*1 Procedure; Appellate Local Fifth Circuit 16), Rehearing Rule the Petition for En Banc filed Honda is DENIED. stay The motion of Honda for pending petition issuance of the mandate Pearson, Stewart, Frates, Richman Floyd, for writ of certiorari is DENIED. Stewart, Greer, Fox, Gary Larry D. S. & Miami, Fla., Dorsey. and Barbara for Glen Associates, An-
Anthony M. Lanzone & Lanzone, Calinoff, Robert A. New
thony M. Co., Honda Motor Ltd. and City,
York
American Honda Motor Co. Morris, Wohlust,
DeWolf, Ward, Jontz & Jr.,
O’Donnell, O’Donnell, Thomas John L. DeWolf, Orlando, Fla., for Honda Motor
B. Co., America, Ltd. UNITED STATES of Plaintiff-Appellee, Eidson,
Akerman, & John Ed- Senterfitt Fisher, Orlando, Fla., win for Continental Cas. Co. BARRY, Richard John Miami, Fla., Unger, Joe N. for Honda Defendant-Appellant. Co., Ltd., American Honda Motor Motor & No. 80-5352. Mission Ins. Appeals, States Court Circuit.
Sixth Argued Oct. 1981. GODBOLD, Judge, Before Chief MOR- HENDERSON, Judges. GAN and Circuit Decided March 1982. Rehearing May Denied BY THE COURT: Dorseys quali- that we The motion of the
fy provide our mandate to for interest from Cir., original judgment, 5
the date of the respect compen- with to both
655 F.2d
satory punitive damages is GRANTED. liability of Continental to Honda for damages punitive award is an issue for
the district court on remand. If Continen- Honda,
tal is held liable to the district court whether li-
should also decide Continental’s of interest.
ability includes the award
Honda’s motion for taxation of costs
against Continental is GRANTED. Dorseys to strike the motion
petition rehearing en banc filed Hon-
da is DENIED. panel Judge of this nor
No member having
regular active service on the Court polled
requested that (Rule Rules
rehearing en banc *2 Segal, City, New York J. Brooke
David Lathram, Burch, Johnson, Porter & Mem- Tenn., defendant-appellant. phis, Atty., Timothy Cody, W. J. Michael U. S. Tenn., DiScenza, plaintiff- Memphis, R. appellee. EDWARDS, Judge, Chief Circuit
Before MARTIN, FEIKENS,* Judge, and Circuit Judge. District Chief MARTIN, Jr., Judge. F. BOYCE Chief by jury possess- Barry was convicted ing a schedule II controlled substance distribute, (Methaqualone) with intent to 841(a)(1). violation of 21 U.S.C. § Barry’s The District denied motion Court suppress allegedly evidence seized in vio- of the Fourth Amendment. The evi- lation dence, containing the controlled four bottles substance, was trial and introduced formed the basis for his conviction. 1) deny now it was error: motion; 2) tele- suppression to admit records offered as evidence to show phone charge. requisite intent under by agents Drug Barry was arrested January Enforcement Administration package 1980 after he claimed a Ex- Memphis, Tennessee office of Federal freight press, carrier. On package had previous day, the arrived Express airport facili- Memphis damaged package ty in a condition. agent service company was referred to a who, circumstances, normal would “rewrap area.” How- have taken it to a ever, through parcel, small hole in the containing pills. agent could see four bottles contraband, agent called a Suspecting manager, Crump, Mr. took the security who * Feikens, Michigan, sitting by designation. Judge, United Honorable John Chief the Eastern District of District Court for opened requirement to his office and it. He inadvertence to this exception large pills, four bottles of each
found inside was not satisfied. Coolidge See v. New Although “Methaqualone.” labeled Metha- Hampshire, qualone may possessed legally, Crump’s District dis- suspicions large quantity were raised agreed, concluding that the DEA’s search pharmaceu- the fact that the was valid under the view doctrine. tical numbers had been effaced. He then now attacks this conclusion and ar- *3 Drug Agency called the Enforcement which gues private as well that the search rule of agents to his office. After exam- sent two applied incorrectly Burdeau was to the contents, ining package- and its facts of this case. agents pills testing. took five for The tests positive. Agents were then resealed the I.
package
Express.
and returned it to Federal
attempted
was arrested when he
Barry
support
To
his contention that the search
package.
claim the
by
Express
Federal
govern
constituted a
suppression hearing,
search,
At
Barry
private
con- mental rather
than
by
Express
tended that the search
involving
cites a number
cases
the silver
purposes
was conducted for
of federal law platter doctrine. Gambino v. United
pri-
enforcement and
not
was therefore
States,
72 L.Ed.
McDowell,
vate search under Burdeau v.
(1927);
States,
Lowrey v. United
addition, the specific memorandum lists cri- II. designed profile drug parcels.
teria We must now determine whether subsequent seizure pill DEA of
One could view this document as an sam- ples Barry’s attempt by open parcel the DEA violated to coach Ex press employees rights. Fourth Amendment Currently, conduct searches that Supreme will meet the interpretation search test of Bur Court’s of the law deau. invites us of search to draw this infer and seizure reveals that evidence However, ence. suppressed inference is not exclu should not be unless it was face, sive. On its asking a) memorandum seized means of: unlawful conduct on employees to company policy part follow is be- of law enforcement authorities
916
b)’
1054, 1059-61,
violated the Fourth Amendment
98 S.Ct.
rights personal to the defendant. The lat-
(1978);
Powell,
Stone v.
ter criterion has
with in-
employed
489-491,
3037, 3050-51,
96 S.Ct.
49
creasing frequency to derail the exclusion-
(1976);
Michigan
see
v.
ary rule.
recently
Until
cases which have
Tucker,
433, 450-451,
417
explored these two factors have done so
2357, 2367,
(1974).
Our
standing.
the rubric
e.g.
See
cases have consistently recognized that
Brown v. United
411
93
unbending application
exclusionary
(1973);
S.Ct.
208
sanction to
governmen-
enforce ideals of
Jeffers,
v.
tal
impede
rectitude would
unacceptably
L.Ed. 59
If a defendant could not
the truth-finding
judge
functions of
police
show that unlawful
conduct violated
jury. E.g.,
Powell,
supra,
Stone
his own Fourth Amendment
rights, he
U.S.,
S.Ct.,
3048-3050;
standing
would be denied
to complain of the
Calandra,
United States v.
supra, 414
alleged violation and the tainted evidence
U.S.,
S.Ct.,
all,
at 620. After
it
would be
important
admitted. One
fact
defendant,
is the
constable,
and not the
emanates from these cases:
the exclusion-
trial,
(footnote omitted).
who stands
ary rule
applied
every
will not be
in-
Id. at
at 2445.
stance of unlawful
conduct. Deter-
Moreover,
recog
Court has
rence of official misconduct is a primary
nized
of whether the de
objective
of the rule.
exclusion
fendant’s own
constitutional
have
probative
of valuable
evidence is in some
been violated need not be undertaken solely
high
price
cases too
to pay
slight
for a
*5
in terms
standing.
Illinois,
of
Rakas v.
439
police discipline.
increase in
Thus where
128,
421,
99
U.S.
S.Ct.
58
(1978).
L.Ed.2d 387
police
separated
unlawful
conduct can be
Instead “the
analysis
better
forthrightly fo
appraisal
from a fair
of the defendant’s
cuses on the
particular
extent of a
defend
rights,
Fourth
ig-
Amendment
the law will
ant’s
under the Fourth Amendment
nore
proper,
a minor deviation from
consti-
rather
any
than on
theoretically separate
tutionally
police
mandated
procedure.
but invariably
concept
intertwined
of stand
Recently
Court made this
ing.”
139,
Id. at
clusion of evidence in every case of ille- ment of the principles Rakas, established in Instead, gality. weighed must be which summarizes that must be against the considerable harm that would claim, undertaken in considering such a is application flow from indiscriminate of found in Mr. Justice concurring Blackman’s exclusionary an rule. opinion in another recent Fourth Amend Thus, the exclusionary rule “has been case, ment “standing” Rawlings v. Ken restricted to those areas where its reme- 98, tucky, 448 100 S.Ct. 65 objectives dial are most efficaciously (1980): Calandra, served.” United v. States 414 view, 338, 348, my Illinois, Rakas v. 38 L.Ed.2d 439 U.S. (1974). (1978), The S.Ct. 58 L.Ed.2d acknowledged Court has [99 387] recognized suppression that two probative analytically of distinct but but costly “invariably tainted evidence exacts a intertwined” toll issues of sub- ability of courts to stantive jurispru- ascertain the truth Fourth Amendment Illinois, Id., E.g., in a criminal case. dence. 428], Rakas v. at 139 at S.Ct. The [99 supra, [128], 439 U.S. first is “whether disputed S.Ct. search or [a] [421], 387]; at 427-28 United seizure infringed has an interest of the [58 Ceccolini, 268, 275-279, 435 U.S. defendant which the Fourth Amendment id., protect,” rules, at 140 designed.to fixed we cannot help but believe that [99 429]; will, the second is whether “the question first perhaps should, S.Ct. or violated challenged search seizure address the legality police conduct. righ[t],” ibid. [that] questions is answered first of these The A. whether defendant by determining The that District expectation privacy” of “legitimate a
has
Court correctly concluded that
the DEA’s
governmental
aby
has been invaded
that
warrantless
fell
seizure
within the plain
is answer-
or seizure.
second
search
view exception
requirement.
to the warrant
by determining
applicable
ed
whether
Coolidge
Hampshire,
See
v. New
requirements have
cause and warrant
properly
observed.
facts
present
of this case
a
agree
I
the Court
these two
with
that
situation in
although
the exception
one,” ante,
inquiries
into
“merge
implicated,
seems to be
it does not in fact
2562], in the
S.Ct. at
sense that both
[100
apply.
following
statement from Cool-
principles
to be
are
addressed
idge disposes
government’s
argu-
analysis developed
Fourth Amendment
ment:
Katz v.
[88
The limits on the doctrine are implicit
(1967), and
19 L.Ed.2d
576]
in the
statement
its rationale. The
I do not
progeny.
today’s
But
read
deci
first of these is that
view alone is
sion,
Rakas,
holding
or
it is im
that
never enough to justify the warrantless
courts
treat
proper for lower
to
these
seizure of evidence. This
simply
is
a cor-
inquiries as
components
distinct
ollary of
principle
the familiar
discussed
Indeed, I
Fourth Amendment claim.
am
above, that no amount
probable
cause
it would
convinced that
invite confusion
can justify a warrantless search or sei-
possible
hold otherwise.
It remains
“exigent
zure absent
circumstances.” In-
prove
legitimate
defendant
testimony
controvertible
of the senses
invaded,
yet
interest
incriminating
an
object
premis-
is on
prove
police
illegally
acted
fail
es belonging to a
suspect
criminal
may
it
doing
equally possible
so. And
possible
establish the fullest
measure of
prove
defendant
that the
acted
*6
probable cause. But even where
illegally,
fail
the ob-
yet
prove
that his
affected,
ject
contraband,
(em
is
privacy interest was
Court has
own
re-
phasis added).
peatedly stated and enforced the basic
police
rule that
the
may not enter and
2565.,
111-112,
Id.
100 S.Ct. at
make a warrantless seizure.
appreciate
dividing
We
this concern over
The second limitation is that
the dis-
preceding analysis.
the
For a court to con-
covery
plain
of evidence in
view must be
to ask
the
tinue
whether
Fourth Amend-
inadvertent. The rationale of the excep-
finding
ment has been violated after
tion to
requirement,
just
the warrant
police
illegally
have
seized evidence invites
stated,
plain-view
is that
seizure will
one
govern-
the conclusion that
branch of
initially
(and
not turn an
valid
therefore
is
the
condoning
illegality
ment
another.
limited)
“general” one,
search into a
unseemly
This
result can be avoided
while the inconvenience of procuring a
manipulating the order in
the
two
warrant
cover
an inadvertent dis-
considered,
illegal
are
in
factors
that both
covery
great.
is
But where the discovery
privacy
conduct and a
violation must be
is anticipated, where
police
the
know in
before
will
exclusionary
found
the
rule
advance the location of
the evidence
applied. Therefore
absence
one fac-
it,
intend
will
to seize
tor
obviate the need to consider the
situation is alto-
gether
inquiry
requirement
because the
re-
different. The
other.
of a
is,
police
imposes
conduct
in
warrant
seize
garding
contrast
no inconven-
whatever,
question, governed
privacy
by relatively
ience
or at
none
least
which is
cognizable
legal sys-
exigent
in a
constitutionally
circumstances and inadvert-
ence
regards
requirements we mentioned previously
tem that
warrantless searches as
conspicuously
are
absent from the
discus-
“per se unreasonable” in
absence of
Rodriguez
plain
sion in
excep-
view
“exigent
(footnote
circumstances.”
omit-
However, Coolidge
tion.
requires us to an-
ted).
alyze
“plain
view” seizure in light of these
Id. at
S.Ct.
Rodriguez
criteria.
did not eliminate these
apply
plain
exception
To
view
here
plain
factors
from the
view exception.
would be to make the obvious mistake Rather,
Rodriguez emphasized
court in
against
Coolidge.
warned
Plain view is
other factors
particular
which that
requirement
exception.
but one
Ab-
case
Although
turned.
not expressly dis-
others,
sent
necessary.
a warrant
cussed, exigent circumstances and inadvert-
particularly dangerous
Plain view is a
ex-
ence were necessary and were subsumed in
because,
noted,
ception
as Justice Stewart
case,
the court’s analysis.
present
In the
cases,
majority
any
vast
evi-
“[I]n
however,
government
and the District
dence seized
will be in
Court should not have relied
Rodriguez
view, at least at the moment of seizure.”
because the
failed to establish
(emphasis
Id. at
at 2037
requirements:
exigent
threshold
cir-
original).
Coolidge
any-
The rule of
is that
cumstances and inadvertence.
may
time a warrant
be obtained it must be.
police may
What the
consider to be a waste
B.
of time in a clear
overwhelming
case of
Having determined that
the DEA
probable
preser-
cause is at a minimum the
unlawfully
pill samples,
seized the
we must
right
possessions
vation of one’s
to have
reverse the District Court’s order and sup
pursuant
seized
to a limited warrant which
press the samples as well as the remainder
exactly
scope
details its own
and effect.
Methaqualone,
of the tainted
unless we de
termine that Barry had no reasonable ex
unquestionable
It is
the DEA
pectation
privacy
in the contraband at
gotten
could have
a warrant here. Certain
the time of the seizure. We first note that
ly probable cause was no
barrier for
charged
while
possession,
with
knew,
information,
based on reliable
that alone
provide
does not
necessary
Methaqualone awaited their arrival. Fur
Salvucci,
interest. United States v.
thermore,
exigent
no
circumstances excused
Similarly,
the
drugs
of
they
gal shipment
had reason
and therefore was
a suitcase which
acquired
properly
pursuant
admitted
to Rules 401
marijuana.
contained
to believe
and 402 of the Federal
of
Rules of Evidence.
expectation
the owner’s
citing
held that the
unopened bag, the Court
the
Judgment affirmed.
the
Amendment
police violated
Fourth
they opened
obtaining
when
it without first
EDWARDS,
Jr.,
GEORGE CLIFTON
99
a
U.S. at
warrant.
Judge, dissenting.
Chief
position
anticipated
This
the Court’s
2593.
governed by
This case séems tó me to be
Ex
ever
in Walter
when it noted
since
that
of
the result
the United States
Jackson,
727,
See Arkansas v. 2586, 2589, 235]; L.Ed.2d [99 Chadwick, 1, 10
United v. States 2476, 2482, 53
[97 538]. supra
Walter v. United (footnote omitted).
Since the
v. Rodriguez,
1979))
discussed Martin’s was de-
cided before this court the benefit of
the Supreme opinion Court’s in Walter v. States, supra, my view it cannot
govern our current decision.
I judgment would reverse the Dis-
trict Court. CLARK,
Bettie Ethel On Behalf of Similarly
Herself and All Others
Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, CORPORATION,
CHRYSLER
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 80-2064.
United States of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit.
Argued Nov. 1981.
Decided March 1982.
Rehearing April Denied
