*2 POOLE, ANDERSON, Before HUG and Judges. Circuit HUG, Judge: Circuit his convic- Rylander appeals Richard W. fail- willfully tions of criminal *3 ing with the district court’s order in produce corporate various documents to Internal Revenue sum- response Service at a hear- failing monses and for be held ing to show cause he should not difficulty The initial arose contempt. in corpo- certain when the IRS tried to obtain and documents from rate records investigate in order to the tax returns of pres- of which he had been corporations two ident. He did not the records summons, contending to an response IRS that he did not them. The efforts possess to enforce the summons and IRS genesis sanctions form the obtain of this case. the in highlights problems
This case
interrelationship
volved in the
of civil and
contempt.
criminal
was tried for
civil and criminal
both
proceeding.
Ry
same
In United
-
lander,
-,
I),
(1983) (Rylander
reversing
(9th Cir.1981),
Supreme
Brookhart, D.C., Washington, plaintiff- appellee. FACTS simple a mat-
The facts demonstrate how
complex
into
case.
very
ter can mushroom
Respondents,
how a district
tion over
and it is
It is understandable
there-
calendar,
contact with
busy
whose
hereby
fore
in the form of numerous brief
the case was
(Dick)
that Richard
Rylan-
ORDERED
months,
period many
procedures over
der,
shall
on Monday,
Sr.
Febru-
complexities
could overlook some of
4,1980 at 10:00
ary
a.m. before Joan Van
subtleties.
Berg,
person
Den
or other
designated by
purposes,
began
our
this case
on Jan-
Petitioner,
For
at the office of the Internal
4, 1979, when the Internal Revenue
uary
Street,
Revenue Service at 801 I
Room
(“IRS”) issued administrative sum-
Service
292, Sacramento, California, and then and
directing
Rylander,
pres-
monses
Richard
as
there
inspection
Petitioner’s
Realtors,
Company,
ident of
copying
records described
Inc. and Affiliated Investments and Mort-
IRS summonses attached hereto as Ex-
gage Company,
before an IRS
B,
hibits A and
rec-
except
following
agent
give testimony regarding
his tax
ords described in Exhibit A:1
*4
corporations.
and that of the two
liability
The order
require Rylander
give
did not
to
required Rylander
The summonses also
to
to
testimony, only
produce documents.
The
produce
corporate
various
documents.
Rylander appeared on
4. He
February
sought pur-
were
testimony and documents
not, however, bring
did
with him any of the
into
investigation
suant
to an
documents
the
by
demanded
IRS. After
tax
for the
liability
years
federal
income
being informed of his fifth amendment
through
Rylander
1973
1977. When
failed
rights, Rylander stated that he was not the
summonses,
the Govern-
comply
president
corporation
of either
and that he
petitioned
ment
the district court for en-
had none of
the corporate documents
7402(b)
forcement
and
under
U.S.C. §§
then
sought. He
refused to answer any
(cid:127)7604(a).
questions.
The district court issued orders on No-
The district court subsequently issued an
1979,
20,
directing Rylander
vember
and
February
requiring
order on
14,
appear
January
before the court on
10, 1980,
appear on March
and show cause
show
why
and
cause
the administra-
why
he should not be held in
tive summonses should not be enforced.
January
failure to
the order of
Rylander returned the orders to the court
enforcing
the summonses. The order
with a cover letter
that he
stating
was not
that service
by February
be made
president
the
of either corporation and that
per-
20. The marshall was unable to effect
had, therefore,
he
been improperly served.
by
service
and a new
February
sonal
He
at the
appear
hearing.
did
February
show cause order was issued on
judge proceeded
The district
in Rylan-
by
was made
mail in accord-
Service
and,
15, 1980,
der’s absence
on
is-
January
ance with
on that date.
Fed.R.Civ.P.
stating:
sued an order
required Rylander
That show cause order
proof
The Court heard an offer of
and
March 24
cause
he
why
on
and show
oral
the is-
testimony
argument
and
on
should not be held in
of the Janu-
(1) personal jurisdiction
sues of
over the
ary
why
15 order and
he should not immedi-
respondent corporations
(2)
pos-
and
IRS
the records. He was also
ately produce
requested
session of records
in the sum-
response
to file a written
to the
directed
Upon
monses.
consideration of the fore-
petition by March 17.
going,
by
as well as the Declarations filed
response
not file a
or
Rylander did
Respondent Rylander,
peti-
the verified
However,
24 Ry-
on March 24.
on March
Berg,
tions of Petitioner Van Den
and the
three-page
son Edwin filed a
state-
remaining
proceedings,
records
these
lander’s
ment,
by Rylander
which had
dictated
jurisdic-
the Court finds that it does have
been
produced
excepting certain records in 1975 which
1. The records to be
were certain rec-
possessed.
January
ords from
to December
the IRS
telephone
Oregon
Sunday,
appearing
over the
on
with one of the court-appointed
March 23. The statement
informed the
lawyers. Although Rylander would not ex-
just
court that he had
received word
the
counsel,
plicitly
waive his
he chose
requested
order and could not
subsequent
himself in
represent
proceed-
He
be rescheduled.
also ings and the district court found he had
appeared
February
stated he had
on
“knowingly, intelligently,
competently
records,
he had not refused to
waived counsel.”
produced
but that he had
no records be-
demanded a
trial. This
cause he had no records.
was denied because
district court deter-
petition
The
filed a
Government
penalty
imposed
mined that
if a
were
it
March
civil and criminal
seeking
both
imprisonment
would not exceed six months’
contempt.
petition
Based on that
the court
also moved to disqualify
$500.
an order on March 28 for
issued
the district judge, alleging
preju-
bias and
show
why
adjudged
cause
he should not be
dice. This motion also was denied
guilty
of criminal
he
district court.
adjudged guilty
should not be
of civil con-
for failure to
tempt
documents.
On October
court
portion
concerning
of the order
crimi-
non-jury
conducted a
combined
trial on
specify
particu-
nal
what
civil and criminal contempt charges. The
lar acts or orders were the
basis for
Government’s evidence showed that Rylan-
did, however,
charge.
refer
to the
president
der had been
of both
petition.
Government’s
The petition clearly
Realtors,
Company,
Inc. and Affiliated
*5
produce
identified the failure to
the records
Mortgage Company
Investments and
from
It
February 4.
also discussed the failure
corporate
until 1977. He had filed
24,
on March
although
was
income tax
years
returns for those
singled
not
out. The return date on this
identified him as the
of both cor-
president
15,
April
order was
at-
Repeated
addition,
porations.
opened
In
he had
bank
tempts
personal
at
service failed and the
accounts,
checks, signed
written
correspon-
district
the
court continued
matter until
dence,
contracts,
applica-
executed
and filed
May
and issued
another
yet
order
government agencies
tions with
on behalf
to show
why
cause
he should not be held in
entities,
prior
of both business
all
to 1980.
contempt.
both civil and criminal
The or-
The Government offered no direct proof
specified
der
that constructive service be
the
sought
documents
were in exist-
made
certified mail.
by publication and
On
ence
in Rylander’s possession
or control
May
Rylander
appear,
when
the
on or after
It
January
contended
judge
district
issued a bench warrant
proof
that such
was unnecessary because
his arrest.
presented
evidence
created an inference
appointed
The district court
counsel to
that the documents existed
Rylan-
and that
represent Rylander,
Rylander
because
had
possessed
der
them. Rylander, appearing in
not obtained counsel on his own and the
propria persona, introduced no evidence and
district
appropriate
court believed it
that he
refused to
participate
proceedings,
counsel,
be represented by
even though Ry-
stating only
judge
the district
was
complete
lander refused to
a financial dis- disqualified
hearing
the case because
closure statement
on fifth amendment
judge
personally
against
was
biased
grounds. Rylander discharged two court-
him.
appointed lawyers, believing them to be in-
The district court found
guilty
effective and less than zealous in their rep-
contempt
pro-
of criminal
for his failure
resentation of him. He then filed a de-
by the or-
duce the documents as
appointment
mand for
of “competent and
January
enforcing
der of
the summonses
effective counsel.”
The district
told
contempt
that his
also
of criminal
for his
guilty
choices were
representing
himself,
choice,
obtaining counsel of his
or
show
failure to
addition,
Timmons,
fixed.
In
24. In
conditional and
re
cause on March
at 124.
supra
for his continued
contempt
was held in civil
the documents.
failure
trial,
At the conclusion of his
produced
his was ordered incarcerated until he
appeal, Rylander challenges
In this
the summoned records or testified as to
contempt convictions.
criminal
The
purpose
he could not do so.
of this
coercive,
order was
so the indefinite incar
II
contempt.
ceration was for civil
This order
AND CIVIL CONTEMPT
CRIMINAL
ultimately upheld by
Supreme
was
The difference between criminal and
I,
- U.S. at -,
Court.
clear. The
always
civil
at 1554.
S.Ct.
result
in citations for
same conduct
Rylander was also sentenced to six
contempt.
both civil and
imprisonment,
upon
months’
to commence
Workers, 330
v. United Mine
the civil contempt
his release from
incarcer-
(1946).
ly
Ill
designed
to enforce
ty
compliance
OF THE EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENCY
*6
Timmons,
In re
a court order.
607 F.2d
many grounds
urged
the
for reversal
Of
120,
(5th Cir.1979).
124
that
For
reason
we turn first to his claim that
by Rylander,
civil
is
contempt punishment
conditional
We
the evidence was insufficient.
address
obeys
and must be lifted if the contemnor
first,
this issue
because if there was not
the order of the court.
v.
Shillitani Unit-
conviction,
support
to
sufficient evidence
1531,
States,
364,
ed
384 U.S.
86
16
S.Ct.
jeopardy
the fifth amendment’s double
(1966).
punish-
The term of
a retrial. Burks v. United
clause bars
contempt
ment for civil
cannot extend
States,
1, 18,
2141, 2150,
437
98
57
U.S.
S.Ct.
proceedings
the trial
since at the
beyond
(1978).
1
L.Ed.2d
termination of the trial
the contemnor’s
can no longer
purged.
actions
be
Shillita-
A. Failure to Produce
ni,
supra at
Criminal stems from his produce there is a clear and definite order of the viction for failure order, court, knows of the failure to turn over the summoned docu the contemnor 4, 1980, February the as willfully disobeys the contemnor the ments to IRS of by Tel. Tel. the district court’s order Chapman order. v. Pacific & 193, 195 Cir.1979). A federal court Co., (9th January The 613 F.2d its authori contempt It as criminal penalty punitive punish, is in nature. serves to its lawful ty, of the court and disobedience or resistance authority vindicate the established with upon compliance does not terminate order. Criminal is un- when it is shown that the defendant punishment the The court’s order. 1002 offense, prove including all elements of the and definite court order
aware of a clear
order,
the order. United
disobeys
ability
comply
beyond
an
with the
willfully
Powers,
at 627. The
629 F.2d
The Government’s bur-
States v.
reasonable doubt.
case is whether the
in the summons
substantially
issue in this
den was
less
primary
establish, beyond
Thus,
proceeding.
pos-
was sufficient
even if
evidence
enforcement
doubt,
Rylander willfully
that
a reasonable
session or control was established
January
order of
the court’s
disobeyed
proceeding,
summons
enforcement
the
as to
preclusion
Government cannot assert
the
ability
lacked
Rylander
If
contempt proceed-
that issue in
order, he
not
with the court’s
could
comply
ing.
violated it.
willfully
be
have
found to
Thus,
with the court’s
comply
inability
There was evidence in the record
complete
order
defense. See
would be
comply
was unable to
Rylander
Joyce,
did not
order because the documents either
therefore
relevant
It
his
possession
exist or were not within
existed
whether the summoned documents
Ry-
Two
testified as to
control.2
witnesses
possession or
Rylander’s
and were within
February
appearance
lander’s
at the IRS
15, 1980, the date
January
control between
office, where
stated that he was
order, and Feb
court issued its
produce
unable to
the summoned documents
which the
upon
the date
ruary
addition,
In
because he did not have them.
required production.
order
by Ry-
statement dictated
three-page
son, Edwin,
by
lander and filed
at
that,
contends
The Government
evi-
March 24
was admitted into
pos
claim lack of
because
said
dence.
In
statement
pro
enforcement
session at the summons
and was
that he had no such documents
judicata pre
of res
ceeding, the doctrine
therefore unable to
them as or-
argument
cludes the
that the documents did
evidence,
4. This
even
February
dered on
possession
or were not within his
exist
Government, cre-
though
introduced
I
Although
or control.
Rylander’s
factual
as to
question
ated a
Maggio
held that under
Supreme Court
ability
January
order.
Zeitz,
401, 92
68 S.Ct.
L.Ed.
did
(1948),
prior proceeding
preclude
prove
Ry-
The
tried to
Government
to the
possession
lack of
defense
the documents
lander was able to
citation,-U.S.
at-,
civil
that he had
been the
by showing
previously
at
the same is not true
S.Ct.
corporations.
two
officer of the
principal
type
the criminal
citation. The
showed that
evidence
Government’s
Maggio
was
preclusion approved
issue
of the two
president
had been
in civil
apply only
intended to
and 1977.
corporations between 1972
at 407.
proceedings. 333 U.S.
various
performed
that he had
also showed
*7
preclu-
of issue
elementary principle
It is an
corporation prior
to
acts on behalf of
where the
may only
sion that it
be asserted
evidence that
1980. There was no direct
no great-
as to that issue is
proof
burden of
sought were in existence
the documents
where
prior proceeding
er
than it was
or control on
Rylander’s possession
in
Miller,
Wright, A.
the issue was decided. C.
January
after
1980.
Practice and Proce-
Cooper,
& E.
18 Federal
corpo
as a former
Rylander’s
Emerald
status
(1981);
dure
see One Lot
States,
officer,
light
in
of his
particularly
rate
v. United
409 U.S.
Cut Stones
or control the
489, 492,
(1972)
possess
claim that he did not
Rylander concedes that his argues that the district letter requesting 1980 to the court combined his trials on the improperly his actual knowl- court proof continuance of 1004 pear 42(b) Joint- with Rule of the contempt charges.
civil and criminal contempt and criminal Rule civil Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. ly trying unless ground not a for reversal charges 42(b) requires the notice “state the preju- to result in substantial it is “shown constituting essential facts the criminal v. Mine Work- dice.” United United States it as such.” contempt charged and describe 299-300, ers, at 698-99. at 42(b) U.S. Rule “simple required by notice” to demonstrate such Rylander has failed rigid requirements is less than the to which safeguards None of the prejudice. information, it but formal indictment defendant was entitled as a criminal he was still of the basis apprise must defendant therefore do not reverse compromised. We v. contempt charge. for the ground. Robinson, Cir.1971). on this (9th not contain the Although the notice need combining the Although civil “criminal,” word there must be some indica- case was not reversi criminal trials in this that a tion that the defendant is aware error, problems trials entail joint ble such charged. criminal United think it would that lead us to and hazards Workers, v. Mine States United try to the civil and criminal usually be wiser at 697. 67 S.Ct. many There are safe charges separately. guards in a applicable of the charge The clearest notice trial right such as the proceeding, Rylander was contained against cases, counsel, right right in some brief, nine pretrial days filed Government’s stand, the “be not to take the witness trial, argued which that he explicitly before proof, a reasonable doubt” burden of yond of criminal guilty should be found contempt pro in a civil apply which do not on March 24. for his failure to ceeding. These differences create unfore less clear was the show cause Somewhat when civil and criminal con problems seen order, contempt pro which initiated the Thus, al tempt charges jointly. are tried ceeding inquired why Rylander as to here, it was not reversible error we though should not be held in “criminal practice do civil trying not endorse therefor.” That order punished court and contempt charges jointly. and criminal petition, to the Government’s referred which, why Rylander in its recitation of B. Recusal to show cause he should be ordered rejected The district court properly contempt, not be held in included a should Rylander’s request pursuant for recusal at the statement of his failure Rule of the Federal Rules of Criminal in violation of the district March 24 Procedure and 28 U.S.C. 144. The con § court’s order. tempt charges did not involve criticism of of whether the show cause Regardless the trial as for recusal under petition, order and the stand- Government’s 42(b). Rylander’s pretrial Rule affidavits alone, notice, constituted sufficient ing contain no “specific allegations tending fact pretrial sufficiently ap- brief Government’s an personal stemming show bias charges to meet the prised Rylander source,” extrajudicial required by as requirements 42(b). of Rule See Sibla, 144. United U.S.C. Robinson, 449 F.2d at 930. Cir.1980). (9th F.2d The record district judge indicates that the conducted Right D. to Counsel in a fair proceedings impartial these Indeed, he showed pa manner. unusual argues that he was denied his tience and tolerance. to counsel in the sixth amendment appointed court. The district court Charge C. Notice of the and, af- attorney represent Rylander an attorney, ap- discharged that the notice ter Rylander contends who was also attorney, contempt charge ap- pointed for failure a second
1005 subsequently discharged by Ry- Rylander. possible that this was not clear to Rylander requested lander then that the district court until the Government pretrial brief, filed its appoint an attorney Rylander’s choosing. after had waived counsel. There Instead, gave the district court is also no indication in the record that Ry- being the choice of represented by one of lander possible understood the penalties at lawyers the two who had been previously the time he waived counsel. The district himself, appointed, hiring counsel repre- judge did not discuss the penalties that senting rep- himself. chose to might be imposed until he took up the mo- himself, resent permitted and was to do so jury trial, tion for a after waiver after the district court found that he had of counsel. “knowingly, intelligently, competently and Because the record does not indicate that waived counsel.” Rylander understood the nature of the
Although a criminal defendant
charges or the possible penalties at the time
himself,
has a right
represent
Faretta v.
counsel,
he waived
we reverse the convic-
California,
806, 807,
2525,
422
95
U.S.
S.Ct.
tion and remand for a new trial.
(1975),
basis for a contempt charge. quite charge failing the summoned *10 POOLE, refusal to Rylander’s Judge, dissenting.
documents arose Circuit issued comply pursuant with a summons conspicuous This case is a illustration of Punishment for disobedi- U.S.C. § the capacity of a determined individual lit specifical- ence to a section 7602 summons is erally to thumb his nose at a district court ly controlled 26 U.S.C. §§ escape being later called to account penalty which authorize a maximum judges because are tripping unable to avoid $1,000 year imprisonment of or one of over themselves with legal technicalities. Thus, any contempt charged both. have, Try as I I simply agree cannot that as a to a section result of disobedience defendant, history this whose of utter defi summons is a offense and carries serious orders, ance legal process of and court right jury with it the to a trial. spread record, across a again clear to be request for a trial therefore should jury bailed out on the grounds that he did not have granted. been act knowingly intelligently when he only If had been tried on rejected appointed two court lawyers, tried contempt charge, second he would not personally-known to insist that a lawyer be have a to a right had trial. That and, appointed public expense denied charge, appear failure to on March luxury, represent elected to himself. brought was under 18 401(3).3 U.S.C. § phase In an earlier of this same case specify That statute does not a maximum defendant became the beneficiary judi penalty. There was therefore no right to technicality cial when this circuit reversed jury trial because he was neither sentenced adjudication the trial court’s of civil con imprisonment to more than six months’ nor tempt. United v. Rylander, fined more than $500. I). (Rylander (9th Cir.1981) The Su Rylander’s contempt preme Because we reverse Court overruled and reversed us and conviction for failure to on another reinstated the judgment. ground, question we do not reach the of Rylander, - U.S. -, whether, II). charge because that was tried (Rylander (1983) We are jointly produce charge, failure to about to again. reward him a jury failure to afford him trial would agree I can was not shown require remand, reversal. On since he can- sufficiently to have had actually possession not be retried on the failure to produce disputed corporate during records charge, Rylander will not be entitled to a period although critical he was the presi- jury trial so long as he is not sentenced to dent the corporation. presumption more than six months’ imprisonment or that because he directed the corporation he fined more than $500. records, had personally possession of the inadequate. V But on March he deliberately failed to CONCLUSION response to the court’s order to We reverse Rylander’s contempt convic- show cause. He was tried on that charge tion for failure because the evi- majority and the concludes that he had dence was insufficient. We reverse the duty appear, notice of both the the na- conviction for failure to scheduled, proceeding ture of the and the because Rylander’s sixth amendment to have When he was ability appeared. to counsel was violated. The case is re- the court finally brought involuntarily, manded for further on the fail- proceedings ordinary contempt to hear an proceeded ure to appear contempt charge. judge appointed lawyer case. The REVERSED and REMANDED. the defendant. dis- represent charge failing only punish- 3. Unlike the because that section authorizes documents, charge requirements summoned could not ment for disobedience to the brought 7604(b), have been under 26 U.S.C. summonses. appointed him. The the trial charged ify judge. His adamant refusal to lawyer second to defend him. with any order of the court was discharged lawyer. Clearly, Rylander part pattern. of a I find it difficult *11 could that act and as keep up indefinitely comprehend how we expect obedience to be able to fend clearly, might indefinitely valid court orders if we tolerate willful and then him any gave off trial. The his contumacy. Rylander sustained is shown as option: lawyers take either of the first two crafty a and person. rejec- deliberate The go or it alone. tion of counsel by corporation this president cannot be called the decision of a novice. Rylander went it alone and was convict- principle That is protect intended to reasons, ed. For two both of which I be- unwary, ratify deliberate disobedi- lieve are wrong, majority has set aside a simple ence to and uncomplicated order to majority says conviction. First come to court at a certain time. that the court did not explain pitfalls his own being counsel. Harris, cites cases such as United JURY TRIAL (9th Cir.1982) authority. F.2d as its majority holds that Rylander was The facts in Harris are vastly different. entitled to a jury trial because that Harris was tried under 26 7203 for U.S.C. § contempt charge arose from his refusal to failing to file income tax returns for three with a summons issued the Inter- by It was a he years. jury represent- trial and nal pursuant Revenue Service to 26 U.S.C. ed himself. He knew of his to counsel 7602. The majority reasons that disobe- § but represent twice stated that he wished to dience punished under § himself. He not know anything did about a and authorizing a misde- § § trial, jury nothing challenges, about nothing $1,000 meanor penalty of as much as or a about cross-examination and making objec- year’s imprisonment, Therefore, or both. opinion tions. The Harris states that his says the majority, “any “opening” statement was a rather largely charged as a result of disobedience to a meaningless objection to the law and pro- 7602 summons is a serious offense § and ceedings. charge A 7203 has ele- many § with it the right carries to a jury trial.” calling ments for skill in learning pre- (Op. p. 16). The majority is confused. He sentation. An layman untutored is not was not in disobeying a sum- generally equipped to handle the intricacies disobeying mons but a court order. trial, of a not in a crimi- especially The Internal Revenue code sections make nal tax case. it a crime to disobey Congress a summons. But the only similarity to this case is thát procedures has established to compel com Rylander had refused when or- pliance summons to IRS’ be by dered the court in a proceeding which agency fore that records was merely ancillary to a tax trial. Since give testimony. and/or There are defenses he was notified to and there is no requirement. to that See United States v. reason shown why appear, he did not Rylander, - U.S. -, U.S. case would seem by well described the lan- (1983) (passim), which can be guage Harris agency proceedings asserted in the or in has, however, “this court held that a fail- any proceedings pur court convened for the ure the district court to describe all [of pose enforcing obligation. But when not, the elements of will in every waiver] a court issues an order or other process case, necessitate reversal.” person purpose bringing for the him into Whatever defense chose to of- court where his defenses or mitigation may fer, heard, he invoking judicial had to have a valid reason for not be the court is its when he knew he should. and even if the entire world knows appearing Rylan- power, der presented part perfect no excuse and took no the defendant has a and com itself, proceedings except disqual- his effort to the summons he still plete defense to refuses,
must he come. If it is not of hare and merely adjudication, game “a played mission, to the disappointment agency’s I, it is at 1555 hounds.” 103 S.Ct. This, disobedience to valid court process. Bryan, as from United (quoting thought I no disputed, plain one act of 94 L.Ed. 70 S.Ct. contempt under 18 U.S.C. 884). It is now time for an end. motion, initiated the court on or sua 42, Fed.R.Crim.P.,
sponte, under Rule or on
application of the United States Attorney attorney an appointed by the court for purpose. In such a proceeding,
agency standing except has no as the court *12 direct, purpose for the is not remedial benefit,
for the agency’s punitive but QUEETS vindicate the court’s own dignity. INDIANS, al., BAND OF et Plaintiffs-Appellees, The district court denied Rylander here jury trial on such authorities as Muniz v. Hoffman, al., STATE OF et WASHINGTON (1975). view, In its however Defendants-Appellants. outrageous Rylander might inbe refusing to respond to the process, court’s he still TRIBE, MUCKLESHOOT INDIAN was liable to punishment only under the tax Plaintiff-Appellee, statutes. This is at odds with logic both and policy. The district court Ry- advised WASHINGTON, al., The STATE OF et lander that subject he would be only to a Defendants-Appellants. fine of or confinement, six months $500 both. That is the limit of petty offense. 83-3644, Nos. 83-3646. Petty offenses do not carry Appeals, Court of trial. sentence was within Ninth Circuit. those bounds. I dissent from the majority’s reversal and its awarding him a jury trial. Argued Aug. Submitted Finally, although it may only be advisory Sept. Decided dictum and district judges may wish to accept the advice with caution and reserva-
tions, I do not associate with the majority’s
teaching that it practice is bad to combine
civil and criminal contempt hearings. Com-
bined hearings are common in district court
contempt cases, of which many arise in the
course of labor case injunctions. Because
they involve almost the evidence, identical
and, especially cases, in labor because of the
need to bring a speedy end to labor dis-
putes, it would be burdensome on the par-
ties expensive charges against judicial
resources to require two trials with the
same evidence and witnesses. The majority
supplies no empirical basis for its an- preference
nounced and therefore I would
belabor it no further.
Rylander has again, once Supreme as the
Court said in reinstating his civil contempt