constitutionality of prior state convictions that may be used to enhance a federal sentence. This ruling marks an extraordinary expansion of federal judicial power to invalidate state convictions. The decision is ruinous both to federalism and finality, as it opens up yet another channel for criminal defendants to attack the validity of state convictions without even requiring exhaustion of state remedies. Because I believe that federal law, properly construed, requires a federal sentencing court to respect state convictions which the federal defendant has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate, I dissent.1
I.
The imposition the majority‘s holding places on our federal system, the new burden it visits on the federal judiciary, and the severe threat it poses to the finality of convictions can best be appreciated by considering just how frequently the federal judicial power announced by the majority will be invoked by criminal defendants being sentenced pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. As examination of the Guidelines makes clear, the majority‘s holding will allow almost every federal defendant with prior convictions to bring unrestricted attacks on those prior convictions at the federal sentencing stage.
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant‘s criminal history category is a primary factor in the determination of his sentencing range; the higher the category,
the greater the sentence he receives. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5 Pt. A (Sentencing Table). Section
No matter which method is used to determine a defendant‘s criminal history category, placement in a particular category is always based on prior convictions. Because the criminal history category is an important variable in every sentencing determination under the Guidelines, the federal judicial power recognized by the majority to review and invalidate underlying prior convictions can be invoked by virtually every federal defendant with a criminal record. And given the relatively low cost and the potentially high return of such a collateral attack, every criminal defendant can now be expected to bring one.
In this new round of collateral review, the defendant will always be represented by counsel. Because such representation is not afforded as a matter of right under
The majority attempts to soft-pedal the significance of its holding by asserting that the power to invalidate a state conviction for federal sentencing purposes is a mere adjunct to the sentencing function that will not involve release of a prisoner from custody and that will have no preclusive effect in the state that rendered the “invalid” conviction. It insists that the authority to invalidate convictions will not disrupt the sentencing process, for sentencing courts can fashion procedures to hear challenges to prior convictions and will maintain substantial flexibility to make upward departures. I regard such assurances as nothing but sheep‘s clothing: This decision distorts the will of Congress, undermines the philosophy of the Sentencing Guidelines, disregards much of the Supreme Court‘s habeas corpus jurisprudence of the last two decades, imposes substantial new burdens upon probation officers, federal prosecutors, and district judges, and dramatically reorders the relationship between state and federal courts.
II.
The federal judicial power claimed by the majority is extraordinarily broad, exceeding in many ways the authority of federal courts in habeas jurisdiction,
A.
The majority lacks authority for the power that it claims. Federal courts cannot exercise adjudicatory authority unless Congress affirmatively confers on them the right to do so. Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S. Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1986). The presumption against federal jurisdiction, see Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985), which is grounded in separation of powers concerns, is even more compelling when the jurisdiction in question involves the power to invalidate state judgments, for in such a situation principles of federalism are also implicated.
Congress has seen fit to grant federal courts the authority to adjudge the validity of state judgments in two instances:
Certainly there is no such jurisdiction here. The purported source of jurisdiction—Application Note 6 in the Commentary to
The majority‘s discovery of the power to invalidate state convictions in a single sentence in an Application Note that is silent on the issue is all the more extraordinary because the Application Note by itself lacks the force of law. The Guidelines state that the Commentary, which includes the Application Notes, should be “treated as the legal equivalent of a policy statement,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7, “much like legislative history or other legal material that helps determine the intent of a drafter,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7, comment. They are to be used as a way to “interpret the guideline or explain how it is to be applied.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7. An Application Note thus has no legal significance independent of its power to illuminate a Guideline. Rather than identifying the Guideline in
pursuant to
Notes
counted in the criminal history score. Also, if to count an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction would result in the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment under circumstances that would violate the United States Constitution, then such conviction shall not be counted in the criminal history score. Nonetheless, any conviction that is not counted in the criminal history score may be consideredInvalid Convictions. Sentences resulting from convictions that have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law, or because of subsequently-discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, are not to be counted. Any other sentence resulting in a valid conviction is to be counted in the criminal history score. Convictions which the defendant shows to have been constitutionally invalid may not be
possibly invalid prior conviction before its use in sentencing“).3 The majority‘s interpretive legerdemain elevates Application Note 6—the legal equivalent of legislative history—to the status of a Guideline which confers an unprecedentedly broad grant of federal jurisdiction to invalidate state judgments. To describe the provenance of today‘s holding is to disclose its groundless-ness.
The proper place to begin is not with the Commentary to the Guidelines, but rather with the Guidelines themselves. Section
Sentences for expunged convictions are not counted, but may be considered under
§ 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category).
As the past tense adjective “expunged” indicates,
In view of the fact that the Sentencing Commission specifically stated in
raise non-delegation and separation of powers concerns not addressed in Mistretta. Thus, the majority‘s holding, which derives from an extremely tenuous textual foundation, is even more questionable because it raises constitutional difficulties in derogation of the Supreme Court‘s admonition that statutes should be interpreted to avoid such difficulties when reasonably possible. See, e.g., Coit Independence Joint Venture v. Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp., 489 U.S. 561, 109 S. Ct 1361, 1371, 103 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1989); Commodity Futures Trade Comm‘n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3251, 92 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1986).
Sentences resulting from convictions that have been reversed or vacated because of errors of law, or because of subsequently-discovered evidence exonerating the defendant, are not to be counted.
The contested sentence in Application Note 6, which prohibits the counting of convictions that “the defendant shows to have been constitutionally invalid,” merely adds that the criminal defendant has the burden of “showing” the fact of the conviction‘s invalidity.4 The elevation of the rather innocuous assertion that the defendant has the burden of verifying that a conviction has been invalidated into an unprecedented grant of federal jurisdictional authority is indefensible.
B.
The majority attempts to skirt the dearth of jurisdictional authority for its holding by insisting that a federal sentencing court‘s power to inquire into and invalidate state convictions “raises questions not of federal jurisdiction but only of the proper exercise of the sentencing court‘s discretion and the permissible breadth of the sentencing court‘s inquiry.” Op. at 462. The majority consults a rather eclectic band of sources in support of its claim. None of the grounds it offers, however, is convincing.
Certainly
No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, char-
acter, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.
Section 3661 is incorporated with modifications in the Guidelines at
In determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range, or whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted, the court may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law. See
18 U.S.C. § 3661 .
The majority interprets these provisions to provide “that for purposes of federal sentencing there is no statutory limitation on the breadth of the sentencing court‘s inquiry.” Op. at 467. Within this “limitless” range of inquiry the majority finds the authority to invalidate convictions.
This authority exceeds even the majority‘s own expansive reading of
answer the “unusually difficult” question whether “the Guidelines require the sentencing court to inquire into the validity of a challenged prior state conviction,” Op. at 462, belies its assertion that such a question was addressed and answered by the single quoted sentence in Davenport. The Davenport sentence concerns only the burden of proof for showing that a conviction has been invalidated. Like Application Note 6, Davenport is silent on the central issue of who has the power to determine invalidity.
character—does not justify the exercise of judicial power asserted in its holding.
In any event, neither
fendant had not been convicted. Williams was predicated on the belief that “[h]ighly relevant—if not essential—to [the sentencing judge‘s] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant‘s life and characteristics.” 337 U.S. at 247, 69 S. Ct. at 1083 (emphasis added); see also id. at 249, 69 S. Ct. at 1084 (“careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted offenders” needed to ensure appropriate punishment).
Equally unavailing is the majority‘s attempt to locate the source of its authority in United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S. Ct. 589, 30 L. Ed. 2d 592 (1972). In Tucker, the defendant brought a habeas suit under
The majority‘s attempt to glean this power from “the interaction between
This is clearly wrong. First, the majority‘s interpretation of
More importantly, the majority‘s focus on the fact that sentencing courts can consider under
C.
In addition to the particular errors in the majority‘s interpretation of the Guidelines, its ruling suffers from a broader, and more portentous, flaw. This larger problem concerns the philosophy of discretionary sentencing inherent in the majority‘s logic, which until now I had thought was precisely the philosophy that the Sentencing Act of 1984, and the Guidelines promulgated thereunder, rejected.
In the majority‘s world, sentencing judges possess unlimited discretion to consider any factor about a defendant‘s past in order to mete out the precise sentence that
Prior to the establishment of the Guidelines, “the Federal Government employed in criminal cases a system of indeterminate sentencing.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 647, 650, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989). Because this system presupposed that rehabilitation was the goal of sentencing, it “required the judge and the parole officer to make their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own assessments of the offender‘s amenability to rehabilitation. As a result, the court and the officer were in positions to exercise, and usually did exercise, very broad discretion.” Id. The indeterminate sentencing system suffered at least two major difficulties. First, “[r]ehabilitation as a sound penological theory came to be questioned.” Id. at 651. Second, because the system gave almost unfettered discretion to the sentencing judge, “[s]erious disparities in sentencing...were common.” Id.
Dissatisfaction with these and other flaws led Congress to pass the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. The Act rejected the “outmoded rehabilitation model” at the heart of the indeterminate sentencing system and established a Sentencing Commission to institute instead a “mandatory-guideline system.” Id. at 651-52. In accordance with the congressional mandate, the guidelines were “designed to create uniform, determinate sentences based upon the crime committed, not the offender.”
United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1989).
In addition, the Guidelines “substantially circumscribe the discretion which sentencing courts formerly exercised.” United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 1989). The Commission achieved this goal by translating numerous sentencing factors into categories of offense behavior and offender characteristics that, when applied to the facts of a particular crime, yield a determinate range of sentences for each class of convicted persons. Congress made the Guidelines sentencing ranges “binding on the courts,” Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 652, unless a court is presented with sentencing factors not considered by the Commission:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, [of the Guidelines] unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.
The flaw in the majority‘s logic lies in its utter failure to appreciate that the Guidelines channel the inherently subjective nature of the traditional sentencing inquiry by determining in advance the relevance for sentencing purposes of many sentencing factors. The Guidelines themselves al-
sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission.”
Consistent with these explicit limitations on a court‘s power to inquire into the defendant‘s background, character and conduct, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.4 recognizes that other provisions of the Guidelines circumscribe its scope. Section
determining the sentence to impose within the guideline range or whether departure is warranted, the sentencing court may consider information about a defendant‘s background without limitation, ”unless otherwise prohibited by law” (emphasis added). Congress’ requirement in
The majority now casually dismantles this careful structure. It is obvious that the Guidelines prohibit the majority from sanctioning a limitless, standardless, subjective inquiry into a defendant‘s background. The power to inquire about a defendant‘s person is rigorously circumscribed, and certainly cannot be invoked as authority to reassess the validity of a prior conviction. Just as the Guidelines determine the relevance and weight, for sentencing purposes, of certain personal characteristics, they also speak in comprehensive detail about which prior convictions can and cannot be used as sentencing factors. See U.S.S.G. Chapter 4. Because the relevance and weight of a prior conviction, as well as its potential invalidity, are factors that the Guidelines thoroughly “take into consideration,” a court is bound by the criminal history score generated by U.S.S.G. chapter 4, and is prohibited from performing its own personal inquiry into a conviction‘s validity as a basis for departing from a Guideline range.
I recognize, of course, that discretion has not been altogether eliminated under the Sentencing Guidelines, and that discretion
record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant. Furthermore,
III.
In arrogating jurisdiction to invalidate state convictions, the majority refuses to recognize the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies and the comity concerns that underlie it. The exhaustion doctrine predates its statutory embodiment in
The majority disregards nonetheless the consistent admonition of this circuit that “state remedies must be exhausted before a federal forum will pass upon the validity of a prior conviction in connection with a [claim that the prior conviction illegally enhanced a federal sentence].” Strader v. Troy, 571 F.2d 1263, 1268 (4th Cir. 1978). In Brown v. United States, 483 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1973), the defendant brought a
If the state conviction is in another state from that in which the 2255 proceedings are had, the State procuring the challenged conviction would not be a party to the proceeding, would not have been heard on the invalidation of its conviction, and would have been denied the right to a prior exhaustion of state remedies.... [These reasons] appear sufficient warrant for requiring that a prisoner who bases his attack against one sentence on a collateral attack on another state sentence, particularly, when imposed in a foreign jurisdiction, to attack first the underlying sentence in the court imposing that sentence.
Brown, 483 F.2d at 119. See also United States v. Gaylor, 828 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1987) (failure to exhaust state remedies bars a
Disregarding the dispositive force of Brown and Gaylor, the majority maintains that United States v. Scarborough, 777 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1985), absolves it from recognizing an exhaustion requirement here. This is incorrect. The Dangerous Special Offender statute at issue in Scarborough instructed courts to “disregard”
The majority contends nonetheless that this case comes within Scarborough‘s narrow exception to the requirement to exhaust state remedies because “the language of Application Note 6 and the interaction between
In an attempt to soften the affront to states of its decision, the majority asserts that a federal judgment invalidating a prior state conviction for purposes of federal sentencing will have no preclusive effect in subsequent state or federal habeas proceedings because the state custodian would not have been a party in the federal sentencing process. This conclusion does not follow, since the federal defendant may now use the federal sentencing court‘s judgment as the basis for a separate
The majority‘s explanation of the effect of its decision upon states further demonstrates its disregard for the values of federalism. These values are not implicated only when a federal court orders the release of a state prisoner. Federal court invalidation of a state conviction—even if it lacks collateral legal consequences within the state—constitutes a major affront to the integrity of the state‘s judicial process. As we stated in Gaylor:
A challenge to the validity of a state conviction implicitly questions in at least some part the integrity of the state‘s judicial process. It is the state‘s particular interest in preserving the dignity and public respect attendant to its system of criminal justice that justifies an exhaustion of remedies requirement.... [I]t is the challenge itself and not the vehicle by which it is brought that implicates the interests of a state....
Gaylor, 828 F.2d at 255. In addition, “[i]ndiscriminate federal intrusions may simply diminish the fervor of state judges to root out constitutional errors on their own.” Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128-29 n. 33, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1572 n. 33, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982).
The majority‘s insistence that “a finding of constitutional invalidity for [the limited purpose of federal sentencing would not] have preclusive effect in a later state or federal habeas proceeding,” Op. at 469, misses the point. State convictions are either valid or they are invalid. They are not valid for some purposes, but invalid for others. They are not valid in the eyes of the state judiciary, but invalid in the eyes of the federal system. The method for determining their validity is singular, and it
IV.
This decision also strikes another blow to the finality of judgments that is essential to the proper functioning of the rule of law. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1074-75, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-54 & n. 16, 106 S. Ct. 2616, 2627 & n. 16, 91 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1986) (plurality opinion); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127-28, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1571-72, 71 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1982).
The resources of the federal judiciary, we are repeatedly reminded, are finite and increasingly unable to address the demands made upon them. As Johnson‘s case illustrates, the majority‘s rule will increase these demands dramatically. Johnson attempts to attack his state conviction by claiming that he entered an involuntary plea of guilty as the result of coercion by his counsel. To support this claim, Johnson wished to take the stand to testify concerning the circumstances of his plea agreement in state court, and to submit to the district court for review the official transcripts of his guilty plea hearing and subsequent hearings before the New York State Supreme Court. In response, the government may have been required to introduce testimony from Johnson‘s original attorney and others involved in the New York proceeding to rebut the claim of invalidity. The district court would thus have been forced, probably after a lengthy continuance, to devote a significant amount of time and effort to consider and address Johnson‘s collateral attack. Moreover, Johnson‘s case involved no more than a single-issue attack on a single underlying state conviction; the burden on federal district courts will necessarily increase as multiple state convictions are attacked for multiple infirmities.8
This decision will also increase the workload of federal appellate courts. First, because the majority makes upward departure under
The additional resources required to give meaningful review to state convictions at federal sentencing hearings will consequently cut deeply into the time and attention that federal courts can give to “civil actions, many novel and complex, which intimately affect the lives of great numbers of people” and “original criminal trials and appeals which deserve our most careful attention.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 260, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2065, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). It will also require United
ing court‘s power to inquire into and invalidate federal convictions, even if these convictions have been validated through direct federal appeal and federal habeas review.
Numerous procedures now exist for those in Jones‘s and Johnson‘s situation to challenge state convictions. Direct review in the state court system and to the Supreme Court, as well as state and federal habeas review, are all means by which state convictions can be attacked. The Supreme Court has frequently noted the significant costs of habeas review, not only to finality, but also to our federal structure and to society at large. See Engle, 456 U.S. at 127-28, 102 S. Ct. at 151-52. There is no justification for increasing these costs when the purposes served by the majority‘s ruling can be achieved through mechanisms already in place.
Astoundingly, the majority denounces reliance on these well-established procedures as a “litigious approach.” Op. at 469. Insistence upon respect for such settled rules of direct and collateral review is certainly not more litigious than the majority‘s approach, which adds to the host of procedures already available a novel and undemarcated round of post-conviction attack. Moreover, the break from established procedures raises a plethora of problems all but unmentioned by the majority. Foremost are the practical difficulties of reviewing an old conviction from a foreign jurisdiction. The state of the original conviction is where “all of the material events took place” and where “the records and witnesses pertinent to” the challenge are likely to be found. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 493-94, 93 S. Ct. 1123, 1128-29, 35 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1973). As we noted in Brown, “it can hardly be gainsaid that a more orderly and
justiciable review of the validity of a conviction can be afforded by the [original] sentencing court than by a court of a foreign jurisdiction.” Brown, 483 F.2d at 119. These reviewability problems are amplified by the “erosion of memory” and “dispersion of witnesses” that invariably occur with the passage of time. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. at 453, 106 S. Ct. at 2627. The lack of an exhaustion requirement further magnifies the difficulties, because unexhausted claims will often lack “a complete factual record to aid the federal courts in their review.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519, 102 S. Ct. at 1203-04.
The majority brushes aside all these complexities when it states that the presentence report prepared by the probation officer as required by
In its rush to establish yet another means for criminal defendants to challenge state convictions, the majority ignores this mass of legal and practical difficulties. At bottom, the power to invalidate state con-
A procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the effectiveness of the underlying substantive commands.... There comes a point where a procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer reflects humane concern but mere anxiety and a desire for immobility.
Bator, supra, at 452-53. This decision will make its own unnecessary contribution to the immobility confronting our system of criminal justice. It will make the new Sentencing Guidelines more burdensome for federal district judges and will create a new source of friction with the states. And in the name of procedural justice, it will sever the process of federal post-conviction review from the state‘s own process of self-review, creating a system in which federal attacks upon state convictions are endless, and endlessly disconnected.
V.
The proper analysis in this case begins and ends with the recognition that Congress has not conferred upon the federal courts the power assumed here by the majority. The majority‘s approach is also disturbing because it violates the clear command of Congress that federal courts must give state court judgments “full faith and credit“:
The... judicial proceedings of any State, Territory, or Possession... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.
The Full Faith and Credit statute “reflects a variety of concerns, including notions of comity, the need to prevent vexatious litigation, and a desire to conserve judicial resources.” Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84, 104 S. Ct. 892, 898, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984). It requires federal courts, in determining the subsequent effect of a state judgment in federal court, to give the state judgment the same effect as it would have in the rendering state. Id. at 81, 104 S. Ct. at 896. Section 1738 applies to state criminal as well as state civil judgments. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1981).
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the preclusion rules of
The Full Faith and Credit Statute speaks directly to the question presented in this case. Nothing in the Guidelines, its Com-
The Full Faith and Credit Statute requires federal courts to give “not some, but full credit” to state judicial proceedings. Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40, 59 S. Ct. 3, 6, 83 L. Ed. 26 (1938). The majority‘s holding fails to respect state judgments even to the extent that the states themselves would do so. Its suggestion that a federal court need not respect a state judgment when the state judgment is considered for purposes of federal law, see Op. at 461, 466, reveals an astonishing failure to appreciate the dictate of
VI.
The district court thus properly held that it lacked authority to entertain Jones’ and Johnson‘s attack on their prior state convictions. The district court also correctly noted that if the defendants’ state convictions are declared invalid by the state of conviction, the defendants can bring a habeas suit under
Attention to these procedures will affect the two defendants differently. Johnson is still in custody on the 1983 New York state conviction he attempted to challenge at the sentencing hearing. As his counsel conceded at the sentencing hearing, he retains the option to exhaust certain state remedies and to bring a federal habeas attack on that conviction. If successful, he can challenge his federal sentence under
In contrast to Johnson, Jones is no longer “in custody” for the 1978 conviction that he challenges and thus appears to be precluded from federal habeas relief even though the prior state sentence is being used to enhance his present sentence. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 109 S. Ct. 1923, 1926, 104 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1989). The record does not reveal whether Jones obtained state or federal postconviction review. However, even assuming that Jones now lacks postconviction remedies altogether, the district court still does not possess authority to scrutinize and invalidate his state conviction.
The fact that Jones‘s twelve-year-old state conviction is now being used to enhance his federal sentence for another crime in no way casts doubt on the validity of the state conviction. The state conviction is similarly no less legitimate because a federal court did not review the state court‘s constitutional rulings. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected the notion “that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court,” Allen, 449 U.S. at 103, 101 S. Ct. at 419, for “it is more important to give full faith and credit to state-court judgments than to ensure separate forums for federal and state claims.” Migra, 465 U.S. at 84, 104 S. Ct. at 898. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 & n. 35, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3052 & n. 35, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976). Nor is the state conviction somehow unsound because it was not challenged collaterally. The Supreme Court has made clear that
direct appeal is the primary avenue for review of a conviction or sentence.... When the process of direct review
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. at 887, 103 S. Ct. at 3391-92. The state trial remains the “main event,” not a “tryout on the road’ for what will later be the determinative federal... hearing.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90, 97 S. Ct. 2497, 2508, 53 L. Ed. 2d 594 (1977).
Jones and Johnson each had a jury trial, an appeal of right, and an opportunity for collateral review. Our criminal justice system, though generous, does not allow them to challenge the validity of their state convictions at the sentencing stage of their federal offenses. The majority has chosen the wrong time, the wrong place, and the wrong manner of federal review. The district court refused to assume the authority rightly reserved to other jurisdictions, and I would affirm its judgment.
The [Sentencing] Commission shall assure that the guidelines and policy statements, in recommending a term of imprisonment or length of a term of imprisonment, reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment
