United States v. Richard C. VentrillaUnited States v. Richard C. Ventrilla
Aрpellant Richard Ventrilla appeals from a sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Elfvin, J.). Ventrilla contends that his sentence was “imposed in violation of law,”
In 1996 and 1997, appellant Richard Ventrilla (“Ventrilla”) wrote eighteen anonymous letters to people he did pot know. He threatened that if they did not pay him sums between $25,000 and $35,000 according to his instructions, the consequences would be “absolutely catastrophic.” Ventrilla received no payments in response to his letters.
Ventrilla did receive attention from the United States government, however. On March 19, 1999, he pled guilty to a one-count information charging him with mailing a threatening communication with intent to extort money, in violation of
At sentencing, Ventrilla requested a diminished capacity downward depаrture, and the government opposed it. Ventrilla put on evidence that prior to late 1995 or early 1996, he had a stable family history and employment background, and no сriminal record. He then underwent a change in personality and became depressed. Upon seeing a psychiatrist, Ventrilla discovered that he had a “large vаscular lesion in the area of the internal capsule” (the “lesion,” “infarct,” or “stroke”). The psychiatrist concluded that the lesion caused Ventrilla’s personality change and the resulting “bizarre behavior.” Two other medical experts, hired by the defendant in conjunction with his criminal ease, were less convinced of the causal connection. One testified that the stroke “could not explain the behavior associated with [the defendant’s] committing extortion.” The other testified that although such behаvior change is “not typically associated with” the type of neurological damage Ventrilla had suffered, “the temporal connection ... suggests such an association.” The two medical experts hired by the government concluded that the infarct was not causally related to Ventrilla’s criminal behavior.
This evidence was prеsented to the district court at sentencing. The court wondered why the defendant claimed diminished capacity when he had not invoked the affirmative defense of insanity tо demonstrate an incapacity to have formulated the appropriate mens rea. It stated:
“Despite the provisions of Section 5K2.13 of the sentencing guidelines, and the clеar intimation therein that an individual’s intention or lack of intention due to diminished mental capacity can be taken into consideration by the Court in imposing a sentence, its [sic] my firm belief that that’s a misplaced qualification or differentiation. If any such is to come into play in my mind, it would have to enter into the mens rea as to whether the defendant had the intention to do what he did to — regardless of any knowledge of whether it was against the law, a matter which should clearly be for the jury. So having in mind the clear language of subsection 13 and listening to your presentation, Mr. Humann, well made, and to the documents which are in front of me, including the reports of the Doctors, I am not going to give it [5K2.13] any сredence in my sentencing.”
The district court then denied the motion and sentenced Ventrilla to 46 months imprisonment and two years supervised release. Ventrilla appeals the sentence.
DISCUSSION
Normally, a district court’s decision not to depart downward from the sentencing guidelines is within the court’s discre
Where a sentence has been “ imposed in violation of law,”
The court’s remarks may mean one of two things, either of which requires that we vacate Ventrilla’s sentence. First, the district court may have simрly refused to exercise discretion with regard to Ventrilla’s motion. If that is the case, then
Cam-po
controls here. In
Campo,
the U.S. Attorney’s office for the Eastern District refused to make specific downward departure recommendations for substantial assistance pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 The district court stated that it would not consider downward departures for substantial assistance without suсh a recommendation. This court held that it was “legal error for a court to take the unusual step of expressly abdicating the discretion that it has been duly entrusted by law to exercise.”
In sentencing Ventrilla, the district court stated that it “ha[d] trouble with that subsection,” and that, the guidelines notwithstanding, it held a “firm belief’ that a downward departure for diminished capacity is “a misplaced qualification or differentiation.” The court’s cursory statement that it had considered the medical records constitutes the kind of “isolated portionf ] of the record” that fails to overcоme its obvious refusal to exercise discretion.
Alternatively, it is possible that the district court mistakenly believed that it did not have the authority to grant a downward departure оn the basis of diminished capacity. Its statement suggests that it thought of diminished capacity as a question of
mens rea
for the jury to decide at trial, most likely in the form of an insanity defense, rather than a question for the court at sentencing. But that is incorrect. As the government concedes, the elements and standards of proof for an insanity defense and diminished capacity are different. In addition, who decides the issue, judge or jury, differs for each claim. A defendant must persuade a jury by clear and convincing evidence that he “was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts” in order to prevail on an insanity defense.
We have made clear in the past that a sentence is imposed in violation of law when “the judge’s sentencing remarks create ambiguity as to whether the judge correctly understood an available option.”
United States v. Thorpe,
CONCLUSION
In imposing sentence on Ventrilla, the district court either refused to exercise its discretiоn or believed it lacked authority to exercise such discretion. Either way, under