Case Information
*1 Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Richard Lincoln had his term of supervised release revoked. His revocation sentence included a new term of supervised release, which has the same special conditions as the original revoked term. Lincoln now argues that the re-imposition of one condition in particular—a condition that he did not object to or appeal from *2 when it was originally imposed—is outside the bounds of the district court’s [1] discretion. We disagree and affirm the district court.
I.
Lincoln challenges thе re-imposition of Special Condition #4, which states in part that “[Lincoln] must participate in a mental health evaluation and/or treatment program” that “may include participation in a sex offender treatment program.” It was re-imposed after Lincoln’s supervised release wаs revoked, primarily because he used marijuana on multiple occasions and lied to his probation officer about it. The [2] district court’s revocation sentence was comprised of a six-month term of imprisonment and a new three-year term of supervised release that continuеd the special conditions—including Special Condition #4—that were on his original term. [3] Lincoln specifically objected to the re-imposition оf Special Condition #4 at his revocation hearing. He did not, however, object to or appeal that condition when it was imposed as part of his original term of supervised release. Lincoln continues his [4] challenge here, and it is his sole claim on appeal.
II.
We review the district court’s imposition of Special Condition #4 over
Lincoln’s оbjection for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Lincoln’s primary argument on appeal is that Special Condition #4 is not
“reasonably related” to the “nature and circumstances of the offense”—here, the
revocation of a term of supervised release that he was serving for violating federal
drug laws—and his “history and characteristics.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Our cases
have dealt with similar arguments regarding sex-offender conditions imposed for
crimes that are not sexual in nature. Compare United States v. Scott,
Our prior cases show that we need not engage in “precise line-drawing” to
assess Lincoln’s argument; rather, we look to his “history and characteristics” and
*4
“rehabilitative needs”—as we always do—to evaluate the condition. United States
v. Fenner,
In this case, the district court was well within its discretion to impose Special
Condition #4. To start, we note that the same judge presided over both Lincoln’s
initial sentencing and revocation sentencing—a factor that buttresses the district
court’s decision because it shows that “the district court wаs aware of [Lincoln’s]
history and characteristics.” United States v. Franklin,
The record supports the decision as well. As noted in the Pre-Sentence Rеport (“PSR”) from Lincoln’s original sentencing, he was previously found guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault and failure to register as a sex offender. Nonetheless, Lincoln argues that his sexual misconduct occurred when he was 15, over 20 years ago, and thus we should account for its remoteness and his capacity for change. Lincoln, however, never completed a sex-offender treatment program. Cf. [5]
Fenner, 600 F.3d at 1026-27 (noting lack of treаtment supported imposition of
condition requiring “sex offender and/or mental health treatment”). And the
probation office noted at his revocation hearing that Lincoln displayed “some
moderate risk dynamic factors” for “sexual offense recidivism.” Thus, the continued
presence of risk fаctors in Lincoln, coupled with his lack of prior treatment, indicates
that his “rehabilitative needs” counsel in favor of Special Condition #4. Id. at 1027;
sеe also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (stating “sentence imposed” should “provide the
defendant with . . . medical care, or other correctional treatment”).
[6]
*5
The district court’s decision was all the more warranted because Lincoln had
already begun complying with Special Condition #4 at the time of his revocation
hearing. Lincoln had completed approximately three weeks of what the district court
described as a twenty-two-week “cognitivе behavioral program,” the treatment
program he was assigned to in relation to Special Condition #4, when his supervised
release was revoked. We have previously observed that a “defendant should not
benefit from supervised release violations, where special conditions of supervised
release would have remained in effect at [the] time in question if [the] defendant had
not violated supervised release.” United States v. Big Boy,
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.
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sentencings). He has, however, waived that challenge. See United States v. Bledsoe, 445 F.3d 1069, 1073 (8th Cir. 2006). Lincoln’s objection to thе district court’s factual characterization of his offense at the revocation hearing fails for that same reason because the district court was relying on the description contained in the PSR. Compare PSR ¶ 36, with Rev. Tr. 14-15; 26.
Notes
[1] The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern District оf Iowa .
[2] Lincoln’s term of supervised release was also revoked because he associated with a person involved in criminal activity.
[3] The district court imposed one additional condition that Lincoln “reside in a Residential Reentry Center for a period up to 60 days” after imprisonmеnt.
[4] Lincoln was also re-sentenced on three separate occasions because of revisions to the United States Sentencing Guidelinеs. Lincoln did not object to Special Condition #4 on these occasions either.
[5] Lincoln was charged as an adult on the aggravated criminаl sexual assault charge. He was charged for failing to register as a sex offender when he was an adult.
[6] Lincoln also attempts to challenge the description of his offense in the PSR at this stage after failing to object at the time of his sentencing (and subsequent re-