OPINION
Reginald Boxley appeals his conviction of possession of sixty grams of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Based on the reasoning of the district court, we affirm the judgment. We write only to elaborate on two issues: (1) the qualification of testimony regarding canine searches, and (2) the operation of the presumption under the doctrine of spoliation.
I. Testimony on Canine Searches: Qualifications
On the night he was arrested in December of 1997, Boxley was subjected
On cross-examination, Boxley asked Officer Anderson whether he had any documentation, suсh as “search find sheets,” to verify the dog’s prior history and accuracy. Anderson stated that the department did not keep accuracy records for drug dоgs, but that Cuffs was certified as a drug dog after a two-month training program. Anderson also explained that Cuffs’s record on the department’s computer database was deleted after Cuffs passed away, more than two years before Boxley’s trial. When asked whether Cuffs had alerted in the past to a finding of no drugs, as he did in this cаse, Anderson acknowledged that Cuffs had done so one other time in his prior sixty to seventy searches. Anderson also stated that no dog can be “one hundred percent accurate.” On appeal, Box-ley claimed that the district court abused its discretion in allowing Anderson’s testimony because Cuffs’s qualifications сould not be documented or verified.
We recognize that an alert in the context of a canine narcotics sniff indicates that narcotics are рresent in the item being sniffed or have been present in such a way as to leave a detectable odor.
United States v. Buchanon,
We held that in order to admit evidence of a dоg’s alert to an aroma of drugs, it is not necessary to provide the dog’s training and performance records, as it is similarly unnecessary to qualify a human expеrt in this way. Rather, testimony as to the dog’s record is sufficient. Id. at 396. We stated: “[wjhile training and performance documentation would be useful in evaluating a dog’s reliability, hеre the testimony of [the dog’s handler] sufficiently established the dog’s reliability.” Id.
We also determined that it is not necessary for the government to show that the dog is acсurate one hundred percent of the time, because “a very low percentage of false positives is not necessarily fatal to a finding that a drug dеtection dog is properly trained and certified.” Id. In Diaz, we concluded:
When the evidence presented, whether testimony from the dog’s trainer or records of the dog’s training, estаblishes that the dog is generally certified as a drug detection dog, any other evidence, including the testimony of other experts, that may detract from the reliability of the dog’s performance properly goes to the credibility of the dog. Lack of additional evidence, such as documentation of the exact course of training, similarly would affect the dog’s reliability. Aswith the admissibility of evidence, generally, the admissibility of evidence regarding a dog’s training and reliability is committed to the trial court’s sound discretion.
Id.
at 394. Thus, after it is shown that the dog is certified, all other- evidence relating to his accuracy goes only to the credibility of the testimony, not to the dog’s qualifications.
See United States v. Sanchez-Pena,
II. Instruction on Spoliation of Evidence
At trial, Boxley requested the following jury instruction:
The government in this case has failed to take efforts toward preservation of certain fingerprint evidence. The failure to preserve this evidence creates a rebuttable presumption that the missing evidence may have been favorable to the defendant. This presumption could be sufficient to create a question of reasonable doubt on the issue of whether Reginаld Boxley ever possessed the , cocaine base charged in his indictment.
In arguing for a presumption based on the government’s “failure to preserve” evidence, Boxley 'claims spoliation. Spoliation is defined as the intentional destruction of evidence that is presumed to be unfavorable to the party responsible for its destruction.
See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co.,
The doctrine traditionally operates against the defendant in a criminal prosecution. For example, the prosecution usually requests a jury instruction on spoliation when there is evidence that the defendant intentionally destroyed evidence again him. Here, Boxley аrgued, unconventionally, for the use of a spoliation instruction against the police, so that the jury would exercise an unfavorable presumption against the prosecution. Boxley argued that in order to hold the government to its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he should have every accеss to presumptions in his favor.
The facts of this case do not warrant exercising the presumption. At trial, the government demonstrated that there was very little chаnce that even the most diligent preservation would have yielded fingerprint evidence. The government also demonstrated that the police did not aсt with any intention to destroy evidence. In
Nationwide,
We agrеe with the district court: “the most that has been shown is that the policemen did not maintain and control the evidence in a manner consistent with good policе tactics. But there was no bad faith involved.” Because the fingerprints were not likely to be lifted from the evidence notwithstanding the officers’ actions, and because their actions were not in bad faith, the motion for a jury instruction on spoliation was properly denied.
Ill
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.