UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rickie BELLAMY, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-1752
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Filed March 16, 2017
447
Patricia Gaedeke, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Detroit, MI, for Plaintiff-Appellee Douglas R. Mullkoff, Law Office, Ann Arbor, MI, for Defendant-Appellant BEFORE: KEITH, BATCHELDER, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant, Rickie Bellamy, Jr., appeals his June 1, 2016 conviction by a jury on Count 3, for being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm in violation of
I. Background
Defendant was indicted on June 2, 2015 for two counts: Count 1, possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of
Defendant proceeded to trial on January 19, 2016. Most of the information presented by the Government at trial was collected by two special agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF)—Agents David Salazar and Michael Yott. On May 21, 2015, federal agents arrived at a home located at 17160 St. Aubin Street in Detroit, Michigan, to execute a search warrant and to arrest Defendant‘s father, Rickie Bellamy, Sr., who had on at least 13 occasions sold heroin to an undercover agent the month prior to execution of the warrant.
Agent Yott testified to going upstairs during the execution of the warrant, and seeing Defendant come out of the southwest bedroom. Prior to the raid, the federal agents did not know Defendant resided at the home. Agent Yott also attested to witnessing another man coming out of the bathroom, and a third man in the hallway. Agents guided the men downstairs, where Agent Yott read them their Miranda rights and recorded the conversation that ensued. The jury was played the recording at trial, and they heard Defendant tell Agent Yott that marijuana and a loaded firearm would be found in his room.
Thereafter, Agent Yott testified that he went into the room he initially saw Defendant come out of, and retrieved various items: a firearm, ammunition, marijuana, marijuana packaging material, a digital scale, and proof of residence for Defendant. The parties stipulated to the fact that the firearm was not manufactured in Michigan, and that it traveled in and affected interstate commerce. A portion of the marijuana was contained in green vials that were labeled with Defendant‘s name and medical marijuana card number, while the remainder of the marijuana was contained in small plastic bags. Agent Salazar took photographs of the items recovered.
Subsequently, Defendant was arrested. Agent Salazar attested to the following: “[Defendant] did advise us that [the room] was his bedroom. The room [also did] have a padlock on there, which [Defendant] had the key for, and when we were leaving the location with [Defendant], he asked us if we could padlock the door so no one could enter the room for him.” Additionally, Agent Yott testified that Defendant locked the door to the room where the items were seized, and hid the key in a closet, prior to
At the close of the Government‘s case-in-chief, Defendant moved for judgment of acquittal on all three charges, pursuant to
The next day, Defendant testified. He stated that he was working at Ford Motor Company, in an assembly plant in Flat Rock, Michigan. Consequently, he left his mother‘s home in Eastpointe, Michigan, and was staying at the St. Aubin Street home, off and on, temporarily. When he was not staying at the St. Aubin Street home, he stayed with his girlfriend. Defendant stated that he usually slept on the couch in the St. Aubin Street home, and not in the bedroom where the items were seized. The reason for this was because, for a period of time, a dog occupied the bedroom, and the room contained animal feces.
Rickie Bellamy, Sr. moved into the home while on probation. According to Defendant, Rickie Bellamy, Sr. cleaned out the bedroom the dog occupied, and resided in the room for about six weeks prior to the raid. He stated that the gun seized in the room belonged to Rickie Bellamy, Sr., and was not in the room prior to his father‘s arrival at the home.
Defendant stated that he regularly uses marijuana to help with his lower back pain and to help him sleep. He also stated he used the digital scale to “[l]ine[] out what [he] was going to smoke for the day or week.” Defendant stated that he had slept in the bedroom the night of the raid, but that the bedroom was his father‘s. He confessed to ownership of the marijuana seized by the agents, as well as the digital scale, but stated several times that the firearm and ammunition belonged to his father. Defendant also stated that the door to the bedroom in which the items were seized did not contain a padlock. Further, he explained that his counsel had asked Defendant to take photographs of all of the rooms upstairs, and the doors, at the St. Aubin Street home. He also stated that he had taken the photographs at 5:45 am, the morning of his testimony, and that the upstairs layout looked the same on the day of the raid.
Thereafter, the Government requested a sidebar, and during the bench conference, Defendant‘s counsel explained that he intended to introduce the photographs as evidence rebutting the agents’ testimony that the door to the room at issue was padlocked. The Government asserted that the evidence should be excluded because Defendant had not complied with Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court excluded the photographs, stating that the photographs were not necessarily probative; were new, having been taken only a few hours prior; and that the court did not see how the photographs would aid the jury. The district court did, however, allow Defendant to preserve the issue for appeal. Afterwards, Defendant again testified that the bedroom door was never padlocked.
At the close of all evidence in the case, Defendant did not seek to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty as to Count 1 and Count 2, but found Defendant guilty of Count 3. Defendant was sentenced on June 1, 2016 to three years’ probation. This timely appeal followed.
II.
Defendant first reasserts his motion for judgment of acquittal, contending that: (1)
Defendant did not renew his motion for judgment of acquittal, pursuant to
Defendant‘s conviction for violating
Defendant‘s assertion is contrary to federal law. Under
Additionally, on September 21, 2011, the ATF issued an “Open Letter to All Federal Firearms Licensees.” The letter stated that “any person who uses or is addicted to marijuana, regardless of whether his or her State has passed legislation authorizing marijuana use for medicinal purposes, is an unlawful user of or addicted to a controlled substance, and is prohibited by
Both parties stipulated that the firearm charged in the indictment traveled in interstate commerce. Further, a recording was played at trial, in which Defendant stated that the officers would find a loaded firearm in his bedroom. He also testified to smoking marijuana on a regular basis. For these reasons, we hold that there was evidence in the record that Defendant engaged in repeated use of marijuana, and that there is evidence that said pattern of use occurred during a period of time in which he possessed the firearm. Therefore, the district court did not create a manifest miscarriage of justice by denying Defendant‘s motion for judgment of acquittal.
III.
Defendant next argues that the photographs of the bedroom doors, taken the morning of Defendant‘s testimony, were relevant as to whether Defendant in fact possessed the firearm. Defendant contends that the photographs were crucial in discrediting the two agents who testified on behalf of the Government and stated that there was a padlock on the bedroom door at issue, and that Defendant had either locked the padlock himself or had asked the agents to do it for him. The district court‘s exclusion of the photographs, according to Defendant, denied him of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right to present a defense.
“We review all challenges to district court evidentiary rulings, including constitutional challenges, under the abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 752 (6th Cir. 2006). But since Defendant frames the evidentiary issue as a violation of a constitutional right, and it is an abuse of discretion “to rest [an] evidentiary decision on [an] incorrect interpretation[] of the Constitution,” our review of his legal claim is de novo. Id.; see also United States v. Reichert, 747 F.3d 445, 453 (6th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Blackwell, 459 F.3d 739, 752 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that the abuse of discretion standard generally applicable to a district court‘s evidentiary rulings is not at odds with de novo review of constitutional questions because district courts do “not have the discretion to rest [their] evidentiary decisions on incorrect interpretations of the Constitution“). While the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, this right is not without limits. United States v. Kessinger, 641 Fed.Appx. 500, 503 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006)) (further citations omitted). “[A] defendant ‘does not have an unfettered right to offer evidence that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.‘” United States v. Kerley, 784 F.3d 327, 342 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Blackwell, 459 F.3d at 753). Simply stated, a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to present evidence that is not relevant and not material to his defense. Baze v. Parker, 371 F.3d 310, 323-24 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986)) (holding that “the Constitution leaves judges ‘wide latitude’ to exclude evidence that is only ‘marginally relevant.‘“). “Unless the particular rule of evidence ‘serves no legitimate purpose’ or is ‘disproportionate to the ends that it is asserted to promote,’ a district court‘s application of the rule to exclude defense evidence will not offend the Constitution.” Kessinger, 641 Fed.Appx. at 503 (quoting Holmes, 547 U.S. at 326, 126 S.Ct. 1727). “Exclusion of evidence is ‘unconstitutionally arbitrary or disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused.‘” Id. (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998)). Therefore, “erroneous evidentiary rulings rarely constitute a violation of a defendant‘s right to present a defense.” Kerley, 784 F.3d at 342 (quoting United States v. Hardy, 586 F.3d 1040, 1044 (6th Cir. 2009)) (further citation omitted).
Having reviewed the trial transcript, we conclude that the district court‘s exclusion of the photographs did not violate Defendant‘s right to present a defense. Defendant testified that the door at issue never contained a padlock, and thus, the photographs would have been cumulative of his live witness testimony. Because there was at least one other avenue of putting his statements and beliefs into evidence, the photographs were not improperly excluded. See Reichert, 747 F.3d at 454 (“[O]f course, Reichert had at least one other avenue of putting his own statements and beliefs into evidence: by taking the stand himself.“); see also
Further, even if we were to find the district court erred in excluding the photographs, Defendant cannot show that exclusion of the photographs infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused, given that he cannot demonstrate the photographs were material to his defense or were more than marginally relevant. Evidence is material if its suppression might have affected the trial‘s outcome. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 868, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). Here, other evidence was offered by the Government to prove Defendant possessed the firearm. The jury listened to an exchange that Defendant had with Agent Yott, in which Defendant stated that there was a loaded firearm in his room. Moreover, Defendant also stated that he knew the firearm was loaded and was accessible to him. Accordingly, notwithstanding whether the door at issue was padlocked, there was other proof presented to the jury demonstrating Defendant had dominion over the premises where the firearm was located, as well as the fact that Defendant did not deny knowledge of the firearm found in an area under his control. Given this information, there was sufficient proof to allow a jury to conclude Defendant possessed the firearm. See United States v. Bailey, 553 F.3d 940, 944-45 (6th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, without more, on this record, there is no indication that the photographs materially advanced Defendant‘s defense.
IV.
For the above stated reasons, we find the district court did not create a manifest miscarriage of justice by denying Defendant‘s motion for judgment of acquittal, and the exclusion of the photographs did