UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert PEOPLES, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Peoples, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 11-4963, 11-4965
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided: Oct. 23, 2012.
698 F.3d 185
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Argued: Sept. 21, 2012.
But that is not the whole story. The often worn and mysterious beauty of ancient coins renders them invaluable cultural artifacts, helpful not only in dating archaeological finds but in revealing how distant civilizations once conducted their civic and commercial life. Whether coins (or sculptures or pottery) should be exempted from coverage as cultural property presents a lively policy debate, but the tension is resolved for us through the medium of law. The definition of covered properties is general in character, see
We emphasize that our decision does not leave the Guild without a remedy. At oral argument and in its brief, the government represented that it will bring a forfeiture action under the statutory scheme once this litigation has concluded, Gov‘t Br. at 43. There, it hardly need be said, the basics of due process require that the Guild be given a chance to contest the government‘s detention of its property.
In a timely forfeiture proceeding, the Guild can press a particularized challenge to the government‘s assertion that the twenty-three coins are covered by import restrictions. Under the CPIA, the government bears the initial burden in forfeiture of establishing that the coins have been “listed in accordance with section 2604,”
We obviously express no view on how the forfeiture process will unfold. We simply conclude that this suit seeks to have the judiciary assume a role that the statute does not intend for us to assume. We have reviewed the Guild‘s various claims and find them to be without merit. The district court faithfully interpreted the CPIA, and its judgment is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
ARGUED: Parks N. Small, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Susan Zalkin Hitt, Office of the United States At-
No. 11-4963 affirmed; No. 11-4965 reversed by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Chief Judge TRAXLER and Judge NIEMEYER joined.
OPINION
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
Robert Peoples challenges two convictions for criminal contempt. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the first conviction and reverse the second.
I.
Peoples, a former inmate, has brought a number of
After Peoples arrived late to court on the day of jury selection, Judge Currie cautioned him that he had to appear no later than 9:30 a.m. on March 21 for the first trial. Nonetheless, on March 21, Peoples arrived late for trial. Judge Currie warned him that if he was late again, she would dismiss his case with prejudice. The first trial concluded without further
At 9:15 a.m. on March 23, Peoples called Judge Currie‘s chambers to notify the court that he was stranded on the interstate, 10 to 15 minutes from the courthouse, with a flat tire and would be late for court. After speaking by telephone with Peoples and roadside assistance personnel, who confirmed that Peoples’ vehicle was not drivable, Judge Currie directed a marshal to pick up Peoples and bring him to court. Although this delayed the second trial, Judge Currie did not dismiss the case; instead she found that Peoples had left his home in time to arrive by 9:30 a.m. but had been delayed by an unanticipated event. During the second trial, Peoples became disruptive and disrespectful to the court, and Judge Currie cautioned him that, if he continued to behave that way, he would be held in contempt and possibly incarcerated.
On April 11, the first day of the third trial, Judge Currie reminded Peoples that failure to appear on time for trial the next day could result in dismissal of his case with prejudice. Peoples noted his dissatisfaction with the admonishment by muttering disrespectfully. The following day, Peoples arrived 15 minutes late. After considering argument from the parties, Judge Currie determined that Peoples willfully failed to appear timely after numerous warnings and dismissed his case with prejudice. Judge Currie then directed that the jury be brought into the courtroom so that she could advise them of the dismissal. As the jury entered the courtroom, Peoples left muttering “I was wanting to dismiss my sh—anyway.”
After dismissing the jurors, Judge Currie, accompanied by the court security officer, went into the jury room to thank the jurors for their service. At that time, Peoples reentered the courtroom, and approached Deputy Clerk Sara Samsa, who was gathering jury certificates to bring to Judge Currie. Peoples interrupted Samsa and repeated several times, “Tell Judge Currie get the f— off all my cases. I started to tell her something there. I started to tell her ass something today.” Upon hearing Peoples’ remarks, Court Reporter Jenny Williams, who was finishing her work on the day‘s proceedings, turned on her voice recorder and recorded Peoples making some of these comments.1 Samsa told Peoples if he had something to say to the judge, he should put it in writing, and then left the courtroom to tell Judge Currie and the court security officer of Peoples’ outburst. The court security officer immediately returned to the courtroom.
The next day, Judge Currie issued a written Rule to Show Cause and Order of Referral, directing Peoples to “show cause why criminal contempt sanctions should not be imposed.” Judge Currie recused herself from further proceedings, asking that the criminal contempt trial be referred to another judge.
The criminal contempt trial was referred to Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief Judge of the Western District of North Carolina, who scheduled the trial for September 20, 2011 at 10:00 a.m. When Peoples arrived more than an hour late on September 20, Judge Conrad advised Peoples that, given his tardiness that morning, at the conclusion of the trial for contempt of Judge Currie, the court would hold a separate trial for criminal contempt to Judge Conrad himself. At this second contempt tri-
During the first trial, the parties stipulated to the relevant facts as to Peoples’ language in Judge Currie‘s courtroom. They also stipulated to the admission of the actual audio recording of Peoples’ outburst and to the admission of FBI reports of interviews with Samsa and Williams setting forth the actions of court personnel in response to Peoples’ outburst. In addition, Judge Conrad admitted a transcript from the March 23, 2011 trial in which Judge Currie admonished Peoples that his behavior could result in a contempt charge. After considering the evidence and the parties’ arguments, Judge Conrad found Peoples guilty of criminal contempt of Judge Currie, and sentenced Peoples to four months’ incarceration.
Immediately after concluding the first trial, Judge Conrad proceeded to a second trial to determine whether Peoples should be held in criminal contempt for his tardiness in appearing in court that day for the first contempt trial. The judge gave Peoples an opportunity to confer with his attorney in the courtroom, while court remained in session. When Peoples had done so, he addressed the court and explained that car trouble caused his tardiness. Judge Conrad found Peoples’ explanation not credible and so found him guilty of a second charge of criminal contempt. Judge Conrad sentenced Peoples to an additional 30 days’ incarceration consecutive to the four months previously imposed.
Peoples appeals both contempt convictions.
II.
With respect to his first contempt conviction, Peoples challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented in a bench trial, we must uphold a guilty verdict if, taking the view most favorable to the Government, there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.” United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 184 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Elliott, 332 F.3d 753, 760-61 (4th Cir. 2003)). “[S]ubstantial evidence” means “evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). We review questions of fact, other than the ultimate question of guilt, for clear error. See United States v. Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447, 451 (4th Cir. 2004). Determinations of the meaning of statutory phrases, however, constitute legal conclusions that we review de novo. See United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 230, 233 (4th Cir. 2008).
Congress has provided federal courts with the power to impose criminal penalties for “contempt of [the court‘s] authority.” See
A.
Peoples asserts that his conduct did not amount to “misbehavior” because the words he “used have legitimate definitions,” were not directed at “Judge Currie personally,” and he “did not call Judge Currie these ... terms.” Peoples contends that he simply “expressed his unhappiness about Judge Currie‘s decision in his civil cases in terms ... possibly offensive to some,” but not rising to the level of misbehavior constituting criminal contempt. Appellant‘s Br. at 17.2
Criminal contempt does require more than just “[t]he vehemence of the language.” In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972). But Peoples did not just use vehement language. He targeted a judge, using profane language directed at the judge so that she would remove herself from his cases. Thus, Peoples did more than merely utter profane words; he profanely threatened judicial authority.
Courts repeatedly have found that offensive words directed at the court may form the basis for a contempt charge. As the Second Circuit has said, “there is an implicit standing order that parties, counsel, and courtroom attendees refrain from direct and egregious insults to judicial authority.” United States v. Marshall, 371 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 2004). See also In re Sealed Case, 627 F.3d 1235, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Gordon v. United States, 592 F.2d 1215, 1217 (1st Cir. 1979).
The record evidence offers ample support for Judge Conrad‘s conclusion that Peoples’ outburst was both threatening and directed at the court, and thereby constituted misbehavior under
B.
Peoples also maintains that his outburst did not obstruct the administration of justice because it (1) did not impede performance of any judicial duty, but rather (2) occurred after court had adjourned. Appellant‘s Br. at 12-17.
1.
The phrase “obstructs the administration of justice” in
Judge Conrad concluded that Peoples’ outburst impeded the performance of judicial duties in two ways. First, the judge found that Peoples’ outburst caused Judge Currie and court personnel to spend time participating in the subsequent investigation of the outburst. Second, Judge Conrad found that when Peoples’ outburst occurred it required court personnel to cease
As Judge Conrad noted, we have held that the delay and distraction resulting from a court‘s investigation of misconduct can be considered in determining if a defendant has obstructed the administration of justice. Warlick, 742 F.2d at 116. Peoples urges us to abandon this view in favor of the Seventh Circuit‘s rule, announced in United States v. Oberhellmann, 946 F.2d 50, 53 (7th Cir. 1991), that the delay and costs associated with the investigation of contempt cannot themselves serve as proof of obstruction of the administration of justice.
Even if a panel could ignore circuit precedent (which it cannot), we would find no basis for reversal here. This is so because Judge Conrad did not find the delay or distraction resulting from the investigation of contempt alone satisfied the obstruction element. Rather, the judge found that the administration of justice was also obstructed because Peoples delayed court personnel in and distracted them from the performance of their judicial duties. As Judge Conrad put it, at the time of Peoples’ outburst, “court personnel [were] continuing to engage in the business of the court” and “[t]hey were obstructed in that effort.” Peoples’ outburst “required them to leave the work that they were doing and deal with the statement that the defendant made.” The record contains undisputed evidence that the outburst (1) delayed Samsa in obtaining jury certificates and bringing them to Judge Currie, (2) prevented Williams from finishing the work associated with the day‘s proceedings and required her to turn on the recorder and type Peoples’ remarks, and (3) caused the court security officer to leave his post and return to the courtroom. Thus, the record clearly supports Judge Conrad‘s factual finding as to the delay and distraction caused by Peoples’ outburst.
Of course, as the Government conceded in the district court, the effect of Peoples’ obstructive conduct was not great. But it need not be. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 627 F.3d at 1238 (“An outburst of foul language directed at the court is intolerable misbehavior in the courtroom and falls within the prohibition of section 401(1).“); Gordon, 592 F.2d at 1217 (“[T]here is a point at which mere words are so offensive and so unnecessary that their very utterance creates a delay which is an obstruction of justice.“). To satisfy the obstruction element it suffices if the defendant‘s conduct “interrupt[ed] the orderly process of the administration of justice” by distracting court personnel from, and delaying them in, completing their duties. Warlick, 742 F.2d at 115-16. Peoples’ outburst did this.
2.
Alternatively, Peoples argues that his outburst did not obstruct the administration of justice because it occurred after court had adjourned and thus did not disrupt a judicial proceeding. To be contemptuous, however, conduct need not occur during ongoing court proceedings. See In re Sealed Case, 627 F.3d at 1237 (“We begin by rejecting the premise that an obstruction of justice cannot occur in the absence of ongoing court proceedings or once the proceedings have concluded. Misbehavior in the courtroom, at any time, carries the potential to obstruct justice.“).3
Section 401(1) criminalizes conduct “in [the court‘s] presence or ... near there-
C.
For these reasons, we reject Peoples’ challenges to the first contempt conviction. The record fully supports Judge Conrad‘s findings that Peoples’ profane language in Judge Currie‘s courtroom constituted intentional misbehavior that obstructed the administration of justice.
III.
With respect to his second contempt conviction, Peoples maintains that Judge Conrad erred by summarily imposing a contempt sanction for Peoples’ tardiness in arriving at the trial on the first contempt charge. Because Peoples failed to object to the imposition of summary contempt before the district court, we review for plain error. See In re Gates, 600 F.3d 333, 337 (4th Cir. 2010).
Generally, a person who commits criminal contempt may be punished for his contemptuous conduct only “after prosecution on notice.”
We, and the majority of our sister circuits, do not consider tardiness or absence from court to provide an adequate basis for summary disposition under
Therefore, when tardiness provides the basis of a contempt charge, “the district court should ... appl[y] the procedural safeguards set forth in
The Government acknowledges that Judge Conrad “announced that [he] was proceeding pursuant to
We therefore must consider whether this error affected Peoples’ substantial rights. See In re Gates, 600 F.3d at 340. In general, an error affects substantial rights if it “has a prejudicial effect on the outcome,”
The Court has also held that a person accused of criminal contempt enjoys the normal range of procedural rights. Int‘l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826 (1994). Of course, “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the second contempt conviction resulted from a summary proceeding erroneously denying Peoples this opportunity, we must conclude that this error affected his substantial rights.
We “exercise our discretion to correct the error only when ‘the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.‘” In re Gates, 600 F.3d at 341 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736). As we concluded in In re Gates, the sort of error at issue here is “of the most fundamental kind. Notice of criminal charges and an opportunity to respond to them are bedrock principles in our system of justice.” 600 F.3d at 341. Accordingly, we exercise our discretion to correct the error and reverse Peoples’ second contempt conviction.
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm in No. 11-4963 and reverse in No. 11-4965.
No. 11-4963 AFFIRMED.
No. 11-4965 REVERSED.