History
  • No items yet
midpage
United States v. Riley
858 F.3d 1012
6th Cir.
2017
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 Township specifically. locate within Genoa America, UNITED STATES Livingston seeks to serve

LCS instead Plaintiff-Appellee, these circum- County as a whole. Under stances, hold as a matter law we substantially burdened sim- LCS was RILEY, Defendant-Appellant. Montai not relocate within ply because could Township. Genoa No. 16-6149 Appeals, United States Court not be taken

Our decision should Sixth Circuit. religious institution can to mean that a a RLUIPA claim based never establish 16, 2017 Argued: March particular inability to locate within Decided Filed: June deter jurisdiction. simply hold that the We mination of a substantial burden whether geographical due to limitations

exists institution, A religious

factual in nature. might have a mission of cater example, to lower-income individuals

ing specifically center, might be

located in an urban by relocating to a suburb that

thwarted transportation. See Islamic

lacked Miss., Starkville, City Inc. v. Center of 1988) (noting F.2d many of a of whom mosque,

that members living in an urban area lo

were students university campus,

cated near a would be

substantially burdened if had to trav automobile). But mosque using

el to the present

the circumstances in the case sim do not constitute a substantial burden

ply

on LCS.

III. CONCLUSION above,

For all of the reasons set forth judgment

we AFFIRM the of the district

court.

OPINION PER CURIAM. upon

This case clarify calls us to police may rules seek to find fugitive subject miscreants: When a an arrest warrant for robbery armed hides in motel, may government track his cell phone’s GPS coordinates to locate and ar- rest him?

Yes, the district court held—and we af- firm, holding government’s detec- tion Riley’s of Montai whereabouts in this case, tracking Riley’s which included real- time GPS location data for approximately arrest, preceding seven hours did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search precedent under our United States v. 2012). Skinner, 690 F.3d Riley’s used GPS location data to learn that hiding out at Inn in Airport Memphis, Tennessee— inquiring of the front-desk after clerk Riley’s did the ascertain specific room number order to arrest him. The provided thus no greater insight Riley’s into whereabouts Riley exposed than what view as H. Ferguson, ARGUED: Claiborne “along public thoroughfares,” he traveled THE CLAIBORNE FERGUSON LAW Therefore, lobby. to the hotel id. FIRM, P.A., Tennessee, Memphis, Ap- for Skinner, Riley under has no reasonable Brown, Ashley pellant. C. UNITED privacy against such track- OFFICE, Mem- STATES ATTORNEY’S ing, properly and the district court denied Tennessee, phis, Appellee. for ON BRIEF: suppress motion to evidence found Ferguson, H. THE Claiborne CLAI- arrest. FIRM, P.A., BORNE FERGUSON LAW Tennessee, Memphis, Appellant. for Mar- I

ques Young, T. AT- UNITED STATES OFFICE, Memphis, TORNEY’S Tennes- On a state court in Kent June see, Appellee. for County, Michigan, issued arrest war- Riley, having probable rant found BOGGS, ROGERS, COOK, Before: cause to believe that he had committed Judges. Circuit ’n robbery armed of a local Check Go store allegedly entered The court delivered a PER CURIAM on June 22. had BOGGS, 1018-24), store, clerk, gun at the in- opinion. (pp. pointed J. safe, open her to and fled on separate concurring opinion. delivered a structed money bags.” Riley’s phone. Specifically, coordinates of “money box and foot with a Riley purchased required the order AT&T to disclose the On June A months, AT&T. member following, serviced for two until potentially 2015; phone’s telephone number family gave this August she could contact Riley’s girlfriend “so 16. Precision location of mobile device ” Riley’s *3 the run.’ him while he was ‘on (GPS Location) provid- such service the to girlfriend in turn disclosed number signal shall initiate a to determine the er Bowman, a Deputy Joel member Special subject’s location of the mobile device on the States Marshal Service Grand United provider’s the service network or with Apprehension Team. On June Rapids points other reference as such and received an order applied Bowman for reasonable available and a such [sic] [sic] of Kent from the 17th Circuit Court Coun- by intervals and times as directed State produce AT&T to ty, Michigan, compelling Investigators Deputy Task Force and records of cell telecommunications Marshals of the States Marshal phone under federal electronic-surveillance Service. .2703, 3123, §§ laws. See 3124. U.S.C. Within hours of the issuance of the sur- compelled court order disclosure of order, veillance Marshals received and out-

call metadata such as inbound revealing data real-time GPS and cell-site location phone bound numbers (CSL) Inn in data, phone Airport was located the tracking1 as well as real-time longitude Memphis.2 deputies in the Mar- “pinging” or of the latitude and Task-force Cell-phone practice 1. refers to all in line with the of other courts that phone, including methods of cell cell-phone tracking, have discussed we use (com- gathering cell-site location information only ping "pinging” in the latter sense: to CSLI) monly to CSL and referred as or track- phone signal, speak, cell is to send so to to Positioning System ing Global satellite-based identify phone any given where the is at mo- (GPS) generated data. CSL data are when a pinging may ment. While in some cases em- phone cell connects with a cell tower in order (for ploy example, by information trian- CSL call; phone may make receive a con- to gulating phone the location of a while a call is multiple nect to disconnect from towers gathered progress using data from mul- if, during phone call the course of a for exam- towers), tiple pinging cell the at issue in this ple, during the caller is in motion the call. case, cases, only as in recent most involves hand, on the other do not come Rather, real-time collection of GPS data. GPS data reveal tower. longitude the latitude and coordinates of the provided phone's regardless 2. AT&T cell GPS coor- phone, cell of whether a call is in the times, progress, orbiting as identified satellites twenty-two dinates at various the first phone. the Earth that connect to the A cell detailed No evidence of are below. can be identified GPS location so Riley’s phone record indicates whether auto- long phone functionality the has GPS in- matically transmitted its GPS coordinates to (as smartphones universally stalled almost so, (and AT&T if whether on a continuous on, do), is turned and .the GPS otherwise) basis or or whether AT&T affirma- functionality Finally, “ping- is not disabled. signal Riley’sphone tively to sent to cause ing” is a word that refer some con- AT&T When send its GPS coordinates. phone’s connecting texts to a cell to a cell majority map, viewed these coor- tower”), (e.g., phone pinged tower "the perimeter dinates are within the scattered provider's and in other contexts to a service Inn, Airport preci- with insufficient identifying proactively the real-time act of lo- Airport sion—even if the Inn were one cation of the cell when cell room, story any, tall—to reveal which ordinarily would not transmit its location on ping. (e.g., pinged phone”). phone was in at the time of each its own “AT&T motel, Memphis shals’ office went to the States District Court the Western Dis- showed the front-desk clerk a picture of trict of Tennessee to answer his federal Riley, Riley and determined that had firearm-possession charge. Riley twice in under the name checked “Rico Shawn compel moved to to dis- dep- Lavender” and was Room 314. The close information on how uties went room and knocked. Riley located so quickly, asserting that Riley opened immediately the door and no legal way “[t]here was known that Mr. it, attempted deputies shut but the en- Riley’s location could have been located tered the room and arrested at some absent the use of illegal tech- p.m. time between 8:50 and 9:00 A Smith nology,” disclosure required pistol & Wesson .22-caliber was in plain to allow bring constitutional *4 bed, view on the and was subse- challenge to whatever technology was quently indicted on one count being of a used. granted The district court Riley’s firearm, possession felon in of a in viola- second compel. motion to § 922(g)(1). tion of 18 U.S.C.

Attaching copies of the state court’s sur- order, veillance Riley moved suppress II pistol found his motel room as the search, fruit of an unconstitutional arguing Following his arrest in Memphis, whatever method the had Wyoming, was extradited to Michigan, used to find him—whether ping- GPS where, on October he was sen- ing, “cell-site simulator” such as a “Dirt- years tenced state court to 7.5 to 25 Box, etc.,” otherwise, Stingray, or Mot. to imprisonment robbery, for armed with an R. 13, 2023, Suppress, upon 3—intruded Ri- January earliest release date of 13, ley’s discharge July privacy and a latest date of reasonable 2040. He then returned to required gov- the United thus a search warrant.3 The parties agree 3. The that the state court's sur- not a valid search warrant that on would its order, despite being pursuant veillance issued justify tracking Riley’s own location laws, to federal electronic-surveillance was motion, precedent our including ly logic within the opposed eminent Skinner, we affirm. fourteen-page exhibit response its with listing the GPS coordinates starting June

phone on 454 occasions Ill The first ending June 2015. protects The Fourth Amendment Ante, are listed above. twenty-two entries searches against unreasonable individuals average, logged approxi- AT&T at n.2. On houses, pa “persons, and seizures their minutes, every thirteen mately “ping” one offi pers, and effects.” Law-enforcement course, Riley was arrested on although, of seek to cers conduct “search” when day tracking. the first ways: in either of two obtain information denied the motion on The district court (1) by physically trespassing upon indi first, ground bases: on the two alternative house, effects, person, papers, vidual’s justified that our decision Skinner Jones, see United States v. short-term GPS without war- 181 L.Ed.2d second, rant; ground that the war- (2012) (holding tracking of a vehicle rant that had been issued for arrest twenty-eight days search when justified obtaining real-time GPS informa- agents physically trespassed the ve to ef- tion about order device), or hicle to install the Riley pleaded guilty arrest. fectuate his *5 by intruding upon an individual’s reason firearm, of a being possession a felon see v. expectation privacy, able of Katz reserving right appeal his the denial of 347, 360-62, States, 389 U.S. suppress, and his motion to was sentenced (1967) (Harlan, S.Ct. forty-one imprisonment months of J., concurring) eavesdropping on (holding concurrently run with his state sentence payphone by conversation means of an delayed February start of but with a date device, recording listening electronic 13, 2022. closed, payphone when the door was was search; noting expectations whether “reasonable of question The sole before us is may by be defeated electronic as holding privacy the district court erred in that the invasion”). Riley does not government physical did not violate Fourth well as rights by compelling argue AT&T to that committed Amendment sort, disclose, trespass any of and we de by subsequently using, physical and then pinging cell cline to consider whether the real-time GPS location of tresp may approximately phone over the course of constitute an electronic phone ass,5 only seven hours.4 Because the sort of short- so the ‘reasonable applicable test is here. square- privacy’ term conducted here falls of signal attempts statutory argu- ing Riley's cell rather than 4. also to raise a recog- appeal. ment on nized, As the district court merely gathering the cell data own, the statutes relies emitted on its had committed an elec- authorizing provide for access to mechanisms technologi- digital trespass that was tronic or cell-phone prohibit certain data and do not cally distinguishable from otherwise an argument This was not raised in Ri- Skinner. Thus, individual’s GPS location data. the stat- however, ley’s appeal, and thus it is brief provide Riley remedy utes cannot with the he Moreover, properly Skinner ex- before us. against seeks—suppression of the evidence pressly contemplated tracking "cell infor- site him. location, mation, 'ping' GPS real-time data,” nothing 690 F.3d at and there is argument, Riley sought 5. At oral to advance government, by that the argument initiat- in the record before us to indicate Supreme likely Both the Court and our court more raise Fourth Amendment con- recognize have declined to as reasonable a in light cerns of the protec- common law’s criminal suspect’s expectation privacy tion of against government the home intru- moving along public his location while Pitt, Chatham, sion. As Earl of William thoroughfares. See United States v. reportedly proclaimed during a debate Knotts, 276, 279-80, 460 U.S. 103 S.Ct. Parliament in 1763: “The poorest may man 1081, 75 L.Ed.2d (holding cottage to all bid the forces defiance placement by of a radio transmitter nar frail; may of the may Crown. its roof It cotics in a container of officers chemicals shake; it; through wind blow purchased by suspected to be metham enter; enter; storm the rain may but phetamine manufacturer was not a search the King England cannot enter—all his when officers used the transmitter to track force dares not cross the threshold a vehicle while it the transmitter carried ruined The Dictionary Oxford tenement!” cabin, along public to a when roads (2d Quotations 1953), 379, quoted in ed. itself); transmitter did not enter the cabin States, Miller v. United Skinner, United States 690 F.3d (1958). 1190, 2 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 1332 The 2012) (holding gov intervening two-and-a-half centuries have ernment use of real-time jurisprudential seen little erosion of this to track suspected drug data trafficker sanctity tenacious reverence for the days as he traveled for three in a “moto home. rhome that was driven on roads” search). not a Supreme Court very has made clear, example, that “obtaining Skinner,

In we held sense-enhancing technology any informa- “voluntarily procured” emitted the interior the home regarding tion subject could not be to a reasonable that could not otherwise have been ob- expectation of privacy, even the cell- *6 physical without ‘intrusion tained into phone no expect user had reason to that constitutionally protected area’ government constitutes compel would the service States, Kyllo provider to disclose those data. Id. at 779. v. United search.” 533 U.S. There, 27, 2038, 35, because “the move- 121 S.Ct. 150 L.Ed.2d defendant’s 94 by any (2001) added) (citation omitted) ments could have observed been (emphasis ibid., public,” member of the we held that States, (quoting Silverman v. United 365 possibly it could not a Fourth Amend- 505, 512, 679, U.S. 81 S.Ct. 734 L.Ed.2d ment violation for law-enforcement officers (1961)) (holding government use of ther- by using to monitor those movements cell- mal-imaging devices to monitor the heat just because elec- such being produced part inside home as of a monitoring tronic was more efficient than strategy marijuana grow- to detect indoor relying on visual surveillance alone. ing was a search where the devices were general public, unavailable to the even

The fact that the defendant’s movements though the devices were used from Skinner in were from public visible van- effecting physi- outside the home without tage points important was an factor in our Karo, United States v. reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis. trespass); cal 705, 708-09, 713-15, Entering an individual’s home 104 S.Ct. observe movements, if by technological (holding government his even physically, monitoring tracking device rather than would much of a device in a placed fracking technologically tracking here is distinct from that occurred Skinner. tracking. tracking taken home the time of the And the

shipment of chemicals Karo, drug was a search where a search to the extent that suspected dealer while the device to locate the agents tracked device was monitored there chemicals, occasions, within the residences, on several private was not a pri- and various other times, defendant’s house at as when the search other such residences; distinguishing Karo vate tracking device was monitored one Knotts on the sole basis that unlike in ... trip the defendant’s vehicles “on its Knotts, show in which “the record did not vicinity the immediate private resi- of’ was monitored while the beeper dence. at 104 S.Ct. 3296 468 U.S. cabin,” containing it was inside the can added). (emphasis Karo “surreptitiously had government Therefore, did not con- employed] an electronic device to obtain duct a search under the Fourth Amend- pri- information” about the interior of “a ment it tracked the real-time when GPS residence, open a location not to visu- vate Riley’s coordinates of cell on the surveillance,” way al Skinner Riley’s upheld arrest. date of device) (em- the aid of the feasible without here, spanned days; three added). phasis elapsed be- approximately seven hours “inside a home without a Searches ping tween the first and the time of presumptively warrant are unreasonable.” That in a arrest. was arrested motel Karo, 3296; at 104 S.Ct. see 468 U.S. moment, for is of no Silverman, also at 365 U.S. 81 S.Ct. learned no more about where- right at (holding privacy abouts from his very core” of what the “[a]t home is Riley exposed public data than what protect). Fourth Amendment seeks to And lobby “along to the motel by traveling view full complement the Fourth Amendment’s Skinner, public thoroughfares,” 690 F.3d protections applies “also to hotel keep at 774—even if meant to Allen, States v. rooms.” United 106 F.3d secret, expect priva- location a one cannot 1997) (citing Hoffa cy in one’s movements. And had States, detection, Riley truly wished to avoid he (1966)). 408,17 L.Ed.2d 374 carry a could have chosen not to to turn all, court district off. using But seven hours of GPS loca correctly thus denied motion to tion data to determine individual’s loca suppress. (or *7 location), long tion so tracking the not reveal movements does AFFIRMED. (or room), the home hotel does not home, the sacred threshold of the

cross CONCURRENCE to a and thus cannot amount Fourth BOGGS, concurring. Judge, Circuit all, tracking Amendment search. After the in Knotts revealed the location of the cabin I to which the criminal suspects had trav separately highlight I write certain Knotts was not tracking eled—but the play factors at in this case that additional search because it revealed no information provide holding additional comfort that our Like about cabin itself. interior today is correct. here, tracking only wise revealed had traveled to Inn, Airport argument, not At oral con- (if room if any) in at ceded that the GPS had been was identify precise enough specific home work based on the Supreme rul- Court’s hiding— or motel room in which ings in Katz and Jones is the so-called generally—Kyllo doctrine, rather than a motel and third-party according to which presented greater Karo have con- one can have no reasonable cerns: privacy in information knowingly disclosed that, party, to a third

I think if these and thus no coordinates had Fourth Amendment claim identify been sufficient to a home can lie for acquisi- room, tion hotel this could be a and use agents different law-enforcement case, I think the fact here that the such information. See United States Miller, only get police coordinates officers 96 S.Ct. lobby, essentially, to the hotel and (holding government- then have to do additional work in terms compelled depositor’s disclosure of “a pri- figuring exactly out what hotel room vate [bank] records” was not a Fourth in, he’s makes this case different Amendment search because “the Fourth home, he had been identified and Amendment prohibit does not the obtain- makes akin this case more to Skinner. ing of information revealed party to a third conveyed by him to Government au- Arg. Tr. of Oral 20:06-20:35. thorities, even if the information is re- But our precedent governs Skinner assumption vealed on the it will be brought because the here the law- only used for a limited purpose and the enforcement officers as far as the placed confidence in the party third will lobby of the Inn—a Airport public area— betrayed”); not be Smith v. Maryland, 442 and the officers then had to ask the front- 61 L.Ed.2d desk clerk to determine where- (1979) (holding government-compelled specific abouts within the confines of a pen register installation of a to track hotel room. phone numbers dialed specified from a I Riley’s, would note that cases like telephone-service subscriber’s landline even GPS data within a home or pen was not search where the a hotel room fail to rise to the level of register telephone was installed on the a Fourth Amendment search when the company’s property and where the out- individual, cell-phone location whose voluntarily bound numbers were fugitive subject tracked is a to a valid telephone company disclosed to the warrant, arrest and when the law-enforce- reasonably therefore be consid- could tracking him ment officers have at least private). ered suspicion posses- reasonable that he is in Thus, phone being sion of the tracked. Kyllo, But decided well after both Mil- follow, the reasons that I would hold that Smith, expressly rejected ler and the no- fails, Fourth Amendment claim al- tion that government’s use of thermal- ternatively, because he was a fugitive sub- imaging devices to detect heat within the warrant, ject to a valid arrest and because justified home could defendant’s on the *8 suspicion the officers here had reasonable ground “exposed” that the defendant that he was in that possession the activity public” by emitting “to the heat they tracking. were public waves that could be detected from a 44, vantage point. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 121 Third-Party

A. The Doctrine (draw- (Stevens, J., dissenting) 2038 S.Ct. Supplementing general ing analogies the Fourth between heat waves that “en- they Amendment unreasonable-search frame- ter the domain and when 1020 home, the but whether warrant garbage, and discarded restee’s building” a

leave or a search Greenwood, must be an arrest warrant 486 U.S. v. California (1988), defini- 1625, question warrant is not a answered pen- 108 S.Ct. text, 742, data, Smith, tively by the constitutional and the 442 U.S. at 99 register utility fugitive subject a to a valid arrest rec case of subpoenaed and S.Ct. warrant, ords). short, the “will suffice to third-party the doctrine arrest warrant In magistrate’s determination of interpose Brother’s watchful the lay Big bare to does the zealous officer activity probable within the cause between eye every conducted at 100 S.Ct. outside the and the citizen.” Id. just because someone home (“If there is sufficient evidence of a to detect its occur might home be able doctrine, therefore, participation felony per- in a third-party citizen’s rence. The judicial officer that his arrest is' likely on its own to suade would be insufficient justified, constitutionally it is reasonable to tracking of support government-compelled him to the offi- require open movements his doors revealed law.”). cers of the a home or hotel room. Surely, if the issuance of valid arrest Fugitive-Suspect (cid:127)B. The Distinction may reasonably require an indi- warrant this case and key home, A distinction between open vidual to the doors of his Karo, Knotts, Skinner, which Kyllo, “very at core” of Fourth stands holding, is that the supports Silverman, further our protection, Amendment phone only tracked 81 S.Ct. then it warrant for his arrest had a valid reasonably require the same individual after issued, the defen- already been whereas open phone—at the doors of his least so Karo, Knotts, Kyllo, and Skinner dants longitude and latitude far as to disclose suspects fugitives. criminal but not were coordinates emitted although the text of the Fourth And carry turn on. individual chooses to imply Amendment does not itself indi- Allowing agents to track law-enforcement on the run from arrest warrants viduals location includ- fugitive’s cell-phone privacy, home, have a diminished ing GPS location data within Payton decision in Supreme Court’s logic Payton thus falls well within the York, New S.Ct. contravening Kyllo or Karo: so without (1980), as corroborated L.Ed.2d 639 long as a valid arrest warrant has been origi- significant historical evidence of the issued, officers who rea- law-enforcement Amendment, meaning nal of the Fourth sonably suspect that a cell is in the provides strong support proposition for the subject of the warrant possession at-592-96, 603, do. Id. track that cell (holding that law-enforcement where order to facilitate the execution of the have a arrest warrant and warrant, officers valid Fourth implicating without reasonably suspect that the individual sub- Amendment. home, they may

ject to arrest is inside his Against Weighing C. Factors enter the home and arrest individual Privacy Fugitive’s Expectation warrant to obtaining without first search so). Data GPS Location do considerations, none of which is logic Payton is that the Fourth Several sufficient, support prop- requires independently Amendment provider’s entering the ar- osition that service obtain warrant before

1021 walls.”). fugitive’s cell-phone records of a location within his own Arguably, one who private data are not for Fourth Amend- refuses the lawful King demand of the purposes. ment enter and an execute arrest warrant inis an analogous position to one who is on the First, subject of the surveillance is a warrant, run from a lawful arrest and so fugitive. fugitive While a does not forfeit reasonably the two could expected be all, expectation privacy—after all his of expectations have similar of privacy. Payton, under law-enforcement officers Second, simply fugitive’s break into a the information gathered in data, home to arrest him without at least some cases like is location not call sure, in- fugitive Kyllo reason to believe content. To be and Karo set a in compelling fairly side—the most factor favor low threshold level of intrusion with- allowing fugi- to track a in the at home which surveillance becomes phone regardless tive’s cell a search. tracking Riley’s But fugitive subject location is that the is the provided no more information (or of a valid arrest warrant. about the interior of home mo- room) tel than the tracking did device in Payton, In addition to the rule in which Karo, it provided far less information allows officers enter arrestee’s home than thermal-imaging did the device in to effectuate the arrest with reason- Kyllo. While GPS is “accurate home, suspicion able the arrestee is at feet,” within about 50 United States v. Supreme Court has held that law- 880, Carpenter, 819 F.3d 889 pursuit” enforcement officers “hot 2016), precise and is thus more than CSL quarry right their have limited to enter ballparks which a cell phone’s loca- without a private homes search warrant. wedge extending tion within a “radial be- Hayden, See Warden tween one-half mile and two miles in 310, 87 S.Ct. length” based on the cell towers to which it exigent (holding circumstances validated connects, ibid., GPS coordinates reveal entry warrantless into a home to search nothing other than the location of the suspected for a armed who had robber content, phone: text-message no call no or reportedly entered than less five minutes content, application email and no data. earlier). There is some support historical Third, holding fugitive’s that a cases like Jones, privacy at home is at In diminished as well: is limited duration and reach. law, at Sotomayor sepa- common officers have had Justices and Alito wrote authority concurring opinions they least some enter a home to exe- rate making longer cute an arrest warrant after that “the term first commented use Payton, monitoring investigations demand. at of most See Case, (citing Semayne’s expectations priva- impinges S.Ct. 1371 Co. offenses (K. B.) (1603)) 91a, Jones, Rep. Eng. Rep. cy.” 565 U.S. at 132 S.Ct. 945 (“[I]n (Alito, J., felony, concurring judgment); cases of the officers were in the id. J., required presence, (Sotomayor, to announce their de- at 132 S.Ct. 945 con- 945). admission, entry curring) mand and be refused (quoting be- id. doors.”); comment, however, pertains fore were entitled to break Justice Alito’s Blackstone, investigations, but see 3 William Commentar- not manhunts. And for (“[F]or warrant, part fugitives subject ies *288 the most not so much to an arrest summons, surveillance, a common citation much which will ordi- duration of (i.e., arrest, narily relatively less an can be executed a man short-term com- *10 in the mail could be examined deposited the issuance of an arrest mencing after warrant, the issuance of a but is ending fugitive when the warrant and open “left printed the content of matter found), a concern than for those is less of examination,” and, newspapers, by such as investiga- of an simply suspects are who implication, mailing information on the tion. letter, protect- outside of a sealed was Fourth, I noted that the third- although Amendment). ed the Fourth provide does not party doctrine itself Jackson, in in which a logic defen- technology to detect activi- using basis for depositing convicted of “a circu- dant was home, cell-phone fact ty that concerning lottery offering prizes” lar their location voluntarily users disclose into the States mail violation of a phones their turned on by keeping data statute, federal id. at is one their weighs against finding location data how to using the mail—no matter essential is, course, It unclear private. to be daily might life the mail have been in Riley knowingly disclosed his lo- whether govern- 1877—assumes the risk (the cation data record does not indicate see, duty and will have no to ment will Riley aware of the cell whether from, eyes open avert information left its feature, nor does it include phone’s GPS Jackson, logic to be seen. Under the one any Riley’s cell-phone terms of service voluntarily unknowingly left a let- who contract that would reveal whether it ter unsealed and then mailed would have gather to allow AT&T either to agreed govern- no recourse in the event that a location data or to initiate store GPS ment official found evidence of a crime signals Riley’s phone to to facilitate real- the letter and used to secure warrant. that). tracking, if AT&T in fact did time cell-phone Perhaps the current state carry But the fact that chose to general is similar: mat- location data (as distinguished from the ter, may any users not have cell-phone unwittingly by the defen- devices carried idea of the extent to which their cell Knotts) certainly weighs in Karo and dants phones broadcasting are their location allowing government favor of (whether in data or the form CSL access AT&T’s records of cell- data). choosing carry But in him, phone location in order to arrest even phones equipped turn on and leave on generated only if those records were with GPS and other location-based ser- response requests government from the vices, people arguably assume the risk that tracking. for real-time location A criminal may cell-phone providers their service dis- hardly hiding from an arrest warrant “can government close to the the location data Slcinner, complain,” 690 F.3d about they acquire—at least the absence of having to evade detection the burden agreement contractual between the con- phone. of a cell without constant use provider sumer and the service that would say require To otherwise would or restrict disclosure. And prohibit such eyes to avert its from GPS strong pro- while Fourth Amendment freely that are available to yet afforded to the home tections providers fugi- that facilitate wireless protect some location data emit- Fourth phones, being tives’ use of cell but the ted from within the home require government, fugitive Amendment does not such willful who tracked Jackson, parte blindness. Ex carries a cell turned on must as- Cf. (holding L.Ed. 877 sume the risk that the able to track him wherever he be. packages the content of letters and sealed *11 course, data, Of law-enforcement officers GPS unlike CSL can locate a fugitives object track down could the old-fash- tracked to within tens of feet of its Still, way: they put case, ioned could out alerts to actual location. in this it may upon grocery-store not be posted sufficiently precise bulletin boards to pinpoint the for exact shoppers disregard, oblivious location of a phone. GPS-enabled cell they fugitives could wait for the to be To the extent that reveals caught, perhaps, they when commit location information some that would otherwise they other crime from which are less be available from public vantage suc- points, in flight. cessful But that cannot such as identifying Riley’s presence be what at the requires; Airport case, the Constitution when Inn in fugitives this our precedent sophisticated phones use cell permits to evade de- Skinner at least short-term track- tection, by ing of communicating whether elec- such location information. Even hideouts, tronically, finding soliciting will- the confines of a home or a hotel abettors, room, ing or perhaps acquiring false the Fourth Amendment does not like, only fugitive’s documents and the it shield a makes cell from being sense that law-enforcement located agents be able while turned on: a cell-phone ser- fugitives’ to track provider’s vice records the loca- to execute arrest private, valid warrants. tion are not and their use law enforcement, compelled otherwise, Accordingly, setting even aside the fact not a search under the Fourth Amendment government’s that the GPS location track- long so as the officers have at least reason- ing here revealed information about suspicion able phone they are of Riley’s phone, movements cell tracking is in possession fugitive Riley’s Fourth Amendment claim fails be- they seek. fugitive justice cause was a from who lacked a privacy reasonable Finally, I opinion would note that our whereabouts, in his and the district court today does not—because it not— needs deny Riley’s was correct to motion sup- many questions address that will almost press. certainly cases, geolocation arise future such as or when the whether II may use GPS location track data to indi- game Unlike the traditional children’s fugitives viduals other than within the hide-and-seek, which tolerates most means questions home. Nor does address the of finding hiding, those who are the Fourth surely technology that will arise as contin- separates cop Amendment from robber develop. Perhaps, example, ues to if requirement that “a neutral and de- government agents gain ability to acti- magistrate,” tached Johnson v. United camera, vate and microphone, monitor the States, S.Ct. or video recorder individual’s cell (1948), L.Ed. 436 issue a warrant based on phone knowledge, without the individual’s probable cause that the robber has com- greater degree intrusion such robbery. mitted the monitoring materially audiovisual could af- issued, aOnce valid warrant has a fugitive’s expectation privacy howev- fect even er, game changes: robber the data transmitted from his cell both refuge seek from execution of the phone. nothing opinion And our curtails simultaneously warrant and power legislatures broadcast his of federal and state by carrying location legislation against cell-phone GPS-enabled to craft loca- phone. Indeed, tion wish. our not address whether today does

opinion

existing protections under the Stored Act or elsewhere al-

Communications requirements on

ready impose additional agents seeking engage

the sort of GPS Riley, track used here to because

Marshals *12 before us is whether the question constitutional violated not.

rights—and did COREY, Plaintiff-Appellant,

Bruce

SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT

SERVICES, INC.; Corporation; Eaton Corporation Disability Plan for

Eaton Employees; Eaton Health and Committee,

Welfare Administrative

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-3817 Appeals, States Court of

Sixth Circuit.

Argued: March Filed:

Decided and June

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Riley
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Jun 5, 2017
Citation: 858 F.3d 1012
Docket Number: 16-6149
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
Read the detailed case summary
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.
Log In