Lead Opinion
Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge TATEL.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
At resentencing following remand required by Bailey v. United States,
I
A jury convicted appellant Robert Rhodes of two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994), and one count of using or carrying a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994). The district court sentenced Rhodes to concurrent 121-month terms of imprisonment for his drug possession convictions. For the firearm conviction, the district court sentenced him to a consecutive sixty-month term. Because of the section 924(c) conviction, the district court declined to apply section 2Dl.l(b)(l)’s two-level enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“U.S.S.G.”) § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1997). See id. § 2K2.4 backg’d (section 924(c) conviction precludes the application of “any specific offense characteristic for ... firearm ... use ... or possession”).
After this court affirmed Rhodes’ conviction, United States v. Rhodes (“Rhodes I”),
At resenteneing, Rhodes sought downward departure, arguing that during his six and a half years in prison, he had taken “every opportunity” to improve his circumstances, entering drug rehabilitation, taking vocational and college-level courses, consistently getting above-average or far-above-average work reports, and repaying his assessment early. Finding no authority to depart based on post-conviction rehabilitation, the district court rejected Rhodes’ request.
Again appealing, Rhodes now contends that the district court misperceived its departure authority. Although we review district court departure decisions for abuse of discretion, Koon v. United States,
II
We begin with the government’s contention that Rhodes II limited the district court to applying section 2Dl.l(b)(l)’s weapon-possession enhancement, thus precluding Rhodes from seeking departure. Had Rhodes II remanded “solely to apply” or even “to apply” section 2D1.1(b)(1), we would agree. But Rhodes II contains no such prescriptive language. It merely remanded for “possible resentencing taking into account the provisions of § 2D1.1(b)(1).” Rhodes II,
The government argues that our rejection of de novo resentencing in United States v. Whren,
Ill
Recognizing a sentencing court’s “obligation to consider all the relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in an appropriate case,” S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 52 (1983), the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 gave district courts authority to depart from an applicable Guidelines range if they find “an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). The Sentencing Commission, acknowledging that in drafting the Guidelines it had not adequately taken into consideration “unusual” cases, U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro, cmt. 4(b); see Koon,
In approaching departure requests, sentencing courts operate under a set of clearly defined principles. As Koon directs, if the district court identifies features of a ease that “ ‘potentially ... take it outside the Guidelines’ “heartland” and make of it a special, or unusual, case,’ ” Koon,
[F]or the courts to conclude a factor must not be considered under any circumstances would be to transgress the policymaking authority vested in the Commission.
... Congress created the Commission to “establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system,” and Congress instructed the Commission, not the courts, to “review and revise” the Guidelines periodically. As a result, the Commission has assumed that its role is “over time [to] ... refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should not be permitted.” Had Congress intended the courts to supervise the Commission’s treatment of departure factors, we expect it would have said so in a clear way. It did not, and we will not assume this role.
Id. at 106-09,
Attempting to distinguish Koon and avoid the Second and Third Circuits’ holdings that sentencing courts may depart based on post-conviction rehabilitation, the government argues that such departures somehow “revive the parole system” abolished by the Sentencing Reform Act. Our dissenting colleague goes even further. Citing authority granted to the Bureau of Prisons to award “good time” credits as well as the abolition of parole, Judge Silberman argues that “the very passage” of the Sentencing Reform Act “implicitly” precluded consideration of post-conviction rehabilitation, concluding that “it would not be permissible for even the Sentencing Commission itself to authorize such a departure.” Dis. at 1. Certainly to the extent the Act clearly limits sentencing discretion, courts must act accordingly, regardless of the Guidelines’ silence. For example, if the Guidelines contained no prohibition on consideration of an offender’s race as a departure factor, see U.S.S.G. § 5H1.10, the Act’s direction that the Commission ensure the Guidelines’ neutrality as to offender race, see 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1994) — if not the Fifth Amendment — would clearly prevent such departures. But neither the Act nor any other provision of law we have found explicitly bars consideration of post-conviction rehabilitation.
We think the government and the dissent, moreover, misinterpret the implications to be drawn from the abolition of parole and overlook significant differences between parole and resentencing. Congress ended parole largely to remedy significant problems flowing from the fact that district court sentences for terms of imprisonment were generally open-ended, with the United States Parole Commission actually determining an offender’s date of release. As a result, “the offender, the victim, and society” were unaware of the prison release date regardless of the nominal term imposed. S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 46. Split authority between the Parole Commission and the courts also produced sentencing inconsistency because judges were “tempted to sentence a defendant on the basis of when they believe[d] the Parole Commission” might release the defendant. Id. To solve these problems, the Sentencing Reform Act vested sole sentencing responsibility in district courts, see Mistretta v. United States,
Allowing district courts to depart from the Guidelines for post-conviction rehabilitation implicates none of the concerns that primarily led Congress to abolish parole. There will be no mystery about the sentences defendants will serve because sentences that take account of post-conviction rehabilitation will be entirely determinate. And because the same district court that imposed the initial, erroneous sentence will impose the second, correct sentence, such sentences pose no risk of judicial second-guessing.
Nor would consideration of post-conviction rehabilitation “infringe upon” the Bureau’s responsibility for awarding good time credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3624. See Dis. at 1384. While considerations that inform the Bureau of Prisons’ exercise of discretion in awarding good time credits, see 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1) (in awarding good time credits, the Bureau of Prisons should consider whether “the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations”); id. (“In awarding credit under this section, the Bureau shall consider whether the prisoner ... has earned, or is making satisfactory progress toward earning, a high school diploma or an equivalent degree.”), may parallel some factors sentencing courts could weigh for post-conviction rehabilitation departures, awards of good time credits differ from post-conviction departures in several important respects. For one thing, good time credits simply reduce time served for behavior expected of all prisoners, see United States v. Brown,
At two points in its brief, the government points to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, suggesting that Congress’ 1984 modification of the rule provides another ground to prohibit departures based upon post-eonvietion rehabilitation. But that amendment merely deleted Rule 35’s reference to a district court’s discretion to reduce sentences on its own motion within 120 days of certain specified contingencies, compare Fed. R.Crim.P. 35(b) (1986) (amended 1987) (allowing courts on their own motion to modify sentences already imposed in certain circumstances), with Fed. R.Crim. P. 35(b) (1998) (allowing courts to modify sentences already imposed on motion of government for substantial assistance); it said nothing about departures at resentencing in response to a defendant’s motion. The government has identified nothing in either the Act or its legislative history, see S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 158 (discussing the amendment to Rule 35 without mentioning district court departure
For its final effort to distinguish Koon, the government, as well as our dissenting colleague, see Dis. at 2, argues that because all defendants can potentially seek departure based on pre-initial sentencing rehabilitation, while only those defendants “lucky enough” to be resenteneed following appeal can seek departure for post-conviction rehabilitation, Appellee’s Br. at 14, allowing Rhodes’ departure would contravene the Guidelines’ goal of treating similarly situated defendants alike. Any disparity that might result from allowing the district court to consider post-conviction rehabilitation, however, flows not from Rhodes being “lucky enough” to be resenteneed, or from some “random” event, Dis. at 2, but rather from the reversal of his section 924(c) conviction. The Sentencing Reform Act seeks to eliminate not all sentencing disparities, but only “unwarranted” disparities, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (sentencing judges must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (directing Commission to “avoid[ ] unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct”); id. § 994(f) (Commission should “reduc[e] unwarranted sentence disparities”). Distinguishing between prisoners whose convictions are reversed on appeal and all other prisoners hardly seems “unwarranted.” Cf. United States v. LaBonte,
Considering post-conviction rehabilitation, moreover, is perfectly consistent with the fact that Congress, notwithstanding its concern about reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity, directed the Sentencing Commission to maintain “sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences.” 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). “It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.” Koon,
To be sure, both the Sentencing Reform Act and its legislative history reflect congressional concern with the failure of rehabilitation as the central goal of sentencing. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (directing the Commission to “insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant”); S.Rep. No. 98-225, at 40 (citing studies rejecting basing parole decisions on rehabilitation and concluding that “[w]e know too little about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a par- • ticular prisoner has been- rehabilitated”); id. at 53 n. 74 (indicating in a footnote that Congress considered the abolition of parole consistent with doubts about the efficacy of rehabilitation and the difficulty of accurately gauging rehabilitation). Yet, in many places the Act takes rehabilitation into account. In addition to providing good time credits in part for rehabilitative efforts, the Act re
IV
Having concluded that nothing in the Guidelines prohibits post-conviction rehabilitation departures, we move to Koon’s next set of questions in order to determine the threshold for departure Rhodes must meet and the method of analysis the district court should undertake. See Koon,
Post-conviction rehabilitation does not fit easily into Koon’s framework. Koon focused largely on those sections of the Guidelines that give fairly clear departure instructions. Id. at 94-95,
The Guidelines offer no such clear instruction about postconviction rehabilitation. Although the Guidelines mention “post-offense rehabilitative efforts,” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 n.l(g), a concept linguistically broad enough to cover post-conviction rehabilitation, that reference appears in the acceptance of responsibility departure, which generally applies only to pretrial efforts, see id. n. 2 (“[A] determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pretrial statements and conduct.”). Post-
Faced with this quandary, the Third Circuit, relying on a Fourth Circuit decision, United States v. Brock,
Turning to the question of the circumstances under which a district court can depart, and building on Hairston, Brock concluded that if a factor is “listed by the Commission as one appropriately considered in applying an adjustment to the guidelines, a court may depart only if the factor is present to such an exceptional or extraordinary degree that it removes the case from the heartland of situations to which the guideline was fashioned to apply.” Brock,
We think the Third Circuit’s approach makes sense and therefore adopt its requirement that before district courts can depart based on post-conviction rehabilitation, that factor must be present “ ‘to such an exceptional degree that the situation cannot be considered typical of those circumstances in which the acceptance of responsibility adjustment is granted.’” Id. (quoting Brock,
Applying this standard to the facts of this case — that is, determining whether Rhodes’ work, education, and other rehabilitative activities exceed “to an exceptional degree” the rehabilitative efforts of all defendants, cf., e.g., Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice, Program Statement No. 5251.04 ¶ 1(a) (1996) (requiring federal prisoners “physically and mentally able to work ... to participate in [a] work program”); Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice, Program Statement No. 5350.25 ¶ 1 (1997) (requiring prisoners who have neither a General Educational Development (GED) credential nor high school diploma “to attend an adult literacy program for a minimum of 240 instructional hours or until a GED is achieved”) — is a question Koon directs us to leave, at least
This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I agree with the majority that the Sentencing Guidelines do not address the question presented — whether a district court may consider a prisoner’s post-conviction conduct when it resentences a prisoner following an appeal. But I do not believe this case is controlled by the standards set forth in Koon v. United States,
Congress chose to take account of a defendant’s rehabilitative efforts in a different and more limited way than it had under the parole system. The Bureau of Prisons may award good-time credits to a prisoner who has shown “exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations,” including progress toward earning a degree. 18 U.S.C. § 3624 (1994). This is just the sort of determination that Rhodes has asked the district court to make, arguing that “he has earned his GED, taken college level courses, consistently received better than average to much better than average work reports, paid the full $150 assessment imposed by the District Court ... completed one drug rehabilitation program ... and taken advantage of every other opportunity for rehabilitation presented to him while incarcerated.” Rather than operating within the framework that Congress has provided, appellant has asked the district court to infringe upon the Bureau’s role. See United States v. Evans,
One of the primary goals of the Act was to narrow the wide disparity in sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, ch.l, pt. A, intro, cmt. 3 (1997). To be sure, the Act requires a court to consider the individual circumstances of the defendant as well as the need for uniformity in sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994). Post-conviction good conduct, however, is not a circumstance particular to appellant. Rhodes will have the chance to secure a downward departure that is unavailable to other prisoners with identical, or even superior, prison records. The Sentencing Reform Act seeks to end the sort of unfairness that results from allowing some defendants to gain consideration that others cannot. When sentencing was almost totally discretionary, some judges relaxed sentences for reasons that others refused even to consider. Rhodes’ position injects the same unfairness back into the process. The line between those who will have the opportunity to make his argument and those who will not is totally random. Only those prisoners who are lucky enough to have a sentencing judge who commits legal error can benefit from their postconviction conduct.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
