United States v ReimonenqUnited States v Reimonenq
Military Judge: CDR Timothy N. Cronin, USCG CDR Jeffery C. Barnum, USCG CDR Tereza Z. Ohley, USCG
Appellate Defense Counsel: CDR Jason W. Roberts, USCG
Appellate Government Counsel: LCDR Lorhel E. Stokes, USCG Mr. John P. Nolan, Esq.
BEFORE McCLELLAND, BRUBAKER & PELL Appellate Military Judges
BRUBAKER, Judge:
This is the second time this case hаs come before us. While the case was pending trial, we considered a Government appeal of a ruling suppressing Appellant‘s statements to the Coast Guard Investigative Service (CGIS) and one of several statements he had made to his command. United States v. Reimonenq, No. 1509, 2025 WL 1702021 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App. June 18, 2025). We denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling. Id. at *7.
Subsequently, a military judge sitting as a general court-martial convictеd Appellant, consistent with his pleas entered in accordance with a plea agreement, of one specification of willful dereliction of duty, one sрecification of false official statement, and two specifications of carrying a concealed weapon, in violation of Articles 92, 107, and 114,
Appellant personally raises the following issues pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982):
- Did the military judge err in finding that Appellant‘s command and CGIS did not commit unlawful command influence (UCI)?
- Did trial defense counsel ineffectively represent Appellant by allowing him to plead guilty to the additional charge of making a false official statement when the statement made by Appellant had been suppressed by thе military judge?
- Did the military judge fail to inquire into Appellant‘s competency before accepting his pleas?
We conclude there is no error and affirm.
Unlawful Command Influence
After the military judge denied Appellant‘s motion alleging that members of his command and CGIS committed UCI, Appellant entered into a plea agreement where he agreed to waive all waivable motions. During the guilty plea inquiry, the military judge reviewed this provision and expressly advised Appellant that by agreeing to this term and pleading guilty unconditionally, he was waiving the UCI issue. Appellant affirmed he understood and nonetheless desired to enter into the agreement and to plead guilty unconditionally.
Claims of “adjudicative” UCI such as this one are waivable. United States v. Suarez, 86 M.J. 65, 71 (C.A.A.F. 2025). The record amply supports that Appellant did so knowingly and intentionally. The issue is waived, and no further consideration is warranted.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Appellant asserts that his counsel were ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty to making a false official stаtement to CGIS when the evidence of Appellant‘s statement to CGIS had been suppressed. To prevail on this claim, Appellant has the burden of showing: (1) that his
To establish the first prong—deficient performance—Appellant must overcome a “strong presumptiоn that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. This presumption “is rebutted by a showing of specific errors made by defense counsel that were unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.” Davis, 60 M.J. at 473. To establish the second prong—prejudice—in the context of a guilty plea, Apрellant must show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel‘s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and instead would have insisted on going to trial. United States v. Furth, 81 M.J. 114, 117 (C.A.A.F. 2021).
Appellant offers no factual foundation to support his claim: no affidavits alleging specific errors and nothing in the record that would give rise to an inference of deficient performance. He instead broadly asserts that it was ineffective for his counsel to “allow” him to plead guilty to making a false official statement when the evidence of that statement had been successfully suppressed. There is no merit to this assertion.
First, the military judge personally addressed Appellant to ensure he understood the meaning and effect of pleading guilty and nonetheless chose to do so of his own free will. See Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 910(c). By pleading guilty, Appellant waived any objection to thе factual issue of his guilt to the offense, relieving the Government of its burden to prove his guilt with admissible evidence, as well as any non-jurisdictional defects regarding the additional charge. R.C.M. 910(j). Appellant offers nothing to support that his decision to plead guilty and give up these rights was induced by any erroneous advice or actions by his counsel.
There also is no evidence of prejudice. Appellant does not assert that, but for specific errors by his counsel, he would have pleaded not guilty and instead insisted on going to trial. Nor does anything in the record demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have done so. He thus fails to establish рrejudice. See United States v. Bradley, 71 M.J. 13, 17 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (“[M]erely being entitled to relief on an erroneously waived motion does not by itself satisfy the prejudice analysis in the guilty plea context. Appellаnt also must satisfy a separate, objective inquiry—he must show that if he had been advised properly, then it would have been rational for him not to plead guilty.” (footnote оmitted)).
Having failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice, Appellant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
Whether thе Military Judge Failed to Inquire into Appellant‘s Mental Competency
“The question of whether an additional psychiatric examination is necessary rests within the discretion of the military judge and is reviewable only for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Collins, 60 M.J. 261, 266 (C.A.A.F. 2004) (cleaned up).
Appellant underwent two sanity boards under R.C.M. 706. The first, ordered by the convening authority before referral of charges, concluded that Appellant was mentally responsible at the time of the offenses and was able to understand the nature of the proceedings
During the guilty plea inquiry, the military judge reviewed a stipulation of fact where Appellant expressly attested that he had not at any time suffered any mental defect or disease that caused him to commit the offenses. Appellant then was able to participate intelligently in a collоquy with the military judge where the military judge ensured Appellant understood and desired to enter into the plea agreement of his own free will, that he in fact committed the offenses to which he pleaded guilty with the requisite mental state, and that he could have avoided committing the offenses had he wanted to. Nothing during the colloquy or any other part of the guilty plea proceedings raised any concern about Appellant‘s mental responsibility at the time of the offenses or his capacity to pаrticipate in the proceedings.
Under these circumstances, we readily conclude that the military judge did not abuse his discretion by failing to order a third sanity board or otherwise inquire further into Appellant‘s mental responsibility or capacity.
Decision
We determine that the findings and sentence are correct in law and, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved. Accordingly, the findings of guilty and the sentence, as entered into the record, are affirmed.
Chief Judge McCLELLAND and Judge PELL concur.
For the Court,
Sarah P. Valdes
Clerk of the Court