*1 Township specifically. locate within Genoa America, UNITED STATES Livingston seeks to serve
LCS instead Plaintiff-Appellee, these circum- County as a whole. Under stances, hold as a matter law we substantially burdened sim- LCS was RILEY, Defendant-Appellant. Montai not relocate within ply because could Township. Genoa No. 16-6149 Appeals, United States Court not be taken
Our decision should Sixth Circuit. religious institution can to mean that a a RLUIPA claim based never establish 16, 2017 Argued: March particular inability to locate within Decided Filed: June deter jurisdiction. simply hold that the We mination of a substantial burden whether geographical due to limitations
exists institution, A religious
factual in nature. might have a mission of cater example, to lower-income individuals
ing specifically center, might be
located in an urban by relocating to a suburb that
thwarted transportation. See Islamic
lacked Miss., Starkville, City Inc. v. Center of 1988) (noting F.2d many of a of whom mosque,
that members living in an urban area lo
were students university campus,
cated near a would be
substantially burdened if had to trav automobile). But mosque using
el to the present
the circumstances in the case sim do not constitute a substantial burden
ply
on LCS.
III. CONCLUSION above,
For all of the reasons set forth judgment
we AFFIRM the of the district
court.
OPINION PER CURIAM. upon
This case clarify calls us to police may rules seek to find fugitive subject miscreants: When a an arrest warrant for robbery armed hides in motel, may government track his cell phone’s GPS coordinates to locate and ar- rest him?
Yes, the district court held—and we af- firm, holding government’s detec- tion Riley’s of Montai whereabouts in this case, tracking Riley’s which included real- time GPS location data for approximately arrest, preceding seven hours did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search precedent under our United States v. 2012). Skinner, 690 F.3d Riley’s used GPS location data to learn that hiding out at Inn in Airport Memphis, Tennessee— inquiring of the front-desk after clerk Riley’s did the ascertain specific room number order to arrest him. The provided thus no greater insight Riley’s into whereabouts Riley exposed than what view as H. Ferguson, ARGUED: Claiborne “along public thoroughfares,” he traveled THE CLAIBORNE FERGUSON LAW Therefore, lobby. to the hotel id. FIRM, P.A., Tennessee, Memphis, Ap- for Skinner, Riley under has no reasonable Brown, Ashley pellant. C. UNITED privacy against such track- OFFICE, Mem- STATES ATTORNEY’S ing, properly and the district court denied Tennessee, phis, Appellee. for ON BRIEF: suppress motion to evidence found Ferguson, H. THE Claiborne CLAI- arrest. FIRM, P.A., BORNE FERGUSON LAW Tennessee, Memphis, Appellant. for Mar- I
ques Young, T. AT- UNITED STATES OFFICE, Memphis, TORNEY’S Tennes- On a state court in Kent June see, Appellee. for County, Michigan, issued arrest war- Riley, having probable rant found BOGGS, ROGERS, COOK, Before: cause to believe that he had committed Judges. Circuit ’n robbery armed of a local Check Go store allegedly entered The court delivered a PER CURIAM on June 22. had BOGGS, 1018-24), store, clerk, gun at the in- opinion. (pp. pointed J. safe, open her to and fled on separate concurring opinion. delivered a structed money bags.” Riley’s phone. Specifically, coordinates of “money box and foot with a Riley purchased required the order AT&T to disclose the On June A months, AT&T. member following, serviced for two until potentially 2015; phone’s telephone number family gave this August she could contact Riley’s girlfriend “so 16. Precision location of mobile device ” Riley’s *3 the run.’ him while he was ‘on (GPS Location) provid- such service the to girlfriend in turn disclosed number signal shall initiate a to determine the er Bowman, a Deputy Joel member Special subject’s location of the mobile device on the States Marshal Service Grand United provider’s the service network or with Apprehension Team. On June Rapids points other reference as such and received an order applied Bowman for reasonable available and a such [sic] [sic] of Kent from the 17th Circuit Court Coun- by intervals and times as directed State produce AT&T to ty, Michigan, compelling Investigators Deputy Task Force and records of cell telecommunications Marshals of the States Marshal phone under federal electronic-surveillance Service. .2703, 3123, §§ laws. See 3124. U.S.C. Within hours of the issuance of the sur- compelled court order disclosure of order, veillance Marshals received and out-
call metadata such as inbound revealing data real-time GPS and cell-site location phone bound numbers (CSL) Inn in data, phone Airport was located the tracking1 as well as real-time longitude Memphis.2 deputies in the Mar- “pinging” or of the latitude and Task-force Cell-phone practice 1. refers to all in line with the of other courts that phone, including methods of cell cell-phone tracking, have discussed we use (com- gathering cell-site location information only ping "pinging” in the latter sense: to CSLI) monly to CSL and referred as or track- phone signal, speak, cell is to send so to to Positioning System ing Global satellite-based identify phone any given where the is at mo- (GPS) generated data. CSL data are when a pinging may ment. While in some cases em- phone cell connects with a cell tower in order (for ploy example, by information trian- CSL call; phone may make receive a con- to gulating phone the location of a while a call is multiple nect to disconnect from towers gathered progress using data from mul- if, during phone call the course of a for exam- towers), tiple pinging cell the at issue in this ple, during the caller is in motion the call. case, cases, only as in recent most involves hand, on the other do not come Rather, real-time collection of GPS data. GPS data reveal tower. longitude the latitude and coordinates of the provided phone's regardless 2. AT&T cell GPS coor- phone, cell of whether a call is in the times, progress, orbiting as identified satellites twenty-two dinates at various the first phone. the Earth that connect to the A cell detailed No evidence of are below. can be identified GPS location so Riley’s phone record indicates whether auto- long phone functionality the has GPS in- matically transmitted its GPS coordinates to (as smartphones universally stalled almost so, (and AT&T if whether on a continuous on, do), is turned and .the GPS otherwise) basis or or whether AT&T affirma- functionality Finally, “ping- is not disabled. signal Riley’sphone tively to sent to cause ing” is a word that refer some con- AT&T When send its GPS coordinates. phone’s connecting texts to a cell to a cell majority map, viewed these coor- tower”), (e.g., phone pinged tower "the perimeter dinates are within the scattered provider's and in other contexts to a service Inn, Airport preci- with insufficient identifying proactively the real-time act of lo- Airport sion—even if the Inn were one cation of the cell when cell room, story any, tall—to reveal which ordinarily would not transmit its location on ping. (e.g., pinged phone”). phone was in at the time of each its own “AT&T motel, Memphis shals’ office went to the States District Court the Western Dis- showed the front-desk clerk a picture of trict of Tennessee to answer his federal Riley, Riley and determined that had firearm-possession charge. Riley twice in under the name checked “Rico Shawn compel moved to to dis- dep- Lavender” and was Room 314. The close information on how uties went room and knocked. Riley located so quickly, asserting that Riley opened immediately the door and no legal way “[t]here was known that Mr. it, attempted deputies shut but the en- Riley’s location could have been located tered the room and arrested at some absent the use of illegal tech- p.m. time between 8:50 and 9:00 A Smith nology,” disclosure required pistol & Wesson .22-caliber was in plain to allow bring constitutional *4 bed, view on the and was subse- challenge to whatever technology was quently indicted on one count being of a used. granted The district court Riley’s firearm, possession felon in of a in viola- second compel. motion to § 922(g)(1). tion of 18 U.S.C.
Attaching copies of the state court’s sur- order, veillance Riley moved suppress II pistol found his motel room as the search, fruit of an unconstitutional arguing Following his arrest in Memphis, whatever method the had Wyoming, was extradited to Michigan, used to find him—whether ping- GPS where, on October he was sen- ing, “cell-site simulator” such as a “Dirt- years tenced state court to 7.5 to 25 Box, etc.,” otherwise, Stingray, or Mot. to imprisonment robbery, for armed with an R. 13, 2023, Suppress, upon 3—intruded Ri- January earliest release date of 13, ley’s discharge July privacy and a latest date of reasonable 2040. He then returned to required gov- the United thus a search warrant.3 The parties agree 3. The that the state court's sur- not a valid search warrant that on would its order, despite being pursuant veillance issued justify tracking Riley’s own location laws, to federal electronic-surveillance was motion, precedent our including ly logic within the opposed eminent Skinner, we affirm. fourteen-page exhibit response its with listing the GPS coordinates starting June
phone on 454 occasions Ill The first ending June 2015. protects The Fourth Amendment Ante, are listed above. twenty-two entries searches against unreasonable individuals average, logged approxi- AT&T at n.2. On houses, pa “persons, and seizures their minutes, every thirteen mately “ping” one offi pers, and effects.” Law-enforcement course, Riley was arrested on although, of seek to cers conduct “search” when day tracking. the first ways: in either of two obtain information denied the motion on The district court (1) by physically trespassing upon indi first, ground bases: on the two alternative house, effects, person, papers, vidual’s justified that our decision Skinner Jones, see United States v. short-term GPS without war- 181 L.Ed.2d second, rant; ground that the war- (2012) (holding tracking of a vehicle rant that had been issued for arrest twenty-eight days search when justified obtaining real-time GPS informa- agents physically trespassed the ve to ef- tion about order device), or hicle to install the Riley pleaded guilty arrest. fectuate his *5 by intruding upon an individual’s reason firearm, of a being possession a felon see v. expectation privacy, able of Katz reserving right appeal his the denial of 347, 360-62, States, 389 U.S. suppress, and his motion to was sentenced (1967) (Harlan, S.Ct. forty-one imprisonment months of J., concurring) eavesdropping on (holding concurrently run with his state sentence payphone by conversation means of an delayed February start of but with a date device, recording listening electronic 13, 2022. closed, payphone when the door was was search; noting expectations whether “reasonable of question The sole before us is may by be defeated electronic as holding privacy the district court erred in that the invasion”). Riley does not government physical did not violate Fourth well as rights by compelling argue AT&T to that committed Amendment sort, disclose, trespass any of and we de by subsequently using, physical and then pinging cell cline to consider whether the real-time GPS location of tresp may approximately phone over the course of constitute an electronic phone ass,5 only seven hours.4 Because the sort of short- so the ‘reasonable applicable test is here. square- privacy’ term conducted here falls of signal attempts statutory argu- ing Riley's cell rather than 4. also to raise a recog- appeal. ment on nized, As the district court merely gathering the cell data own, the statutes relies emitted on its had committed an elec- authorizing provide for access to mechanisms technologi- digital trespass that was tronic or cell-phone prohibit certain data and do not cally distinguishable from otherwise an argument This was not raised in Ri- Skinner. Thus, individual’s GPS location data. the stat- however, ley’s appeal, and thus it is brief provide Riley remedy utes cannot with the he Moreover, properly Skinner ex- before us. against seeks—suppression of the evidence pressly contemplated tracking "cell infor- site him. location, mation, 'ping' GPS real-time data,” nothing 690 F.3d at and there is argument, Riley sought 5. At oral to advance government, by that the argument initiat- in the record before us to indicate Supreme likely Both the Court and our court more raise Fourth Amendment con- recognize have declined to as reasonable a in light cerns of the protec- common law’s criminal suspect’s expectation privacy tion of against government the home intru- moving along public his location while Pitt, Chatham, sion. As Earl of William thoroughfares. See United States v. reportedly proclaimed during a debate Knotts, 276, 279-80, 460 U.S. 103 S.Ct. Parliament in 1763: “The poorest may man 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d (holding cottage to all bid the forces defiance placement by of a radio transmitter nar frail; may of the may Crown. its roof It cotics in a container of officers chemicals shake; it; through wind blow purchased by suspected to be metham enter; enter; storm the rain may but phetamine manufacturer was not a search the King England cannot enter—all his when officers used the transmitter to track force dares not cross the threshold a vehicle while it the transmitter carried ruined The Dictionary Oxford tenement!” cabin, along public to a when roads (2d Quotations 1953), 379, quoted in ed. itself); transmitter did not enter the cabin States, Miller v. United Skinner, United States 690 F.3d (1958). 1190, 2 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1332 The 2012) (holding gov intervening two-and-a-half centuries have ernment use of real-time jurisprudential seen little erosion of this to track suspected drug data trafficker sanctity tenacious reverence for the days as he traveled for three in a “moto home. rhome that was driven on roads” search). not a Supreme Court very has made clear, example, that “obtaining Skinner,
In we held sense-enhancing technology any informa- “voluntarily procured” emitted the interior the home regarding tion subject could not be to a reasonable that could not otherwise have been ob- expectation of privacy, even the cell- *6 physical without ‘intrusion tained into phone no expect user had reason to that constitutionally protected area’ government constitutes compel would the service States, Kyllo provider to disclose those data. Id. at 779. v. United search.” 533 U.S. There, 27, 2038, 35, because “the move- 121 S.Ct. 150 L.Ed.2d defendant’s 94 by any (2001) added) (citation omitted) ments could have observed been (emphasis ibid., public,” member of the we held that States, (quoting Silverman v. United 365 possibly it could not a Fourth Amend- 505, 512, 679, U.S. 81 S.Ct. 734 L.Ed.2d ment violation for law-enforcement officers (1961)) (holding government use of ther- by using to monitor those movements cell- mal-imaging devices to monitor the heat just because elec- such being produced part inside home as of a monitoring tronic was more efficient than strategy marijuana grow- to detect indoor relying on visual surveillance alone. ing was a search where the devices were general public, unavailable to the even
The fact that the defendant’s movements though the devices were used from Skinner in were from public visible van- effecting physi- outside the home without tage points important was an factor in our Karo, United States v. reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis. trespass); cal 705, 708-09, 713-15, Entering an individual’s home 104 S.Ct. observe movements, if by technological (holding government his even physically, monitoring tracking device rather than would much of a device in a placed fracking technologically tracking here is distinct from that occurred Skinner. tracking. tracking taken home the time of the And the
shipment of chemicals
Karo,
drug
was a search where
a search to the extent that
suspected
dealer
while
the device to locate the
agents
tracked
device
was monitored
there
chemicals,
occasions, within the
residences,
on several
private
was not a
pri-
and various other
times,
defendant’s house
at
as when the
search
other
such
residences; distinguishing Karo vate
tracking device was monitored
one
Knotts on the sole basis
that unlike in
...
trip
the defendant’s vehicles “on its
Knotts,
show
in which “the record did not
vicinity
the immediate
private
resi-
of’
was monitored while the
beeper
dence.
at
cross CONCURRENCE to a and thus cannot amount Fourth BOGGS, concurring. Judge, Circuit all, tracking Amendment search. After the in Knotts revealed the location of the cabin I to which the criminal suspects had trav separately highlight I write certain Knotts was not tracking eled—but the play factors at in this case that additional search because it revealed no information provide holding additional comfort that our Like about cabin itself. interior today is correct. here, tracking only wise revealed had traveled to Inn, Airport argument, not At oral con- (if room if any) in at ceded that the GPS had been was identify precise enough specific home work based on the Supreme rul- Court’s hiding— or motel room in which ings in Katz and Jones is the so-called generally—Kyllo doctrine, rather than a motel and third-party according to which presented greater Karo have con- one can have no reasonable cerns: privacy in information knowingly disclosed that, party, to a third
I think
if these
and thus no
coordinates had
Fourth
Amendment claim
identify
been sufficient to
a home
can lie for
acquisi-
room,
tion
hotel
this could be a
and use
agents
different
law-enforcement
case,
I think
the fact here that the
such information. See United
States
Miller,
only get
police
coordinates
officers
96 S.Ct.
lobby, essentially,
to the hotel
and
(holding government-
then have to do additional work in terms
compelled
depositor’s
disclosure of “a
pri-
figuring
exactly
out
what hotel room vate [bank] records” was not a Fourth
in,
he’s makes this case different
Amendment search because “the Fourth
home,
he
had been identified
and Amendment
prohibit
does not
the obtain-
makes
akin
this case more
to Skinner.
ing of information revealed
party
to a third
conveyed by
him to Government au-
Arg.
Tr. of Oral
20:06-20:35.
thorities, even if the information is re-
But our
precedent
governs
Skinner
assumption
vealed on the
it will be
brought
because the
here
the law-
only
used
for a limited purpose and the
enforcement officers
as far as the
placed
confidence
in the
party
third
will
lobby of the
Inn—a
Airport
public area—
betrayed”);
not be
Smith v. Maryland, 442
and the officers then had to ask the front-
61 L.Ed.2d
desk clerk to determine
where-
(1979) (holding
government-compelled
specific
abouts within the confines of a
pen register
installation of a
to track
hotel room.
phone numbers dialed
specified
from a
I
Riley’s,
would note that
cases like
telephone-service
subscriber’s
landline
even
GPS data within a home or
pen
was not
search where the
a hotel room
fail to rise to the level of
register
telephone
was installed on the
a Fourth Amendment search when the
company’s property and where the out-
individual,
cell-phone location
whose
voluntarily
bound
numbers were
fugitive subject
tracked is a
to a valid
telephone company
disclosed to the
warrant,
arrest
and when the law-enforce-
reasonably
therefore
be consid-
could
tracking him
ment officers
have at least
private).
ered
suspicion
posses-
reasonable
that he is in
Thus,
phone being
sion of the
tracked.
Kyllo,
But
decided well after both Mil-
follow,
the reasons that
I would hold that
Smith, expressly rejected
ler and
the no-
fails,
Fourth Amendment claim
al-
tion that
government’s
use of thermal-
ternatively, because he was a fugitive sub-
imaging devices to detect heat within the
warrant,
ject to a valid arrest
and because
justified
home could
defendant’s
on the
*8
suspicion
the officers here had reasonable
ground
“exposed”
that the defendant
that he was in
that
possession
the
activity
public” by emitting
“to the
heat
they
tracking.
were
public
waves that could be detected from a
44,
vantage point. Kyllo,
A. The Doctrine (draw- (Stevens, J., dissenting) 2038 S.Ct. Supplementing general ing analogies the Fourth between heat waves that “en- they Amendment unreasonable-search frame- ter the domain and when 1020 home, the but whether warrant garbage, and discarded restee’s building” a
leave
or a search
Greenwood,
must be an arrest warrant
486 U.S.
v.
California
(1988),
defini-
1625,
question
warrant is not a
answered
pen-
108 S.Ct.
text,
742,
data, Smith,
tively by the constitutional
and
the
ject to arrest is inside his Against Weighing C. Factors enter the home and arrest individual Privacy Fugitive’s Expectation warrant to obtaining without first search so). Data GPS Location do considerations, none of which is logic Payton is that the Fourth Several sufficient, support prop- requires independently Amendment provider’s entering the ar- osition that service obtain warrant before
1021
walls.”).
fugitive’s cell-phone
records of a
location within his own
Arguably, one who
private
data are not
for Fourth Amend-
refuses the lawful
King
demand of the
purposes.
ment
enter and
an
execute
arrest warrant
inis
an analogous position to one who is on the
First,
subject
of the surveillance is a
warrant,
run from a lawful arrest
and so
fugitive.
fugitive
While a
does not forfeit
reasonably
the two could
expected
be
all,
expectation
privacy—after
all his
of
expectations
have similar
of privacy.
Payton,
under
law-enforcement officers
Second,
simply
fugitive’s
break into a
the information gathered in
data,
home to arrest him without at
least some
cases like
is location
not call
sure,
in-
fugitive
Kyllo
reason to believe
content. To be
and Karo set a
in
compelling
fairly
side—the most
factor
favor
low threshold level of intrusion with-
allowing
fugi-
to track a
in the
at
home which surveillance becomes
phone regardless
tive’s cell
a search.
tracking Riley’s
But
fugitive
subject
location is that the
is the
provided
no more information
(or
of a valid arrest warrant.
about the interior of
home
mo-
room)
tel
than
the tracking
did
device in
Payton,
In addition to the rule in
which
Karo,
it provided
far less information
allows officers
enter
arrestee’s home
than
thermal-imaging
did the
device in
to effectuate the arrest with
reason-
Kyllo.
While GPS
is “accurate
home,
suspicion
able
the arrestee is at
feet,”
within about 50
United States v.
Supreme
Court has held that
law-
880,
Carpenter, 819 F.3d
889
pursuit”
enforcement officers
“hot
2016),
precise
and is thus more
than CSL
quarry
right
their
have
limited
to enter
ballparks
which
a cell phone’s loca-
without a
private homes
search warrant.
wedge extending
tion within a “radial
be-
Hayden,
See
Warden
tween one-half mile and two miles in
310, 87 S.Ct.
length” based on the cell towers to which it
exigent
(holding
circumstances validated
connects,
ibid., GPS coordinates reveal
entry
warrantless
into a home to search
nothing other than the location of the
suspected
for a
armed
who had
robber
content,
phone:
text-message
no call
no
or
reportedly entered
than
less
five minutes
content,
application
email
and no
data.
earlier). There is some
support
historical
Third,
holding
fugitive’s
that a
cases like
Jones,
privacy at home is
at
In
diminished as well:
is limited
duration and reach.
law,
at
Sotomayor
sepa-
common
officers
have had
Justices
and Alito wrote
authority
concurring opinions
they
least some
enter a home to exe-
rate
making
longer
cute an arrest warrant after
that “the
term
first
commented
use
Payton,
monitoring
investigations
demand.
at
of most
See
Case,
(citing Semayne’s
expectations
priva-
impinges
S.Ct. 1371
Co. offenses
(K. B.) (1603))
91a,
Jones,
Rep.
Eng. Rep.
cy.”
opinion
existing protections under the Stored Act or elsewhere al-
Communications requirements on
ready impose additional agents seeking engage
the sort of GPS Riley, track used here to because
Marshals *12 before us is whether the question constitutional violated not.
rights—and did COREY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
Bruce
SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT
SERVICES, INC.; Corporation; Eaton Corporation Disability Plan for
Eaton Employees; Eaton Health and Committee,
Welfare Administrative
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-3817 Appeals, States Court of
Sixth Circuit.
Argued: March Filed:
Decided and June
