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United States v. Richard B. Lankford
955 F.2d 1545
11th Cir.
1992
Check Treatment

*2 BIRCH, Judges, Before FAY and Circuit *, Judge. District Senior and HOFFMAN FAY, Judge: Circuit questions con- presents This case two court’s exclusion evi- cerning district prosecution. Defen- criminal dence dant-Appellant Richard B. Lankford was counts of extortion and two convicted on re- filing false income tax two counts defense, counsel’s cross-ex- During turns. wit- government’s chief amination of the Lankford, the district court against ness by questioning defense precluded line of motive for to show purporting counsel govern- testimony on behalf false addition, the district ment witness. offered court excluded might show that defense to reasonably $1500.00 have believed gift and therefore check he received For the income. reasons taxable follow, disagree with exclusion we instances. evidence in both * Hoffman, sitting by designation. U.S. Dis- Walter E. Senior Honorable Virginia, Judge for the Eastern District trict I. History Procedural asked him money. While Lankford never threatened to terminate L & G’s con- Richard Lankford was indicted Octo- tract with the county, LeCroy twenty-one 1989 on testified ber counts extor- *3 paid he tion and two counts of Lankford because extortion under he was afraid of right, color of official in losing violation of the his contract. Evidence present- was Act, addition, Hobbs 18 U.S.C. 1951. In § ed that Lankford solicited and received alleged the indictment four of will- counts payments ranging in amount from fully filing subscribing false income $2000, with payments most being close to returns, tax in violation of 26 U.S.C. $1000.4 7206(1). 28, 1990, On March con- §

victed Lankford on two of extortion counts B. Income Tax Charges and on two filing counts for false income tax returns. jury acquitted Lankford One of the charges for filing false in- on one attempted count of extortion and come tax returns was based upon a $1500 failed to reach a on remaining verdict payment received Lankford in 1984. post-verdict counts. A acquittal motion for Lankford resigned position with the or a new denied on April was County Fulton Sheriffs in office 1984 in and on June 1990Lankford filed a timely order to run for Sheriff in the November appeal. notice of 1984 election. Evidence presented was sergeant at the County Fulton Jail II. History Factual inmate, solicited an Wesley Merritt, for a A. Charges Extortion contribution to Lankford’s campaign.5 Richard Lankford served as the Sheriff Merritt testified he contacted his of Fulton County, Georgia January from niece, Hudson, Sandra who manag- was the 19851 until he was convicted in the district liquor store, er of a requested that she charges 1990. extortion write a check for $1500 from the store against Sheriff Lankford involve a series of account. Hudson testified individu- payments allegedly Lankford received from al claiming to be Richard Lankford came to Jack LeCroy from 1985 through 1988. Le- liquor pick up check, store Croy owns -a majority interest in the cater- requested that wife, it made be out to his ing company, (“L G”), L & G Catering & Jacqueline. Hudson made out the check that received a contract to provide food accordingly, services to did but not indicate County the Fulton on the Jail.2 Le- Croy testified that he check that it believed Sheriff intended campaign as a Lankford had awarded L & G the contract contribution. Lankford testified that he and that power Lankford had the to renew never picked up the check liquor from the or to cancel the contract. store, but that he received the check campaign

During the workers who years in which indicated it was a operat- L & G Jail, ed at the County gift, help LeCroy family Fulton testi- meet expenses while fied3 that Sheriff Lankford periodically he was unemployed. Sheriff, 1. Prior to his election LeCroy grand 3. testified before a and at served as a deputy County in the grant Fulton Sher- immunity. trial under a of use Department years. iffs for nine LeCroy's testimony 4. payments he that made

2. L & G one-year was awarded the food service supported by Lankford was jail contract for spring of 1985. Its Anderson, bookkeeper, former Doris county contract with the was renewed for two LeCroy who testified that she cashed checks periods, one-year additional and it continued to in the paid amounts claimed he he to Lankford. provide food service thereafter addition, on month-to- checks that were on L & drawn month basis until November 1989. G account admitted into were evidence. LeCroy testified when the contract was first awarded population the inmate Merritt testified that had no direct contact jail approximately 850 and that concerning campaign with Lankford contri- population nearly tripled by November 1989. bution. (citations Jenkins, F.2d at 1392 tion.” III. Discussion such cross- omitted). importance A. Cross-Examination upon whether depend does examination evidentiary rulings court’s A district in fact exists between deal or not some appeal where disturbed may only be Greene, 634 government. and the witness of discretion. a clear abuse appears there F.2d at 276. Rodriguez, 917 may the witness is whether What counts Further, Cir.1990). 1289 n. effort to testimony in an shading his be has trial court held that has circuit co- “A desire to please prosecution. of Evi Rule under Federal discretion broad the con- formed beneath operate may *4 permissible 611(b) the to determine dence level, apparent in a manner scious States United scope of cross-examination. witness, a subtle but such to the even (11th 1552, Cir. 1564 Jones, F.2d 913 v. state nevertheless desire to assist Bent, 707 v. 1990) (citing States perception.” may cloud Cir.1983), de (11th cert. 1190, 1194 F.2d Sullivan, F.2d 618 Burr v. (quoting Id. 2174, 960, 80 104 S.Ct. nied, 466 U.S. further, Cir.1980)). (9th 583, And 587 (1984)). 557 L.Ed.2d sought to be cross-exam where the witness witness, government’s “star” ined is in discretion district court’s “ prose in link ‘providing an essential is scope of cross-examination limiting the of full cross- importance cution’s of however, requirements subject, possible is nec bias examination disclose to v. Greene Wain Amendment. the Sixth ” (quoting at 275 Id. essarily increased.’ Cir.1981);6 272, (5th 275 F.2d 634 wright, 450, Summers, F.2d v. 598 United States 1277, Williams, F.2d 592 v. Calle, F.2d at (1979)); 822 see also 460 Cir.1979); v. (5th United States 1281 1520, F.2d 1020; Wainwright, 756 Haber v. Cir.1978). 945, (5th F.2d 949 565 Crumley, Cir.1985). (11th 1522 by guaranteed confrontation right of right of Therefore, includes the discretion of the Sixth Amendment while Alaska, 415 v. ruling Davis the admissi in cross-examination. court the district 1105, 1109, 39 great deal 94 S.Ct. entitled to bility of evidence court, has (1974). discretion by 347 Cross-examination this L.Ed.2d deference of purpose the district allowed for where traditionally been somewhat narrower to cross- discrediting right the witness. or limits defendant’s impeaching of court particular, against 1110. In him. See Unit 316, at 94 S.Ct. examine Id. at witnesses 1412, Beale, 1424 motivation 921 v. F.2d exposure of witness’ ed States Cir.1991) by (11th (“Subject Sixth labelled Su to testifying has been Amendment, court has the dis of the district important function as an preme Court limit authority to cross-examina right cretionary to cross-exami the Sixth Amendment de 1110-11; (emphasis added)). Unless 316-17, at 94 tion.” nation. Id. permitted sufficient 1016, been Calle, fendant has F.2d v. 822 1020 United States cross-examinatipn ade allow a Andrews, Cir.1987); v. (11th United States credibility, the the witness’ Cir.1985), quately assess 1491, cert. F.2d limitation cross-examina 815, court’s 1064, district denied, 106 S.Ct. 474 U.S. Id. in’ error. tion will be (1986); Jenkins Wain L.Ed.2d 789 Cir.1985), F.2d wright, 763 limited Lank- court here The district denied, the chief cross-examination ford’s 90 L.Ed.2d him, Le Jack. against government witness Le sought to elicit par- long recognized Croy. Lankford has “This court motive for possible aof searching Croy, cross-exam- as evidence importance of ticular prosecution, with LeCroy’s cooperation who have substantial of witnesses ination ar- sons had been the fact that proseeu- cooperate incentive former adopted precedent decisions City Circuit Bonner 6. The Eleventh prior (11th Cir.1981), Prichard, October Fifth Circuit rendered by rested state authorities for the sale of sons and to obtain ip federal assistance pounds twenty marijuana.7 avoiding The district a subsequent federal against addition, refused to allow them. In cross-examination a reasonable arrests, juror could concerning drug conclude concluding that LeCroy might even hoped prejudicial. addition, that it was too should things go “well” for government questioned district court the likelihood case, he could later solicit help from LeCroy had reason to fear a federal investi- government federal in his sons’ state case. gation of state charges against probative value such strong evi agree. sons. We cannot possible dence of motive outweighs Notwithstanding the fact that Le possible prejudice to LeCroy. While the Croy had govern made no deal with the jury may not have believed concerning ment a federal investigation by motivated fear of a subsequent arrest, into his marijuana sons’ his desire federal investigation affairs, of his sons’ cooperate may have in fact motivat the fact of the state arrest and fact investig ed prevent effort such an possible investigation federal were cru imagine We cannot a much ation.8 jury’s cial to the *5 assessment of LeCroy’s stronger motive for testifying on behalf of credibility.9 Accordingly, the exclusion of government than the protect desire to this evidence erroneously limited Lank- one’s children. A juror reasonable could ford’s right, guaranteed by the Sixth have that LeCroy’s concluded testimony Amendment, to cross-examine LeCroy for was the result of his protect desire to his possible motive or bias.1 7. The LeCroy evidence elicited from Although outside the 9. the defense did have opportunity presence jury LeCroy’s revealed two bring that to LeCroy out the given fact that been had possession sons had been arrested for tent to distribute 20 with in- immunity testify, use thereby to implicating Le- pounds marijuana. possible Croy’s seeking protect motivation in to Buffet, Papa’s Country arrests occurred Lankford, charges himself from connected to operated by LeCroy restaurant and his sons. inquiry grant into the immunity of use LeCroy’s The record reveals that sons had en- jury not have LeCroy’s allowed the to assess guilty pleas tered they charges to the state and that credibility to the same extent or in the same probation were on at the time of the Lank- manner as evidence the arrests of his sons. ford trial. all, LeCroy’s testimony After while could not be that, although We LeCroy’s note the arrests of him, against LeCroy used prose- could be still operated sons occurred at an by establishment cuted for the testifying. acts about which he was LeCroy, appears there linking to be no evidence Moreover, jury while a reasonable could have LeCroy by to the offenses committed his sons. LeCroy concluded that by was not motivated himself, any knowledge protect 8. It is "joint desire to common it task could simulta- that forces” exist govern- neously between state LeCroy testify- have concluded federal that they together, ments in cooperating ing fact, work protect out of a desire In sons. Furthermore, sharing information. LeCroy could have concluded that chose to instances, govern- some the state and federal undertake a risk order together ments decide charges in which or courts protect assist and his sons. brought. will be In cases where charges court, already brought have been in state addition, LeCroy’s In as further motive for charges it is not unusual for to be refiled cooperation government, Lankford in federal court after law enforcement officials sought LeCroy investiga- that establish feared have proceedings deemed results of the state tion into losses had claimed he on recent tax satisfactory. to be less probation than State agree returns. We with the district court’s ex- provide sentences examples excellent of those questioning. clusion of this line subsequent situations have led that federal LeCroy’s reporting The evidence of -tax is dis- proceedings against previ- defendants had that tinguishable concerning evidence ously LeCroy’s tried in state courts. It is drug LeCroy’s any arrest of possible sons subsequent because con- fear that federal action LeCroy might sons, investigation tention against feared a tax have is together been taken them, highly speculative. protect There simply with his no may desire to indica- LeCroy LeCroy any testify government. motivated tion that had reason to investi- fear gation by fact, Such a supported conclusion would be Revenue further Internal Service. In presence the fact cooperation with the outside estab- government appears begun LeCroy to have about the lished that had been audited in 1982 time when admittedly change worried with no to his made return. Without charges about they his sons and the facing. were support possi- foundation whatsoever to violating the tax See Expert jury.12

B. Witness law for the Here, id. at 611. S.Ct. the statute determining the dis whether under which Lankford was re convicted excluding testimony by trict court erred in quires part willfulness on the of the indi witness, only expert we will reverse files vidual who a false tax return.13 It of discretion. where there is a clear abuse then, jury, remained for the to determine Rodriguez, See F.2d at 1289 n. 6. We willfully report whether Lankford failed note, however, the element of that “where income the check he received.' $1500 defense, willfulness is critical latitude in the defendant is entitled to wide Any concerning the reasonable- tending to show introduction of evidence ness of Lankford’s belief that he $1500 Garber, lack of intent.” United States gift received was a rather than taxable banc). (5th Cir.1979) (en income is relevant to the determination of Here, determined that the the district court willfully whether violated the tax by the defense could not tax Offered Supreme recognized laws. Court has concerning the reasonableness testify “the more unreasonable the asserted check Lankford’s conclusion misunderstandings beliefs or a defen- [of gift was a rather than taxable received are, likely more will dant] agree. Again, income. we cannot nothing consider them to more than simple disagreement legal with known Supreme recently Court has imposed by duties the tax laws and will subjective “good-faith determined that find that the Government has carried its misunderstanding good- of the law or a Cheek, proving knowledge.” burden' of violating the faith that one is not belief highly pro- at 611-12. It is thus statutory negate can willfulness *6 law” for the defense to bative show that requirement of' criminal tax' offenses. — U.S. —, States, defendant’s belief —whether or not mistak- Cheek v. United reasonable; 609-11, (1991).11 604, en —was evidence of a belief’s L.Ed.2d 617 negate question finding of whether a defendant reasonableness tends to a Such a good support a.finding in' faith .that believed he was not willfulness that and by jury supported by ble conclusion that feared was the state arrest of IRS, investigation by the admission of such evi- drug charges. sons on That arrest awas matter prejudicial proba- be dence would more than record, it as a factual and served foundation tive. by possible for the conclusion that Le- require Sixth Amendment does not un "[T]he investigation Croy feared a federal of the state inquiry potential limited into the bias of a wit charges. DeParias, 1447, ness.” United States (11th Cir.1986) (citing Delaware v. Van We court did not note that district have 11. 673, 679, Arsdall, 1431, 1435, U.S. 106 S.Ct. Supreme Court’s discus- benefit recent States, (1986); L.Ed.2d Alford sion of this area of the law it tried the when 218, 220, 282 U.S. 51 S.Ct. 75 L.Ed. 624 case. (1931)), denied, 107 S.Ct. (1987). long 96 L.Ed.2d 678 As as suffi fact, involving 12. In in criminal tax cases will cient information is elicited from the witness fulness, "forbidding jury to consider evi adequately possi from which the can assess might negate dence would raise that willfulness bias, ble motive or the Sixth Amendment a serious under the Sixth Amendment’s Id.; Burke, satisfied. United States v. 738 F.2 d —States, provision.” Where, here, Cheek v. United (11th Cir.1984). —, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 testifying may exposed witness’ motive be through questioning, alternative lines of the dis inquiry prejudicial trict court's refusal to allow nothing grounded into motive that is more applicable 13. section that an indi- declares Here, speculation LeCroy's than is not in error. guilty felony vidual will be of a if he: protect motivation to himself had been suffi return, Willfully makes and subscribes ciently explored through inquiry into the use document, statement, or other which contains immunity government granted that the had Le- by or is verified declaration that it is written Croy testimony. in order to obtain his perjury, penalties made under the hand, permit- On the other the district court which he does be true not believe to inquiry ted no LeCroy may into the distinct motive that other every correct as to material matter.... testifying, have had for that of 7206(1) added). protecting Inquiry (emphasis this motive 26 U.S.C. § sons. into

J551 the defendant’s good belief was held in gift/income tax opinion of the de- faith. expert fense’s witness could have had a powerful impact on the issue of Lankford’s trial, At Lankford testified that he .sub- willfulness, the critical element in Lank- jectively believed check he $1500 ford’s defense to Count Lankford testi- gift received was a gifts need not fied that he believed the $1500 check awas reported as income. The defense also gift that taxable; was not expert’s tes- presented evidence revealing that Lankford timony revealed legitimate and well- facing personal was financial difficulties legal founded analysis would sup- office, while he was running for that mem- ported the reasonableness of that belief. bers of the community were aware of these By disallowing expert testimony on the difficulties, and that Lankford received gift/income issue, the trial deprived cash and the check campaign Lankford of evidence showing that his as- workers, together explanation with an serted state of mind was reasonable. Ac- the money being provided for his fami- cordingly, we hold that the exclusion of ly in recognition of the financial difficulties expert testimony on this was error. issue campaign- imposed had on him and Garber, See 607 F.2d at 99. his family. Expert testimony of the rea- sonableness of Lankford’s belief would be The trial court’s error was further highly relevant to the assessment of wheth- compounded, however, because govern thé er willfully violated the tax laws. ment permitted opin elicit Thus, the critical whether, issue here is ion from preparer, Lankford’s tax called as under facts such as presented those a witness government.15 ex That jury, it is reasonable political for a candi- pert testimony was used to establish that date to treat certain monies received dur- the reasonable and proper course of con ing a campaign as political contributions, duct “campaign where contributions” have treating while other gifts monies as donat- been used personal expenses would ed to him living assist expenses in- have report been to that amount as income. during curred the campaign. jurors issue, Most however, On this the defense was simply lack specialized knowl- permitted to offer its *7 edge, background, experience and needed expert, a public accountant, certified certi to assess the reasonableness gift/in- of the fied planner, financial and tax lawyer. interpretations come tax unique a- to candi- expert This opinion sought show, was date’s finances political during campaign, among things, other it would have particularly where the candidate must re- just been as reasonable to treat the $1500 sign existing position in order to run for gift.16 check as a government Because office.14 was allowed to expert offer on testimony 14.Although the argue defense does not that the facts must studied be to determine whether establishing gift/income law distinction is personally contribution was intended to assist legally vague, the categorization of items as ei- during the candidate the course of his campaign gifts ther rarely or income a simple matter. or to assist political campaign candidate’s fact, experts in field of taxation often political goals. differing, well-grounded hold positions with re- spect specific to whether items are be classi- Although 15. Lankford’s preparer tax was never gifts fied as either or income under tax laws. qualified expert, accounting an an held These sophisticated conflicts result from appli- degree and preparing had been tax returns cations myriad of the tax laws to a of scenarios Moreover, twenty over years. the trial court only that often differ as to the rendition or allowed him as if he interpretation underlying the facts the dis- qualified had been expert. as puted classification. politi- In the context aof campaign, cal complexity application in the of the law is "campaign sought tax seen 16. The expert when also contri- defense to have its bution” . directly testify, is not concerning received from the gifts donor distinction between expression made, no of donative taxable intent income under the Internal Revenue thereby requiring gift/income distinction to Code. it judge explain Because is for the , made without knowledge direct of the law jury, agree we district court’s is, donor’s actual intent. That the available refusal to testimony. such allow and 27. It is tion Counts implications of a “cam tax

the reasonable involved evidence other than true that there was contribution,” the defense was but paign Lank- testimony that showed that LeCroy’s of the de exclusion not, that the we hold $2,000 Vegas, in Las in re testimony, submitted ford had been wired expert fense’s disputed by of discre Lank- fact was never buttal, It is an abuse but that error. was argued simply admissible otherwise exclude the ford. tion “to expert LeCroy a critical an unsolicited party’s payment on was of a opinion back; LeCroy’s of his opinion paid issue, allowing the that was later while loan presented issue.” only same testimony on the adversary’s Sellers, genu- F.2d was not a payment that the v. to show of extortion. Sim- Cir.1977); United States ine loan but the result see also testimony appears Cir. to have Parshall, LeCroy’s 213-14 ilarly, Co., Sears, & evidence used to convict 1985); Roebuck the critical Breidor Cir.1983). (3d 20.17 1140-41 Lankford of Count testimony, Without Error Harmless C. against strength government’s case LeCroy 1. Cross-Examination of counts to which Lankford on the for this court to is insufficient the district testified Having found that court’s limitation that the district conclude limiting the cross-examina court erred beyond harmless determine on cross-examination was LeCroy, must next we tion Indeed, ruling upon beyond a a reasonable doubt. “harmless that error was whether ap pending and release a motion for bond v. Van Delaware reasonable doubt.” See recognized as much: peal, judge the trial Arsdall, making “LeCroy’s testimony is the heart of (1986). In 89 L.Ed.2d If defense were government’s case. determination, factors” are a “host of LeCroy successfully, the considered, impeach including importance “the able to be very could well have in this action testimony prosecu in the verdict of the witness’ (R1:59 4).18 cu differed.” whether tion’s mulative, presence or of evi absence Expert contradicting Witness corroborating or

dence testimony of the witness .material simply cannot con Similarly, we oth of cross-examination points, the extent district court’s exclusion of that the clude course, and, of the over permitted, erwise testimony was harm expert’s the defense prosecution’s case.” strength of the Id. all state that he Although Lankford did less. must, damaging Assuming, that the as we check did not need to be the believed *8 LeCroy’s cross-examination potential of did not allow the district court reported, realized, id., fully see we would have been ex jury to the to present evidence him to that the limitation simply cannot conclude have rea why that been plain belief cross-examination of Le- the defense’s however, government, was sonable. beyond Croy harmless a reasonable question to a pose hypothetical to allowed doubt. prop concerning preparer whether tax to of conduct have been course should LeCroy’s testimony on the counts in- er as income. Given appears report appeal $1500 in this to have volved by the the facts possible construction of government’s crucial to the case. It was inability to given the defense’s jury LeCroy’s testimony that contradicted Lank- the ex expert testimony to rebut present of the nature of the transac- ford’s account beyond the trial court's error was Although Henry wit- that a reasonable doubt. Wilson testified that he harmless receiving something green nessed Lankford hallway Fulton from in the of the old again was convicted note that Lankford 18. We Jail, relationship Le- County to- the Wilson’s twenty-seven includ only four counts on Croys strong loyalty them sense of to and his LeCroy’s question of ed in the indictment. credibility testimony us insufficient to convince makes his overemphasized. hardly be can pert opinion government, elicited jority we held that it did. In ruling in this manner, simply cannot conclude that the trial the majority seemingly ignores the court’s error harmless. mandates of weight to Delaware Arsdall, v. Van given expert testimony is within the 89 L.Ed.2d 674 province However, jury. of the fairness experts demands that if presented, are The Van Arsdall Court addressed two

jury must presentation receive a full (1) issues: whether the trial court’s limita- both sides of predict an issue. We cannot tion of the cross-examination state’s guess But, or what a will do. the witness violated Confrontation Clause excluded expert was ex (2) whether such a violation could be tremely relevant the reasonableness of found to be harmless error. The Court Lankford’s decision to treat the $1500 answered questions both in the affirmative. gift report and not it as income. Given the Addressing issue, the first the Court rec- importance critical of the reasonableness ognized that the Confrontation Clause does willfulness, issue in the determination of prevent we find that the trial error court’s could judge trial imposing from any limits on impact have had a substantial on the out defense inquiry counsel’s poten- into come of the If the trial. had been tial bias of a witness. On permitted to consider excluded testimo contrary, judges retain wide lati- ny, jury’s may verdict well have been tude insofar as the Confrontation Clause different. is concerned impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on con- IV. Conclusion about, cerns among things, other harass- above, For the reasons set forth we RE- ment, prejudice, issues, confusion of the VERSE the district court’s exclusion of safety, witness’ interrogation or concerning drug cross-examination repetitive ar- only or marginally relevant. rest of addition, Jack sons. In we Id. 106 S.Ct. at 1435. The Court REVERSE the exclusion of testimo- goes on to emphasize that the defense is ny assessing the reasonableness Richard not entitled to cross-examination “that is Lankford’s conclusion that a check effective way, whatever and to whatever gift was a income, rather than taxable and extent, the might defense wish.” Id. The REMAND for a new trial.19 Court concluded for the defendant to prove violation the trial must HOFFMAN, Judge, Senior District prevented the defendant “from engaging in dissenting: appropriate otherwise cross-examination designed, to believe, prototypical show a firmly Because I form of on both issues part witness, on the addresses, of the majority thereby bias the district expose the facts and, court was correct in rulings its even if jurors ... incorrect, appropriately could draw refer did not abuse its discretion or ences relating the reliability error, wit commit I compelled reversible feel ness.” Id. at (quot S.Ct. at 1436 majority dissent. The first examines ing Alaska, Davis v. *9 415 U.S. 94 whether the court district committed error (1974)).20 39 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 347 by prohibiting the defendant from cross- examining LeCroy about the arrest of his Finding that the trial court committed a marijuana two sons charges. on error, The ma- constitutional the Court then turned issues, appellant 19. raises agree two additional I with Justice White’s in concurrence 20. alleging against prospective discrimination the argued Van Arsdall case where he that the jurors Kentucky, black in violation of v. Batson curtailment or limitation of the cross-examina- 79, 1712, 476 U.S. 106 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 69 90 tion of a witness should not be a of the violation (1986), asserting error in the district court’s Confrontation Clause when the "has no action questions answers to significance in the course of delib- in whatsoever terms the outcome remanding Arsdall, 685-86, erations. we are Because for a new of the trial.” Van 475 U.S. at trial, we need not reach these issues. 106 S.Ct. at 1438. Vegas Las two returned from In its when he harmless. error was the whether hand, LeCroy, “the on the other weeks later. emphasized discussion, the Court any reference to defendant criminal denies that there was ever the entitles Constitution 681, one,” at id. and further trial, perfect “temporary loan” a “loan” or a fair harmless 1436, and that repaid at or tendered denies that Lankford 106 S.Ct. process criminal $2,000. focuses Obviously, ei- any portion error doctrine of the trial fairness “underlying telling on the LeCroy is not ther Lankford or ,the pres virtually inevitable on rather than LeCroy’s accepted state- truth. The Id.; see also error.” ence of immaterial explanation. rejected ment and Lankford’s — U.S. —, Fulminante, v. Arizona count, 20, second extortion Count 1264, 113 L.Ed.2d receiving charged Lankford with out remanding the case then The Court hallway of the old LeCroy in the cash determining factors to consider lined the LeCroy testified to the County Jail. Fulton doubt Chapman reasonable whether testimony of this event and occurrence met, had been test21 eyewitness ac- was corroborated of the witness’ includ[ing] importance Henry LeCroy’s employees, one of count of prosecution’s testimony in the receiving the denied Wilson. cumulative, testimony was whether to convict. Again, chose money. cor- of evidence presence or absence contradicting testimony roborating or chosen to reverse majority has points, on material of the witness refus- of that court’s district court because otherwise cross-examination extent of LeCroy cross-examination of al to allow the course, and, the overall permitted, Le- his two sons. the arrests of about (cid:127) case. strength prosecution’s by the sons had been arrested Croy’s two at Arsdall, possession of County police Van Dekalb by the propounded first These ideas 1438. intent to pounds marijuana twenty the case should control Arsdall Van pro: the sons were on Court Both of distribute. us. before By time of Lankford’s trial. at the bation court, majority reversing the LeCroy I. Cross-Examination of sons us the sins of two would have visit Richard Lankford juryA convicted who, prior credibility of the father upon the two counts of of extortion and two counts grand jury testifying before charged Lank- tax fraud. Count income immunity granted use petit jury, had been $2,000 wire the extortion of ford with Lankford. connected with anything as to LeCroy while Lankford transfer from agree I cannot respect, due With all charged Vegas. Count 27 trip to Las on admitted. should be this evidence report the failure to Lankford with to exclude court’s decision The district tax return.22 his 1987federal transaction on may only testimony be disturbed disputes LeCroy nor Neither Lankford appears a clear abuse appeal there where Vegas. $2,000 to Las Further- was wired Rodriguez, v. States of discretion. United Anderson, bookkeep- more, Doris Cir.1990). A n. 6 Gearon, er, employee LeCroy, David cross-examination may restrict receipts confirm the all Western Union infor receive sufficient long jurors as the only fact is in Essentially, one transaction. credibility of the witness. $2,000 assess the mation to insists that the dispute; Lankford Leavitt, by LeCroy, Un made ited “temporary loan” denied, Cir.), LeCroy repaid in cash to allegedly charge, in no tax fraud Supreme 22. the other Chapman Court Count California prosecu- and will way error is harmless if stated that an involves the *10 "prove beyond doubt that a reasonable tion can be addressed later. complained of did not error the constitutional Chapman obtained.” contribute to the verdict 824, 828, California, U.S. 87 S.Ct. v. 386 (1967). L.Ed.2d 705 17

1555 968, 415, U.S. 110 S.Ct. 107 L.Ed.2d 380 state authorities is simply unbelievable in a (1989). Furthermore, crux the the of test case this of nature. opposed As to this Arsdall, Delaware v. Van su set in out speculation, the record indicates that the pra, is that there is no violation of the major motivating force, other than to tell Sixth Amendment unless “the excluded tes truth, the behind LeCroy’s testimony was timony jury’s would have affected the im grant the of use immunity, prior to testify- pression of the Leav credibility.” witness’ ing before grand the jury petit jury, as itt, Arsdall, Van 878 F.2d at (citing 1339 to anything connected with Lankford.24 681, 106 475 1436). U.S. Finally, S.Ct. at This result becomes even more compel the Van Arsdall Court clearly stated that ling in light of the abuse of discretion the district court has wide latitude to limit standard. The majority fails to cite a sin cross-examination repetitive “that is or gle case attributing bias to a witness from Arsdall, only marginally relevant.” Van an association with someone in no way 679, 475 U.S. at 106 S.Ct. at 1435. connected to subject of parties or the The defense in present this failed to case in a involved case. Conversely, Eighth one of LeCroy scintilla evidence that testi- Circuit has held that a district court did not hope fied of benefitting his somehow abuse its discretion in preventing cross- sons. proffer Neither by offered examination on whether a witness’ father (R12:44-47) defense nor the actual cross- was a federal parolee. See United States LeCroy (R8:180-81) examination of even Witschner, 840, 624 F.2d Cir.), hints LeCroy aided his sons testify- denied, cert. 994, 532, ing.23 complete This lack of evidence (1980).25 L.Ed.2d 291 makes it impossible to believé expected Moreover, to aid or reading did from aid sons. Of the .majority opinion, additional is concern one Dekalb would think Coun- the trial court ty police, County personnel arbitrarily Fulton decided to limit the cross-exami- involved in this made the nation of LeCroy. arrests. The record indicates The attempts majority’s raise specter just to opposite. The trial judge allowed “joint of task forces” between federal and an expansive cross-examination, limiting it 23. The revealing defense did succeed in nity possible from to access the motive or LeCroy’s probation. sons were on The bias of witness? following question and is in answer the record: majority LeCroy’s finds that motive to you Q. particular Did have a why you reason protect himself is different than the motive government wanted the not to look into protect majority his sons. The concludes that your affairs? testimony focusing LeCroy’s use immuni- Well, A. [LECROY] I knew I had pay- ty satisfy was sufficient to the Sixth Amendment ing money Mr. for one himself, protect as to motive to but not as to thing, to, you that’s alluding if what are protect motive his sons. The case law is you I think alluding what my boys are to is clear, however, that "a court can restrict probation. has been on [sic] Is that what scope long of ... cross examination as as the you alluding are to? jurors receive sufficient information to assess R8:180-81. credibility of the witness.” United States v. Parias, 1447, De Cir.1986) F.2d supra, In note majority distinguishes Burke, (citing United States questioning exclusion the line aon (11th Cir.1984)). possible investigation immunity IRS use from testi- that on the mar- ijuana "where, mony writes, provided ample majority convictions. evidence here, general a witness' which it evaluated the testifying credibility motive for may exposed through LeCroy. be Consequently, any inquiry alternative lines into the questioning, the district court’s refusal unrelated arrest and allow prejudicial inquiry grounded irrelevant, into speculative, motive is sons prejudicial. nothing speculation more than is not in er- Eighth argument although ror.” easily finding This 25.The Circuit can the limi turned support argument ask, tation of the of this dissent. For I cross-examination "troublesome" very apparently what marijuana compelled uphold evidence felt attenuated the district “prejudicial convictions than other because of the abuse of discretion stan inquiry into motive grounded nothing that is Witschner, dard. See United States v. speculation,” more than (8th Cir.), denied, where the has suf- 844-45 ficient grant in the form of a immu- 66 L.Ed.2d 291

1556 is that an error Supreme stated Court proposed hearing the only after “prove can be if the harmless jury. the This of presence outside the constitu doubt that yond a reasonable held repeatedly

court has did not contrib complained of tional error may limit cross-exami- judge that a 24, 87 Id. at the verdict obtained.” ute to infringing the defendant’s nation without Supreme Court has made at 828. “(1) S.Ct. rights where amendment sixth Clause violations Confrontation clear that per- the cross-examination jury,-through harmless error. See Ari subject to are facts sufficient mitted, exposed to — -, Fulminante, U.S. zona v. 111 relating to the inferences draw for it to 1263, (1991). 1246, 302 113 L.Ed.2d (2) witness; S.Ct. reliability of Lay, v. in United States The Fifth Circuit by defense conducted cross examination (5th A, May 1087, Unit Cir. F.2d 1091 make a record 644 him to enabled counsel 869, denied, 1981), 102 argue why the wit- cert. he could from (1981), 336, 172 stated 70 L.Ed.2d might have biased.” ness erroneously judge exclud the trial “where 1016, Calle, 1020 F.2d v. 822 States first evidence, must deter ed [the court] Cir.1987) v. (quoting United States (11th have been mine what the evidence .would Cir.1979)); (5th 450, Summers, 461 the trier determine whether and then Burke, 738 v. F.2d States also United see guilty the defendant have-found fact would Cir.1984) (11th (finding no 1225, 1227-28 doubt with addi beyond a reasonable where Amendment violation Sixth Later cases inserted.” tional evidence credibility and as gauge adequately could asserting factors have clarified that from the testi motive or bias possible sess prosecution’s “the error are harmless witness); mony solicited cumulative, testimony was -the whether the 1549, Haimowitz, 1559 F.2d 706 v. of evidence corroborat presence or absence no Cir.1983) (holding there was contradicting testimony of the ing or counsel defense where abuse discretion points, the extent of on material witness expose facts from which opportunity had permitted, otherwise cross-examination regarding draw fair inferences jury could course, strength of and, overall denied, witness), credibility of United States prosecution’s case.” 974, 79 L.Ed.2d 104 S.Ct. Cir.1990) LeCroy Lang, 904 testimony of lengthy Arsdall, U.S. at (quoting Van and cross-examination about direct both 1438). cooperation immunity and his S.Ct. at grant of certainly allowed the government with the from the be discerned The most can part argue bias on defendant LeCroy’s sons were arrested record is that and, likewise, was sufficient twenty pounds of mari possession of credibility. Accord weigh LeCroy’s jury to points Two juana intent to distribute. by this Circuit out ingly, both test set disagree with vehemently me to convince in Delaware the earlier test enunciated majority’s holding that the exclusion Arsdall, supra, are satisfied. v. Van error. not harmless this evidence was court committed Finally, if the trial even out, First, pointed previously an abuse of constituted an error which testifying LeCroy was was well aware that discretion, not rise to the such error does immunity. If grant of use under a inappropriate It is of reversible error. level raising the convictions is purpose of sons’ court conviction on reverse a lower bias, you can create how to establish affect do not account of errors which juror’s mind of bias more asserting rights the party substantial testifying showing by than 2111; Fed. error. U.S.C. § very avoiding prosecution for witness 52(a). R.Crim.P. the defendant with which crimes 26 Thus, admitting this charged? California, 386 U.S. Chapman in nature. (1967), clearly be cumulative L.Ed.2d Oliver L. North demon- John M. Poindexter and high-profile criminal trials of 26. The recent *12 Second, Lankford went to charged trial 1984 income tax return. The defense of- with 26 counts. The to chose convict fered Tokars’ testimony support to Lank- only four counts related to two transac- argument ford’s that he believed the $1500 tions. of Both these transactions were cor- gift was a to him and his family. As with roborated other indepen- witnesses or the limitation of the cross-examination of dent evidence. This indicates that when I LeCroy, again agree cannot that the trial convicting of came down to an court committed error in excluding the evi- issue of whether' Lankford or LeCroy was dence. Furthermore, I emphatically con- telling the truth the to convict. refused tend that all of possible errors of the Consequently, already because the jury re- judge should be considered harmless LeCroy fused to believe it simply when was error. against Lankford’s, his word any additional trial, At presented defense lengthy going to the bias of would proffer of Tokars’ testimony. The ques- have no effect. tions in appear issue to be the following: A inevitably defendant will be able to Q. Assuming that those facts are raise errors on appeal any criminal you do opinion have an true,27 as to especially one of length magni- whether or not that check gift was a tude. justice system The criminal cannot and therefore not includable in income bogged become in alleged down errors that and not subject taxation, to or whether absolutely no affect jury’s on the or not it a campaign contribution perception of a witness or on the outcome that was converted to Richard Lank- Therefore, the trial. I argue that the personal ford’s use and thus income trial court was ruling, correct its did not subject to taxation? discretion, and, abuse its did, even if it A. My opinion would [TOKARS] be that error was harmless. that would gift subject to taxation.

II. Cross-Examination Expert Witness [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*] Q. And second issue the majority what’s the opin- basis of that addresses

is whether the ion? trial court in limiting erred testimony defendant’s wit- Well, A. it appears that none of the ness, Fred Tokars. The portion excluded parties expressed intent, their so what Tokars’ only relevant to I would do is fall trying back on Count 24 charged the defendant with look at their conduct and trying to the failure report check infer intent. It appear doesn’t Liquor East Side Store as income on his though Sheriff Lankford himself solic- difficulty strate 5) prosecuting a witness for Lankford a campaign manager has crimes which are testimony given related to keep treasurer to campaign track of contri- grant under immunity. of use See butions. North, 6) States v. modified, All campaign F.2d checks to are made out to (D.C.Cir.1990); Poindexter, the Sheriff Campaign United States v. Lankford deposit- separate (D.C.Cir.1991); ed in a campaign Kastigar only bank used see account also States, expenses. 7) Liquor pleased stores are L.Ed.2d Lankford’s campaign. 8) Liquor gave Eastside Store a check to Mrs. hypothetical Tokars, In its the defense payable Lankford that was made to Mrs. requested following: that he assume the Lankford. 1) supports a wife and two'chil- 9) deposited Mrs. Lankford the check into the' dren. family’s joint personal checking account 2) running Lankford is plat- for sheriff on a and used it car insurance and other expanding form of the role sheriff. items. 3) public knowledge It is gave that Lankford R12:167-69. attempting hypo- Before ask the up job to run for sheriff. jury present, thetical with the the defense mod- 4) during Lankford has little income assumption cam- ified comport # 8 with Lankford’s paign support family. testimony. Liquor who employee at Eastside wrote contribution. campaign ited a *13 Lankford, himself, check, that testified ato out obviously written check was the told her to make the store and came to individual, being Mrs. that personal in his wife’s name. Presented check out could you Lankford, I think so and testimony of Lankford Sandra that it with the intent was payor’s the infer that juries decide what Hudson, jury had to gift. abe decided, telling traditionally have who a time at occurred this Also because testimo- and Hudson’s Lankford the truth. community in the people when most exclusive; not both could mutually ny was have a did sheriff knew that Unfortunately for telling the truth. be course, gave up his he, of

job and that him. against Lankford, decided of run sheriff deputy as a job probably that he knew fice, they well that a correctly asserts majority The you Then live on. money to admitting or needed in discretion broad judge has of the the actions a look at testimony take and could excluding expert check, and recipient of manifestly or the payee upheld unless is action of the recipient Sans, it’s no doubt erroneous. Lank gift. Mrs. it as a Cir.1984), check treated de person in her check deposited ford nied, mon and used checking account deciding al whether to L.Ed.2d car buy insurance ey for—to testimony, the fundamental expert admit I, from And so car. and to use such whether court is the trial test for intent, you their parties, looking trier of “assist the fact.”28 evidence gift. it’s a to infer standard, advisory com this Explaining Rule of Evidence note Federal mittee’s Rl2:169-70. 702 states: testimony as discusses majority test for deter- certain is no more There thorny some deciphering expert was if the than may be experts used mining when laymen tax code—one in the issue inquiry whether the common sense just the I believe not understand. could qualified to laymen would be untrained testifying is expert Here opposite. intelligently to the best determine defendant’s processes mental particular issue with- degree the possible ascer- attempting to is expert mind. having a from those enlightenment out thinking at a individual what an tain subject understanding specialized no scien- time, something for which given opinions dispute. When in the involved This ever been devised. has method tific un- excluded, they are it is because are issue. complex tax involve a does not count and a helpful superfluous and therefore involves most this count com- Instead time. waste telling the truth. all, iswho issue mon earlier, omitted). argued As (citations present- The defense issue of the basic wheth- presents Count 24 completely different two ed the Wesley and Sandra or Merritt er involving the transaction of the versions their telling truth. Since Hudson are that his Lankford testified check. weighed experts, have juries, not inception, him the check gave campaign staff Now not credibility of witnesses. campaign head- day at one some cash process. to muddle the time Sutton, a Reverend (R9:29-30). quarters. part on the recent time, majority relies testified at that staff member decision Supreme Court picked United States previously had worker that another — U.S. —, States, Liquor Store. Cheek v. from Eastside up the check (1991), find L.Ed.2d 617 Hudson, hand, the S.Ct. Sandra other On the issue, expert by qualified as an a witness 702: Fed.R.Evid. 28. See skill, training, experience, edu- knowledge, or technical, scientific, specialized or other If knowledge cation, testify may in the form of an thereto to un- of fact the trier will assist opinion otherwise. or a fact determine or to derstand the testimony that Tokars’ is admissible. The analysis of events by does noth- considered Cheek Court the issue of ing wheth to aid the jury in determining the rea- er a trial committed error in instruct sonableness of Lankford’s beliefs when he ing ignore the defendant’s was deciding testi whether the $1500 check was mony explaining why he believed he did not income or gift. Additionally, nothing in pay have to taxes. The supports Court found Cheek the broad notion that ex- prove pert code, violation of willful the tax should be sup- admitted to *14 prove port Government must “that the law reasonableness of the defendant’s imposed duty defendant, a on the belief that the that he is not violating the law. Con- defendant knew of this duty, sequently, and that the the majority’s reliance on the voluntarily defendant and intentionally Cheek decision vio is misfounded. lated duty.” Id. S.Ct. at 610. In Furthermore, the trial court properly ex- discussing prong, the second the defen cluded expert testimony because admit- dant’s knowledge, the Court held a ting it would' have violated Fed.R.Evid. defendant’s claim of ignorance of the law 704(b),29 prohibits expert testimony or of a misunderstanding of the law result on whether a defendant had the mental ing good-faith in a belief that he was not state constituting an element of the crime. violating negates the law knowledge Willfulness is the mental required state for

prong of proving willfulness whether or the crime with which the defendant was not the claimed belief or misunderstanding convicted. 7206(1). See I.R.C. § is objectively reasonable. Id. at 610-11. Cheek Court defined willfulness to mean “a The Court then concluded the discussion voluntary, intentional violation of a known with the language the majority cites to legal duty.” Cheek, 111 S.Ct. at 610 support its conclusion of admissibility, writ In previous case, a the Court formu- “ha[d] ing “the more unreasonable the asserted lated requirement of as willfulness bad are, beliefs or misunderstandings the more faith intent, or evil ... or knowledge that likely will consider them to be taxpayer should reported more nothing more than simple disagreement income than he did.” United States v. with legal known duties.” Id. at 611-12. Bishop, From this majority concludes that To- 2017, (1973)(citations L.Ed.2d omit- kars’ should be admitted as pro ted). bative of the reasonableness Lankford’s Admittedly, the courts have had trouble actions. I disagree with conclusion. determining in tax at point cases what an . for decide expert .704(b). violates Rule example, For determining willfulness is whether the de- in United States v. Windfelder, the Sev- fendant subjectively was aware of legal enth Circuit held agent’s that an IRS testi- duty issue, here, duty to declare the mony that the “intentionally defendant un- as key income. The then is what did derstated his income” and was “well aware honestly defendant believe at the time of happened” what to Windfelder’s assets of the transaction. Consequently, evidence was 704(b) inadmissible under Rule because of reasonableness must have some connec- it impermissibly opinion stated an tion with the actions the accused. Con- knowledge or defendant’s willfulness. versely, Tokars wished to examine the United v. Windfelder, States transaction its after occurrence and to give (7th Cir.1986). The Fifth Circuit in opinion his that the transaction constituted- Dotson, conversely, States v. found gift. no, Nothing in the record indicates error where an agent, while document- Lankford knowledge had of the expla- ing consecutive increases in a defendant’s nations offers. post Tokars worth, Such net testified “[tjhis is indica- facto 704(b): 29. Fed.R.Evid. did have the -state mental or condition expert testifying No respect constituting witness an charged element crime the mental state or condition of a defendant or a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues may in a criminal case opinion an state or are matters for the of fact trier alone. inference toas whether the defendant did or personal his money use. to could use. experience shows my tive, and based to decide— intentionally in- the issue for This was willfully and me, he transaction was cor knowing full well that version of whose income creased due thereon.” of factual issues the taxes rect. The resolution reported had not Dotson, jury. Tokars’ always matter tes part opinion on other 1132-33, nothing more than timony vacated Cir.1987). willfully F.2d 1034 violated grounds, on whether that this borderline 704(b) laws, accordingly, pro commented Rule tax expert mere- statement, found that but testimony. hibits his indi- of the facts analysis “explained ly to the enactment Fed.R.Evid. Prior not, evasion, ... di- and did cating willful the use 704(b), discussed the Fifth Circuit question....” ultimate rectly embrace expert testimony to contest willfulness Circuit the Ninth a third yet Id. Garber, case of United States exclusion trial court’s upheld a *15 Cir.1979).31 (5th The case F.2d 92 Garber wanted who testimony from an accountant selling her was a defendant who involved charged with testify that a defendant to very high prices. Garber was one at blood owed income tax returns to file the failure people in the only or known two three alleged period. United taxes for no antibody in her blood. a certain world with (9th 492, Brodie, 495 F.2d 858 v. States to allow an The trial court refused testimo- Cir.1988). that this The court held recognized theory of tax testify that a to opinion state an impermissibly ny would supported the defendant’s belief law and, accord- willfulness to the taxpayers’ was not income from the sale blood conclusion the ultimate ingly, address Appeals reversed The taxable. Court very had “the was im- powerful of “its and held that because the evidence.” the law and to answer willfulness,” pact the issue Garber’s on at 495-96.30 Id. conflicting there were the evidence testimony Tokars’ of Mr. purpose liability tax theories of should that, as the defendant if the facts were In jury. at 99. go to Id. allowed gift. check was argues, then case, Lankford’s contrast to the Garber way of simply another conclusion This argue that based on defense does not did not have re stating that Lankford or same event transaction only point If To state. mental quired an- and the defense reaches one conclusion transac that this to make was kars wished uses one version other. Instead Tokars only needed to gift then was a tion controversy argue are in facts that Commis the donor’s intent. See discuss he assumes then this if the facts are as Duberstein, 80 363 U.S. v. sioner gift. is a transaction (1960) 1196, 1190, 4 L.Ed.2d 1218 Furthermore, opinion has the Garber donor’s transferor’s or (holding that allowing uncertainty in been criticized as of whether a sole determinant is the intent even when negate willfulness law to em gift). Instead Tokars is a transaction of the uncer- the defendant was unaware recipients of the that the intent phasized Harris, tainty. v. 942 United States See that it was gift that this was Cir.1991) 1125, (7th (arguing that F.2d 1132 such. to believe for Lankford reasonable “on ambiguity of case law testimony on the evidence, however, interpret could be rely in fact which defendant did showing personally that Lankford ed as determining willful- irrelevant because liquor and had the check store [in went subjective belief is only so that he in his wife’s name defendant’s made out ness] Brodie, v. 858 in their United States in the district belief....” court 30. The circuit concurred 492, (9th Cir.1988). F.2d 495 explanation of the ac- effect court’s use have been "[t]o countant's prior rendered Circuit 31. Decisions Fifth posi- [testimony] extrapolate to another 1, binding Eleventh to October 1981 are is, tion, they [taxpayers] believed and that Prichard, City Bonner v. F.2d Circuit. See right they pay were taxes and that didn’t have 1206, (11th 1981). Cir. issue); Curtis, United States v. 782 asked Lankford’s tax preparer the tax con (6th Cir.1986) (arguing that sequences of a hypothetical transaction, “unless there is a connection between the the defense should be able pose its nine- external [ambiguity facts of the tax part hypothetical law] Neverthe Tokars.32 and the mind, defendant’s state of less, the evi the case majority law the cites does dence of the external relevant”); fact is not not support this conclusion. Two of the Mallas, United States v. 762 F.2d 364 three cited, cases States Sellers, (4th n. 4 Cir.1985) (holding that the uncer 566 F.2d 884 Cir.1977) and Breidor v. tainty of the tax law is for the court to Sears Co., Roebuck & (3d F.2d 1134 law); decide anas issue of Cir.1983), concern situations where the trial Ingredient Corp., Tech. (2d court excluded expert’s testimony on Cir.1983) (agreeing with the dissent of Federal Rule of Evidence grounds. Judge Garber), Ainsworth in denied, case, this court, the trial discretion, its 77 L.Ed.2d concluded that the testimony would not aid Lankford has presented no the jury. The third United States v. attempted that he to discern the Parshall, 757 F.2d 211 Cir.1985),relies taxability check, of the $1500 but was con on the Garber decision which I have al fused by the tax law. ready criticized.33 Interestingly, as I argue dissent, Parshall Fifth and Eleventh conclud Circuits them ed that even though the trial judge selves have erred narrowed Garber without ex *16 excluding expert the pressly testimony, overruling it. such exclu See United States v. sion Heller, was harmless error. 866 F.2d Id. at 214. Cir.1989) In addition to the (arguing that case law not apply to supporting Garber the the uncer majority’s conclusion, tainty the I of tax law must believe the approach legal two hypotheticals vagueness), pose denied, different situations. The (1989); question 107 L.Ed.2d 38 Government’s highly proba is Burton, tive because it was asked of person the Cir.1984) who was (holding preparing “apart that from Lankford’s tax those returns during few period where the legal cases the in duty pointed issue. If to Lankford is so sought advice, uncertain had approach as to the level this is of what vagueness, the have legal hand, abstract of told. On the other Tokars uncertainty of had nothing which a to defendant un do with Lankford or the marginal aware is of relevance”). preparation There of his returns. analysis His no simply evidence that the law a applied retrospective in this look at the events. case is uncertain to the being extent of of Because the lack of supporting case law vague. Because of the distinction and the between fundamental differences in the Garber and this suspect questions, case the I reject na must the majority’s “ex ture of decision, the Garber pert its an expert” mandates for theory in this context. are binding precedent. not For reasons, the above majority In relying addition to on the Cheek and should have concluded that it was proper opinions, Garber majority, as an alter- for the trial to limit court Tokars’ testimo- native reason for admitting opin- Tokars’ ny. Furthermore, because of the lengthy ion, finds that because government proffer taken by court, the trial ques- 32. On redirect following examination the ex- A. Yes. change between the and Lankford’s Q. And what would the effect have been? preparer tax occurred: A. It should have been recorded as income. Powell, client, Q. Mr. this taxpayer, if Lankford, provided Richard you had infor- The Ninth Circuit has that noted “Parshall mation that "I campaign received some con- persuasive carries little because it value relies ' year tributions last deposited and I those on [Garber repudiated by ] which has been oth my personal into spent account and them er Brodie, courts.” States v. personal had,” costs that I would that (9th Cir.1988). n. have had an prepared effect on a return particular year? that him give Lankford to Sandra Hudson told assist testimony would of whether

tion testified Hudson Sandra ambiguity $1500. of check for fact, and the of trier and told the store Cases, to it came Lankford 704(b) in tax that Rule of application did wife. She trial his the check imagine how her to write my mind strains him check. gave its discretion. this and abused could open tobewill decision today’s effect defense, that Lankford testified In his involving a disease in cases door his entered workers campaign couple of testimony as to what tomind headquarters campaign his office at in point certain thinking aat person around with him the check handed answer cannot analysis Scientific time. for his fami- this was cash, telling him that weighing all after question. wife used his then testified ly. He a defen- determine must insurance, bills, car some money pay by its verdict state. mental dant’s then The defense car loan. his willfully evaded Lankford found who Gregory Sutton a Reverend presented in this agree that cannot I tax. income working Lankford’s he was testified discre- abused judge instance the check when headquarters campaign tion. Ross Sergeant He testified came in. Mr. Le- the limitation Again, as to have in and claimed brought the check ardently cross-examination, believe I Croy’s Fi- Store. Liquor East Side gotten it testimony was Tokars’ exclusion Tokars, who, called Mr. nally, defense Chap contrast error. harmless complicated lengthy and in addition rea beyond a concluding standard man whether, general, concerning error the constitutional doubt sonable attempt- money, taking had been not contribute did complained long hypothetical34 testify after ed error obtained, a nonconstitutional verdict de- by the presented facts based on error if the harmless considered may be I gift. awas this transaction fense that *17 verdict, substantially influence "did context in the above whether must decide sup evidence sufficient there was and substantially opinion of that exclusion error.” from the apart verdict port the trial. of the outcome influenced 1016, 1021 Calle, F.2d States I not believe argued, v. Wain do Palmes Cir.1987) (quoting previously As complex Cir. for count called resolving this wright, Montal versions the tax law. 1984)); analysis of legal also see 711, 110 much that vo-Murillo, U.S. differ so this transaction of (1990) (stating that to be- L.Ed.2d which witnesses to decide jury had un harmless will be weighing error the credibil- nonconstitutional after lieve. as the record from concludes that Lank- concluded ity less of the witnesses had a may have campaign the error contri- willfully a whole that taken had ford of outcome on the influence” To use. personal “substantial used it for bution and Accordingly, the proceeding). reject the verdict, had reach this testify Tokars from preventing for To- is whether made that were assumptions basic be substantially influenced Lankford Moreover, ing miss- opinion. give kars ing convicted. assumptions the list ing from for of Merritt solicitation of the mention trial, brief, earlier discussed As discrep- Faced with the contribution. presented the'opin- the foundation ancies between in the was solicited that he Wesley Merritt and what by Tokars35 given ion contri- campaign County Jail for Fulton Lankford, exclu- convicting believed the East he called He testified bution. on the effect opinion had no owned, Tokars’ sion of and Store, Liquor Side Lankfords, deputies. Notice- a few sheriff supra 27. note See 34. Merritt, Wesley missing list are ably this prepare for his that to indicates The record 35. Hudson, LeCroy. Jack Sandra minister, the testimony, Tokars interviewed

J563 trial. I believe so incon- City for the Cochran; White; Freddie sequential its exclusion would have Wayne Rogers; Wayne Tripp; Sonja Chapman met the Curtis, test, reasonable doubt Larry Williams, and J. Individu ally much less lower standard of substan- and in their capacities official tially Members influenced trial. The fact Bleckley is that County Board Education, Tokars was testify allowed to Defendants-Appellees. forty pages record, judge that the listened No. 91-8306. eighty-seven pages of the prof- defense’s United States of Appeals, Court fer, and in the end excluded only a- small Eleventh Circuit. portion the testimony. opposed As reversing judge, praised he should be March for his valiant effort to consider all sides of ruling. Therefore, issue before I have found no discretion, abuse of error,

even if there was that it would have

met the harmless error standard. HALL, Sr.; Walker;

Rev. E.K. David Donalson; Harris; Ates; Richard Willie *18 Roberson;

Rev. Wilson C. and NAACP

Chapter Cochran, Bleckley County,

Plaintiffs-Appellants, HOLDER,

Jackie Individually capacity

official County as Commis

sioner Bleckley County, Georgia; Johnson, Individually

Robert and in his capacity

official Superintendent as Bleckley County;

Elections for Charles Killebrew, Individually and in his offi capacity Mayor cial City as

Cochran; Barlow; Lonnie Jessup; Ben Crooms; Basby;

C.C. Billy Willie Ray

Godfrey, Greer, and T.C. Individually

and in capacities their official as Alder City Cochran;

men of the William J.

Lucas, Individually and in his official

capacity Superintendent of Elections

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Richard B. Lankford
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Date Published: Mar 25, 1992
Citation: 955 F.2d 1545
Docket Number: 90-8583
Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.
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