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United States v. Rene C. Martinez, Kenneth W. Noel, and Steven T. Garcia
988 F.2d 685
7th Cir.
1993
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*3 COFFEY, Circuit and Before CUDAHY FAIRCHILD, Circuit Senior Judges, and Judge. Judge.

FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit and Martinez, Noel Kenneth W. C. Rene prison, Garcia, at Oxford T. inmates Steven within institution correctional a federal States, of the jurisdiction territorial of an death jury for the before were tried another. On inmate and assault 18, 1991, the defendants November murder, 18 second-degree guilty of found causing assaulting U.S.C. § 113(f). Noel U.S.C. injury, 18 serious possession guilty of additionally was found inmate, 18 U.S.C. by an weapons 1791(d)(1)(B).1 1791(a)(2) & §§ terms of 200- to concurrent sentenced was term year years, a five five months assess- release, a criminal supervised sen- was Noel of $100.00. penalty ment 405 months terms of concurrent tenced re- supervised years years, five and five assessment lease, criminal a $200.00 to concur- sentenced Garcia was penalty. years, five months and of 212 rent terms release, and a $100.00 supervised years five In each case penalty. assessment criminal is consecutive imprisonment the term ap- On being served. presently the term a number raise defendants peal, the of their con- propriety regarding the issues We affirm. victions. l-A-25; 4-B-45. script at guilt counts. Tran- as to these conceded

1. Noel then or no resistance and Brown offered I. At the encounter. during remainder of 7:45 27, 1991, approximately April On officers time, held back same Noel Mar- between out PM, fight fist broke was The shank holding up a “shank.” wing B Sammons tinez Charles pick-type knife consist- an ice described pris- at Oxford Unit Portage House eight six to approximately ing of blade seconds, the A inmates on. Within handle. Tr. to a black long attached inches on watch and cheer wing gathered to Band The officers observed l-B-112. L. Glattfelder Darren fight. Officer yelling and was highly agitated Noel the scene. guard to arrive the first Tr. at 1-B- stay back. the officers inmen two stepped between He drop demands Despite the officers’ *4 Transcript at fighting. stop the effort to shank, to stab the vic- proceeded Noel light- and shorter was 1-B-ll. Glattfelder times, then turned tims a number contestant, and the blows than either er “Stay yelled, back. When around and up it on his to break continued. Unable him, you can have through with we’re body his alarm2 own, depressed Glattfelder time, 2-B-41, At the same him.” Tr. that a officers notify other correctional back and Garcia switched Martinez and pushed arisen. Glattfelder problem had they con- the two victims forth between inmates, making his through the crowd was them. There to kick beat tinued and wing B of the way entrance door to the Martinez’ shoe point at one testimony that tes- Glattfelder responding officers. meet The offi- mouth. caught in Brown’s he did not observe trial that tified at order the defendants cers continued to fight. point in the at this weapons involved the inmates approached stop and Schirmer Tr. at l-B-10-14. the attack mop wringer however, with a — out, fight initially broke At the time continued. Even- and Brown on Sammons in the B were and Noel inmates Garcia Noel, Martinez, and Garcia volun- tually, and Noel room. Garcia wing television and returned tarily the attack ceased shortly after Glatt- joined in the encounter immediate area. cells in the their There was testi- the alarm. felder sounded that, was re- point, Martinez mony at this of the shank ownership and use Both the Garcia, fight. ceiving of the The the brunt unclear. remain during the encounter roommate, on his be- interceded Martinez’ that Noel clearly evidence demonstrated joined in after that he Noel testified half. and Brown with Sammons struck both the corridor from observing Brown enter no direct testimo- there was shank. While Martinez from behind. grab cell and either Martinez or demonstrating that ny participant active Brown an Whether shank, testified witnesses Garcia used merely bystand- innocent fight, or an making a thrust- they Garcia observed er, at trial. was contested knelt over fist as he ing with his motion Margiotta Additionally, inmate Sammons. Schirmer, Shy, and Williams and Officers Sammons, Noel stabbed testified that while responded to Glatt- Specialist Merrill Rec. continually down and Martinez held him Shy and alarm. As Schirmer felder’s 2-A-55, Tr. at him in the face. struck through way the crowd pushed their testified that both Cummings also Inmate fifty inmates that had approximately now “rolling” were Sam- Garcia Glattfelder, and Merrill gathered, Williams him. Tr. at 2-A- Noel mons while stabbed to their cells. the crowd of inmates directed testimony was buttressed 157-58. This arrival, Shy ob- their Schirmer Upon Williams, he observed who testified continually and Garcia served Martinez “uncurl” or or Martinez either Garcia and Brown as the punch and kick Sammons him. as Noel stabbed “open” Sammons lay hallway floor. Sammons on two apparatus also working directly The in- an officer-needs assistance. with 2. Correctional officers carry device. When activat- acts as a officers communication are unarmed. These mates ed, which, activated, directly pris- speak with the body a loud the officers can emits alarm when Tr. at l-B-6-7. signals dispatcher control center. beeping sound and thereafter, and Brown were Sammons trial adduced the evidence None offering little or no resistance. or Garcia down that Martinez demonstrated that the officers During most of time fight. Whether the shank brought scene, shank, Martinez and Garcia on the initially introduced were Noel kicking punching Noel re- Sammons brought it and Brown whether Brown, him, alternating at trial. them. Noel between was contested trieved times, that Mar- than 27 show Sammons more testimony did tend to stabbed The with them the shank received five stab wounds. took tinez and Garcia Brown cells and their they went back to when 19, 1991, indictment was an On June line, along with it into the sewer flushed three against defendants. returned April clothing. On torn sweat pieces of with charged I all defendants three Count incident, items were these day after Sammons; Count II degree murder of first approximately from the sewer extracted Brown, resulting in serious assault of and Garcia’s location as Martinez’ the same III and IV each bodily injury; and Counts clothing was sim- Tr. at l-B-73. cell. possession an inmate charged Noel with at the Martinez wore that which ilar to object designed and intended wearing encounter, but was time of “object” in weapon. as a Count used evening. later *5 used to apparently was shank stab III the taken Brown were and Sammons Both Although some of and Brown. Sammons died Sammons treatment. for medical Noel, error, particularly by of the claims Hunting- Dr. Robert shortly thereafter. II, assign defendants to Count all relate ton, that the pathologist, established respect I. to Count error two stab from one of of death was cause I, Judge Shabaz submitted Under Count the approximately out wounds murder, degree verdict on as first forms (a body num- found on Sammons’ wounds degree also on murder charged, and second back). One of which entered from ber voluntary manslaughter as lesser in- and entered the apparently fatal wounds peculiar element offenses. One cluded head, continued left side of Sammons’ degree the circumstances of murder in first down into the through the across brain and jury acquit- The premeditation. is case this right eye. The other wound over the bone murder, degree ap- of first defendants ted pulmo- and back severed entered A finding no sec- premeditation. parently from serious Brown suffered nary vein. element, and second to first common ond five stab including approximately injuries, aforethought”, murder, is “malice degree wounds, jaw, a loss of five a broken parties’ argu- in the dealt with principally beating, Brown As a result teeth. “intent.” in terms of U.S.C. ments prop- chew impaired perception, cannot has Manslaughter is the unlawful kill- § feeling in the lower has lost the erly and malice, and it being ing a human without 2-B-110, 111. The mouth. Tr. part manslaughter voluntary if as punished injuries stipulated Brown’s that defendants pas- heat of quarrel or “upon a sudden serious. 1112(a). The defen- 18 U.S.C. sion.” concerning trial, testimony At detailed here, that argued at echoed dants by numerous wit- given these events kill, design to they premeditated had no elapsed time dur- The estimates of nesses. fast a at so proceeded the events that longest estimate fight vary; ing the to, opportunity they had no that pace episode ten approximately minutes. not, equivalent to mal- form intent did initially, as follows: can summarized argued government aforethought. The ice fistfight Sammons there was between jury found ample time. there was that to the aid of Garcia came and Martinez. guilty of second de- defendants three all Martinez, seems to have and then Brown murder, finding malice afore- thus gree Sammons, although he was help joined to thought. how he became remember at unable to trial additionally instructed judge The district encounter joined Noel next involved. self-defense, including and, elements of shortly on help Martinez and Garcia the mur- prevail on is to government none of appeal, On another. defense charge. they der that seriously contends defendants acted find that would voluntary diced each a claim ond a sudden tions. regarding The defendants degree murder contends him have self-defense, of defense he so quarrel manslaughter. in his acquitted killed without found propriety that chance raise heat of alleged errors of another. found a number of to have defendant only of their any of malice and passion. him Noel guilty them, it Rather, convic- of sec- makes issues preju- upon jury Had Tr. at jected slaughter, arguing should sudden fear, might in order Heat out reflection. son self-control [*] 4-B-128, treat a rage, quarrel” naturally passion passion of anger or terror. [*] proposed and act killing adequate, must as a matter cause a reasonable [*] may be The defendants instruction the moment impulse [*] occurs provoked distinct Provocation, instruction be such [*] on man- “upon a to lose with- from per- sj< ob- as beyond proved so as to be passion, II. of man- as an element doubt a reasonable Upon a Killing case, to Instruct Refusal A. in this importantly slaughter, or more of Vol- Quarrel is an Element Sudden doubt be- reasonable beyond a disproved Manslaughter Distinct untary of murder. a conviction can be fore there Passion in Heat of Killing requested to include declined The court quarrel concluding “sudden language, manslaughter defined Voluntary the Court’s fall within very well would has remained unaltered by a statute *6 Tr. at passion.” of heat of definition It is the un in 1948. its enactment since court appeal that the on asserts 17. Garcia malice, another, without killing of lawful jury that to instruct the erroneously failed pas heat of quarrel or sudden “upon a voluntary for return a verdict they could 1112(a). In context 18 U.S.C. sion.” he acted upon finding that manslaughter trial, significant was issue the most of this quarrel”.3 “upon a sudden voluntary man killing was whether had the bur we government that cannot slaughter government and contends The close of At the on that issue. we that district proof of unless find den reverse error”, largely instructed due judge “plain the district committed court that manslaughter: the court voluntary to inform failure Garcia’s component of quarrel” volun- presented that “sudden has been Evidence theory of de- tary manslaughter was passion. heat of in the acted defendant government, murder. The howev- fense to presented, has been Where such evidence objection was er, that Garcia’s prove concedes government is on burden 44), (Gov. Brief, “comprehensive” that Defen- doubt a beyond a reasonable pro- agree.4 submitted we Garcia passion, of if must in the heat not act dant did by proved defendant and unlawful act unless failed to argues the court that Garcia also prov- preponderance passion must on sudden jury that the Government instruct prove reversal). beyond doubt the absence a Because we hold required reasonable ocation Lesina, v. quarrel. United States See Cir.1987) (“the a sudden quarrel not on sudden was that the instruction (9th government F.2d 156 argument required, address this we need not beyond proving a reason bears the burden of concerning proof. burden of passion or of heat of the absence able doubt raised"); quarrel defense sudden where pro- initially submitted a particular, Garcia In (10th Lofton, Cir. 776 F.2d 918 States United 1985) providing posed Govern- instruction prove be (government carried burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt must ment killed yond doubt that defendant a reasonable upon quar- sudden that “the defendant acted aforethought she did and that he or with malice rel; the heat of acted in or that the defendant passion); see abo Mul in absence of heat so laney passion was caused passion and that the heat Wilbur, 95 S.Ct. U.S. The at 11. adequate provocation[.]" Tr. (1975) malice instruction that (jury L.Ed.2d 508 refused, Garcia submitted conclusively implied intention district could be medley object- deadly The chance was a subsequently confronta- posed instructions wearing between men accustomed to court’s refusal —both tion ed to the district clearly stated in orally. weapons generally ensued writing and Garcia from a pro- that the for reconsideration drunken brawl or defense of a a motion breach.of Comment, “critical to his de- posed instruction honor. Provoked Reason Men fense,” objection at he renewed this Manslaugh- Heat-of-Passion and Women: preserved his ob- hearing. Self-Defense, has Imperfect Garcia ter appeal. this jection purposes (1986). 1684 n. 30 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. Goddard, C.J., referring Lord to “old manslaughter is the unlawful Voluntary authorities,” law Crown described quarrel or heat killing “upon a sudden as follows: crime “a sudden treat passion.” Garcia would killing Where ... was the outcome of alternative distinct from and an quarrel” as excusable, quarrel fight, the encoun- passion.” Because to “heat of though justifiable, not if the killer had ter, initially, have been de- could least begun part but had taken argues quarrel”, he as “a sudden scribed it, fight, having begun or if he endeav- prejudiced by the omission that he was struggle ored to decline further Read lit- term from the instructions. retreated, being closely pressed, but statutory language erally, the —written antagonist killed his to avoid himself be- defendant’s claim disjunctive supports — ing killed or maimed. quarrel killing upon a sudden that a defense. passion to the heat of Semin, (1949), alternative Tr. v. K.B. 407-08 development of the vol- inception and Medley, Demise of at 311 quoted in Chance however, statute, manslaughter untary n. 8. & question regard.5 in this raises a very killings of these denied nature manslaugh- accused the shelter of self-defense. commonlaw The evolution of However, wearing early century. due to the custom began in the sixteenth ter side-arms, anger time, combined with the heat of During killings “upon some sud- this affray, the courts viewed affray” prevalent generated and were ac- den killing morally repre- major danger type this as a less knowledged to be a than that which order. hensible form of homicide preservation of the communal *7 carried out in Brown, B., Medley long premeditated and The Demise of Chance was Up eigh- until the a cold Id. at 311. Recognition the of Provocation as blood. however, person Law, century, a who English in 7 Am. teenth Defense to Murder 310, (1963) (hereinafter punished “equal on an killed another was 310-11 J.L.Hist. is, by In the footing” only death. Medley”). The “sud- “Demise of Chance —that malice, brawl”, evidence of was re- of clear affray” den or “sudden absence unwilling impose this sen- at that time as a “chance med- courts ferred to tence, policy of believing as a matter ley.” Medley, Demise of Chance at 311. 175, Requested Objection Inst. No. 10. At quarrel.” R. Reconsideration and Motion for court, proposed by hearing, pretrial which renewed his the instructions Garcia the final language. quarrel" the “sudden did not include quarrel request that "sudden be treated in the argued: 235, Garcia way passion Tr. that heat of is.” same Aforethought, The instructions on Malice 11. Murder, Degree and Man- and Second First slaughter recognize killing ‘upon history a a early each general 5. For a discussion on negates quarrel’ of mal- sudden the existence History Kaye, Early manslaughter, of see of required for a conviction of first or second ice L.Q.Rev. Manslaughter, Murder degree murder. The defendant asserts that (1967). case, factual circumstances of this under the refusal to instruct the im- the Court’s properly so originally type re- This of confrontation was the defendant of an instruc- denies or "chaunce med- to as a "chaud melee” ferred law, correctly and which tion which states the ley,” into the more familiar and later evolved critical to his defense. medley”. Demise of Chance Med- term "chance 176, added). (emphasis Garcia Tr. at 1 also ley, at 311. proposed “upon definition of a sudden filed The court “made application. had no tak- tion Courts excessive. was a sanction such dead medley had been a that chance clear killed those who punished ing this view of forfeiture letter since the abolition severely— medley less a chance a result of attempt- its killings, and that non-felonious and hand- property of by forfeiture such as misconcep- based on perpetuation ed Dressier, 312; Re- Id. burning. century function.” pre-nineteenth of its tion in A Defense of Passion: thinking Heat Medley, at 316. of Chance Demise Rationale, & 73 J. of Crim.Law Search of a (hereinafter (1982) 421, 426 Criminology may suggest The above discussion Passion”). of “Rethinking Heat (1) quarrel” or following: the “sudden developed in re medley” doctrine “chance inception, there- law its common From times; circumstances of sponse to the by death “sud- recognized fore, the courts (2) as the cus those circumstances —such sought neither side or quarrel” den —where the harsh wearing sidearms and tom of indepen- advantage undue took an —as imposed anyone who sentence death man- reducing murder to ground for dent (3) as cir longer prevalent; killed —are no Ashworth, of The Doctrine slaughter. out changed, the doctrine fell cumstances Cambridge 293 & Provocation, L.J. disuse; (4) passion appears of However, (1976). a second branch n. 6 expanded “chance to be a more refined evolve from began to manslaughter doctrine, separate medley” and not ac- concept where an quarrel” “sudden history theory in itself. distinct sufficiently provoked that been cused had today’s legal system is quarrel” in “sudden Demise of Chance passion. he killed An extensive discussion sparse, at best. cen- During eighteenth Medley, at 313. 1112(a) is set out adoption of Section medley “sudden chance or tury the use of Alexander, States v. 471 F.2d United into disuse as a defense fell quarrel” as denied, cert. (D.C.Cir.), n. 54 944-45 influences: result of two 541, 34 L.Ed.2d 494 U.S. 93 S.Ct. the cus- (1) stages which gradual portion here. (1972); extrapolate a we dises- wearing sidearms became tom of 1112(a) the direct descendant completed (a virtually Section process tablished revise, codify 274 of an act to cen- of Section eighteenth part the latter penal laws of increase, and amend (2) attributable tury); and 4, 1909, States, ch. 35 Stat. March (1), of the defense popularity part ap- revision The federal law before provocation. (1878 peared in Revised Statutes § concept chance Id. at 313. In ed.), read: eventually 9 Geo. medley abolished. who, person Every within (1828); Rethinking Heat of Pas- see c. 31 unlaw- places upon any of the waters 56; sion, n. Demise Chance at 426 & malice, fully willfully, but without However, n. 15. Medley, at 313 & *8 at, strikes, stabs, wounds, or shoots or in killing while provocation and doctrine of another, strik- injures of which otherwise persisted, and over passion the heat of stabbing, wounding, shooting, or ing, passion century expanded into the dies, person other ei- injury other such today. Rethinking Heat of doctrine used sea, on land or within or without the ther also Passion, 426-27; Kaye, The see at States, guilty of the crime of is Manslaugh- Early History of Murder manslaughter. 569, (1967). II, L.Q.Rev. ter, 600-01 Part commission, in to special appointed A time, had an courts have Since that few criminal and codify the federal revise viability of opportunity to revisit laws, Report in 1906 penal issued a Final courts, English medley. In the chance provided following definition which medley was addressed fate of chance manslaughter: in Tr. Appeal Court Criminal Semini, Whoever, unlawfully Semini, and will- (1949). In Sec. 8931. 1 K.B. 405 malice, kill anoth- medley fully, but without shall chance argued counsel that because er, guilty manslaughter, and shall offense, provoca- is separate the law of was a 1908, special joint commit- wording. one thousand more than fined not provides some report, which than ten tee issued not more imprisoned dollars inten- explain the Committee’s assistance years. In its ed: murder homicide with quite, all stated Speaking comments, malice, in the first of the States of the with the statutes but without general malice and Commission terms, degree; premeditation, premeditation nearly, Union make elaborat- homicide may if not tions. The committee manslaughter. Under respects. committee has ed sections definition of the crimes >1; existing law there is no [Id. [*] defining such at The Commission changed them in some [*] 12] commented: [*] crimes, of murder or # statutory report- [*] homi- degree, and in the second murder This section en- Section 270 [Murder]: premeditation malice or definition, cide without larges the common-law lines of demarca- manslaughter. These defining in terms to the statutes similar in the sections tion have been observed large majority in a of the states. murder here submit.... which we [Id. 24] manslaughter in section [Manslaughter]: is said

The definition What Section Statutes, 5341, amplified so as respect Revised to section 270 is true as to re- specific section, manslaughter being acts defined include a number of this death, language do not come with- similar to sulting in and classified large majority language of that section. found in the statutes of of the states. [Id. 24] Revise Report 1 Final of the Commission report by Special A Joint Committee Codify of the United States the Laws Laws, later, Revision and (1906). the Revision of years the Commis- Two Laws, Etc., H.Rep. No. The man- Codification report. sion issued another (1908); S.Rep. Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 section, 60th now labeled as Section slaughter (1908). Cong., 1st 1-5 No. 60th Sess. language contained the identical 1112(a), 4, 1909, differs enacted March ch. Section today. exists Act of provisions However, only Act in its from the 1909 no 35 Stat. § manslaughter.7 relating involuntary change explanation given for comments, (1970). the Commis- In its Although voluntary manslaughter statute 174-75 today, free unaltered it has not been stated: remains sion 1960’s,Congress manslaughter,’ scope enact- ‘voluntary attack. In the late As to 89-801, which established a Na- ed Public Law 'provocation' to in- is broadened admissible of the Federal Commission on Reform tional excusably anything to 'ex- leads clude an Laws. This Commission conducted Criminal example, disturbance.' For treme emotional laws. review the federal criminal extensive might relatives or seduction of female taunts recommended the fol- In lowing language the Commission disturbance But extreme emotional suffice. manslaughter: manslaughter if the not reduce murder will manslaughter, guilty B person is a Class A brought own culpably about his actor has felony, if he: disturbance, by involving himself such mental (a) recklessly the death of another causes reasonable, crime, is not or if the excuse ain (b) being; an- causes the death of human provoke political where events such as being circumstances human under other assassination. murder, except that he causes which would be omitted). (citations Comment to of extreme emo- the death under the influence additionally printed voluminous Commission there is reason- disturbance for which tional *9 Here, criti- working papers. the Commission of the ex- able excuse. The reasonableness existing federal law: law and cized the common viewpoint shall be determined from cuse present is that law] [of The rationale person circum- in his situation under the of a only homicidally under persons who behave them to be. An emo- stances as he believes great present a provocation so do not serious excusable, within the tional disturbance is meaning Also, security. general it has been threat to paragraph, it occasioned of this if is argued, beside himself the offender was if any provocation, event or situation for emotion, anger is useless to it with or other culpably responsi- was not which the offender him, against gravest as employ sanctions ble. hopefully try a coldblood- might to deter one Report the National Commission on Final 1602, capital punish- the threat of ed killer with Laws § Reform of Federal Criminal 694 Sand, 1A L. e.g., Congress in the same manner. See the above appears from

It Jury distinguish al, Federal Instructions be- Modern an intent et manifested manslaughter by the 41.02, 41-17, ¶ comments 41-18 and tween murder Instr. It is fur- of malice. presence absence (1992). apparently or blend the Other courts the intent of it was ther evident that jury instructing that the together by terms quarrel or legislature that the “sudden acted “in the defendant to have must find its com- language retain passion” heat quarrel “upon sudden passion” or sudden this, legis- meaning. Beyond mon law fact, court has passion”. In one in heat of little assis- us with history provides lative as to the term is so obvious ruled that intend- understanding the statute’s tance e.g., explanation at all. See require no meaning. ed 735, Hardin, 443 F.2d v. States United standing of the “sudden present (“the (D.C.Cir.1970) ‘mutual words 738-39 and state in federal quarrel” language sufficiently self-explanato- combat’ ... are isWhat courts8 is not well-documented.9 require ry so as to not elaboration interpret have few courts apparent is that reasonably convey their intent to court to manslaughter statute in a voluntary ed the intelligent jury”). quote Typically, courts consistent manner. apparently case exists little law What (including “sudden statutory language the two terms —“sudden indicates their discus quarrel”), and then continue not re quarrel” passion” “heat of —do passion. to heat of solely applies sion meanings. courts treat tain distinct Some Collins, F.2d v. 690 e.g., States See United type provocation quarrel” “sudden as a denied, Cir.1982), 431, (5th cert. passion. causing to kill one 1447, 1046, 75 L.Ed.2d 801 103 S.Ct. U.S. McRae, example, in States v. For United Browner, (1983); v. United States denied, (5th Cir.), cert. 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.1989); States 551-53 United 62 L.Ed.2d 83 100 S.Ct. U.S. (8th Hawk, 1215-16 815 F.2d Eagle (1979), man trial court read the federal denied, Cir.1987), cert. U.S. jury, but later slaughter statute (1988); L.Ed.2d 662 S.Ct. quarrel” language the “sudden omitted (8th Elk, 658 F.2d Cir. States proof. The defining the elements of when 1981). cases, provide the courts these conviction, and the appealed defendant analysis meaning insight no as to as to appeals affirmed. Doubtful jury in quarrel”. Some standard “sudden aspects voluntary man- manslaughter the two statute whether structions treat quarrel beyond they or heat of violently the "sudden moved killer omitted ment. The rather, Therefore, passion” language; the murder and man- such calculations. considerations slaughter provided murder humanity ‘economy punishment' a defense to statutes death was caused under circum- mitigation. where the for call stances, is, however, re- the defendant was not for which Existing Federal law defective sponsible, the defendant to lose which caused respects. quarrel several The 'sudden or heat likely cause an ordi- and that would may adequate self-control nary person passion’ been have of when all formula death, to lose self-control to at least punishable by murder but 1722, 1723, e.g., S.Rep. Nos. same extent. See present day legal it is too loose in the context. (1971). Cong., proposed These 96th changes 1st Sess. intentionally coldbloodedly kills One who code were never enact- to the criminal quarreling prop- another whom he is ed. er candidate a murder conviction. 'Heat misleading passion’ antique phrase is an affray” quarrel" or "sudden lan- 8. The "sudden qualifications about what without statutes, e.g., guage persists state see in some passion, the courts have caused the (West 1986); Idaho Code Cal. Code § Penal hand, the other read into the statute. On (1984); N.M.Stat.Ann. 30-2-3 § 18-4006 judicially created rules need revision too.... (1970), (1963); although others K.S.A. 21-3403 Working Papers National Commission of of the language. Ky.Rev.Stat. longer See no retain this Laws, at 827-28 Reform of Federal Criminal (1974). § 507.030 (Vol. 1970). II manslaughter statute introduced Drafts *10 Congress respect quarrel” is also known as “sudden to whether the 9. "Sudden differed with combat”, “knowingly.” affray”, killing "mutual or "sudden combat.” was "reckless” or These drafts, however, interchangeably. were consistent in We use these terms alternative

695 (cit 305-06, at 1020 573 P.2d. another, at 223 Kan. one from discrete slaughter were and Proce Law 1 Criminal ing Wharton’s reasoned: the court Law, 280; on Criminal Perkins dure § probably quarrel’ is phrase ‘sudden The 61; 40 Am.Jur.2d, 57-59; Homicide 40 § af- the ‘sudden of descendant the direct omitted). 42) Other (quotations C.J.S. § of- common-law element of fray’ quarrel” is “sudden agree that states literal, nonhistoric In its .... fense causing one to act out type provocation of quarrel that surely not the it is meaning, v. e.g., State passion. of See in the heat passion that the heat signifies but (1989) 436, N.W.2d 890 Pettit, 445 233 Neb. feigned Manifestly, a mere occasions. recognized as legally (sudden quarrel is no would passion, without quarrel, causing reasonable provocation sufficient whatsoever. excuse self-control); People lose normal person to 411, 353, Additionally, Leonard, ruled Ill.2d 47 Ill.Dec. 83 705. v. Id. at case, (1980)(“mutual has combat trial 358 facts of the 415 N.E.2d that under adequate as in Illinois recognized passion caused been emphasis on court’s reduce the of provocation, sufficient justified. adequate provocation manslaughter”); voluntary State fense to Id.10 (Iowa 1980)(prov 292 N.W.2d 119 Inger, v. similar employ a read courts state Some combat); resulting mutual ocation For exam manslaughter. voluntary ing of 46, Smith, 455 A.2d 1041 123 N.H. v. State Peters, Mass. 372 v. ple, in Commonwealth adequate (1983)(mutual constitutes combat on (1977), overruled 319, 1277 361 N.E.2d provocation). Aponte, v. grounds, Commonwealth other jurisdictions recognize that some We (1984), the N.E.2d 284 462 Mass. 391 quarrel” the “sudden have treated Massachusetts Court Supreme Judicial distinctly. Ken In passion” terms “heat of readily is that “sudden combat reasoned interpreted example, the courts tucky, for events which to be one understood stat manslaughter voluntary Kentucky of mind that perturbation may provoke affray, or heat a sudden ute—“in malice.” 372 killing without in a can end separate cir providing two passion”—as (citing at 1280 N.E.2d 361 Mass. a defendant could cumstances 1969)). (2d ed. Perkins, 57-59 Law Criminal manslaughter. See Richards convicted Coop, 223 Kan. Likewise, in v. State (Ky.Ct.App.), Commonwealth, 237 517 S.W.2d v. argued (1978),the defendant P.2d 1017 573 S.Ct. denied, 422 U.S. rt. ce quar “sudden passion” and “heat of (1975); Young v. L.Ed.2d be consid and should separate rel” were (Ky.Ct. Commonwealth, 256 S.W.2d Supreme merits. its own each ered on Commonwealth, 24 Violett v. App.1953); Kansas, noting that the Kansas Court (1903); accord 1720, 72 S.W. Ky.L.Rptr. code, rea federal derived from statute Commonwealth, Ky. Burris soned: (1948) (jury instruction 213 S.W.2d charged “heat as “sudden com- such we use words instruction improper where [I]f charged only affray” to have similar indictment passion” “sudden bat” and statute, Kentucky see quarrel,” we affray”). meanings as “sudden “sudden define amended to truly however, it is not has since been part most for the term “extreme using merely manslaughter one It creature. separate Ky.Rev.Stat. brings disturbance.” provocation which emotional the means Additionally, California some sudden com- passion_ 507.030. heat on [A] separate as terms viewed the courts have same ordinarily considered bat Ross, Cal.App.2d People In operating elements. provocations footing other ap (1939), court of P.2d 1019 temporarily passion as such to create peals stated: judgment. unseat Id. living at 701- room. sitting McRae, on a chair argued had defendant, who his wife shot earlier that day, with his wife through rifle while she with a deer the head

696 meaning, Garcia its historic term retains manslaughter is the unlawful

Voluntary issue) (the this malice, only defendant to brief being, without killing a human requested. the instruction not entitled to passion. quarrel or upon a sudden persons who not one of the two one He was existence of but requires the The law in mutual willingly engaged conditions, may have been provocation to re- of these Rather, ongoing he entered murder combat. homicide from a felonious duce aiding one of purpose for the encounter manslaughter.... Likewise, not Noel was the combatants. 1022; 579, see 93 P.2d Cal.App.3d at 34 He en- here. to the instruction entitled Cal.App.2d 259 Whitfield, People v. also aiding purpose of fight for the tered However, (1968). a 605, Cal.Rptr. 438 66 that Martinez do we believe Martinez. Nor reveals a decisions at other California look instruction, although was entitled to the interpretations of of inconsistent number initially engaged in a arguably, Martinez passion” affray” “heat of the “sudden could fall fight fist with Sammons Pacheco, 116 Cal. language. People v. See quarrel”. meaning of a “sudden within (1981); 617, Cal.Rptr. 269 Peo App.3d 172 However, joined in and Noel once Garcia 498, Perrotta, Cal.App.2d 36 224 ple v. picture, the attack and a knife entered Small, (1964); People v. 7 Cal.Rptr. 813 something very different into escalated (1970); Cal.Rptr. 478 86 Cal.App.3d quar- a “mutual combat” or “sudden 714, 4 Cal.App.2d 179 Dugger, People v. rel.” Sedeno, (1960); People Cal.Rptr. 388 Cal.Rptr. P.2d 913 Cal.3d to Instruct that Prior Sworn B. Refusal (1974), grounds on other overruled is Probative of Inconsistent Statement Flannel, 25 Cal.3d Cal. People v. Truth its (1979); 84, 94, People P.2d Rptr. conference, At the instruction Best, P.2d 168 Cal.App.2d proposed to instruct disparity, the district court (1936). large part to their Due prior state particular jury regarding inconsistent these cases to be do not find we ments: ly helpful. a that on some former occasion Evidence assigns text which note a recent We also inconsistent witness made statement meaning to the term “mutual

a distinct testimony in case his or her this with persons willingly two combat”: “[w]here by you only in deter- may considered combat, be during the in mutual engage credibility mining the witness other as the result of an fight one kills the the truth of the matters strug- not establish during formed intention to do so prior statement. contained in that long been held to be gle, the homicide has murder, the notion manslaughter, and not pro- objected Counsel for occasion, of the being that the suddenness posed requested instruction and the follow- victim, by the provocation rather than some ing addition: “unless the statement was killing to some- mitigates the intentional prior proceeding and then it under oath Wayne R. La- thing less than murder.” In this can considered for its truth.” Scott, Substantive Fave and Austin W. context, for Martinez mentioned counsel (1986). 7.10(b)(2)at 256 Criminal Law § testimony, Williams’ cited Rule discussion, hearsay stated that “it is not if it was foregoing light prior proceeding.” oath in a Tr. at quarrel” under may arguable that the “sudden meaning judge no 4-A-62. The district denied Mar- term an anachronism proper defini- tinez’ adequately addendum. We believe the addition served go We need not so was a correct statement of passion. tion of heat of law under Fed- the term from eral Rule of justify far the omission of Evidence 801 and should have given.11 case. Even if the been the instruction this 801, upon hearsay A statement is not 11. Federal Rule of Evidence if [t]he ... declar- relies, hearing ant testifies at the pertinent part: trial or provides and is counsel subject concerning to cross-examination

697 alone, on the scene was while Glattfelder given estimates trial, had the officers At fight only a fist between pre- there was time, that at a and but admitted elapsed Martinez; II, the time given from hearing they had and evidentiary Sammons trial scene until argued left the immediate defendants which Glattfelder estimates III, arrived; had the time and showed that the other officers he and inconsistent significance has This issue the encounter shorter. that arrival until been the defendants to whether to 45 it relates I estimated at 30 Part was ceased. aforethought, an element malice in con- seconds, formed not be considered and need murder.12 to convict for in order proved being be re- argument the now nection with the defendants to whether It relates that, also according to Martinez asserts solved. malice, degree necessary for second formed II testimony, Part the Williams-Glattfelder presence or parties the treat murder. seconds, III 150 to 120 Part 90 to lasted intent, terms of element in of this absence seconds, time the and the maximum 180 During here. language and we use 240 300 seconds—or four was used knife argued prosecutor the closing arguments, pre-trial testi- Using minutes. the five time had sufficient defendants the Part II lasted mony, he contends that In this to kill. the intent to form which seconds, seconds, and the III 45 to 60 Part the as- argued that context, prosecutor the to 120 seconds— knife-time 105 maximum seven approximately lasted between sault minutes. three-quarters to two or one The de- Tr. 4-B-17. eight minutes. given jury, the as told The instruction not have they could argued that fendants statements, effect, if incon- that the earlier inter- kill intent to because formed .deciding sistent, could be considered first used the time knife val from to believe Williams-Glattfelder whether very short. affray was the end of the until trial, relied on but could estimates that Mar- testimony shows Although the had lapse time been find that kick viciously to tinez and Garcia continued indicated. earlier as the statements short Brown, even after and beat Sammons had been the earlier statements Because defenseless, been rendered the latter had prior proceeding, in a oath given under only the to contend that appears Martinez could that it been told jury should have held and he cannot be produced death knife true, if inconsistent. them as consider he unless fatal for the wounds responsible use of to learn about Noel’s apply time urges had us to The Government join with an intent to and then form here knife standard “plain error” heightened context, for Martinez In this counsel objec him. to state Martinez’ failure due to only four fight entire took argued that the clarity. States United with sufficient tion Tr. at three-quarter minutes. Cir.), to four (7th Briscoe, F.2d 4-B-95. denied, 111 S.Ct. U.S. cert. (1990); States 112 L.Ed.2d argues that if the appeal, On Cir.1991), (7th Canino, 928, 940 F.2d to treat permitted jury had been — U.S. -, denied, 112 S.Ct. cert. testimo- pre-trial and Glattfelder Williams (1992); Fed.R.Crim.P. L.Ed.2d 410 evidence, lapse ny as substantive applied, 52(a). of the standard Regardless used could the knife was during which time continues, the instruction Government significantly determined to have been prior statements proper because provided less was (and thus to have shorter consis rely are defendants intent). upon required to reach the opportunity testimony. trial I, with the parts: tent episode three into He breaks a human killing, the life of take to willfully inconsis- [ ] and the statement, statement in callous and being, to act an intent willfully declarant’s testimony, tent with the subject hu- given disregard under oath penalty wanton the consequences hearing, or other perjury aforethought aat not nec- proceed- does malice life; man but ing. ... or hatred to- will, ill spite, essarily imply 801(d)(1)(A). Fed.R.Civ.P. the individual killed.” wards "that malice district instructed 12. The aforethought at the time of a means an intent inconsistency, upon reason its Pro rate Federal Rules Criminal sufficiently assign objection find distinct party may as we that no provide

cedure Rule 30. See unless the charge satisfy requirements any portion error Pacione, retires, “stat e.g., United States v. before the party objects *13 — denied, par to which that cert. ing distinctly 1348, (7th Cir.1991), the matter 1355 objec grounds of the ty 3054, and the 920 objects U.S. -, 120 L.Ed.2d 112 S.Ct. objection 30. “The tion.” Fed.R.Crim.P. (1992). something particular in the point to must given only instruction need be An what, identify particularly, and instruction reasonably issue when addresses an nothing the else alerts wrong, why; is and v. the evidence. United States by raised stake.” United States is judge to what Cir.1990); Valencia, (7th 671, F.2d 679 907 354, (7th Cir. Kehm, v. 362-63 799 F.2d Diaz, 544, v. States 864 F.2d United Barth, 1986); 892 F.2d Guerts denied, cert. (7th Cir.1988), U.S. (when (7th Cir.1989) objecting proposed (1989); 104 L.Ed.2d 639 109 S.Ct. litigant identify evidentia- must instruction Talkington, 875 F.2d United States support objection); see ry deficiencies to Cir.1989). (7th government ar The 595-96 Requarth, F.2d also States v. was gues pre-trial that answer Williams’ (7th Cir.1988). long So the testimony really his not inconsistent with grounds for judge apprised is the district at trial. however, is litigant not objection, the trial, At testified direct Williams lan required to “formalities of to adhere B-range had down the hall pushed he v. Yellow Cab Willits guage style.” officers, through inmates other the Co., (7th Cir.1954), quot and had Noel and the others involved seen Guerts, ed in (applying F.2d at 624 in the when he reached the front encounter 51). Fed.R.Civ.P. observations, After of the crowd. some argues that Martinez’s The Government told he described at Schirmer which objection was insufficient he because B- get him to the crowd of inmates out of identity the “merely guessed” at the This range A-range.13 into involved witness, objection stated an because pushing and when he and the other some incomplete formulation of Rule A-Range had officers “almost them ... explain why he failed to Williams’ because He that the lock- I went back.” estimated prior testimony At was inconsistent. the ing approximately took two process down conference, counsel instruction an obser- to three minutes. He described in- specified portion the the during pushing opera- he made vation objected provided struction to which he turn On tion when he and looked back. additionally an addendum. He referred to counsel, by cross-examination Martinez’ speci- applicable rule evidence following colloquy place: took proposed fied whom the witness to Q. through you From the time broke applied. clearly instruction Counsel stated you stopped seeing until inmates testimony prior that he believed Williams’ Garcia, any kind of interaction between Any used for truth. uncertain- could be its Martinez, Noel and Sammons and ty phrasing, in his “I think it was Brown, yes sir. Williams,” insignificant. apparent It is question made it Government, earlier evident rejoinder in its [An questioning was counsel Williams impeach-

“that evidence offered for fight the duration of the ‘from purposes,” aware about ment nature you through objection. Although did time that first broke counsel quote particular portion the inmates until incident came to of Williams’ upon relied, testimony he nor elabo- an end....’] Portage wings, wing comprised 13. Unit is of two ers. l-B-7-9. cells Tr. at Each has 28 range. A-range designated as the A and B with 14 cells on each side of an 8 to 10 foot adjacent B-range, joined middle hallway. wide station, television and show- officer’s room Portage inside of you and talked it is tell, I think but hard to It is A. Unit? to three minutes two approximately range, approximately have been A. It must got I back down time a half to two minutes. one and B-range. hearing, suppression At the at l-B-28. Tr. questions following then read Counsel testified: Glattfelder hearing: pre-trial answers I and announced my body alarm A. I hit had fin- you point at which Q. ‘At the range. B This is Offi- fight on have a remaining inmates clearing ished Portage. It’s cer Glattfelder. hall, anything you see did out do then? Q. you did What taking that was assault further *14 the back down proceeded I A. place?’ near the the entrance range toward ‘No, sir.’ A. I knew re- because station officer’s you time do estimate Q. long a ‘How coming from would sponding staff it- the assault you had observed that need to di- and I would that direction going on?’ self there. rect them to 45 seconds say approximately ‘I’d A. arrive then? Q. And did staff minute, sir.’ a Yes, momentarily. It should have A. Tr. 2-A-141. less probably a matter been within inconsistency. an- There is no clear minute. than a when period the trial covered given at swer l-B-35. Tr. at scene, fol- immediate on the was Williams question here. Inconsistency is a closer other pushing the period of by a lowed one and one- testimony estimated The trial hall, the followed down inmates period from minutes for the to two half B-range. The second to return Williams’ of and to the arrival alarm Glattfelder’s hearing, esti- answer, pre-trial given at the the team of officers. with conversation the he “had observed only the time mated than testimony less estimated pre-trial on”, period was going a which itself assault (or alarm period from the minute the trial, but about at period asked within at the arrival Glattfelder’s possibly from period when latter also included It staff. entrance) of the the arrival down other inmates pushing Williams testimony pre-trial may that argued A-range. hall toward later slightly began period covered not hand, prosecutor did other On the it took Glattfelder (to the time extent pre-trial court that the district argue to inmates) and crowd of through the push Rather, he inconsistent. testimony was not (to the extent slightly earlier ended for im- stated, was offered “That evidence with Glattfelder team talked that time virtually a only....”, purposes peachment as cover- arrival). Even if construed after interpreted, at could be that it concession difference periods, the time ing identical inconsistent, least, and the district as than one minute. more could be no prosecutor. agreement with indicated it was error assuming that But even contends that this omis- Martinez further instruction, and to the the addition refuse was relevant from the sion instruction pre-trial Glattfelder that the Williams testimony, prior inconsistent Glattfelder’s could have inconsistent were answers rested objection Because counsel’s evidence, as well. we on as substantive been relied testimony, we review solely Williams’ on it We deem harmless. think the error applied instruct —as failure to the court’s on jury relied improbable that most testimony plain error. assessing to Glattfelder’s whether estimates these time —for was asked follow- At Glattfelder afore- with malice acted the defendants ing: and Garcia thought, whether trial, a Noel. At long did take acted concert Q. Okay. About how as to the testified body witnesses you your hit number of

from the time ques- night in on the place took response team came events that until alarm Tr. 2-B- minority groups. against hatred accounts taking the witnesses’ By tion. Noel’s offer rejected also The court consideration, could under- jury into derogatory made Brown had prove passed in must have the time stand that Sam- about minorities transpired. remarks to have these events order for suprem- a white he was had told Noel of mons description no doubt We have However, testimony Tr. 3-B-79. acist. persuasive more events was on the tattoos in that two of did come estimates and Glattfelder’s than Williams’ Tr. 3-A- body swastikas. were Sammons’ during the encoun- elapsed the time that pieces other Additionally, there were rejec- hold that Accordingly, we ter. import which of similar of evidence worked no proffered addendum tion The court would or struck. excluded any defendant. prejudice of Mr. testimony to the race permit the Victims’ Soria, of Evidence of inmate beaten Exclusion handcuffed C. Character, 4-A-44, testimony by Acts and Rac- Sammons, Prior nor Tr. Violent beating Affiliations him of Attitudes and told ist that Sammons Noel referring to the same minority, perhaps arguments are of the defendants’ Much incident. evidence of the exclusion of directed *15 racist views and Brown’s Sammons’ of Although additional evidence acts, di- many of which were past violent might acts be past violent the victims’ con- The defendants at minorities. rected cumulative, of the evi exclusion deemed racist views and vio- that the victims’ tend disposed be their racism cannot dence of significant minorities are toward lence carefully exam We have ground. on are and Garcia Martinez this case because exclusions, and deem challenged ined the are and Brown hispanics and Sammons every the details of unnecessary to discuss non-hispanic non-hispanicwhites. Noel is justified on rulings were Some of the one. white, of Martinez and Gar- the friend but foundation, hear grounds as lack of such cia. proper make a offer say, failure to or However, explicitly many were proof. bearing However, proof on substantial In in relevance. some on lack of based come in at past violence did the victims’ was, stances, relevancy theory of (Sam- that Hammer trial. Noel testified pos had Brown example, that because nickname) enjoyed reputation as a mons’ occasions, he, shanks on earlier sessed 3-B-31, people he fighter, Tr. and that the Noel, probably introduced rather than up inmates. Tr. hangs out with beat other Evidence offered to this encounter. shank testified that Sammons 3-B-32. Noel clearly inad theories was on that or similar of” Noel’s cellmate Mar- the shit out “beat of Federal the first sentence missible under Additionally, an officer tin. Tr. 3-B-31. 404(b). Evidence Rule of had presence that in his Sammons testified while in the face and back hit inmate Soria instances, theory may In some An- Tr. 4-A-44. was handcuffed. Soria traits of vio that the victims’ have been opinion testified that other officer as to racism were relevant lence and individual. Tr. 3-B-104. Brown is a violent acted in self-defense defendants whether that, Likewise, inmate testified in his another, there necessary defense of person. opinion, was a violent Sammons 404(a)(2) and under Rules fore admissible Tr. 3-B-139. Greschner, 405(b). v. See United States Cir.1981); (7th but see try- F.2d successful in Defendants were less Whalen, States ing the victims’ affiliations to show (7th Cir.1991). assuming rele Even organizations and that instances racist self-defense, could not exclusion minority persons. vance their violence involved prejudicial present in the circumstances. a mem- be Although admitted he was Brown 2-B-112, fight, Martinez Before Garcia entered Dirty Boys, Tr. ber of the White acting self-defense. objection may he well have been sustained an when Likewise, fight he such, entered the whether, espoused when Garcia he was asked passion person necessary cause a reasonable acting in defense may have been self-control act the moment lose Martinez, getting apparently was who La impulse and without reflection.” testified that he of it. Noel the worst Cf. 252; Fave, supra at United States Col grabbed fight after Brown entered (5th Cir.1982). lins, If 690 F.2d stage at that the neck and Martinez around defendants did not jury found that the necessary acting in de- may been he have self-control, adequacy provoca lose Any threat to Martinez Martinez. fense of and exclusion of tion would be irrelevant encounter, did not last. most clearly to it harmless. evidence relevant or near- and unconscious was down Brown Thus, found no we will assume well, on the floor Sammons was ly so. As adequate provocation, and consider resistance. This was offered little possible relevance of the excluded evidence assisting offi- things when the way provocation. adequacy as to the in- through the crowd of broke cers first circumstances, the immediate area the immediate mates and reached Under he repeated- provocation of Martinez was the blows Although the officers encounter. early fight. received from Sammons stop, the defendants ly them to ordered a reasonable objective test is whether attack, stabbing with Noel continued the person in the same circumstances would including the fa- many victims both times— If themselves lose control. the blows of Sammons—while tal wounds adequate, they ade- would would In addi- kicked and beat both. and Garcia person if known to be quate struck tion, testimony that Martinez there was motivated racism? violent and to be stabbing. Noel in the and Garcia assisted provocation of Garcia is his The immediate Assuming that the excluded evidence beating Martinez. observation of Sammons self-defense, have relevant to would been *16 enough not seeing If his friend beaten was prejudicial could not have been exclusion control, person lose to make a reasonable circumstances, there these where under person’s awareness of would a reasonable finding rational not have been a could dif- violence make a racism and Sammons’ self-defense. Likewise, that he Noel testified ference? Moreover, theory argued by a grab he saw Brown bystander was a when appeal, but not articulated defendants testimony, According to Noel’s Martinez. record, trial is that defendants’ on the pulled him off Martinez. hit he Brown of the victims’ traits violence awareness on Noel with Brown advanced When relevant to the defen and racism were hand, hit Brown and in Noel “pick” provoked mind when into dants’ state of (effectively re- him into the wall slammed passion. grounds heat of Where combat). dropped Brown moving him from ap readily are not admission of evidence According it. Noel recovered pick to his parent, counsel should alert the court Noel, just I lost it.... he then “kind of to to so is reason theory, and failure do little crazy.” Noel recalled going started confine enough appellate for the court to of Brown If his observations after that. plain error. States v. its review to reasonable enough to make a not 825, (7th Cir.), Peak, F.2d 832 cert. 856 control, would a reasonable person lose 499, 969, denied, 109 102 488 U.S. S.Ct. of Sammons’ person’s awareness (1988) (offer proof should L.Ed.2d 535 make a differ- violence Brown’s racism and significance of the exclud demonstrate ence? Rabideau, 821 testimony); Young v.

ed cited, and we have not parties have (7th Cir.), denied, 373, cert. F.2d found, dealing with this any decisions 98 L.Ed.2d 108 S.Ct. U.S. provocation general- issue. On or similar (1987) needs to alert the trial (proponent LaFave, Although at 255-64. ly, supra see issue). court to may painful infliction of violent blows LaFave, instructed, supra at provocation, adequate “Provoca- Judge As Shabaz aware- that a defendant’s passion], in order to be we doubt tion [of past violent of his adversaries’ might naturally ness adequate, must be such to evidence allowed type to and of rebuttal type of factors are racist motivation at 49-50 event, through in the door. Id. find it come any we In be considered. (3d Wigmore ed. (citing on Evidence the evidence excluded improbable most 1940)). permitted evidence is jury Inadmissible have caused case would this necessary remove “only the extent violence (which of the victims’ had evidence might prejudice which otherwise unfair it) a different conclusion. to reach before original evidence.” have ensued from appeal purposes Assuming for Winston, 447 F.2d error, harmless. United States it was there was omitted); (D.C.Cir.1971) (quotations Alternatively, the defendants con Johnson, see United States “opened the the Government tend that (7th Cir.1974), denied, 420 cert. of Sammons’ the issue door” to 95 S.Ct. 43 L.Ed.2d U.S. particular, the de Brown’s character. (1975) (doctrine admissibility of curative question posed rely upon fendants injec a rule for cannot be “subverted into During exami trial. direct Glattfelder prejudice”); Louisell generally tion of see nation, asked Glattfelder prosecutor Mueller, “open An supra, & at 61-64. any previous into “had ever run whether he give opponent unbridled door” does not Sammons.” Glatt- problems with Charles inadmissible license to introduce otherwise whatsoever”, and responded “none felder justify does it evidence into the nor as to Brown. The indicated the same also receipt merely evidence because of rebuttal per argue they were not defendants category of excludable it is the same testimony by placing this mitted rebut previously the evidence of evidence as and, prior before the act evidence Mueller, supra, fered. Louisell & therefore, inability introduce rebut their does not di Where the rebuttal evidence permitted a one- impermissibly tal evidence rectly previously the evidence contradict picture Sammons and Brown. sided received, beyond necessity of goes or “open the door” or “invited removing prejudice in the interest of fair provides pro that where a error” doctrine ness, it the district court’s discre is within evidence, a ponent introduces inadmissible deny tion to its admittance. Id. opponent to introduce may permit Here, testified that he did not Glattfelder similarly evidence rebuttal inadmissible experience problems victims otherwise-improper cross-ex engage Although the court’s past. *17 it was within may apply “open A court the amination. to rebut this discretion to allow evidence ing doctrine in order to neutralize the door” required testimony, the court was not to do any prejudice incurred from the or cure permitted only so. Inadmissible evidence is introduction of the evidence: any un- necessary to the extent to remove [Wjhere proponent’s inadmissible evi- the original prejudice resulting from the fair case or undercuts dence advances his only evidence. Glattfelder had been as- adversary, otherwise intro- that of his or signed Portage prior month to the Unit one trial, then in fair- prejudice duces to the light April to the 27 incident. In of this adversary should be allowed to ness the frame, testimony narrow time his that the the effect of this evi- try to neutralize victims were not carried lit- troublemakers any resulting prejudice by dence or cure weight unlikely prejudice to the tle and was introducing otherwise-inadmissible rebut- Moreover, jury defendants. the heard evi- impeaching propo- the tal evidence or (although dence of the victims' misconduct witness on cross-examination. nent’s may these instances not have been known Christopher B. 1 David W. Louisell & Muel- Glattfelder). preju- to In the absence of 11, (1977). ler, Federal Evidence at 49 dice, it the district court's dis- was within opponent may coun- extent to which contrary cretion to exclude evidence. ter with evidence is within the discretion of Testimony

the D. Admission of Williams’ Con- district court. cerning Hispanics of Two One doctrine, This referred to as “cura trial, by admissibility”, tempered tive the need Martinez and Garcia Prior place portion of Williams’ upon reasonable limits the amount moved to exclude

703 link in one “unfolding” of Sammons but from identi- arose This motion testimony. testimony pro- Williams’ suppression chain of events. at a testimony given fication hearing, jury’s under- At assistance vided some hearing prior to trial. fight he during sequence full events. standing that of the testified Williams trying to hispanics two it was Martinez or Regardless one of whether observed as Noel “open” Sammons, Sammons or the other “uncurl” unrolled Garcia who l-B-60, 61. Williams Tr. Moreover, him. stabbed face. kicking Brown was person was identify whether that could testimony not stand alone. did Williams’ and Garcia Martinez or Garcia. Martinez testimo- general depiction of Williams’ testi- portion of Williams’ that this argued testimony provided two ny corroborated in that it excluded mony should be testified that Margiotta Inmate inmates. jury to for the called because it irrelevant Sammons, Mar- it was stabbed while Noel coin” as “flip a “speculate” 2-A-55-56, down, Tr. at held him tinez who The court rea- Noel. assisted hispanic had Cummings testified that he Inmate while “important testimony was that the soned Garcia “roll- Martinez observed both understanding of events complete for a 2-A-157-58. ing” Tr. at Sammons. it provided that testimony be Martinez argument, his In support does, indeed, very nature of show the Collins, People 68 Cal.2d relies v. upon intent attack, show the and it does (1968) 497, 319, P.2d 33 Cal.Rptr. 66 438 {in 27. The dis- Tr. Defendants.”14 Transit, Inc., banc) Rapid v. and Smith motion, finding that court denied trict (1945). We 58 754 Mass. N.E.2d outweighed was not probative value Collins, persuasive. In to be find neither might incur. defendants prejudice the defendants, husband jury convicted Fed.R.Civ.P. robbery. At wife, degree second appeal that Williams’ argues on that, assuming cer- argued prosecutor speculate testimony required accused, there characteristics tain Sammons, it inmate uncurled to which overwhelming probability that anwas intent, and issue irrelevant .the matching by couple committed crime was “grossly” prejudicial. its inclusion was closing, characteristics. their distinctive determination district court’s “The probabili- prosecutor selected individual upheld un will be admissibility of evidence and invited purposes” for “illustrative ties clearly the court appears less factors. Col- apply their own jurors to discretion.” United States its abused n. lins, Cal.Rptr. at 500-01 & Cir.1992) (7th F.2d Tipton, theory, n. 10. 36-37 & Under P.2d at Covelli, (citing United States be but one there could infer that one could denied, Cir.), U.S. (7th cert. that defendants in 12 million chance (1984)). 83 L.Ed.2d 105 S.Ct. equally distinc- another and that innocent *18 having is evidence evidence Relevant robbery. the actually committed couple tive the existence of tendency to “any make P.2d at 37. 438 Id., Cal.Rptr. at 66 probable less probable or ... more fact of Califor- Court Supreme the appeal, On the evidence.” it would without than banc, prosecu- that the nia, sitting held gen evidence is 401. Fed.R.Evid. Relevant of mathematical and use tion’s introduction 402; see Fed.R.Evid. erally admissible. two funda- injected probability statistics York, 1351 States v. first, — because prejudicial errors: mental denied, U.S. -, (7th Cir.), cert. adequate founda- testimony lacked an (evidence the (1991) S.Ct. 321, 116 L.Ed.2d by prose- the tion, employed technique the probability that defendant increases that conjecture wild only lead Here, cutor to relevant). “could crime committed is- relevancy to the without demonstrated to his observations testified as Williams second, prosecu- the presented”; the sues during fight the comments about —his this ob- judge overruled The district objected and 2-A-118. Martinez At counsel for 14. jection well. as Tr. at for lack of foundation. to strike moved bits pick apart little asking you to not inject- improperly of this evidence tor’s use testimony. people’s of various jury pieces delibera- the into error fundamental ed that; this, believe believe jury the don’t “distracting] by Believe process tion weigh- here, this. don’t believe function over requisite this proper and its guilt... the issue on ing the evidence the you consider cu- ask that I would 502-03, P.2d at 38- Id., Cal.Rptr. at testimony of all of nature mulative it's all of that heard you’ve because that happened really what testimony tells alleged that she that Smith, plaintiff In people a lot of There were when she case. car this parked awith collided To saw differ- oncoming bus. Each one them by watching. an a road forced off might owned of them things. bus was Each one ent that establish defendant, presented watching slightly circumstan- different plaintiff a have been the bus demonstrating that any given point tial evidence of the assault area by a operated different been consider all time, you not have I should could and think granted a directed court put The line. trial event to bus of that recollections of their appeal, On defendant. for the happened. verdict picture what together of Massachusetts Court Supreme Judicial conclude that We cannot Tr. 4-B-112-13. because verdict the directed upheld testimony of Williams’ the introduction con- a matter of ownership of the bus prejudiced Martinez. Smith, N.E.2d at 755. jecture. enough that reasoned, “it a Argument Permit to E. Refusal fa- mathematically chances somewhat Early Release Expected Defendant’s proved.... to be proposition vor Probative Relationship are Family of the evidence can be said most that Intent Issue of Criminal on perhaps the mathemati- case is instant trial, the dis Prior to close proposition favor cal chances somewhat closing objections to addressed trict court the defendant caused bus the court Martinez informed arguments. (quo- enough.” Id. was not This accident. argue jury intended that he omitted). tations mandatory release his time to the short applicable to are not Collins Smith demonstrated date of December foremost, case neither First our case. kill. Tr. at 4- lacked the intent that he inadmis- at issue was the evidence held that vein, sought to Garcia In the same A-28. ar- relevancy grounds, counsel sible release date of jury that his argue to the Smith, the court concluded gues here. good time (applying November plain- presented by the that the evidence credits), mandatory release date his insufficient, its own—was standing on tiff— while three 21, 1992, marriage and his March Collins, court held that lack of intent to children demonstrated a intro- probability statistics mathematical his state was therefore relevant kill and prosecution inadmissible duced Tr. at the time of the incident. mind at proper foundation— they lacked because that such evi The court ruled 3-B-98. theory. and statistical in evidence both purposes dence, background admitted for Moreover, are also un- and Smith Collins on the argued not be only, could are not we faced persuasive because 4-A-33, intent. Tr. issue of evi- improper use of otherwise relevant contend Garcia Defendants case, *19 did the Government In our dence. erroneously preclud- that district evidence, the jury that this argue to not the jury that their arguing the from to own, ed them to con- its was sufficient standing on familial status dates and upcoming In release murder. re- for the defendants vict Garcia) to relevant the during (as to applied clos- to Martinez’ comments sponse essence, the defen- (Tr. 4-B-83-84), In question the Govern- of intent. ing arguments inmate who is an stated: dants’ contention that ment (and per- prison released from soon to be Well, certainly case is not our based alone_ child) would returning spouse and haps to a testimony I’m Mr. Williams’ v. Mechan 32; Brief, see United States freedom obtain ability to his jeopardize not 66, 73, 106 S.Ct. ik, U.S. is unlike- therefore killing another—and v. Dan (1986); States any kill. intent to L.Ed.2d the formed ly to have Cir.1988). He (7th a iels, is faced with case, a defendant criminal contributing supervisory our we exercise suggest circumstances unique set of does time of the the life at of enjoyment powers. her his or it be alleged crime—whether worst, agent’s use of the very At the life, employ- date, family release upcoming careless, any taint un- language sta- or social financial opportunities, ment should al- implications Unsupported likely. argu- could tus, considerations etc. These avoided, no see occasion but we ways be or she in- he to whether ably be relevant urge than to action supervisory other for logi- crime—because the to commit tended exercised. that care be activity an engage in cally one would reasons, judg- the foregoing For the her him cause potentially that would court are the district ments of Affirmed. This is valued. that which of deprived Additional- best, is, speculative. theory concurring. CUDAHY, Judge, reflection degree a of Circuit require ly, it would with defen- squarely inconsistent without some although not I agree, lost control they had that dants' contention I stand. doubts, verdicts should that these ruling district court’s actions. of their are there some separately because write discretion. abuse of not an manslaughter in- voluntary aspects of the comment. additional that merit struction Indictment for Dismissal Request F. instruct- been jury have How the should Unsupported Statement Because since vexing problem a presents ed Mafia Mexican with Involvement instruction an merely asked for defendants proceedings, grand jury theAt ordinarily an language, statutory using the fight. asked started grand juror what Specifically, request. unexceptionable there was special agent testified A containing an instruction was for request “Dirty White between blood” “bad a sudden statutory phrase “[u]pon In this con group. a Mexican Boys” and U.S.C. passion.” heat of quarrel or stated, text, special agent “[o]ne added). The 1112(a) (1992) (emphasis there’s Mexican Mafia them is enlightening histori- an pursuing majority, Although prose groups.” other these possibility analysis, cal entertains special from the testimony cutor elicited no may have quarrel” sudden “upon a speculative, testimony was this agent that from apart context in the modern meaning jury to grand admonish did not he pas- “heat of saying way of being another advise the testimony, nor this disregard at 696. Ante sion.” Martinez draw inference jury not to images Mafia. At up Mexican summons passion” was member “Heat of reference to arriving made no the Government husband cuckolded of the moved Martinez Mexican Mafia. lover wife find bedroom fla- indictment, arguing that quarrel” “Upon dismissal a sudden grante delicto. Mafia was referent, Mexican the reference but well-known such has no denied his judge case, The district a much prejudicial. suggests majority disputants motion. whose armed age, of earlier unneces- it is I think flair. But tempers attention to calls our appeal, On without phrase is sary hold Mafia, with- Mexican reference this con- recent in a more its meaning own a member he was proof that out the stereo- Perhaps, consistent text. many are “that there concedes group. He killing, we should passion type of pet- legally sustainable holding that a cases confronting each other gunslingers imagine purges whatever guilt verdict *20 the virtue over Street middle of Main in process may be in taint there has encounter lady. an Such a local returned.” Martinez’ the indictment not, however, self-defense, and the tion. This does seem be some overtones fear, fact, rapidly giving the “sudden accompanying as well as of such a case. enmity, surging anger pro- that could mislead the quarrel” instruction here could pre- kill. person Therefore, voke a reasonable I that the district jury. believe quarrel might in a sudden vailing emotion justified declining give in such court was passion in to a heat of be fear contrast an instruction. jealousy envy and are fre- situation where quently key.

But, gunslinging if a encounter is guess quarrel at what a sudden

accurate dress, like in

might look “modern” to fit the mold.

present facts do not seem fight deadly with a

Here we have fist fray later.

weapon introduced into the quarrel, it sudden? This is no doubt a but is FREEMAN UNITED COAL MINING me the suddenness with It seems to COMPANY, Petitioner, potential fight which a flairs into homicide narrowly and must construed critical WORKERS’ OFFICE OF COMPENSA- very quarrel” if “sudden is not to become a Jones, Fairy Dell TION PROGRAM broadly applicable defense homicide Jones, Respon- widow of Donald L. Nevertheless, cases.1 I would be cautious dents. majority’s speculation about garb “upon quarrel” may modern a sudden No. 92-1992. meaning have “in the the same as Appeals, United States Court

passion.” I do not believe that the two Circuit. Seventh phrases meaning have the same nor would good deleting “upon this be a reason for Argued Feb. 1993. quarrel” sudden instructions Decided March 1993. manslaughter generally cases. April As Corrected quarrel” pas- A “heat “sudden categories provocation sion” are two present recognizes

that the federal statute mitigating what would otherwise noted, majority suggests

murder. As categories may really these two be the agree

same: “Other states that the ‘sudden

quarrel’ type provocation causing is a passion.”

one to act heat out me, however,

Ante at 695. To it is not so quarrel may

much that a sudden arouse a combatants, passion

kind of heat of certain, admittedly infrequent,

but

quarrels2 provo- are themselves sufficient manslaughter.

cation reduce murder flair-up

There are circumstances where the quarrel rapid a sudden is so and over-

whelming provide as to a defense and re-

quire prosecu- an instruction in a homicide original by majority Whether the defendant is one of the appel- 2. The cases cited use the per combatants or an intervenor should not be lation “mutual combat.” Ante at 695. se determinative. The suddenness with which one becomes involved in an armed skirmish is key.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Rene C. Martinez, Kenneth W. Noel, and Steven T. Garcia
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Mar 4, 1993
Citation: 988 F.2d 685
Docket Number: 92-1231, 92-1289, and 92-1338
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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