On Dеcember 23, 2014, Rivera and three others robbed a Milwaukee bar called the Brew City Tap. They all wore masks; and three of them were armed, two with BB guns and one with a .40-caliber handgun. They left with $857.25.
Four days later, they robbed the Sky Zone Indoor Trampoline Park. This robbery was more successful than the prior one, netting them over $12,000.
Nearly fifty businesses throughout the Milwaukee arеa suffered similar armed robberies between October 2013 and January 2015. Although various cooperating witnesses implicated Rivera in thirty of those robberies, the government sought a rеckoning for only five of them. To that end, the government charged Rivera with five counts of Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) and 2. The government also took the position that Hobbs Act robbery сonstitutes a “crime of violence” as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). So in addition to the five Hobbs Act robbery counts, the government tacked on five counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 2. Rivera agreed to plead guilty to two of the crime-of-violence counts in exchange for the government dropping the othеr charges. Judge Stadt-mueller accepted Rivera’s guilty plea on November 12, 2015.
On February 4, 2016, Judge Stadtmuel-ler sentenced Rivera to the mandatory minimum of thirty-two years’ imprisonment.
Rivera timely appealed his convictions and sentence, raising two issuеs: (1) whether Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c); and (2) whether Judge Stadtmueller committed procedural error by saying he was “obliged” to impose a five-year supervised-release term.
With respect to the first issue, we have recently decided that Hobbs Act robbery indeed qualifies as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c) because it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” United States v. Anglin, No. 15-3625,
We have little to add to the analysis in Anglin, except to address оne additional argument. Rivera contends that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mathis v. United States undermines the notion that physical force is' an “element” of Hobbs Act robbery. — U.S.-,
But Rivera takes the Supreme Court’s discussion of means and elements out of context. Contrary to Rivera’s belief, the Court did not distinguish between means and elements to dictate which parts of a statute matter in a predicate-offense analysis. The Court instead made this distinction to explain when it is appropriate to use the categorical approach versus a “modified” categorical approach — an issue that is irrelevant here. Mathis,
Even if Rivera’s application of Mathis is correct, his argument still fails. The distinction between means and elements would matter only if one of thе ways to commit Hobbs Act robbery, say, putting another in fear of injury, did not involve force, so that a juror could find a defendant guilty irrespective of whether he used force to cоmmit the crime. But as noted above, one cannot commit Hobbs Act robbery without using or threatening force. Anglin,
We now turn to the second issue on appeal regarding Rivera’s supervised-release term. Rivera’s § 924(c) convictions carry a maximum five-year term of supervised release following imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(1). The government concedes that this term is not mandatory. Neverthеless, at sentencing, Judge Stadt-mueller said he was “obliged” to impose a five-year term. (R. 196 at 24.) Rivera argues that this statement suggests that the judge erroneously believed that the law required a five-year term, so we should remand for resentencing.
We review de novo whether a district court committed procedural error when sentencing a defendant. United States v. Dorsey,
But that’s not the case here. Although Judge Stadtmueller said he was “obliged” to impose a five-year term, this does not necessarily mean that he thought the term was mandatоry. To be sure, the word “obliged” does connote a legal obligation; but it also encompasses a moral duty. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1106 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “oblige” as “[t]o bind by legal or moral duty”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1556 (1986) (defining “oblige” as “[t]o cоnstrain (as another or oneself) by physical, moral, or legal force”). If Judge Stadtmueller thought he was legally required to impose a five-year term, then he committed proсedural error; but if he felt morally bound to impose this term based on the sentencing factors he considered, then there was no error.
The record indicates that Judge Stadt-mueller used the word “obliged” in the latter way. For instance, at the ehange-of-plea hearing, Judge Stadtmueller referenced paragraph six of the plea agreement, whiсh explained that Rivera faced a maximum five-year term of supervised release. (R. 195 at 9); (R. 117 at ¶ 6.) Judge Stadtmueller instructed Rivera to summarize this paragraph to ensure that Rivera fully understood the maximum possible sentence. (R. 195 at 9-10.)
Moreover, the presentence investigation report prohibited imposing a supervised-release term exceeding fivе years, and cited U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(l), which recommends a two- to five-year term. (R. 175 at ¶¶ 138-39.) Judge Stadtmueller relied on this report at sentencing, saying that Rivera’s prison term would be “followed by a term оf supervised release of 2 to 5 years.” (R. 196 at 5.)
Finally, Judge Stadtmueller’s statement of reasons noted that the supervised-release range is “[a]t least 2 years but not more than 5 years.” (R. 184 at 1.) All of this shows that Judge Stadtmueller understood that a five-year term was not mandatory, but he felt obliged — in a moral sense — to impose this term nonetheless.
In United States v. Dill, we addressed a similar chаllenge to Judge Stadtmueller’s use of the word “obliged” when imposing a sentence.
Judge Stadtmueller could have — and probably should have — used less ambiguous language when sentencing Rivera. That said, the record demonstrates that Judge Stadtmueller used the word “obliged” in the moral sense — not the legal one. And our holding in Dill corroborates this conclusion. We thus hold that there was no procedural error.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
Notes
. The first crime-of-violencе conviction carried a mandatory minimum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii). The second one carried a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(C)(i).